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ABSTRACT 
The Fabianization of the British Empire:  Postwar Colonial Summer Conferences and 
Community Development in Kenya and Uganda, 1948-1956 
 
Joseph M. Snyder 
 
This dissertation examines the influence of the Fabian Society on Britain’s postwar 
colonial development regime between 1948 and 1956.  This study demonstrates that a primary 
vehicle for the “Fabianization” of the British Empire was the Cambridge Summer Conference 
series, particularly the conference convened in 1948.  Held on the “Encouragement of Initiative 
in African Society,” the conference devised a policy framework of community development 
based on a model of mass education long-favored by Arthur Creech Jones, former chair of the 
Fabian Colonial Bureau (FCB) and then Secretary of State for the Colonies.  
While the findings of this study attest that Fabian influence (“Fabianization”) during this 
period produced tangible development projects that concretely impacted social welfare in the 
colonies, the results suggest an ambiguity surrounding the relative success of “Fabianized” 
development.  The findings indicate that “Fabianization,” dependent upon the processes of 
negotiation which transpired between the African communities being “developed” and the agents 
responsible for change, and the ability of those agents to inspire and motivate the indigenous 
populations, was at best partial, even in ideal circumstances.  
This study demonstrates that, despite Creech Jones’ appointment to the Cabinet as 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, severe challenges remained for the realization of Fabian-
favored designs.  The most intransigent of these hindrances included the sterling crisis of 1947 
and that posed by inertia and resistance in the territories, which emanated from both colonial 
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This dissertation is concerned with the influence exercised by the Fabian Society (a 
dynamic referred to in this study as “Fabianization”) on Great Britain’s colonial development 
policy following the Second World War, and with the character and nature of that influence.  It 
examines the evolution of Fabian perspectives on colonial policy beginning in the early twentieth 
century, when the Society was forced by circumstance to adopt a position on the empire, through 
the formulation and articulation of a Fabian vision of social-imperialism and trusteeship that 
rejected the dominant Chamberlainite doctrine of imperial trusteeship.1  It then explores how this 
was related to contemporary Labour Party policy and how the Fabian vision came to fruition 
following the ascendance of the Fabian luminary Arthur Creech Jones as Secretary of State for 
the Colonies in 1947.  The aim is to provide a more nuanced understanding of Fabian influence 
not only in the shaping of Britain’s colonial development policy, but most importantly in its 
practice.  
I make the following claims in this dissertation:  First, the role of the Fabians in forging 
postwar colonial development policy was neither straightforward nor predetermined.  Despite the 
popular notion, as expressed by Nicholas Owen,2 that they had an unprecedented opportunity to 
do so, it is quite clear that the Fabians’ ability to influence policy was limited.  Most 
immediately, the exigencies of postwar economic retrenchment obliged by the sterling crisis of 
1947 had the effect of rationalizing much colonial development in terms of offsetting looming 
fiscal emergency.3  As a result, the types of social development projects long-favored by the 
                                                          
1 That is, the variant of imperial trusteeship formulated by Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, 1895-1903. 
2 Nicholas Owen, “Critics of Empire in Britain,” in The Oxford History of the British Empire:  
The Twentieth Century, ed. J. M. Brown and Wm. Roger Lewis (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1999).   
3 The Second World War devastated Britain’s economy.  In the period between 1938 and 1945, 
for instance, Britain’s external debt skyrocketed from £500 million to £3.355 billion while, during the 
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Fabians were marginalized as peripheral to more pressing development concerns.  Moreover, 
constitutional restraints embedded within the structure of colonial administration itself 
circumscribed Creech Jones’ already-narrow field of action.  As the secretary himself 
acknowledged in 1950, he could not govern the territories by fiat; rather, he had to devise 
strategies that encouraged territorial participation.  Forced into an unenviable position as 
negotiator-in-chief, Creech Jones’ circumstances were made all the more intractable by the fact 
that many political appointees in the colonies were conservatives who, as David Goldsworthy 
has observed, had a stake in resisting his reformist agenda.  Gradually, but inevitably, this 
resistance had a cumulative suppressive effect on many of the Fabians’ designs.   
My second claim is that, despite these constraints, the Fabians managed to exercise some 
positive influence on Britain’s postwar colonial development enterprise, both in terms of policy 
formulation and practice.  In keeping with Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton,4 I hold that 
evidence of this influence has been obscured by a historiographic tendency to emphasize the 
failure of such large-scale mechanized development projects as the East African Groundnuts and 
West African Poultry Schemes.  Costly at a time when it could ill-be-afforded (and, therefore, 
                                                          
same period, the value of its reserves of gold and dollars was nearly halved, falling from £864 million in 
1938 to about £453 million by October 1945.  By the end of the war, Britain was nearly bankrupt.  See:  
C. S. S. Newton, “The Sterling Crisis of 1947 and the British Response to the Marshall Plan,” The 
Economic History Review (New Series) 37, no. 3 (August 1984): 391-408; Rohland Schuknecht, British 
Colonial Development Policy after the Second World War (New Brunswick:  Transaction Publishers, 
2010), 193-283;  Allister Hinds, Britain’s Sterling Colonial Policy and Decolonization, 1939-1958 
(Westport:  Greenwood Press, 2001), 37-68; Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton, Doctrines of 
Development (London:  Routledge, 1996), 254-294; Billy Frank, “Labour’s ‘New Imperialist Attitude’:  
State-Sponsored Colonial Development in Africa, 1940-51,” in The British Labour Movement and 
Imperialism, eds. Billy Frank, Craig Horner and David Stewart (Newcastle-upon-Tyne:  Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing, 2010), 107-129; Alex Sutton, The Political Economy of Imperial Relations:  Britain, 
the Sterling Area, and Malaya, 1945-1960 (New York:  Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), 55-93; Clive 
Whitehead, “The Impact of the Second World War on Education in Britain’s Colonial Empire,” in 
Education and the Second World War:  Studies in Schooling and Social Change (New York:  Routledge, 
1992), 151-158.    
4 Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton, “The Origin and Course of Fabian Colonialism in Africa,” 
Journal of Historical Sociology 4, no. 2 (June 1991).   
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high-profile) and initiated by a Labor regime whose Colonial Office (CO) was under the 
headship of a Fabian, the collapse of these projects fitted well with the contemporary 
conservative narrative that, pace Newman, worked toward the delegitimization of postwar state-
planning, particularly considering then-nascent geopolitical and ideological reconfigurations 
between Russia and the West.   
Third, to move beyond this obscurantist tendency and locate evidence of the substantive, 
tangible effects of Fabian-influenced colonial development initiatives following the war, I argue 
that it is first necessary to examine the work of the CO’s postwar Summer Conference series on 
African Administration.  In doing so, I borrow from and extend a premise of John Holford’s 
study on postwar colonial education, in which he argues that the series was initiated by Creech 
Jones to “help win the colonial service” to his policies.5  Unlike Holford’s survey, however, I 
take as my point of departure the conference of 1948, the focus of which was the Encouragement 
of Initiative in African Society.  The decision to focus on the 1948 conference stems from the 
rhetorical and ideological genealogy of the community development policies formulated by the 
conference, which were derived from the prewar work of the CO’s Advisory Committee on 
Education in the Colonies (ACEC), the efforts of which culminated in the 1944 report Mass 
Education in African Society.  The chief architect of the report was Creech Jones, who, by 1948, 
had garnered a reputation both at home and in the colonies as an ardent devotee of mass 
education.  I therefore hold that, in terms of a springboard for “Fabianized” colonial development 
policy, the 1948 summer conference is best positioned for its realization.     
                                                          
5 John Holford, “Mass Education and Community Development in the British Colonies, 1940-
1960:  A Study in the Politics of Community Education,” International Journal of Lifelong Education 7, 
no 3 (1988), 167.   
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Linking colonial policy formulations and initiatives with Fabian influence leads to my 
fourth and final claim, wherein I argue that examining how the policies formulated at the 1948 
summer conference were carried forward to practical effect in the colonies uncovers the depth 
and character of “Fabianization.”  In doing so, I bring together the second and third claims made 
in this dissertation and extend them.  For tracing mass education (framed alternatively as 
community development at the conference) through to its practical conclusion reveals that, as 
noted by C. L. Riley, Fabian influence on colonial development policy was “quietly effective.”6  
To achieve this, I follow the efforts of two conference attendees who not only played vital roles 
in the deliberations at Cambridge, but subsequently devised strategies to implement the 
initiatives in the colonies themselves:  P. E. W. Williams, Commissioner of Social Welfare in 
Kenya and chairman of the group responsible for defining community development at the 1948 
Cambridge conference, and Andrew B. Cohen, conference chairman and later governor of 
Uganda Protectorate.  The result is to complicate the preponderant image of large-scale 
development failure which dominates the historiography.   
 
Dissertation Method 
This study is explicitly interested in understanding the nature of Fabianized colonial 
development policy and practice.  The primary method adopted is documentary research, 
particularly CO archival materials, those of the Labor Party, and those of the Fabian Society and 
its Colonial Bureau.  Documentary research for this dissertation was carried out in the British 
National Archives, Kew; the Weston Library, Oxford University; the Fabian Society Archives, 
London School of Economics; the Labor Party Archive, People’s History Museum, Manchester, 
                                                          
6 Charlotte Lydia Riley, “Monstrous Predatory Vampires and Beneficent Fairy-Godmothers:  
British Post-War Colonial Development in Africa” (PhD diss., University College London, 2013), 30.   
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England; the Institute of Education, University College London; and the microfilm collection of 
the Kenya National Archives, Bird Library, Syracuse University, New York.    
Consultation of these records provided the necessary perspective on the relationship 
between the Fabians, their policies, and policy-formulating machinery; the British Labor Party 
and its colonial policy initiatives; and the “official mind” of the British state and its colonial 
governments in Africa in the period immediately before, during, and after the Second World 
War.  The range of primary documents collected from the archives and used in this dissertation 
includes:  correspondences between members of the Fabian Society and various local, national, 
and colonial government bureaucrats, functionaries, and elected officials; government 
memoranda and interdepartmental correspondences; field reports from Community Development 
Officers and Social Welfare Workers; departmental annual reports; conference minutes; and 
other written materials.  The range of secondary documents collected from the archives and used 
in this dissertation includes:  published accounts in newspapers and periodicals; and other written 
materials.     
Though these documentary research methods provide the necessary details on the 
relationship between the Fabians, the Labor Party, the CO, and colonial governments, and 
colonial policy formulation and implementation, it accounts only for the British perspective.  The 
views shared in this material are oftentimes prejudicial, being framed by the paternalistic 
discourse typical of colonial powers even when propounding such antithetical notions as self-
government and independence.  An effort has been made to recover the African perspective on 
British development efforts, but the material necessary to do so was unavailable at the time 
principal research was conducted.  For example, it is possible that the Local Native Council of 
Machakos District, the site of the Machakos Betterment Scheme in Kenya, deliberated aspects of 
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the scheme.  However, the minutes of the council, if they exist, are not part of the Kenya 
National Archive collection housed at Bird Library, Syracuse University.  Moreover, Uganda 
local government archives, where material on local response and reaction to community 
development schemes resides, have experienced a precarious existence.  Until recently (2016), 
the Uganda National Archives had neither the space nor manpower to collect, catalog, and 
preserve the material from the country’s many provinces.  As a result, much historical paperwork 
has remained in the hands of local government authorities where, in several districts, archival 
material has been stored in conditions ill-suited for their preservation and use.   
The future study of this subject lies in the recovery and inclusion of this material.   
 
Significance of the Research 
Although Labor’s rise to power in 1945 stimulated a political and practical atmosphere in 
Britain that provided the Fabian Society with what Owen has referred to as an “unprecedented 
opportunity” to influence colonial policy, the historiography lacks a balanced, considered 
deconstruction of that role.  Moreover, and despite the existence of several trends in the 
literature, it is evident that there is no consensus as to the depth or character of Fabian influence.  
While I hold no pretentions toward consensus-building, this dissertation represents an attempt to 
salvage (in part) the complexity and scope of Fabian influence on Britain’s postwar colonial 
development policies.  To do so, this dissertation takes as its point of departure the notion of a 
“Fabianized” British Empire, parsing the framework of Fabian influence by examining the 
community development-based policy formulations articulated at the CO’s 1948 Summer 
Conference on African Administration and their subsequent implementation in Africa.   
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This dissertation also challenges the historiographic tendency to ascribe colonial 
development failures under the Labor regime to the Fabians, a trend that has produced a largely 
negative scholarship dominated by conservative opinion generally hostile toward socialist-
inspired state planning—this, despite evidence that Fabian-influenced development in the 
colonies was also, to borrow from C. L. Riley, “quietly effective.”  Furthermore, the propensity 
of scholars such as Susan Cooper, T. E. B. Howarth, and Paul Kelemen to emphasize the failure 
of large-scale development projects in both East and West Africa (the groundnuts scheme in 
Tanganyika and the poultry scheme in The Gambia, respectively) has obscured the real and 
tangible Fabian-influenced development projects that impacted social welfare practices in the 
colonies.   
So considered, the findings of this dissertation carry forward the work of such scholars as 
Riley and I. C. Jackson,7 providing a necessary nuanced counterweight to a biased historiography 
inclined to emphasize postwar colonial development’s large-scale failures.  The cacophonous 
criticism that has subsequently redounded from this narrative has managed to either marginalize 
or drown out entirely evidence of the success of postwar state planning as directed by a Labor 
regime whose CO was, at the time, under the guidance of a leading Fabian (if not the leading 
Fabian).  To an extraordinary degree, this has to do with the very nature of those successes, 
which tend, in the last, to be unexceptional, inconspicuous, and ordinary.  The effect has been to 
perpetuate a theme of the basic unsoundness of socialism and state planning as, of course, 
embodied by the Fabians.   
Further, the findings provide insight into several opaque aspects of postwar colonial 
development, including:  the evolution of Fabian Social Trusteeship, from its origins at the turn 
                                                          
7 Riley, “Monstrous Predatory Vampires;” I. C. Jackson, Advance in Africa:  A Study in 
Community Development in Eastern Nigeria (London:  Oxford University Press, 1956).   
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of the twentieth century to its postwar culmination in what the Fabians called the “Social 
Foundation of Trusteeship;” the dynamic negotiation that unfolded between the FCB, the CO, 
and the colonial governments before and after the Second World War, complicating the notion 
that the success of Fabian-favored colonial development initiatives was irretrievably associated 
with the majority-status of Labor; and the persistence of institutional restraints on 
“Fabianization” despite the long-standing relationship between the Fabians, the Secretary of 
State, and the Labor Party, indicating that the success or failure of any given initiative was 
almost always critically dependent on buy-in on the part of the territorial governments.   
 
“Fabianization” 
The “Fabianising [sic] of the British Empire,” in the esoteric parlance favored by the 
contemporary Leftist press, first appeared in 1947 to herald the appointment of Arthur Creech 
Jones to the Labor cabinet as Secretary of State for the Colonies.  It is noteworthy that for the 
socialist literati, it was Creech Jones’ apotheosis that signaled the onset of “Fabianization” rather 
than Labor’s 1945 electoral victory and the subsequent inundation of Westminster by MPs, 
secretaries of state, under-secretaries of state, private secretaries, and even a premier who 
identified on some level as “Fabian.”  The distinction is not insignificant.  Before 1947, it 
implies, the Fabian agenda in matters imperial was inhibited; after 1947, Fabian influence in the 
framing of colonial affairs and the implementation of colonial policy was unfettered.   
Before we can arrive at an understanding of how Fabianization was to be achieved 
through the vehicle of the 1948 Summer Conference on African Administration, we must first 
come to terms with how it is connected with the notion of Fabian influence.  We are not here 
concerned with “influence” of the textbook variety—such as the conversion of a decision-maker 
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by some other individual, or by a group, to a point of view which the decision-maker had not 
previously held.  That the evidence for “influence” is purely circumstantial precludes any such 
proposition.  Rather, this dissertation elaborates a dynamic identified by Goldsworthy:  a 
relationship in which the views of certain prominent Fabians and the decision-maker were 
already so close that what went on was chiefly a matter of reminders, memoranda, or of 
suggesting details to fill out mutually-accepted plans.8   
Creech Jones explained this very dynamic in a letter to Dr. Rita Hinden, who, at the time, 
had solicited his feedback on a manuscript of the Fabian Colonial Bureau’s pamphlet Socialists 
and the Empire.  “The Bureau,” he explained in his critique of the manuscript (which he also 
faulted for being “lame” and “uninspired”), “offered to the Party constructive ideas which when 
the war was over needed to be implemented.  It also strengthened certain tendencies in colonial 
policy which compelled action during the war years, thus by the time the war was over social and 
economic programmes were being launched, political development was proceeding, and many 
postwar problems were being surveyed.”9  Thus, such ideas as were expressed by the Fabians 
vis-à-vis affairs colonial were already part of the contemporary ideological firmament.  They 
lacked only sufficient impetus, due in large part to circumstance.  And after spending five years 
as chairman of the FCB, the organ chiefly responsible for researching and formulating colonial 
policy recommendations on behalf of the Labor Party, Creech Jones was certainly in a position to 
know.   
                                                          
8 David Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues in British Politics, 1945-1961:  From “Colonial 
Development” to “Wind of Change” (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1971), 130-131.    
9Arthur Creech Jones to Dr. Rita Hinden, April 24, 1946, Bodleian Libraries, University of 




There continued to be a stream of “constructive ideas” from the Bureau on how current 
issues might be dealt with even after Creech Jones took up his position at Whitehall.10  As 
Goldsworthy notes, the relationship between the secretary and the Bureau existed largely on the 
level of “close personal friendship, finding expression in Creech Jones’ private, rather than his 
official, correspondence, and in his frequent confidential discussions,” particularly with Dr. 
Hinden, the secretary of the FCB, on both day-to-day and long-range problems.11   
The following excerpts from correspondences between the Secretary of State and Dr. 
Hinden prove illustrative of both aspects of Goldsworthy’s point.  In March of 1947, Dr. Hinden 
wrote to Creech Jones, noting that: 
On 21st October, 1946, I addressed to you on behalf of my Committee a letter putting 
forward certain proposals for action designed to win the confidence of the colonial 
peoples and to encourage a less suspicious attitude than that which now prevails in some 
of the colonial territories.  You will remember that we proposed the holding of a colonial 
conference in London which would give the opportunity of making certain 
pronouncements regarding economic planning and race discrimination, and for 
enunciating the outlines of this Government’s colonial policy.  We also raised inter alia 
the question of the appointment of governors. 
 
You replied to us on 24th October, 1946, that our proposals were receiving your 
consideration and you would communicate with us in greater detail at some later date.12 
 
Creech Jones replied to Dr. Hinden’s query on April 16, 1947, explaining:  
I have studied your suggestions with great interest and find that several of them are 
matters which I have had in mind for some time past and with which I am hoping to make 
progress this year. …  I need hardly say how greatly I am fortified by your interest in the 
framing of colonial policy.13 
 
This postscript appears in Creech Jones’ hand at the bottom of the typewritten letter:  
Perhaps I had better meet the Committee sometime to talk about some of these things.14   
                                                          
10 Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues in British Politics, 134. 
11 Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues in British Politics, 135.   
12 Rita Hinden to Arthur Creech Jones, March 1947, BLUO, MSS. Brit. Emp. s. 365, FCB 25/2.   





This collaborative penchant framed the relationship between the Bureau and the 
Secretary of State throughout his tenure.  When coupled with the Fabians’ long-standing 
association with the Labor Party, which by 1947 had witnessed the inclusion of several 
prominent Fabians on Party advisory committees, this bond has done much to fuel a tendency 
among scholars to amalgamate and conflate Labor’s colonial policy with that of the Fabians.  
Indeed, it is precisely this dynamic that led K. O. Morgan to observe in Labour in Power that the 
CO was “In many ways…the Fabian Colonial Research Bureau writ large.”15 
While Morgan’s perspective is to a considerable extent justifiable, for our purposes it 
tends toward abstruseness; for the relationship between the Party, the Bureau, and their former 
chairman was nowhere near as straightforward as it implies.  Nor even, as Goldsworthy has 
noted, was it at all times understood to everyone’s satisfaction.  To begin with, Fabian efforts 
were often frustrated despite their long-standing association with Creech Jones.  Indeed, when, 
on several occasions the Bureau expressed views that differed from those of Creech Jones, it 
found itself “pressing against official resistance,” particularly when it drew attention to aspects 
of policy that compromised the Party’s principles as articulated by the minister himself.16  When, 
on other occasions, the Bureau received written responses from the CO it deemed unsatisfactory, 
it requested informal meetings with officials at Whitehall—which were only sometimes granted.   
A further constraint on Fabian influence lay in the colonies themselves.  By virtue of 
constitutional convention, colonial governors could only be encouraged to vouchsafe initiatives 
promulgated by the CO.  They could not be compelled, as Creech Jones himself conceded in the 
                                                          
15 K. O. Morgan, Labour in Power, 1945-1951 (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1984), 205-
206. 
16 Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues in British Politics, 140.   
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1950 Fabian pamphlet The Way Forward: “you cannot in Whitehall dictate the changes you want 
in the Colonies.”17  Successful implementation of initiatives which emanated from the ministry 
depended therefore on constant cooperation and, to borrow from Monica M. Van Beusekom, 
negotiation between the CO and the in-situ regimes.18  For the Fabians and their like-minded ilk, 
this reality was made especially thorny during the postwar period; for although government 
witnessed the arrival of a Labor majority at Westminster in 1945, this ideological sea-change 
was not mirrored by a similar alteration of colonial circumstance.  Indeed, the colonies remained 
largely in the hands of what Creech Jones referred to as “unimaginative reactionaries”:19  
conservative appointees whose interests were served by resisting the Secretary’s policies.20   
The picture that develops of the relationship between the Fabians, Creech Jones, the CO, 
Labor, and the territorial governments is, therefore, a complicated one, belying the simplistic 
notion of a Fabian-dominated CO whose minister acted as little more than the Bureau’s cipher.  
Indeed, it is quite clear that, regardless of their aspirations following Creech Jones’ appointment, 
the Fabians could take nothing for granted.  
 
Sources 
My work is based to a considerable extent on the following source material:  British 
government records, most especially those produced by the CO, held at the British National 
Archives, Kew (NA).  This includes archived papers concerning the Colony and Protectorate of 
Kenya and the Protectorate of Uganda.  In addition, I used Hansard to examine British 
                                                          
17“Labour’s Achievements in the Colonies,” in The Way Forward (London:  Fabian Publications 
Ltd., 1950): 16, BLUO, MSS. Brit. Emp. s. 365, FCB 33.       
18 Monica M. Van Beusekom, Negotiating Development:  African Farmers and Colonial Experts 
at the Office du Niger, 1920-1960 (Portsmouth:  Heinemann Publishing, 2001).   
19 “Labour’s Achievements in the Colonies,” 16, BLUO, MSS. Brit. Emp. s. 365, FCB 33.     
20 See, for example, Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues in British Politics, 50-51.   
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Parliamentary debates on colonial policy; this material is available online via the UK 
Parliamentary Service.  I visited the collections of the Weston Library, Oxford, where I explored 
the papers of Arthur Creech Jones (ACJ), the Fabian Colonial Bureau (FCB), Patrick Williams 
(PEW) and Thomas G. Askwith (TGA).  This material not only helped me to develop an 
understanding of the relationship between the CO and the FCB, but also between the Bureau and 
the Parliamentary Labor Party (PLP) and Labor’s National Executive Committee (NEC).  The 
papers of Williams and Askwith provided essential detailed clarity on the connection between 
the 1948 Summer Conference and Kenya’s postwar community development regime.  For 
information on the origins and perspectives of the prewar Fabian Society, I used extensively the 
digital holdings of the Fabian Society Archives (FSA) made available online by the London 
School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).  This includes the diary of Beatrice Webb 
(nee Potter) and the Minutes of the Fabian Society.  I also used the archives of the British Labor 
Party, which reside at the People’s History Museum and Study Center, Manchester; this 
collection includes the archived papers of the NEC and the PLP.  I explored the collections 
housed at University College London (UCL); I was able to access the archival holdings of the 
Institute of Education’s (IOE) Department of Education in Tropical Areas, which included the 
Annual Reports of Uganda Protectorate’s Department of Community Development.   
 
Summary Review of Relevant Scholarship   
This dissertation fits between several historical fields; in addition to British imperial 
history, modern African history, and the associated field of colonial development scholarship, it 
also shares space with the following historiographies:  the history of the Fabian Society, the 
British Labor Party, and British Socialism.   
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Development is amorphous, prompting David Simon to conclude that it “defies definition.”21  
This resistance has led other scholars to broadly frame development as an outcome-driven, purposefully-
directed process,22 one which rests somewhere between development as “means” and development as 
“goal.”  Complicating matters is the fact that “development” is freighted with controversy.   
Applied incautiously, “development” suggests a “hierarchy of nations and communities” in which 
those at a more advanced stage are duty-bound to “modernize” those that are less advanced.23  This 
Whiggish view of progress imposed on the history of economics, international relations, and social 
change is captured in W. W. Rostow’s The Stages of Economic Growth.  In Rostow’s postwar view, the 
modern Free West constitutes the apex of development.  Nations and communities expressing a stage of 
lesser development relative to this model ought to aspire to it, with the goal of achieving social evolution, 
optimistic economic growth, and (of course) modernization through state direction.24  This is 
Modernization Theory, and it is the closest scholars get to an “orthodox” view of development.  It is also 
the subject of much criticism and the point of origin for myriad development heterodoxies.   
Bjorn Hettne, for example, takes to task Modernization Theory and addresses both the fluidity 
and controversy of development.  He argues that a “critical approach” to development is necessary not 
only because the term itself is contested, but also because much of development practice is “rooted in 
colonialism” and therefore contains “a good measure of paternalism, not to speak of arrogance and 
racism.”25  Further, Hettne condemns orthodox development theory as the “intellectual origin” of 
“underdevelopment” and proposes instead “another development,” one which would “transcend the 
                                                          
21 David Simon, “Development Reconsidered:  New Directions in Development Thinking,” 
Geografiska Annaler.  Series B, Human Geography 79, no. 4 (1997), 183-184. 
22 Emphasis mine.   
23 Riley, “Monstrous Predatory Vampires,” 14.   
24 W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth:  A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1960), 1-13.   
25 Bjorn Hettne, Thinking About Development:  Development Matters (London:  Zed Books, 
2009), 1-2.   
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European model” and “create a new kind of development thinking.”26  This model would be “egalitarian,” 
“self-reliant,” “eco-,“ and “ethnodevelopmental.”   
This “alternative development” theory argues against the Eurocentric view of development as a 
top-down, externally-imposed process.27  Instead, it sees progress as part of what the International 
Foundation for Development Alternatives (IFDA) has called a “third system.”28  This “third system” is 
the segment of the population that has reached a kind of “critical consciousness,” a new awareness of 
their role in society characterized by the view that the essence of history is an endless struggle in which 
people try to master their own destiny.  In this “humanist,” quasi-Marxist paradigm, agency rests not in 
the hands of state bureaucrats, but rather it is manifested locally, at the community level.29  So conceived, 
the process of alternative development is mapped thusly:  first, development is an endogenous process;  
that is, it stems “from the heart of each society, which defines in sovereignty its values and the vision of 
its future;”  second, it is “self-reliant,” meaning each society relies primarily on its own “strength and 
resources in terms of its members’ energies and its natural and cultural environment;”  third, it is 
ecologically sound;  lastly, it is based on structural transformation, which is necessary for realizing the 
“conditions of self-management and participation in decision-making.”  As such, alternative development 
is development from the bottom-up:  it is divorced from external, state pressure and has as its goal the 
restoration of initiative to a nation’s disempowered sectors – which happens also to be most of the 
                                                          
26 Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton, “The Invention of Development,” in Power of 
Development, ed. Jonathan Crush (London:  Routledge, 1995), 41-42. 
27 For more on “alternative development,” see:  Arturo Escobar, “Power and Visibility:  
Development and the Invention and Management of the Third World,” Cultural Anthropology 3, no. 4 
(Nov. 1988):  428-443; by the same author, “Imagining a Post-Development Era?  Critical Thought, 
Development, and Social Movements,” Social Text 31, no. 32 (1992):  20-56; Richard Norgaard, 
Development Betrayed:  The End of Progress and a Coevolutionary Revisioning of the Future (New 
York:  Routledge, 1994).   
28 Jody Jensen and Ferenc Miszlivetz, “Global Civil Society:  From Dissident Discourse to World 
Bank Parlance,” in The Language of Civil Society, edited by Peter Wagner (New York:  Berghahn Books, 
2006), 177-178.  
29 John Friedmann, Empowerment:  The Politics of Alternative Development (Malden:  Blackwell 
Publishers, 1992), 3. 
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population.  Furthermore, unlike Modernization Theory, alternative development proposes no silver 
bullet, no “universal path” that, if followed, makes a nation or community “developed.”30   
As this dissertation will show, the Fabianized model of colonial development rests somewhere 
between Rostow’s Modernization Theory and the “alternative development” approaches discussed above.  
This juxtaposition was on marked display at the CO’s 1948 Summer Conference on African 
Administration, which produced the following definition of mass education/community development: 
We understand the term “mass education” to mean a movement designed to promote 
better living for the whole community, with the active participation and, if possible, on 
the initiative of the community; but if this initiative is not forthcoming spontaneously, it 
should be aroused and stimulated by special techniques designed to secure the active and 
enthusiastic response of the community.  Mass education embraces all forms of 
betterment.  It includes the whole range of community development activities in the 
districts, whether these are undertaken by Government or unofficial bodies; in the field of 
agriculture by securing the adoption of better methods of soil conservation, better 
methods of farming and care of livestock, in the field of health by promoting better 
sanitation and water supplies, proper measures of hygiene and infant and maternity 
welfare; and in the field of education by spreading literacy and adult education as well as 
by the extension and improvement of schools for children.  Mass education must make 
use of the cooperative movement and must be put into effect in the closest association 
with local government bodies.31   
 
While this definition accepts the possibility of endogenous (“bottom up”) community 
development (i.e. “better living…on the initiative of the community”), it is couched in the 
paternalistic language of midcentury Eurocentric development discourse.  Failing local-level, 
“spontaneous” initiative, it is to be “aroused” by Europeans (“top-down”) who, through the 
agency of Mass Education/Community Development Officers, demonstration teams, and 
centralized training centers, can “stimulate” indigenous initiative and thus achieve “progress.”  
Significantly, progress as envisioned here is facilitated by the very same institutions that were 
                                                          
30 Bjorn Hettne, Development Theory and the Three Worlds (Essex:  Longman House, 1990), 
153-154.  
31 Colonial Office Summer Conference on African Administration, Second Session, August 19-
September 2, 1948, King’s College, Cambridge:  The Encouragement of Initiative in African Society, 101, 
BLUO 600.17 r. 147 (2).  
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critical to the development of self-government in England in the nineteenth century:  
cooperatives and local government bodies.   
This dissertation is not concerned with defining colonial development; rather, it 
acknowledges and adopts the term “colonial development” as it is broadly accepted and 
understood in the prevailing contemporary historiography.32  For our purposes, “colonial 
development” is understood to describe a process or series of processes which are meant to 
either:  a) result in the more efficient exploitation of the economic assets of a colony; b) provide 
for the social betterment of colonial subjects (through, for example, local-level initiatives 
concerned with the improvement of health, education, and welfare as imposed by the imperial 
power); or c) a development regime which combines aspects of both (in whole or in part).  This 
definition shares space with the work of Riley and Michael Jennings, both of whom 
acknowledge that “it is not always possible to isolate instances of ‘economic’ development from 
those of ‘social’ development.”33   
At the nexus of these considerations lies the Fabian Society, its Colonial Bureau, the 
British Labor Party, and the so-called colonial development offensive of the immediate postwar 
period.  Historically, scholarly output concerned even tangentially with the subject of Fabian 
influence on postwar colonial development policy has tended to be reflexive, dismissing Fabian 
                                                          
32 See:  Robert Chambers, Settlement Schemes in Tropical Africa:  A Study of Organizations and 
Development (London:  Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969); Peter W. Preston, Development Theory:  An 
Introduction (Oxford:  Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1997); Wolfgang Sachs, The Development Dictionary:  
A Guide to Knowledge and Power (London:  Zed Books Ltd, 1992); Michael Watts, “‘A New Deal in 
Emotions’:  Theory and practice and the crisis of development,” in Power of Development, ed. Jonathan 
Crush (London:  Routledge, 1995); Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard, eds., International 
Development and the Social Sciences:  Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge (Berkeley:  
University of California Press, 1997).   
33 Riley, “Monstrous Predatory Vampires,” 15; Michael Jennings, “‘A Very Real War’:  Popular 
Participation in Development in Tanzania During the 1950s and 1960s,” International Journal of African 
Historical Studies 40, no. 1 (2007):  71-95.   
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influence as part of a vague but growing disillusionment with Labor’s state-directed colonial 
development regime, the administration of which lay to a considerable extent in the hands of 
Creech Jones in his capacity as the Secretary of State for the Colonies.   
Privileged by opponents of Labor’s ambitious postwar “colonial development offensive,” 
the central conceit of this critique, as Cowen and Shenton have noted, is to invoke the costly 
failures of the East African Groundnut Scheme and the Gambia Egg Scheme as the “ultimate 
exemplars” of the sheer folly of the program of postwar development.  The attendant orgy of 
excess and cynicism, meticulously and dutifully documented by Labor’s own bureaucrats and 
condemned by Conservatives who bemoaned Labor’s socialism (often, as Murphy has noted, 
after the fact34), is meant to bring to an end the debate surrounding Labor’s development regime 
and, by extension, the soundness of “Fabianized” state planning.  As Susan Cooper has written:  
“[Labor] had already made a mistake with the groundnut scheme in East Africa: no good done 
for morale there.  Instead they turned to food, to schemes for relieving shortage….  In doing so, 
they accidentally touched a spring of absurdity revealing perhaps more than anything else the 
strength which had resisted the series of catastrophes that had gone before.”35   
With little variation, such criticism has been oft-repeated over the past sixty-odd years, 
producing a scholarship shot-through with a contrarian perspective.  Indeed, decades after 
Cooper’s verdict, T. E. B. Howarth wielded the very same stick with which to beat the postwar 
planners.  “Even the most paralytic Parliamentary opposition,” he wrote, “could scarcely have 
failed to make some capital out of mistakes of this magnitude, and the Conservatives were now 
                                                          
34 Philip Murphy, Party Politics and Decolonization:  The Conservative Party and British 
Colonial Policy in Tropical Africa, 1951-1964 (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1999), 41. 
35 Susan Cooper, “Snoek Piquante,” in Age of Austerity, eds. M. Sissons and P. French (London: 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1963), 50.   
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beginning to recover a measure of their old confidence.”36  Meanwhile, Hugh Thomas observed, 
“The groundnut scheme, in retrospect, seems to have been an object lesson as to how not to run a 
public undertaking.”37  It was this propensity to which M. Newman referred when he wrote in 
John Strachey, his biography of the Fabian-influenced Minister of Food and shepherd of the 
groundnuts scheme:  “When [Strachey] died in 1963, many obituary writers were more interested 
in recalling groundnuts than in discussing his theoretical contributions to socialism.  
This…reflected the success of a contemporary right-wing campaign to exaggerate the affair once 
it became clear that it was an area on which the government was vulnerable.”38 
Despite the apologist minority, a largely ungenerous view persists in the historiography, 
and further examples are legion:  John Lonsdale’s “East Africa,” Anguibou Yan Yansane’s 
Development Strategies in Africa, Philip Murphy’s Party Politics and Decolonization, and 
Michael Havinden’s and David Meredith’s Colonialism and Development:  Britain and its 
Tropical Colonies, to name a few.39  It is arguable, however, that it is nowhere expressed more 
vividly and comprehensively than in Paul Kelemen’s article, “Planning for Africa:  The British 
Labour Party’s Colonial Development Policy, 1920-1964.”40  Kelemen not only takes to task 
earlier justifications for Labor’s postwar colonial interventionism—rejecting both the welfarist 
                                                          
36 T. E. B. Howarth, Prospect and Reality:  Great Britain, 1945-1955 (London:  Collins, 1985), 
138. 
37 Hugh Thomas, John Strachey (London:  Eyre, Methuen, 1973), 254.  
38 M. Newman, John Strachey (Manchester:  Manchester University Press, 1973), 116. 
39 See:  John Lonsdale, “East Africa” in The Oxford History of the British Empire:  The Twentieth 
Century, eds. Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1999), 540; 
Anguibou Yan Yansane, Development Strategies in Africa:  Current Economic, Socio-political, and 
Institutional Trends and Issues (Westport:  Greenwood Press, 1996), 75; Michael Havinden’s and David 
Meredith’s Colonialism and Development:  Britain and its Tropical Colonies, 1850-1960 (Abingdon:  
Routledge, 1993), 276. 
40 Paul Kelemen, “Planning for Africa: The British Labour Party’s Colonial Development Policy, 
1920-1964,” Journal of Agrarian Change 7, no. 1 (Jan. 2007): 76-98.   
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and sterling-imbalance arguments—but, like D. K. Fieldhouse before him,41 characterizes the 
“Fabianizing of the Empire” as “exploitative of the colonies,” arguing that it had more in 
common with Joseph Chamberlain’s colonial estates doctrine than with anything Sydney and 
Beatrice Webb had envisioned.42  More recently, a trend has emerged in the historiography in 
which the Fabians are accused of cloaking their erstwhile imperialism with a mantle of social 
betterment in order to perpetuate the very empire they ostensibly opposed.  This tendency has 
manifested assertions that the Fabians “stopped short” of calling for the independence of 
Britain’s colonies and that the FCB believed the future of the British Empire lay not in 
independence “as such,” but in a relationship “defined by looser bonds.”43  As propounded by 
Riley, the argument suggests that the Fabians were at best lukewarm toward the notion of 
colonial independence and sought, instead, the reform of the empire, not its dissolution.   
While to a point such perspectives are justifiable, particularly considering the sterling 
crisis of 1947 and the related work of the Overseas Food Corporation (OFC) and the Colonial 
Development Corporation (CDC), these trends have done little to advance the argument beyond 
the narrowly-construed, voguish anti-imperial sentiment and criticism that has marked the 
subject of postwar British imperialism in general, and Fabian-influenced colonial development in 
particular, since the 1950s.  For their part, Murphy, Lonsdale, Fieldhouse, and Havinden and 
Meredith have adopted virtually the same analytical framework based on the same set of 
assumptions:  first, a high correlation between Fabian-favored, welfarist initiatives and official 
                                                          
41 D. K. Fieldhouse, “The Labour Government and the Empire Commonwealth, 1945-51,” in The 
Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government, ed. R. Ovendale (Leicester:  Leicester University 
Press, 1984), 95. 
42 Kelemen, “Planning for Africa: The British Labour Party’s Colonial Development Policy, 
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43 Charlotte Riley, “‘The Winds of Change are Blowing Economically’:  The Labour Party and 
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colonial practice (as distinguished from policy).  Second, they privilege the phenomenon of 
large-scale, mechanized postwar development in the colonies necessitated by fiscal exigency 
which marginalizes (or outright ignores) the small-scale, community-level engagement projects 
designed to motivate native initiative and progress identified by Creech Jones as the fulcrum of a 
successful colonial development regime.  Meanwhile, Riley oversimplifies the Fabian position 
on colonial independence.  First, the looser bonds to which she refers are doubtless a reflection 
of the Fabians’ penchant for gradualness; that is, the belief that the development of colonial 
people’s democratic institutions—trade unions, cooperatives, local government, political 
associations, and so forth—was necessary if the “advance to freedom” was to be accompanied by 
what the Bureau saw as “social justice,” with its concomitant educational, economic, and civil 
equality.44  The logic for doing so, as will be demonstrated, was reference back to Britain’s own 
historical experience.  It was, after all, these institutions which were the basis of Britain’s own 
parliamentary democracy.  In effect, this was the Fabian touchstone for self-government, with 
the fatal flaw being that the ideological DNA which lay at the back of British parliamentary 
democracy was not necessarily compatible with conditions in colonial Africa.  However, to view 
the development regimes derived from these notions, with the intention of arriving at self-
government at some unfixed date, as red herrings across the path of immediate self-government 
is off the mark.45   
Further, I contend that the contemporary historiography has perpetuated an obscurantist 
view of postwar colonial development, the majority of which was designed not to usher forth a 
revolutionary change in the condition of Africans in great bursts of innovation made manifest by 
mechanized modernity (like the groundnuts scheme), but rather to unfold gradually at the local 
                                                          
44 Rita Hinden, Socialists and the Empire (London:  Fabian Publications Ltd., 1946), 19.   
45 Ibid., 20. 
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level as a means of stimulating the desire amongst Africans for their own progress.  This 
distinction, I argue, is not semantic pettifogging; rather, it lay at the heart of the colonial 
development enterprise as imagined by Arthur Creech Jones and, at least for Creech Jones and 
the FCB, was the axis on which ultimately its success or failure pivoted.  As Creech Jones 
himself reminded the governors of Britain’s African territories at the 1948 African Conference in 
London:  “It is for this reason that in recent colonial policy we have sought so strenuously to 
promote voluntary service and mutual aid, we have talked much about breaking through 
ignorance by community education, about extending mass education and literacy, and 
encouraging individual and community initiative.”46   
It is this same collaborative hinge (or lack thereof) that in 1950 Dr. Hinden identified as 
the prima ratio of colonial development in a letter to Robert Brady, author of Crisis in Britain.  
Dr. Hinden wrote that, in the “working out of the ten-year development plans, many Colonies 
have drawn in Committee after Committee of local people to advise them….  The point is made 
in every debate in Parliament; and in the individual ‘community-development’ plans in different 
parts of Africa consultation has gone down to the lowest levels.  It is mainly in the big 
Development Corporation schemes—such as groundnuts—that consultation has been entirely 
lacking….”47  Like Creech Jones, Dr. Hinden envisioned “true” colonial development as a 
cooperative effort defined by a bottom-up approach centered on African villages and 
communities, rather than the “big” development schemes whose implementation lay outside the 
purview of the CO.   
                                                          
46 African Conference, 1948, UK National Archives, Kew, Colonial Office Records [hereafter 
NA CO] 847/38/7.   
47 R. Brady, Crisis in Britain (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1950), 629. 
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This singular aspect of the postwar colonial development regime, characterized by 
modest, decidedly unsexy and inexpensive schemes (relative to such large-scale industrial 
projects as the production of eggs in West Africa) concerned to nurture indigenous progress at its 
most basic level, remains overlooked and chronically underserved by contemporary 
historiography.  It is in this regard that my work shares historiographic space with Riley, whose 
research on postwar colonial development in Africa likewise challenges the tendency of the 
scholarship to emphasize high-profile failures by arguing that, in a number of key areas, 
especially “health, education, and social welfare,” development was “quietly successful.”48 
Perhaps nowhere is the effort at “quietly successful” colonial development more apparent 
than in the efforts of the Fabian Colonial Bureau.  The members of the FCB observed a particular 
version of socialism which, very early in the development of the Fabian Society, came to be 
known as “Fabianism.”  Fabianism, to borrow from M. Margaret McCarran, is a socialist 
“mentality” exemplified by members of the Fabian Society either individually (as, for example, 
lecturers, politicians, or journalists) or as an “anonymous cohort” of devoted workers “for Social 
Democracy.”49  As such, it is endowed with a collectivist social theory and is distinguished by a 
belief in the evolutionary and peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism through non-
revolutionary “gradualism”:50 that is, the bringing about of socialism not through the direct 
action or violence promoted by orthodox Marxism, but rather through research and, ultimately, 
                                                          
48 Riley, “Monstrous Predatory Vampires,” 30.   
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the permeation and penetration of Britain’s political classes.  Fabianism, pace Terence Qualter, is 
the “gospel of state-socialism rather than anarchist-socialism.”51   
While inarguably accurate, this tidy definition is nonetheless disingenuous, for it 
bequeaths coherence to the amorphous ideological heritage which lay at the back of Fabianism, 
the wellsprings of which—like modern British socialism itself—lie deep in the history of 
Victorian society.52  Indeed, when considered philosophically, Fabianism—no less than its great 
contemporaries, liberalism and socialism—is manifestly an agglomeration of au courant 
“plebeian and middle-class radicalisms.”53  So considered, it is, contra-Ernest Barker,54 neither a 
“compact” nor “hermetically-sealed” package of traditions;55 instead, historians generally agree, 
Fabianism’s pedigree exhibits a mongrelized intellectual genealogy that has, at various times and 
to varying degrees, compassed, inter alia:  the (quantitative) utilitarianism of Bentham, the 
(qualitative) utilitarianism of J. S. Mill, the (ethical) positivism of Auguste Comte, the social 
reform of Robert Owen, the ethical socialism embodied by the work of such intellectuals as T. H. 
Green, the rent theories of David Ricardo (filtered through Stanley Jevon and Henry George to 
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suit England’s industrial context), the political reforms of the Chartists, and even the socialism of 
Marx.56   
It was these selfsame radicalisms which, throughout the nineteenth century, generated a 
near-constant source of pressure to not only reform parliament, but also address the problems 
created by commercial society and industrialization—especially poverty and large-scale 
unemployment, which were “not susceptible to political solutions as such,” but required “new 
schemes” of economic organization, such as collectivism.57  As H.C. G. Matthew and M. Taylor 
have quite rightly observed, it was owing to this climate of social and economic expectation that 
a series of “incremental” reform measures to redress such long-standing grievances as working-
class enfranchisement and labor organization took hold in Great Britain, producing by 
midcentury something like a “rapprochement” between the existing political order, reform-
minded liberals, and (the now-ageing) radicals.58  These conditions subdued, but did not 
altogether suppress, criticism of the political system as a whole.59  The reconciliation, such as it 
was, was short-lived; for in the 1880s, agricultural and industrial depression dovetailed with both 
the growing popularity of Marxian socialism on the Continent and the coalescence of what Jon 
Lawrence has described as a still-“vibrant radical subculture”60 in Great Britain to produce a 
                                                          
56 Busky, Democratic Socialism, 88; Mark Bevir, “Sidney Webb:  Utilitarianism, Positivism, and 
Social Democracy,” The Journal of Modern History 74, no. 2 (June 2003): 217-252.   
57 Claeys, “Political Thought,” 189.   
58 M. Taylor, “Radicalism and Patriotism, 1848-1859” (PhD diss., University of Cambridge, 
1989); H. C. G. Matthew, “Disraeli, Gladstone, and the Politics of Mid-Victorian Budgets,” Historical 
Journal 22, no. 3 (1979): 615-643.   
59 Evidence of the persistence of radicalism during this period is endemic.  See: Thomas Wright, 
“The Press and the People” in Our New Masters (London, 1873), 334-335 and 346; Aled Jones, 
“Workmen’s Advocates:  Ideology and Class in a Mid-Victorian Newspaper System” in The Victorian 
Periodical Press:  Soundings and Samplings, eds. J Shattock and M Wolff (Leicester:  Leicester 
University Press, 1982), 310 and 313.   
60 Jon Lawrence, “Popular Radicalism and the Socialist Revival in Britain,” Journal of British 
Studies 31, no. 2 (April 1992): 172.   
26 
 
“socialist revival.”61  It was against the backdrop of this late-Victorian recrudescence, set amidst 
riots of the unemployed and strikes by phossy-jawed matchgirls, militant dockworkers, and other 
unskilled laborers, that Fabianism was born.62   
An exercise in parsing Fabianism is an exercise equally in confirming Michael Freeden’s 
admonishment that “ideologies are modular structures, frequently exhibiting a highly fluid 
morphology.”63  And indeed, despite having been founded in 1884, the Fabian Society lacked a 
coherent program for some time.  In point of fact, although the Fabians later formally repudiated 
the “catastrophic insurrectionism” of the Marxian school,64 a number of earlier Fabian works—
those published before a distinctive “Fabian approach” had “jelled,” to borrow from Busky—
suggest something like a voguish (and lingering) flirtation with Marxism:  Fox and Gordon, for 
example, read Marxism in Facts for Londoners (1889) as well as Sidney Webb’s English 
Progress Towards Social Democracy (1890), while Sweezy labors extensively over evidence of 
Marxism in George Bernard Shaw’s chapter “Economic,” which appeared in the Fabian 
bestseller Essays in Socialism in 1889.65  But when, the following year, the Fabian Executive 
Committee published the Bernard Shaw-penned tract What Socialism Is, it disclaimed Marx’s 
rigidly deterministic class-based division of society.  According to G. Foote, the Fabians had 
come to believe that Marx was “fundamentally wrong” about the nature of profit and that the 
capitalists exploited the workers and adopted instead the alternative view that the “real” class 
struggle was between the “idle owners” and the “producers”—that is, those who did nothing to 
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earn their money and those who did all the work.66  The tract’s policy prescriptions did not end 
there; for it not only confirmed the Fabian pivot away from anarchism, the source of much 
debate and, thus, friction since 1886, in favor of state collectivism,67 but it likewise invoked 
worker enfranchisement (and with it, the spirit of Chartism) as a means of banishing the 
“propertied classes from the House of Commons.”68   
For all this, What Socialism Is reflects the larger pattern of ideological maturation 
underway among the infant society since 1887, the year the Fabians issued the programmatic 
tract The True Radical Programme.  A discursive riposte to The Official Liberal-Radical 
Programme, The True Radical Programme brought together a number of nineteenth-century 
radicalisms and, as A. M. McBriar notes, constituted them as the “sum and substance” of early 
Fabianism.69  “Amplified” and “modified” by subsequent tracts throughout the 1890s, most 
notably in the tract, The Workers’ Political Program, this foundational ideological schema called 
for, inter alia:  parliamentary and local government reform (echoing the Chartist movement’s 
calls for adult suffrage, annual parliaments, and payment for MPs); the “progressive” taxation of 
the unearned income or “economic rent” (i.e. profit) of the idle classes to be redistributed to the 
laboring and poorest members of society (a notion of “leveling down” drawn and adapted from a 
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variety of sources, including Ricardo, George, and Jevon-via-Wicksteed70); collectivism and 
state interference (as embodied by appeals for the municipalization of land to compete with 
private industry and the nationalization of such key industries as railways, elements which 
suggest the influence not only of Ricardo’s Theory of Rent, but also T. H. Green’s evolutionary 
approach to social development and the New Liberalism71); and the state-directed reform of 
workhouses and the provision of compulsory education (a notion of “leveling up” society drawn 
partly from Owenite social reform, with its effort to create a “new moral world,” and, once again, 
New Liberalism72).   
If, as McBriar posits, The True Radical Programme manifested the earliest programmatic 
Fabianism, it would have remained little more than an amalgam of reformist radicalisms had it 
not been for the prescriptive formulations of Sidney Webb.  For it was Webb73 who, according to 
Mark Bevir, believed that the peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism could be achieved 
only by working through England’s traditional democratic institutions, a framework of 
representational government he extended to include not only the institutions of local government, 
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but also trade unions and cooperatives.74  For Webb, democratic England, suitably reformed and 
(more) broadly enfranchised, would, in time, produce a political class receptive to the ideas of 
socialism.  The slow-moving “permeation” of this sympathetic group by “experts” (e.g. the 
Fabians) would result in democratic institutions that gradually acquired increasingly progressive 
accretions, such as a regulatory capacity over industry.  In this way, Webb believed, industry 
need not be commandeered; rather, it need only be administered by a minister of government or 
“specialist” whose role it was “to establish an integrated, cooperative, and thus efficient 
organization.”75  This same collectivist state would “enforce” social “duties” through taxation, a 
process which would, ultimately, yield public provisions for such things as education, museums, 
parks, and health services.76  Thus Webb, and, eventually, the Fabians, equated socialism with 
the efficient, cooperative, and coordinated organization of society achieved through state 
activity.  This reflected not only Webb’s peculiar form of utilitarianism—which produced a 
socialism “limited to practical efforts to modify the existing…order”77—but also his belief that 
the principle of natural selection, much on the Victorian public’s mind since Darwin’s Origin of 
Species, taught that more efficient societies thrived.78   
By the turn of the twentieth century, the Fabian Society had welded together various 
elements of then-current radicalisms and emplaced them as the struts and armatures of their own 
ideological framework, one calculated to realize the “dream of the Socialist on sound economic 
principles, by gradual, peaceful, and constitutional means.”79  In the broadest possible sense, 
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then, fin-de-siècle Fabianism sought not only to extend democracy and improve the machinery of 
democratic government, but to expand government powers in a way that yielded “positive 
government action” as a means of promoting social and economic equality.80  It was a vision of 
(J. S.) Millite utilitarianism and Comtean positivism in that it was designed, in the last, to secure 
“the greatest happiness of the greatest number” through state-directed activity.  The end result 
was a vision of social democracy that persisted, in one form or another, as the basis of Fabianism 
for the next half century.   
The principles embedded within Fabianism had considerable future implications, 
particularly when extended to the British Empire.  As we shall see, the society at first struggled 
to reconcile Fabianism with the domestic exigencies inspired by empire.  Formulated to address 
the specific domestic grievances that had arisen in late-Victorian England, Fabianism’s sphere of 
interest all but excluded imperial or colonial policy considerations.  The advent of the Second 
Wave of Industrialization, however, and the international economic competition it stimulated, 
especially from Germany, threatened the global economic dominance Britain had enjoyed since 
at least the end of the eighteenth century.  As a result, the domestic industrial context came 
increasingly to the fore of imperial policy considerations, both at the level of officialdom and 
within the Fabian Society itself.  At first, the Fabians responded by hewing closely to the pro-
imperial policy stance of Whitehall, as expressed in Joseph Chamberlain’s Imperial Estates 
Doctrine.  Progressively, however, the more conscientious members of the society recognized 
the exercise of this policy, or “social-imperialism” as it was known, as fundamentally 
exploitative of colonial subjects.  This realization prompted a considerable revision of official 
Fabian policy, one formulated initially by (Lord) Sydney Olivier in the tract Imperial Trusteeship 
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(1929).  This was the beginning of the gradual evolution of the Fabian Society’s colonial policy 
recommendations which incorporated, as Kelemen notes, a “social democratic model of 
development.”81  By 1950, the evolution of the Fabians’ social trusteeship, which framed 
indigenous African interests as paramount and emphasized community betterment in terms of 
health, education, and welfare, culminated in “The Social Foundation of Trusteeship,” a 
prescriptive framework intended to guide not only imperial governance, but colonial 
development as well.   
 
Outline of Chapters 
The first chapter considers the early development of the Fabian Society and concludes 
with the advent of the South African War.  While it examines the origins of the society, notably 
the place of the Fellowship of New Life in the Fabian heritage, especially close attention is paid 
to the early formulation of Fabianism and the ideological DNA which lay at its back.  In the 
second chapter, this dissertation explores the deepening affinity between the Labor Party, 
effectively born with the creation of the Labor Representation Committee in 1906, and the 
Fabian Society.  The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the processes and ideological 
proclivities which brought the Fabian Society and Labor together.  We witness, first, the depth 
and breadth of Fabian permeation insofar as it informed Labor’s official policy and, second, the 
maturation of the Society as it struggled through a period of intellectual stagnation and near-
extinction only to witness, in 1938-9, an ideological rebirth.  In chapter three, the evolution of 
Fabian perspectives on imperial trusteeship are explored, alongside a discussion of Fabian 
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influence of colonial development policy during the Second World War.  While Fabian efforts at 
permeating political elites of the Coalition Government manifested changes in both mass 
education and colonial cooperative policy before the end of the war, the “welfarist agenda” 
which lay at the heart of Arthur Creech Jones’ favored policy initiatives was seriously 
undermined by the sterling crisis of 1947.  The chapter elaborates the impact of this crisis, and 
the concomitant pivot toward large-scale mechanized agricultural production (in the form of the 
East Africa Groundnut Scheme and the West Africa Egg Scheme), while also exploring the 
establishment and work of the FCB between 1940 and 1945.  Chapter four explores the 
“Fabianization of the British Empire.”  It takes as its point of departure the vehicle arguably best-
positioned to achieve this, the 1948 Colonial Summer Conference on African Administration.  
The nucleus of this conference, the second of three convened while Arthur Creech Jones was 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, was mass education/community development.  As such, it 
connects Creech Jones’ earlier work with the CO’s Advisory Committee on Education in the 
Colonies (ACEC), and the report which resulted, Mass Education in African Society, with the 
postwar colonial development initiatives enacted while the Fabian and former chairman of the 
FCB was in a position to determine and guide official policy.  The conference is discussed at 
some length, fleshing out the connections between the organizers and leaders of the conference 
and the Fabian Society, along with the results of its deliberations.  These policy formulations—in 
effect, a reimagining of mass education as community development—are then examined as 
implemented in two of Britain’s East African colonies:  Kenya and Uganda.  Here, we witness 
not only the evolution of a pair of closely-associated community development regimes, but also 
the multiplicity of indigenous, colonial, and metropolitan factors which ultimately helped 
influence the shape and efficacy of community development as realized on the ground.  The 
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conclusions drawn at the end of the chapter, which consider some of the chief ideological and 
practical flaws embedded within community development, notably the paternalistic reliance on 
motivating African initiative and the broader implications this had for community development, 
are augmented by a concluding chapter.  This concluding chapter sets out to examine some of the 
contradictions of Fabian colonial development designs, chiefly those surrounding the question of 
colonial independence, and considers whether or not the intention of the Fabians was autonomy 
for Britain’s African territories, or rather something like a reformed imperialism.  Included is a 
section which posits the notion, refracted through the globalization of community development 
during the Cold War and the new, hegemonic position of the United States in international 
affairs, that the Fabianization of the British Empire could only ever be “partial,” to borrow from 
Dr. Hinden.82  The final section unpacks and assesses the notion of “partial” Fabianization with a 
discussion of this dissertation’s findings and argues that sufficient evidence exists to determine 
that Fabianized community development was “quietly,” if relatively, successful.   
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CHAPTER 1:  1880s-1899 
On the Origins and Early Evolution of Fabianism:  Ideological Refractions of Late-
Victorian England’s Reformist Zeitgeist, from the Socialist Revival to Social-Imperialism 
For the right moment you must wait, as Fabius did most patiently, when warring 
against Hannibal, though many censured his delays; but when the time comes you 
must strike hard, as Fabius did, or your waiting will be in vain and fruitless. 
 
—Explanatory Note, Why Are the Many 
Poor?, Fabian Tract No. 1 (1884)1 
 
Introduction  
A product of the late-Victorian socialist revival, the selfsame crucible of ideology from 
whence Marxism exploded with such portentous vigor, the Fabian Society formed around a 
nucleus of radicals determined to “do something” about the manifold political, social, and 
economic injustices wrought on the English working-class by industrialization.  Just what that 
“something” was, however, remained frustratingly elusive for several years.  Indeed, it was not 
until the end of the 1880s that the Fabians promulgated something like a comprehensive 
philosophical framework on which to hang their particular “brand” of socialism, which they soon 
unimaginatively called “Fabianism.”  An admixture of contemporary Victorian-era ideologies—a 
kind of “-isms” All Sorts that included, inter alia:  socialism, liberalism, positivism, Chartism, 
and utilitarianism, all seasoned copiously with an overarching sense of social justice—nascent 
Fabianism was first, last, and foremost, a domestically-oriented ideology.  Bent toward rectifying 
industrialism’s more egregious inequities as manifest in the cramped dwellings of England’s 
soot-choked streets and the factories in which their inhabitants daily toiled, Fabianism’s 
prescriptive formulae adamantly excluded the empire as a variable in its arithmetic.  Until, that 
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is, the South African War of 1899 forced a revision.  The result was a calculus whose insular 
solution yoked the socialist cause at home—reform for the working class—to the Fate of Empire 
abroad.  The upshot was a Fabian-favored paradigm of social-imperialism that aligned the 
society with Westminster’s pro-imperial (and anti-Boer) agenda.   
This development, for all its practical implications in terms of Fabian designs, was not 
without consequence.  For an irreparable schism soon formed within the society and fractured it, 
prompting the attrition of its most ardent anti-imperial progressive elements, including J. Ramsay 
MacDonald.  Having been vacated of dissenting voices, the Fabian executive then promulgated 
Fabianism and the Empire, the society’s first official manifesto vis-à-vis matters imperial.  In 
doing so, the Fabians effectively cemented their somewhat ignominious position as the only 
prominent socialist group in Britain to support the government’s blatantly imperialist war effort 
in South Africa.  With few exceptions, notably the great Tariff Reform debate of 1906, the 
Fabian executive did not invest itself or the society in imperial politics for the next twenty-odd 
years—that is until 1929, when the society published Imperial Trusteeship.  Written by Sydney 
Olivier, the tract revoked Chamberlainite trusteeship, the exploitative system which hitherto was 
an essential operational feature of Westminster’s (and, by extension, the Fabians’) social-
imperial model.   
In time, these formulations were folded into the principal rubric of Fabianism, the 
adherents of which had, by the middle of the twentieth century, come to be defined as observing 
a collectivist social theory and as being distinguished by a belief in the evolutionary and peaceful 
transition from capitalism to socialism through non-revolutionary “gradualism;”2 that is, the 
bringing about of socialism not through the direct action or violence promoted by orthodox 
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Marxism, but rather through research and, ultimately, the permeation and penetration of Britain’s 
political classes.  Fabianism is, in other words, a “gospel of state socialism rather than anarchist-
socialism.”3   
This chapter examines the origins of the Fabian Society and its core philosophy, 
Fabianism.  It takes as its point of departure the convergence of Victorian-era ideologies and the 
industrial conditions which inspired them.  We witness how these circumstances created a sense 
among certain segments of England’s middle-class population to “do something” about the 
injustices visited upon the working-class by industrialism.  The Fabian Society was, manifestly, 
an epiphenomenal byproduct of this desire, which reached an apex during the so-called socialist 
revival of the 1880s.  By the end of the decade, the young men who constituted the Fabian 
Society formulated a non-revolutionary, anti-anarchic socialism that came to represent the 
foundational ethos of Fabianism.  This chapter includes an exploration of Fabian efforts to 
influence (“permeate”) Britain’s fin-de-siècle political discourse and how these efforts, 
inescapably informed by the upheaval of the Liberal Party and the South African War, resulted in 
the society’s first forays into imperial policy formulation.    
 
Fabian Origins:  In the Beginning—The Supernatural and the Fellowship of the New Life 
Society for Psychical Research.  Haunted House Com(mittee). 
 
–Fabian Society Executive Committee 
Minute Book, 23 December 1885 – 21 
January 1887   
 
It may perhaps seem unusual that a minute book of the Fabian Society’s Executive 
Committee should have written at the top in the fluid, upright hand of Edward Pease, the 
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society’s long-serving secretary, a heading that is so strikingly phantasmagoric.  And yet, the 
Executive Committee’s Minute Book from 1885 begins with precisely this heading, albeit 
scribbled out.  The obvious question is, why?  What, if anything, does Thomas Linehan’s 
portrayal of the Fabians as “scientistic”4 have in common with the dubiously spiritualistic 
Society for Psychical Research (SPR)?  A number of straightforward—and dismissive—
explanations do in fact present themselves:  it is a reused minute book and is therefore a 
curiosity, but indicative of nothing; hastening, the secretary forgot himself and belatedly 
corrected his error or, perhaps the Fabian Society was briefly—if incongruously—affiliated with 
the SPR.  The answer, we find, is rather more compelling and revealing, not only of the Fabians 
but indeed the era that gave birth to them, than implied by any of these explanations.  
In his study of British Socialism and its influence on the arts in the late-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth centuries, Ian Britain notes that the origins of the Fabian Society are “a matter of 
dispute.”5  While it is undoubtedly true that the circumstances are rather more opaque than 
transparent, history nevertheless presents us with a moment, fleeting to be sure, when 
complementary strands of Victorian-era popular, political, and metaphysical culture met and 
fused, forging a kind of intellectual nexus from which would spring a few years later the 
imperfectly-formed nucleus of the Fabian Society.  That moment we can trace to an intriguingly 
un-Fabian-like milieu:  a darkened, purportedly haunted house in London’s still-gentrifying 
Notting Hill neighborhood.  There, huddled in the bleak interior of the unoccupied house, sat two 
future founder members of the Fabian Society in the “foolish hope that we might perceive 
something abnormal”:  Edward Pease and Frank Podmore.  The circumstances which brought the 
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two men together that evening were their mutual interests in spiritualism and psychical research, 
the controversial Victorian obsession with testing the objective reality of spirit manifestations.  
That Pease would go on to serve as secretary of the SPR’s Haunted House Committee testifies to 
the depth of his interest—and explains why, sometime later, he used an old committee minute 
book to record a series of meetings of the Fabian Society executive between 1885 and 1887.   
Yet the pursuit of the supernatural was not atypical for members of Victorian England’s 
intellectual elite broadly alive to the potential locked away in mesmeric, psychical, and 
spiritualistic phenomena.6  As Michael Cox and R. A. Gilbert explain:  
The Victorian age seems to be invested with a peculiar quality of difference…that is 
reflected in its ghosts.  It was an age shaped, perhaps more than any other previous 
period, by the forces of transition. …  With the shadow of change falling across virtually 
every area of life and thought, the receding past became a focus for anxiety, and in 
literature the ghost story offered a way of anchoring the past to an unsettled present by 
operating in a continuum of life and death.  In the ghost story, obligations do not cease 
with death, and the past is never a closed book.  What has been can be again, though 
often terribly transformed.  For a progressive age…the idea of a vindictive past held an 
especial potential for terror.7   
 
This gothic preoccupation with psychical forces reflects, as Daphne du Maurier put it, an 
“anxious, weary time”8 during which Britain’s ideological breakwaters, mortared together by the 
politics of laissez-faire capitalism, were fatally undermined and, in some cases, overcome by the 
revolutionary changes that were afoot.  And although the troubles of the past stalked the 
darkened recesses of the Victorian consciousness like some formless beast, “future consequences 
of present actions”9 haunted contemporaries to no less degree—and with electrifying effect.  For 
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quixotic men like Pease and Podmore, this culminated in a reunion of sorts in Chelsea in the 
autumn of 1883, when the two men found themselves attending the same lecture by Thomas 
Davidson, an American émigré.   
A “peripatetic and pretentious scholar of humble Scottish birth,” Janet Oppenheim 
explains, “who collected disciples as he roamed,”10 the wandering Davidson returned to London 
full of interest in the philosophy of Rosmini11 and on a mission to form “a small society of like-
minded persons for the reorganization of individual life, and thereby the gradual uplifting of 
society to higher levels.”12  Watchwords such as “uplift” and “reorganization” cast against the 
ghastly tableau of social inequity characteristic of the late-Victorian industrial age were a virtual 
tripwire for the morally-sensitive amongst the English middle class.  And Davidson’s idealism 
was no less than manna for some in this umbrage-prone group, which sat at the table of the 
country’s recent bleak industrial past and supped on a veritable a-la-carte menu of ethical 
socialisms—from the work of Robert Owen and men like T. H. Green and William Maclure to 
the Rochdale Pioneers—intended to correct the worst ravages of industrialization.  Like these 
and many others, Davidson was that quintessential man of ideas the Victorian age produced in 
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12 William Angus Knight, ed., Memorials of Thomas Davidson, the Wandering Scholar (London:  
Ginn and Company Publishers, 1907), 16.   
40 
 
such abundance:  an evangelist of ethical socialism orbited sun-like by “a number of people 
interested in religious thought, ethical propaganda, and social reform.”  Included among these 
adherents were many who constituted the nucleus of the early Fabian Society:  Podmore and 
Pease, of course; but also Havelock Ellis, Hubert Bland, and Percival Chubb.13 
The chief concern of the so-called “Davidsonian Fellowship”14 was not in fact the dread 
past, which so haunted contemporaries, but instead the forging of that most alluring of anti-
industrial Victorian ideals:  a socialist-utopian future shorn of the industrial age’s grievous social 
injustices.15  And although Davidson did not himself linger long in London before returning to 
Italy,16 the company he gathered around him—marshalled by Chubb, Davidson’s very own John 
the Baptist—was inspired to hold a series of meetings at which they debated the essence of 
Davidson’s grandiose vision:  the creation of a brotherhood devoted to the attainment of ethical 
perfection in its members and, ultimately, throughout all society.17   What emerged was the soi-
disant English Fellowship of the Vita Nuova, the founding principle of which was the alleviation 
of the deformities plaguing Victorian society through the “subordination of material things to 
spiritual things.”18 
Almost immediately, the nascent brotherhood fractured.  The obvious religious and 
ethical essentialism prescribed by the founding principle triggered impassioned rejections by 
such would-be adherents as Frank Podmore, who saw in the unregulated operation of the 
                                                          
13 Knight, Memorials, 16.   
14 Pease, The History of the Fabian Society, 16.   
15 Leela Gandhi, Affective Communities:  Anticolonial Thought, Fin-de-Siècle Radicalism, and 
the Politics of Friendship (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 177.   
16 Norman and Jeanne MacKenzie, The Fabians:  The Extraordinary Story of that Famous Circle 
of Enthusiasts, Reformers & Brilliant Eccentrics—Shaw, the Webbs, Wells—Whose Ideas and 
Unconventional Attitudes Fashioned our Modern World (New York:  Simon and Schuster, 1977), 24. 
17 Britain, Fabianism and Culture, 25. 
18 Knight, Memorials, 19.   
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Victorian economic system the harsh tangible means by which the English working class was 
oppressed, condemned to an unimaginably grim existence chained to Britain’s industrial engine.  
Thus, on December 16, 1883, Podmore wrote to the society’s secretary, the orthodox 
Davidsonian Chubb,19 that “some of us, after talking the matter over, find that we cannot 
subscribe to the resolution….  At the same time we wish to have a society, only on more general 
lines.”20  Two weeks later, Podmore addressed a similarly-veined letter to Davidson confessing, 
“I feel so uncertain what is meant by religion, that I do not like to use the word—at present.  I 
wish to learn: & I have not yet learnt enough to enable me to sympathise with the creed of the 
Fellowship heart & soul."21  Increasingly for some, the solution lay not in the existentialist aim 
of “being something,” but in the materialist aim of “doing something;” in the creation of a 
brotherhood “which will not necessarily be exclusive of the ‘Fellowship’” but invested with a 
character that emphasized materialist solutions to the ills that tormented Victorian society.22   
Appalled, Podmore’s rhetoric managed to justify Chubb’s suspicions concerning the 
now-hereticated materialists, whom he derided to Davidson as “not of the right fibre for a 
movement such as ours” and would later condemn as “merely materialistic, atheistic, aggressive” 
socialists.23  Nevertheless, there would be no turning back as the fissure between the two 
groups—the orthodox Davidsonian acolytes and Podmore’s secularists—opened wide, and from 
                                                          
19 For his part, the disillusioned Percival Chubb became an enthralled Puritan, professing to 
Davidson in April 1882 that he yearned “to work out in myself the life that should be…and to aid in the 
realization of the Social Utopia.”  See:  MacKenzie, The Fabians, 23.   
20 Knight, Memorials, 19.  The “resolution” to which Podmore refers was the “Vita Nuova” 
proposed by Dr. Burns-Gibson, the decisive principle of which was “The subordination of material things 
to spiritual things.”  See a clarification of the timeline of these events in Pease, The History of the 
Fabians, 16-17.   
21 As quoted in Janet Oppenheim, The Other World, 146. 
22 Knight, Memorials, 19.  The emphasis here is Podmore’s.   
23 Britain, Fabianism and Culture, 26; MacKenzie, The Fabians, 27. 
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it sprang the “more socialist” Fabian Society.24  The timing was not coincidental; for in 
Podmore’s labored, moralizing justification we glimpse the uncomfortable juxtaposition of belief 
and doubt that helped stir the ideologically complacent late-Victorian middle-class from a 
decades-long reverie.  The age of the great “socialist revival” was at hand. 
 
Changes Afoot:  Radicalism, the Socialist Revival, and Early Fabianism  
In a sense, the socialist revival signals both an ideological terminus as well as an 
embarkation; for on the one hand, it marks the end of the rapprochement that had characterized 
relations between the existing political order, reform-minded liberals, and radicals ever since the 
1850s.  Indeed, despite the persistence of a still-“vibrant radical subculture,”25 centered primarily 
on “obscure” working men’s clubs “dominated” by Marxian socialists from the Continent, it had 
been a remarkably inactive period for nearly thirty years, at least in terms of organized socialist 
movements in Great Britain.26  On the other hand, however, the socialist revival portends the 
emergence of a decidedly more volatile revolutionary movement, one set amidst economic 
depression—and its multitudinous precipitates, including riots of the unemployed and strikes by 
phossy-jawed matchgirls, militant dockworkers, and other unskilled laborers—and infused with 
political disillusionment.27  It was this paroxysmal context which gave rise to the Fabian Society 
and, in time, its socialist “mentality,” Fabianism.28   
                                                          
24 Knight, Memorials, 19. 
25 Lawrence, “Radicalism and the Socialist Revival in Britain,” 172.   
26 Paul Adelman, The Rise of the Labour Party, 1880-1945 (London:  Longman Group Ltd., 
1972), 3.   
27 Willard Wolfe, From Radicalism to Socialism:  Men and Ideas in the Formation of Fabian 
Socialist Doctrines, 1881-1889 (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 1975), 163. 
28 McCarran, “Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain,” x. 
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It was a profound wellspring, yet the Fabian Society that celebrated its inauguration on 
January 4, 1884 possessed nothing like a coherent ideology.  Beyond its members’ general 
aversion to the Fellowship of the New Life’s resolution and a more pragmatic approach to 
addressing society’s ills,29 it remained, as Podmore implied in his letter to Chubb, 
philosophically indeterminate. 30  This vagueness, coupled with the founding Fabians’ lingering 
affinity for both Thomas Davidson and the Fellowship, is perhaps responsible for Norman and 
Jeanne MacKenzie’s observation that the society had been “casually” founded in 1884.31  Yet 
neither the correspondences nor the early resolutions of the Fabians fully justify this assessment; 
for if nothing else we find a straightforward—even if idealized—sense of purpose already 
present in January 1884:  “the association’s ultimate aim shall be to help on the reconstruction of 
Society in accordance with the highest moral possibilities” and that, “with the view of learning 
what practical measures to take in this direction the Society should…delegate some of its 
members to attend meetings held on social subjects, debates at Workmen’s Clubs, etc., in order 
that such members may in the first place report to the Society on the proceedings, and in the 
second place put forward, as occasion serves, the views of the Society.” 32  
From this, it is evident that the Fabians had at the very least staked out the locus of their 
interest, the working class, and framed the-albeit-cautious means by which they hoped to achieve 
their aims:  influence and infiltration, practices which presaged the educative “permeation” 
which eventually became emblematic of Fabianism.  In the short-term, however, the society’s 
                                                          
29 Pease, The History of the Fabian Society, 16-17. 
30 Knight, Memorials, 18.   
31 MacKenzie, The Fabians, 27.   
32 Minutes of the Executive Committee of the Fabian Society [hereafter Minutes, FS], October 24, 
1883-July 6, 1888, January 4, 1884, London School of Economics, Fabian Society Archive [hereafter 
LSE FSA], C/36. 
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early resolutions were ambiguous; but a lack of clarity, arguably typical of most (if not every) 
new Victorian social clubs, ought not to be equated with an unpremeditated foundation.   
Some three months later, the society voted to form a pamphlets committee and took the 
decision to start issuing booklets “as occasion might arise.”33  Why are the Many Poor?, the first 
of these tracts, tacked into the rhetorical headwinds of the debate surrounding what Thomas 
Carlyle referred to as the “Condition of England” by asking the central question which troubled 
the conscience of the reform-minded late-Victorian middle class.  The Fabians’ humdrum 
solution to Carlyle’s problematic was sheer polemic:  “You who suffer think of this also, and 
help forward the only cure for these evils.  The time approaches when Capital can be made 
social, and be no longer left at the disposal of the few, but belong to the community for the 
benefit of all. …  The power is in your hands, and soon the chance of using that power will be 
yours also.  Neglect that chance, and you and your children will remain the victims of 
Competition—ever struggling—ever poor!”34   
Despite its lackluster rhetoric, this bombast indicates some of the ideological genealogy 
which lay at the back of nascent Fabianism.  First, the society is clearly alluding to the Reform 
Bill of 1884, which extended the franchise among working-class men.  Virtually from the outset, 
then, Fabian philosophy compassed the radical reformism of the Chartists, which had been in 
abeyance since the 1850s.   Moreover, the influence of early Victorian ethical socialism is 
likewise evident, particularly the work of the social reformer Robert Owen and the moral 
philosophizer T. H. Green, who coincidentally counted Carlyle among his favorite authors.35  
Indeed, it was Owen who, writing some forty years earlier in his Book of the Moral World, 
                                                          
33 Minutes, FS, October 24, 1883-July 6, 1888, March 7, 1884, LSE FSA, C/36. 
34 Why Are the Many Poor?, 4. 
35 R. L. Nettleship, ed., The Works of Thomas Hill Green:  Philosophical Works (London:  
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1888), xiv.    
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prophesied:  “Are there any who have yet considered the extent of the new, most inferior, and 
degrading circumstances created within the last half century by the competitive increase of the 
new manufacturing system of Great Britain?  No:  this knowledge, so valuable to man to acquire, 
has hitherto been hidden from him—it is yet unknown to him.  But the dawn of the day of this 
knowledge approaches—the destruction of the causes of man’s misery, and the advent of his 
happiness, draw nigh….”36   
Meanwhile it was Green who, even after the passage of the Second Reform Act in 1867, 
assiduously campaigned for the further extension of the franchise to “include artisans and town 
laborers.”  A vocal advocate of the continued reform of the electoral system, Green saw the 
extension of the vote as a “contribution to greater citizenship.”  As he explained in a speech on 
“Parliamentary Reform,” “citizenship only makes the moral man;…citizenship only g[ives] that 
self-respect, which is the true basis of respect of others, and without which there is no lasting 
social order or real morality.”37 
Benefiting from a porous ideological membrane, early Fabianism’s absorptive syncretism 
readily incorporated both Chartism and ethical socialism into its burgeoning program.  Taken 
together, this helps us to understand why Owen’s desire to “build a ‘new moral world’”—or, at a 
minimum, an environment that would systematically encourage the development of “‘social’ 
qualities” 38—and the sentiment embedded in Green’s philosophy—which anchored the ability of 
                                                          
36 Robert Owen, The Book of the New Moral World, Explanatory of the Elements of the Science of 
Society, or of the Social State of Man (London:  J. Watson, 1842-44), 20-21.   
37 Matt Carter, T. H. Green and the Development of Ethical Socialism (Exeter:  Imprint 
Academic, 2003), 42.   
38 Wolfe, From Radicalism to Socialism, 169.  Just what constituted this new moral world or 
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the poor to realize their potential to democratization and reform—feature so prominently in 
many of the society’s earliest doctrines.39  
Yet despite being embedded in a social system which simultaneously reinforced the 
exploitative evils of early industrialization while encouraging a belief that class conflict was 
essential to the regeneration of a new, moral society, few of the Fabian Society’s middle-class 
founders had any practical experience in or with the radical politics of the age.  Hubert Bland, for 
instance, was a twenty-eight-year-old failed businessman who “spent his leisure energetically 
attending advanced societies devoted to arts, crafts, literature and politics.”  For his part, 
Podmore was an Oxford-educated clerk at the Post Office and a lukewarm spiritualist at best.  
Pease, meanwhile, was a stockbroker fascinated in equal measure by spiritualism and H. M. 
Hyndman’s “social revolution.”40  Absent an immediate interest in controversial issues like land 
reform or the increasingly volatile Irish question, the first Fabians were cast unflatteringly as 
poseurs by the contemporary radical and socialist press, which scoffed at their pretensions and 
damned them as “radical philanthropists with vague, melioristic aspirations.”41  This critique, 
leveled by Justice, the organ of Hyndman’s “avowedly Marxist”42 Social Democratic Federation 
(SDF), and the ultra-radical Republican, signals the general uncertainty which dogged the 
                                                          
advantages and enjoyments. …  Thus, when reason shall prevail over superstition, the different 
proportions of the elements of our nature which are united in different individuals, will be calculated to 
produce harmony among mankind, and infinitely to increase the happiness of the human race.”  See:  
Owen, The Book of the New Moral World, 24.   
39 Peter Clarke, Liberals & Social Democrats (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1981), 
14-15; Carter, T. H. Green, 42-43.   
40 Mackenzie, The Fabians, 18-27.   
41 Wolfe, From Radicalism to Socialism, 154 
42 Henry Tudor and J. M. Tudor, Marxism and Social Democracy:  The Revisionist Debate, 1896-
1898 (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1988), 12.   
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Fabians’ early program, the ideological broad strokes of which were painted in a lecture 
delivered by George Bernard Shaw to the society in May 1884.43   
Recruited by Bland, the itinerant Bernard Shaw, whom the socialist activist and SDF 
member, William Morris, called “one of the clearest heads and best pens Socialism has got,” had 
for a time been linked to Hyndman’s SDF.44  In an atypical pique of pragmatism, however, 
Bernard Shaw abandoned Hyndman’s fiery socialism and, when called upon, penned a 
foundational declaration for the Fabians that downplayed the Marxian fantasies of militant 
workers, barricades, and upheaval so gleefully imagined by the zealot Hyndman and his more 
ardent sentimentalists.  As Bernard Shaw later recalled, “we knew that a certain sort of oratory 
was useful for ‘stoking up’ public meetings; but we needed no stoking up, and, when any orator 
tried to process on us, soon made him understand that he was wasting his time and ours.”45   
The product of this quintessentially Shavian legerdemain was a Manifesto that struck a 
decidedly middle-class, non-fanatical socialist tone for the society.  As far as position papers go, 
it was a rousing piece of propaganda, dense with the kind of high-minded rhetoric and anti-
capitalist pomposity favored by the more genteel Victorian middle-class reformers and their 
ciphers.  From prophesying the inevitable division of “society into hostile classes” to pointing an 
accusatory finger at the maldistribution of wealth as evidence that the veneer of fairness had 
been well and truly stripped from the façade of laissez-faire capitalism, Bernard Shaw hit all the 
                                                          
43 Published in 1881, the program of the SDF (at the time, the Democratic Federation) borrowed 
much from that of the Chartists, including:  adult suffrage, equal electoral districts, payment of members 
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right notes. 46  There was, however, one niggling problem: nowhere did the Manifesto mention 
the claims and aims of the working class, the oppressed demographic whose position was so dire.  
Indeed, anything that might have resonated with this group, be it trade unionism or cooperation 
or wages or even hours of labor, escaped the querulous pen of the nimble-minded Bernard Shaw.  
These are noteworthy deficiencies, which Pease, some thirty years later and in full apologist 
mode, attributed partly to the society’s early fixation with “abstraction, Land and Capital, 
Industry and Competition, the Individual and the State” and, at least in the case of the 
cooperative movement, open hostility towards certain working class concerns.47  As a result, the 
early Fabian program lacked much substance that could recommend it to an audience beyond 
ideologues, revealing a disconnect between early Fabian rhetoric and the reality of England’s 
working class.  In the immediate term, this glaring disparity rendered the Fabians susceptible to 
charges of “elitism.”48   
Two things happened in 1885 to alter this state of affairs.  In November, the SDF was 
humiliated and its cause done irreparable harm when the scheme to finance two of its London 
general election campaigns with Tory money—a marriage of convenience between the 
conservatives and Marxists designed to split the vote in contested constituencies and thus ensure 
Tory victory—backfired.  Although such conduct was not entirely beyond the pale of propriety 
in the context of Victorian English politics, the coupling was, according to Bernard Shaw, an 
“utter abomination” to radical sensibilities.  Indeed, for many it was impossible to imagine a 
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more ideologically incongruous arrangement, particularly the insurrectionist wing of the SDF 
which, having repudiated political action altogether, was appalled at the revelation that the 
Federation had colluded with a political party.  Shocked and disillusioned, many who had 
sacrificed their reputations abandoned the SDF.  In their response to the controversy, the Fabians 
sharply denounced the SDF for behavior “calculated to disgrace the Socialist movement in 
England.” 49  Thus, the same year that ended with the embarrassment of the SDF found the 
Fabians unexpectedly occupying a dubiously situated moral high ground.   
Ensconced as they were, the Fabian Society members who chastised the perfidious 
radicals could look back on 1885 as a transformative year.  Not only did the society now count 
amongst its members such socialist luminaries as Annie Besant, Sidney Webb, and Sydney 
Olivier, but it could pride itself in its gradual abandonment of abstraction and utopian idealism.  
As early as March, for example, the Fabian executive formed a committee to examine “and 
report upon the working of the Poor Law,”50 with special reference to “figures and assertions 
recently cited and made by…Gov[ernment] officials to disprove the allegations of great distress 
among the workers.”51  In June, following his visit to the strike-affected Denaby Main Colliery 
                                                          
49 In a motion proposed by Hubert Bland on December 4, 1885 and subsequently carried.  The 
text of the response is as follows: “The conduct of the Council of the Social-Democratic Federation in 
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51 Minutes, FS, October 24, 1883-July 6, 1888, March 6, 1885, LSE FSA C/36.  It is worth noting 
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in Yorkshire, J. H. Watts reported on the conditions of the miners and the families he found 
there.  Meanwhile, and as papers on “Socialist Reconstruction,” “Socialism and Political 
Liberty,” and the “Master Key of Social Reform” circulated among its members, the society set 
about organizing a conference to be held in 1886 to discuss the “aims and methods of 
Democracy.”52  Though minor, these changes signal an important step in the society’s early 
evolution towards a more fundamental awareness not only of the condition of England’s working 
class, but also the Fabians’ own position in the overarching debate.     
Throughout the following year, the Fabians worked to secure a more pragmatic and 
utilitarian footing in the discourse surrounding the working-class movement.  On the one hand, 
the society articulated a refined—albeit still vague—position vis-à-vis the condition of England 
question by publishing What Socialism Is,53 a tract in which both surplus value54 and the 
tendency of wages to a minimum55 were mentioned and the work of trade unionism was alluded 
to.  The society also assumed a more active role in the dialogue surrounding the grievances of the 
working class by hosting “An Eight Hours Working Day,” a debate in which several socialist 
organizations participated, including the SDF.56  Rounding out their wheelhouse of interests that 
year, the Fabians did the inevitable:  they turned to the fraught realm of politics.  Thus, in June, 
the society convened a three-day conference of radicals and socialists in London to examine that 
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great socialist triad of land utilization, capital utilization, and “Democratic policy.”57  It was the 
Fabians’ hope that the conference would act as a catalyst and create the kind of ideological 
atmosphere in which a common basis could be found “on which Radicals, Socialists, and Social 
Reformers of every kind may cooperate to form a Democratic organization for practical work in 
and out of parliament.”58   
While the conference did not have the hoped-for salubrious effect—in fact, it nearly cleft 
the society in two—it nevertheless resulted in the creation of the Fabian Parliamentary League 
(FPL) as a separate body within the society.  Designed as a vehicle for those who favored 
“Parliamentary action” and as an “instrument whereby the forces of Radicalism and Socialism 
might be united in the criticism and initiation of practical steps towards their common goal,” the 
League’s mandate was, as Sidney Webb audibly sighed, “the result of a compromise between 
two schools of opinion…so as not to commit the Society at large to political propaganda.”59  The 
schools represented a pair of rival, although not mutually-exclusive, political strategies:  
Charlotte Wilson’s anarchist-influenced “party of action,” which worked to draw like-minded 
elements away from the Liberal Party so that it might create the “nucleus of a Socialist party in 
Parliament;”60  and Webb’s “party of education,” wed thoroughly to his tactic of “permeation,” 
which sought not the creation of a socialist party in Parliament, but rather favored working 
within the existing Liberal Party to promote “Collectivist Socialist” policies.61  While the 
                                                          
57 Minutes, FS, October 24, 1883-July 6, 1888, December 4, 1885, LSE FSA C/36.  
58 “Fabian Notes,” Our Corner 7 (1886), 189; The Fabian Society:  What it has Done and How it 
has Done it (London:  The Fabian Society, 1892), 10-12.  Fifty-three societies sent delegates.  The SDF, 
not surprisingly, declined.   
59 Minutes, FS, October 24, 1883-July 6, 1888, November 6, 1886, LSE FSA C/36.   
60 The Fabian Society:  What it has Done and How it has Done it (London:  The Fabian Society, 
1892), 13. 
61 Norman MacKenzie, ed., The Letters of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Volume I:  Apprenticeships, 
1873-1892 (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1978), 102.   
52 
 
compromise that resulted in the creation of the League had not been arrived at easily, for the 
debate that occurred prior to its agreement caused the manager of Anderton’s Hotel, the 
meeting’s location, to send notice to the Fabian executive “that the Society could not be 
accommodated there for any further meetings,”62 the debacle over the FPL—and the 
uncomfortable anarchist-Fabian marriage that resulted—seems to have been little more than a 
storm in a teacup.  For by April 1888, the League was reabsorbed as the Political Committee of 
the society, and the remnant anarchists either apostatized and converted or left the society 
entirely.   
Despite its brief existence, the FPL produced several documents that proved significant to 
the long-term development of the society, both in practical and ideological terms.  Indeed, as 
Bernard Shaw later recalled, it was the League’s foundational Manifesto which provided the 
“sketch”63 of what later came to be understood as “Fabian tactics.”64  After all, the FPL was an 
avowedly apolitical entity dedicated in part to the research and propagandization of the “political 
questions of the day” with the ultimate goal of encouraging advancement toward “the Socialist 
ideal.”65  This, arguably, is the quintessential definition of the Fabian mission throughout most of 
the twentieth century.  Moreover, the League’s True Radical Programme, intended as a 
discursive riposte to The Official Liberal-Radical Programme of 1887, was a nexus of 
nineteenth-century reformist radicalisms and, as McBriar notes, constituted the “sum and 
substance” of early Fabianism.66  “Amplified” and “modified” by subsequent tracts, this 
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foundational ideological schema called for, inter alia:  parliamentary and local government 
reform (here, echoing again the Chartist movement’s calls for adult suffrage, annual parliaments, 
and payment for MPs); the “progressive” taxation of the unearned income or “economic rent” 
(i.e. profit) of the idle classes to be redistributed to the laboring and poorest members of society 
(a notion of “leveling down” drawn and adapted from a variety of sources, including Marx, 
David Ricardo, J. S. Mill, Henry George, W. Stanley Jevon, and Philip Wicksteed67); 
collectivism and state interference (as embodied in appeals for the municipalization of land to 
compete with private industry and the nationalization of such key industries as railways, 
elements which suggest the influence not only of Ricardo’s Theory of Rent, but also T. H, 
Green’s evolutionary approach to social development68); and the state-directed reform of 
workhouses and the provision of compulsory education (the complementary notion of “leveling 
up” society drawn partly from Owenite social reform and New Liberalism).69   
The Fabians’ philosophical maturation into one of late-Victorian England’s foremost 
socialist societies was confirmed with the tracts What Socialism Is (revised by Bernard Shaw in 
1890) and The Workers’ Political Programme (published in 1890).  While the latter was little 
more than a modified recapitulation of The True Radical Programme, signifying, in effect, the 
Fabian executive’s official arrogation of the work done by the now-defunct FPL, “What 
Socialism Is” did considerably more:  in the first place, it formalized the Fabians’ rejection of 
                                                          
67 As elaborated in McBriar, Fabian Socialism and English Politics; Sweezy, “Fabian Political 
Economy,” 242-248; Bevir, “Fabianism, Permeation and Independent Labour,” 179-196; Bevir, The 
Making of British Socialism; F. Rosen, “Jeremy Bentham’s Radicalism” in English Radicalism, 1550-
1850:  Tradition or Fabrication?  eds. G. Burgess and M. Festenstein (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
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Economists and Reformers,” 307-319.  
68 Claeys, “Political Thought,” 199. 
69 Bernard Shaw, The True Radical Programme.  
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Marx’s rigidly deterministic class-based division of society and the revolutionary upheaval it 
anticipated.  The Fabians, Foote notes, had come to believe that Marx was “fundamentally 
wrong” about the nature of profit and that the capitalists exploited the workers and adopted 
instead the alternative view that the “real” class struggle was between “idle owners” and the 
“producers”—that is, those who did nothing to earn their money and those who did all the work.  
In addition, What Socialism Is confirmed the Fabian pivot away from anarchism (a largely 
academic exercise, since this was all but accomplished in practice with the reabsorption of the 
FPL in 1888) in favor of state collectivism.   
This early programmatic Fabianism would have amounted to nothing more than an 
amalgam of au courant radicalisms had it not been for the prescriptive formulations of Sidney 
Webb.  The society’s “leading theorist,” Webb believed that the peaceful transition from 
capitalism to socialism could be achieved only by working through England’s traditional 
democratic institutions,70 a framework of representational government he extended to include not 
only the institutions of local government, but also trade unions and cooperatives.71  As Webb 
saw it, democratic England, suitably reformed and (more) broadly enfranchised, would, in time, 
produce a political class receptive to the ideas of socialism.  The slow-moving permeation of this 
sympathetic group by “experts” (e.g. the Fabians) would result in democratic institutions that 
gradually acquired increasingly progressive accretions, such as a regulatory capacity over 
industry.  In this way, Webb believed, industry need not be commandeered; rather, it need only 
be administered by a minister of government or “specialist” whose role it was “to establish an 
integrated, cooperative, and thus efficient organization.”72  This same collectivist state would 
                                                          
70 Bevir, “Sidney Webb:  Utilitarianism, Positivism, and Social Democracy,” 217-218.   
71 Webb, Towards Social Democracy?, 5. 
72 Bevir, “Sidney Webb:  Utilitarianism, Positivism, and Social Democracy,” 235. 
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“enforce” social “duties” through taxation, a process which would, ultimately, yield public 
provisions for such things as education, museums, parks, and even health services.73  Thus, 
Webb, and, eventually, the Fabians, equated socialism with the efficient, cooperative, and 
coordinated organization of society achieved through state intervention.  This reflected not only 
Webb’s peculiar form of utilitarianism—which produced a socialism “limited to practical efforts 
to modify the existing…order”74—but also his belief that the principle of natural selection, much 
on the Victorian public’s mind since Darwin’s Origin of Species, taught that more efficient 
societies thrived—while those encumbered with disorganized systems withered and died.75   
By the turn of the twentieth century, the Fabian Society had welded together various 
elements of then-current radicalisms and emplaced them as the struts and armatures of their own 
ideological framework, one calculated to realize the “dream of the Socialist on sound economic 
principles, by gradual, peaceful, and constitutional means.”76  In the broadest possible sense, 
then, fin-de-siècle Fabianism sought not only to extend democracy and improve the machinery of 
democratic government, but to expand government powers in a way that yielded “positive 
government action” as a means of promoting social and economic equality.77  It was a vision that 
married (J. S.) Millite utilitarianism with Comtean positivism designed, in the last, to secure “the 
                                                          
73 Bevir, “Sidney Webb:  Utilitarianism, Positivism, and Social Democracy,” 235. 
74 Pierson, British Socialists, 331-332.   
75 Webb, Towards Social Democracy?, 29.   
76 Bernard Shaw, The True Radical Programme.   
77 McBriar, Fabian Socialism and English Politics, 25.  
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greatest happiness of the greatest number”78 through state-directed activity.79  The result was a 
statist conception of development and social democracy that had both national and imperial 
ramifications; for not only did it serve as the basis of Fabianism for the next half century, but it 
also framed what, as of 1950, the FCB called the “Social Foundation of Trusteeship”—the 
society’s particular postwar model of late-colonial imperial governance and colonial 
development.   
 
The Fabians and Fin-De-Siècle Britain:  The Tumultuous 1890s 
At the confluence of these developments we find a burgeoning working-class populism 
among the Fabians, a transformation reflected in the prodigious propaganda and proselytizing 
campaigns which characterized the society’s output in the late-1880s.  Indeed, through 1889 the 
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Fabians’ omnivorous intellect yielded a rather considerable crop, including lecture series80 
delivered at radical and liberal clubs or sponsored by sympathetic societies81 which covered a 
range of topics from “The Politics of Labour” and the “Eight Hours Bill” to the “Trades Union 
Movement” and “Cooperation and Labor.”82  Moreover, individual papers, such as Sidney 
Webb’s detailed discussion of economic science, which examined the impact of the extension of 
voluntary cooperation on industry, were shared between society members to galvanize interest 
internally.83  Articles were published, including Edward Pease’s “The Labour Federation,” which 
appeared in the Fabians’ journal, To-day, and Beatrice Webb’s (nee Potter)84 article on the 
sweating system for Nineteenth Century, so as to extend awareness of Fabian views among the 
socialist community at large.85  The society even prepared bills to be introduced in Parliament, 
notably the Eight Hours Bill.86  The output of this prolific period, clearly a product of the 
evolving Fabianism, culminated in 1889 with The Fabian Essays in Socialism, a collection of 
earlier lectures on the condition of industrial England that were formatted for publication.  
Within two years, sales of the Fabian Essays reached some 27,000, a bonanza which not only 
marked the beginning of the Fabian “boom”87 between 1890 and 1893, but also had the effect of 
                                                          
80 The Fabians reckoned that the number of lectures delivered by members of the society in the 
year between April 1888 and April 1889 to be “upwards of 700.”  Though not all these lectures dealt with 
the concerns of the working-class, the statistic is nevertheless impressive. 
81 The Socialist League, to name one.   
82 Pease, The History of the Fabian Society, 54. 
83 Mackenzie, The Letters of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Volume I, 123. 
84 Married Sidney Webb in 1892.   
85 Mackenzie, The Letters of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Volume I, 62. 
86 Minutes, FS, September 21, 1888-April 10, 1891, November 22, 1889, LSE FSA C/37.  See 
also:  Pease, The History of the Fabian Society, 47. 
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reinforcing the society’s growing reputation as the moderate socialists par excellence of the 
Victorian Age.88   
Had the essays been written in 1890 instead of 1888, however, the authors would have 
acquired from the great trade union upheaval of 1889 a fuller appreciation of the importance of 
trade unionism than they possessed just two years before.  For the decade of the 1880s was a 
profoundly complacent one in the annals of late-Victorian trade unionism, characterized by what 
Paul Adelman refers to as the “ostrichlike” torpor of the trade union “old gang.”89  Having 
achieved a modicum of hard-won legislative and political recognition during the 1860s and 
1870s, the Trades Union Congress (TUC) did the incomprehensible:  it hung up its Phrygian cap 
and promptly buried its head in the smug quagmire of self-satisfaction.  And there it stayed, 
refusing to confront the profound problems of rapid technological change, demarcation disputes, 
and unemployment that by 1889 threatened labor.90  Indeed, stalwarts of “Old Unionism,” 
including George Shipton, MP and the secretary of the London Trades Council, and George 
Howell, former secretary of the TUC, were steadfast in their opposition to popular movements, 
such as the Eight Hour Day.91  The result was a kind of broad-spectrum laissez-faire pacifism 
that manifested itself at the level of Parliament, where trade union MP’s were content to be, in 
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Friedrich Engels’s memorably contemptuous phrase, “the tail of the Great Liberal Party.”92  Such 
circumstances exposed “Old Unionism” and its avatars to increasingly vitriolic criticism from 
within its own ranks, which denounced both it and them as “useless” and little more than 
“charitable institutions for doling out funds for sick and superannuation, thus relieving the upper 
and middle classes of poor rate….”93  The calculus of official apathy and sustained criticism 
inflamed the membership at the level of the unskilled laborers, fracturing the ranks and clearing 
the way for the “New Unionism,”94 an outcome Shipton gravely warned would “be the active 
agent of their ruin.”95   
A conservative craft unionist from London, Shipton was no stranger to the revolutionary 
intransigence of which unskilled laborers were capable.  For barely a year had passed since, in 
his capacity as mediator during the London matchgirls’ strike at Bryant and May’s,96 he 
witnessed a working-class victory achieved, “for the first time in many years,” “not by the well-
organized Trade Unionists, but by the class of workers whose very weakness was a source of 
strength.”97  A precedent had indeed been set, of course, but for the new generation of labor 
leaders, men like the future “father” of the Independent Labor Party (ILP) Henry Hyde 
Champion, New Unionism was hardly the harbinger Shipton prophesied.  It was, instead, the 
                                                          
92 Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844 (London:  Swan 
Sonnenschein & Co., 1892), xiii.   
93 John Burns, who was a colleague of the Fabians Tom Mann and Ben Tillett in the running of 
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instrument of labor’s rejuvenation and its defenders needed only point to the most spectacular 
manifestation of the New Unionism to stifle the millennial ravings of Shipton and the picayune 
“old gang:”  the Great London Dock Strike of August 1889.  Arguably the most spectacular of 
the strikes by unskilled laborers to grip London, from his vantage point at the head of the strike, 
John Burns described the scene in the most evocative contemporary terms imaginable:  “This, 
lads, is the Lucknow of Labour, and I…can see a silver gleam, not of bayonets to be imbued in a 
brother’s blood, but in the gleam of the full round orbs of the docker’s tanner.”98  Later, 
Champion reflected that it was “The greatest struggle between Capital and Labour that this 
generation of Englishmen has seen” which “ended in the victory of the weaker side.”99   
Amidst the welter of revolution engulfing the Port of London, the Fabian Society seems 
oddly voiceless.  Indeed, the group took no official role in the Dock Strike and, in fact, the 
Executive Committee seems not to have met at all between July and September of that year.  
Filling the void created by the society’s official silence were elements from its more aggressive 
“right wing,” including Will Crooks, Ben Tillett, and Tom Mann,100 all of whom were leaders of 
the strike and harsh critics of the “Old Unionism.”101  Moreover, many Fabian sympathizers were 
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very much alive to the significance of these events, including Beatrice Potter, who “eagerly read 
every detail” published in the papers and noted in her diary that, “Commercially and financially, 
an extended labor disturbance in London is far more disastrous than in any other part of 
England…therefore an organised labour party would have in London a lever for working its own 
will that provincial labor does not possess.”  Even given this, however, she ruefully added that 
“It is doubtful…whether, even if the Dock [Companies] capitulate, the great struggle of 1889 
will effect [sic] any permanent advance.”  Potter’s ambiguity aside, the London Dock Strike was 
symptomatic of growing labor discontent; for less than two months later, trade unionists were 
actively working toward the “empoverishment [sic]” of manufacturers by forcing a stoppage of 
work.102  Labor unrest, it seemed, had once again become “the order of the day,”103 prompting 
Westminster to appoint the Royal Commission on Labor (1891)104 charged with investigating 
“relations between employer and employed” in England.105    
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Though the downturn that soon buffeted England’s industrial economy dampened the 
spirit of working-class radicalism evinced by the Great Dock Strike, the volatility that lay at its 
heart soon found expression in the political landscape of fin-de-siècle Britain.  For the hitherto 
dominant Liberal Party ran aground on questions of empire and Irish Home Rule (and, as we 
shall see later, free trade and protectionism).106  Languishing throughout the 1890s in protracted 
bouts of opposition, the Liberal Party was consumed by internecine strife as William Gladstone’s 
principal successors—Lord Rosebery, William Harcourt, and John Morley—vied for supremacy.  
The upshot of this political cannibalism was a largely rudderless Liberal Party and Unionist 
Government until 1898.  In the meantime, the decade bore witness to increasing working-class 
activism and Fabian permeation—a subtle process whereby the society attempted to influence 
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political discourse without becoming political.  Instead, the society acted as a clearinghouse, 
gathering and distributing information on a range of topics that particularly interested them with 
the intention of massaging the contemporary narrative.  To this end, Fabians attended the Liberal 
Party’s Newcastle Conference;107 presented papers at workers’ conferences on such topics as 
“The relationship between cooperators and trade unionism;”108 engaged in lecture series hosted 
by labor organizations, significantly at the Bradford Labor League; prepared new tracts on The 
Workers’ Political Programme, The New Reform Bill, Reform of the Poor Law and Organisation 
of the Unemployed; and corresponded regularly with members of parliament, including 
Gladstone himself.109   
Arguably the most suggestive of the Fabians’ efforts during these boom years came in 
1892, with the publication of Bernard Shaw’s Fabian Election Manifesto.  The subject of heated 
debate internally since January of that year and finally published in the run-up to the general 
election in July, the manifesto did not so much make the Fabian case for an independent labor 
party, as a case against the Liberal and Conservative Parties.110  In the text, Bernard Shaw railed 
                                                          
107 Convened in 1891.  The Newcastle Programme which resulted from the conference included 
Irish Home Rule and a major extension of factory regulation.  Early on, the Fabians attempted to 
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against the “Tyranny of our Party System.”  He excoriated the Conservatives, “the party of 
privilege” then in power, for their “scandalous” disregard of the working class, their sanction of 
state interference only as a means of suppressing trade unionism (this, rather than intervening to 
alleviate the causes of unionism’s discontent), their failure to extend the voting franchise to 
include agricultural laborers, and their “denial of payment to Members of Parliament.”  He 
likewise castigated the Liberals, the party in opposition, for “practically” abandoning the 
working class, their “persistent” ignorance of the condition of workers, refusing to adopt the 
“vitally important” reform measure of “Payment for Members (of Parliament),” and their 
enduring “servility” to the laissez-faire economic principles of Gladstone.  Bernard Shaw was no 
less vociferous in his denouncement of the working classes, which he upbraided for their 
“political apathy.”111  Developing on this sort of theme of equal opportunity chastisement, Shaw 
then dug his rhetorical boot heel into the neck of the “labour men,” criticizing them for their 
policy of affecting meaningful political change by “swamping the Liberal Associations with 
Socialists and Radicals.”  Warming to his subject, Bernard Shaw then sniffed that this was a 
“paltry substitute for the straightforward action of a genuine Working Class party, supported by 
Working Class subscriptions and completely independent of both Liberal and Conservative 
aid.”112   
This is a telling turn of phrase, for it is precisely the reverse of the Fabians’ policy since 
1887.  Indeed, the Fabians had to this point demurred when the question of an independent labor 
party came up, preferring, instead, to hew closely to Sidney Webb’s admonition that “the time 
was not ripe for the society to give much encouragement to the attempts that were being made to 
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form a Labour Party.”113  For Webb believed that the mere threat of a third party would 
sufficiently motivate the Liberals to gradually adopt a more progressive policy, thereby 
eliminating the need for a true party of labor.  Thus, until 1892, Fabian designs were chiefly 
limited to the permeation of the Liberal Party, a process begun immediately following the party’s 
promulgation of its Nottingham Program in 1887.  Bernard Shaw’s manifesto signaled a break 
from all of this, albeit a muddled one:  for in the general election, and in clear defiance of both 
the society’s apolitical stance and Webb’s stricture, the Fabians directly supported Ben Tillett,114 
the independent labor candidate in East Bradford, while at the same time contradictorily backing 
the Liberal John Morley against the independent labor candidate in Newcastle.  When the 
election results were returned, in which three labor men were elected and others—including 
Tillett—polled well, it laid bare the costly implications of the Fabians’ indecisive and ham-
handed intervention:  a new labor movement was manifesting itself politically, and it threatened 
to leave the Fabians behind.115     
Initiative now passed to the nascent Independent Labor Party (ILP), which convened its 
foundation conference at the Bradford Labor Union’s hall in January 1893.  The result of a 
meeting of ILP representatives led by the Bradfordian W. H. Drew116 during the Trades Union 
Conference in Glasgow in September 1892, Bradford was the first clear indication of stronger 
                                                          
113 Sidney Webb, “Wanted a Programme.”  In a speech to the Fabians on December 11, 1891, 
Webb articulated his clearest position yet vis-à-vis the Labor Party: “Some members wish to see Fabian 
[Society] devote itself exclusively to the support of the Labor [sic] Party, and throw its entire influence 
unreservedly upon that side.  Well, with this view I cannot agree.”  See:  Mackenzie, The Letters of 
Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Volume I, 354.    
114 Mackenzie, The Letters of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Volume I, 418.  Tillett failed in his bid, 
but polled very well with 2,749 votes to the 3,306 for the Liberal and 3,053 for the Conservative 
candidates.   
115 Beatrice Webb, Our Partnership, ed. Barbara Drake and Margaret I. Cole (Longmans, Green 
& Co., 1948), 110.   
116 Henry Pelling, The Origins of the British Labour Party, 1880-1900 (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 1965), 112.   
66 
 
“cooperation between socialists and trade unionists”—a development confirmed by the fact that 
the party’s leading figure was the Fabian J. Keir Hardie, himself a former miner.117  When the 
Fabian executive in London received Drew’s invitation to the congress, it agreed to send Bernard 
Shaw and W. S. De Mattos as delegates only on condition that “doing so does not hamper our 
independence.”118  This is an instructive caveat; for not only does it reveal that the society was 
determined to guard against any encroachment on the swathe of ideological middle-ground it had 
staked out, which privileged permeating the Liberal Party, but it also speaks to the Fabians’ 
distrust of the ILP, which Bernard Shaw ruefully jibed was “nothing but a new SDF with 
Champion instead of Hyndman.”119  Most troublingly, it also indicates that the outcome of the 
1892 general election had brought no clarity to the tangled Fabian position—a stance many of 
the district Fabian Societies were so unwilling to forgive or forget, it prompted a mass provincial 
apostasy.120   
                                                          
117 Hardie’s Fabian membership is confirmed both by Pease, The History of the Fabian Society, 
113; McBriar, Fabian Socialism and English Politics, 248.  
118 Minutes, FS, September 9, 1891-February 24, 1893, December 30, 1892, LSE FSA C/4.  As 
with much concerning the Fabians, debate surrounds the degree of “influence” the society—in this case, 
its executive—exercised over the constitution of the ILP.  As represented by the society’s London 
delegates at the January meeting, there is some evidence to suggest that Fabian influence extended into 
the early structure of the ILP (as a federal, rather than amalgamated organization, though this would later 
change), the use of the word “Socialist” in the name of the new party (which the Fabians opposed), and 
the rejection of the “Manchester Fourth Clause,” which called for “members to abstain from voting for 
the Liberal or Conservative Parties, even where there were no ILP candidates in the field.”  It is, however, 
difficult to quantify such influence as being wholly derived from the Fabians, for many of the delegates 
already supported such measures even in the absence of proponents like Bernard Shaw and De Mattos.  
Thus, it is probable that the changes would have been adopted even had members from the London 
executive not been present.  For a detailed exposition and analysis of the events as they unfolded at the 
Bradford Conference.  See:  McBriar, Fabian Socialism and English Politics, 280-306. 
119 Dan H. Laurence, ed., Bernard Shaw Collected Letters, 1874-1897:  Volume I (London:  Max 
Reinhardt, 1965), 366-367.   
120 Following the publication of the Fabian Essays, the society’s popularity and membership 
increased tremendously.  An outgrowth of this was the formation of satellites or “provincial societies” 
which sprang up in England, Scotland, and Wales.  Importantly, these provincial groups were independent 
of the London Fabian Society, adopting campaigns as they saw fit but never ultimately beholden to the 
London-based executive.  Thus, when later in 1893 many of these societies adopted close affiliations with 
the ILP, some even becoming ILP branches, the executive was in no position to challenge them.    
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This bitterness found expression at the foundation conference on one especially 
provocative occasion.  Several hostile delegates had interpreted the society’s caveat, which 
appeared in the circular Workman’s Times under the Bernard Shaw-penned article, “The 
Bradford Conference:  From the Fabian Point of View,” as indicating it would actively work to 
prevent the formation of a national ILP.  This dubious if understandable interpretation of the 
Fabian position triggered a challenge to the London Fabian Society’s credentials, particularly 
those of the always-incendiary Bernard Shaw.  During the debate that followed, one speaker, 
inflamed to the point of paroxysm, began a general protest over the Fabian executive’s 
involvement in John Morley’s Newcastle campaign, the outcome of which had snatched victory 
from the teeth of the Newcastle Labor Party.  In the ensuing chaos, Bernard Shaw was debarred 
from the house floor and straightaway took up a “strong enfilading position in the gallery,” from 
whence he launched a violent and vitriolic defense.  Although the London Fabians ultimately 
won the vote of confidence, these events signaled a grim beginning to the year for the society.  
Indeed, within a few months, most of the provincial Fabian groups had either reconstituted 
themselves as ILP branches or were now closely associated with the party.121   
It was increasingly obvious that the heady popularity the society had once enjoyed was 
ebbing—and with it, the potential for a terminal slide into irrelevancy.  Coupled with the gradual 
realization that the Liberal government had no intention of legislating along the lines envisaged 
by the Newcastle Programme, which in turn threatened the status of the men in the society who 
had backed it, notably Webb and Bernard Shaw, the Fabian executive was gripped by a new 
sense of urgency.122  By now thoroughly disillusioned, Webb wrote to Graham Wallas, 
                                                          
121 MacKenzie, The Letters of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Volume II:  Partnership, 1892-1912, 4.   
122 Among other things, the Newcastle Programme called for:  Home Rule for Ireland, “One Man, 
One Vote,” payment of parliamentarians, “adequate representation of labour in the House of Commons,” 
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effectively abrogating his earlier pro-Liberal position.  “The time has come,” explained Webb on 
September 12, 1893, “for a strong tract showing up the Liberal Party, and advocating as many 
decent Labor candidates as possible.”123   
The result was “To Your Tents, O Israel!,” a jointly-penned treatise in which both 
Bernard Shaw and Webb heaped scorn on Gladstone’s cabinet for their collective failure to 
“make good the professions of friendliness to Labor which gained its majority at the General 
Election of 1892” and recommended that “the working-classes, through their trade 
organizations…take matters into their own hands at the next general election by sending fifty 
working men as independent Labor members to Parliament.”124  Unsurprisingly, Webb’s volte-
face affronted the party’s ministers who had hitherto looked upon the Fabians with a benevolent 
eye; for many of them now stood accused of failing to introduce legislation the society deemed 
suitable.125  Thus, from the moment “To Your Tents, O Israel!” appeared in Fortnightly Review 
in November 1893, the Fabians all but doomed their plan of working through the Liberals to 
achieve their aims.126  As Pease later observed in his History of the Fabian Society:  “At this 
point the policy of simple permeation of the Liberal Party may be said to have come to an 
end.”127   
                                                          
the extension of the Factory Acts, and the “limiting or ending” of the House of Lords.  See:  A Plan of 
Campaign for Labor (London:  The Fabian Society, 1894), 14. 
123 MacKenzie, The Letters of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Volume II, 9.   
124 A Plan of Campaign for Labor, 3.  “To Your Tents, O Israel!” first appeared in the Fortnightly 
Review on November 1, 1893.  As it appears in A Plan of Campaign for Labor, it is Bernard Shaw’s 
revised version.   
125 Bevir, The Making of British Socialism, 211.  It is worth noting it had a similar effect on the 
pro-Liberal wing of the society.  Several resignations followed, including H. W. Massingham on October 
20, 1893 and R. Whiteing, and Rev. A. Jephson on November 3, 1893.      
126 Bevir, The Making of British Socialism, 211. 
127 Pease, The History of the Fabian Society, 64. 
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Meanwhile, the Fabians found it no less difficult to convince the ILP of their sincerity, a 
task further complicated by the publication of A Plan of Campaign for Labor.  In the tract, the 
Fabians outlined the scheme by which they hoped to secure victory for Labor candidates in the 
upcoming general election.  The plan hinged on two essential elements:  first, financing achieved 
through the collaboration of the TUC and, second, a compromise in which the trades councils 
and the socialist parties worked in tandem to decide on suitable candidates.  For the ILP, the 
farce had been revealed, for it now appeared that the Fabians were unwilling to support Labor 
candidates where progressive or liberal candidates were running—a circumstance independent 
Labor rejected outright.  At the same time, not only did the TUC balk at the proposal, but it also 
refused to throw its exclusive support behind the ILP.  For the Fabian executive, it was déjà vu 
all over again:  the ILP’s failure to secure the TUC rendered it unreliable, confirming the society 
in its belief that independent labor action was “futile.”128  Clearly, both the ILP and the senior 
Fabians—Webb, Bernard Shaw, Pease, and Wallas—found the idea of electoral alliance 
repugnant.  Importantly, this position was not universally shared by all members of the 
executive, a difference of opinion that would have significant ramifications.     
For their part, Sidney Webb and the pro-Liberal wing of the society (including Beatrice 
Webb, Pease, Bernard Shaw, and William Clarke) found none of this especially disconcerting, 
for a timely upheaval in Gladstone’s Liberal government—almost always in the offing—
virtually delivered the Liberals into the hands of the Fabians.129  When Gladstone’s “blubbering 
Cabinet” collapsed under the weight of a series of debacles between 1893 and 1894, including 
                                                          
128 McBriar, Fabian Socialism and English Politics, 250.  As McBriar explains, the Fabians 
proposed that the ILP secure the TUC as a test of independent labor’s ability—which it clearly failed to 
achieve, thus disappointing the Fabians.   
129 Webb hoped for as much in 1892, when following the Liberals’ narrow majority, he gloated 
that the election “would deliver them into our hands.”  MacKenzie, The Fabians, 164.   
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Home Rule and naval expenditure, it brought to power Lord Rosebery, an imperialist130 and 
committed social reformer who “wished to see as much as possible of the Gladstonian past 
wiped off the slate.”131  Perhaps “To Your Tents, O Israel!” did less to shatter the hopes of the 
society’s pro-Liberal faction, for many of Rosebery’s keenest political allies—including 
Haldane, H. H. Asquith, and E. Grey—were intimates of the Fabians from as early as 1891.132  
Hope in the Liberal Party was resurrected in the bosom of the Fabians.   
As events would prove, however, it was to be a short-lived recrudescence.  For by spring 
1895, it was clear that the Liberal government under Lord Rosebery had “virtually ceased to 
function.”133  In her diary, Beatrice Webb described the debauched indolence into which 
Rosebery’s moribund administration had slipped, concluding with a passage from a conversation 
she had with Haldane. 134  Taking in the long view, the thoroughly-disaffected Haldane lamented 
that “Rot has set in.  There is no hope now but to be beaten and then reconstruct a new party.”135  
It was not long before Haldane’s dire prediction was realized; for in June, Rosebery’s 
Government was defeated on a snap vote over army supply, under ordinary circumstances seen 
as nothing more than a vote of confidence in the then-secretary-of-war, Sir Henry Campbell-
Bannerman.  Instead, Rosebery, demonstrating the umbrage-prone naiveté that informed his 
headship, treated the vote as a censure of his entire government, a sentiment which prompted 
                                                          
130 D. A. Hamer, Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone and Rosebery:  A Study in Leadership 
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131 Ibid., 259.  
132 In March 1891, Haldane invited Sidney Webb to dine with him, Grey, Asquith and their 
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Letters of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Volume I, 270. 
133 Michael S. Foldy, The Trials of Oscar Wilde:  Deviance, Morality, and Late-Victorian Society 
(New Haven:  Yale University Press, 1997), 138-139.   
134 Of all the more progressive Liberals, Haldane was the closest to the Fabians.   
135 Leo McKinstry, Rosebery:  Statesman in Turmoil (London:  John Murray Publishers Ltd., 
2005), 338.   
71 
 
him and his ministers to resign.136  In short order, Lord Salisbury formed a new Unionist 
coalition of Conservatives and Liberals which carried Whitehall through to the general election, 
in which the Unionists trounced the competition in a “landslide” victory.137  In a stroke, the 
Fabians’ would-be allies in the Liberal Party, the “Roseberyite” Liberal-Imperialists 
(“Limps”),138 men such as Haldane, Asquith, and Grey, fell from power and became the 
opposition.  In a matter of weeks, the Fabians’ had lost their last best hope of influencing Liberal 
policy.   
Yet all was not lost; for in Haldane’s fortuitous turn of phrase documented by Beatrice 
Webb, the game was indeed afoot to “reconstruct” the Liberal Party.  Acting as intermediary, 
Haldane enrolled the Webbs and Bernard Shaw as experts at permeating political parties—a 
development that drew the Fabians deeper and deeper into the factional struggle which at the 
time embroiled the Limps.  The intensification of this relationship, which no doubt helped 
influence both the “collectivist” mentality and “progressive social reform” which characterized 
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137 Both the Liberal and Conservative Parties’ memberships included unionists branches—that is, 
imperialists who rejected the notion of Irish Home Rule, since it implied the gradual dismantling of the 
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the “New Liberalism,”139 had grave consequences for the Fabians, for it commingled with their 
own internal division between the pro-ILP wing of the society140 and the Fabian old guard, who 
now stood accused of intrigues with the Liberal-Imperialists.  In the context of political volatility 
seasoned with suspicion and distrust, the society had exposed itself to the toxicity of Liberal 
Party politics.   
Though a catastrophic split of the Liberals had already occurred when Gladstone 
committed himself to Irish Home Rule in 1885, the first formal split of the Liberals in Parliament 
happened in 1900 when the anti-imperial, pro-Boer faction demanded the censure of the Liberal-
Unionist Government then in power over its handling of the South African wars.141  This 
immediately antagonized the pro-imperial faction of the Liberal-Imperialists who, led by the 
former “Roseberyites” Haldane, Grey, and Asquith—all of whom had close personal ties with 
Sir Alfred Milner, the High Commissioner of South Africa and, as such, the man responsible for 
prosecuting Britain’s war against the Boers—joined with the government lobby and defeated the 
resolution calling for their censure.142   
The bifurcation of the Limps in Parliament paralleled a schism in the Fabian Society.  As 
Beatrice Webb recalled in a diary entry from October 30, 1899, the arch-imperialist Haldane told 
her that “the Liberal Party is completely smashed.”  Further, “The cleavage goes right through 
the Liberal Party into the Fabian society.  Shaw, Wallas and Whelan being almost in favour of 
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the war, J. R[amsay] MacDonald and Sydney Olivier desperately against it, while Sidney [Webb] 
occupies a middle position—thinks that better management might have prevented it but that now 
that it has begun recrimination is useless and that we must face the fact that henceforth the 
Transvaal and the Orange Free State must be within the British Empire.”143  
 It was, as Pease noted in his History, as if “the left and right wings of the Fabians joined 
hands in opposition to the centre,” a verdict made manifest at the Members’ Meeting held on 
December 1, 1899.144  A lengthy resolution was introduced by S. G. Hobson—followed by an 
equally long amendment by Bernard Shaw who, on behalf of the Fabian executive, tried to 
“persuade Hobson to withdraw his resolutions in favor of something with regard to which there 
was some chance of unanimity.”145  Despite their length, the resolutions are worth reproducing 
here in their entirety, for they represent the fundamental positions of the Fabian Society at 
arguably one of its most crucial moments.  Hobson moved: 
 
That in view of the character and tendencies of the political and economic ideas which 
have conduced to the present South African war, involving as they do embittered 
antagonism to industrial Democracy and to Socialist principles, the Fabian Society deems 
it essential to the furtherance of its special aims and within the scope of its work to 
declare: -  
 
1. That the war is not caused by the Franchise quarrel but by the British intention to 
establish supremacy from the Cape to the Zambesi clashing with the set purpose of the 
South African Republics to maintain their independence; 
 
2. That the Society is therefore not called upon to criticise either the Outlanders’ political 
claims or the Boers’ policy in regard thereto; 
 
3. That no justification for the war has been shown;  and that the plea that it was 
inevitable, if British paramountcy in South Africa were to be preserved, can only satisfy a 
debased national conscience informed by incapable statesmen; 
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144 Pease, The History of the Fabian Society, 72-73; Minutes, Fabian Society, November 17, 
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4. That the Imperialist passion of the moment, the chief cause and support of the war, has 
swept aside all interest in liberal ideas;  has distracted the attention of the country from 
domestic progress;  has debased the conscience and lowered the democratic spirit of the 
English people;  has effected a sinister cooperation between professional financiers and 
the military power;  and in consequence threatens to involve us in political 
responsibilities, which we cannot meet save by the establishment of militarism as the 
predominant element in our national life. 
 
The Fabian Society therefore resolves, through its Executive, its publications, and by all 
available means, strenuously to work for the revival of a sane democratic public temper 
as the necessary basis of all Socialist progress.  
 
Bernard Shaw’s motion proposed amending Hobson’s resolution along the following 
lines: 
That in view of the character claimed for the South African War by the Government as a 
disinterested struggle to secure democratic institutions for the Outlanders of the 
Transvaal, the Fabian Society ventures to remind the public: 
 
1.That the time has gone by for regarding the acquisition of a parliamentary vote as alone 
worth a war.  If it were, about a third of the adult male population of these islands, and all 
the adult women, would be justified in resorting to armed revolution. 
 
2. That Democratic Institutions in the modern sense imply: - 
a. The recognition of public rights in the natural resources of the country, and the 
effective safeguarding of these rights against aggression from the private 
corporations and individual speculators to whom it may be advisable to grant 
concessions for commercial purposes. 
b. The protection of wageworkers by legislation making due precautions for their 
health and safety compulsory. 
 
3. That the country is therefore entitled to expect that in the event of the war being carried 
to a successful issue, the Government will take steps to: - 
a. Secure the rights of the Transvaal population in the valuable mines of the Rand 
by either placing them in public hands, or else exacting in royalties their full 
economic rent to be expended on public works for the development of the 
country, after recoupment of a reasonable share of the expenses of the war 
b. Impose a stringent Mines Regulation Act for the protection of miners of all 
races and their fellow workers underground. 
 
4. That failing the above Imperial precautions, the only effect of victory will be to 
deprive the Transvaal of its present institutions under the Boer Republic, and make it the 
prey of the commercial speculators of all nations and races whose avowed object is to 
make private fortunes out of the mines without regard to the public welfare.  Such a result 
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would expose the British Government to the charge of being the dupes of these 
speculators, and of having spent the nation’s blood and treasures, and outraged humanity 
by a cruel war, to serve the most sordid interests under the cloak of a lofty and public-
spirited Imperialism.   
 
5. And finally, since the spokesman and newspapers of both our political parties, without 
a single exception, declared before the war that the constitutional grievances of the 
Outlanders must be remedied in any case, every member of these parties, whether he 
approves of the war of believes that it might have been avoided by more skillful 
diplomacy, is bound to insist that the advance in liberty and good government for which 
were are professedly fighting shall not be lost sight of in the hubbub of party 
recrimination, theatrical patriotism, and financial agitation. 
 
The Fabian Society pledges itself to do its utmost to recall public opinion to the realities 
of the situation as set forth above, and to abstain from factious expressions which can 
only introduce party divisions on a matter which demands and admits of complete 
unanimity among disinterested and politically conscientious Englishmen.146  
 
There is a sharp contrast between these two resolutions.147  For Hobson, who 
marginalized the issue of the Outlanders’ franchise in the Transvaal (the circumscription of 
which being a key component in Paul Kruger’s efforts to consolidate Boer power as a check 
against the growing clout of British mining interests on the Rand, and thus a grievance partly 
motivating some of the violence precipitating war), the question was one of balancing the 
autonomy of the Boer Republic against the establishment of British supremacy from the Cape to 
the Zambesi.   Bernard Shaw’s political calculus, meanwhile, held out no such gratifying 
illusions.  Instead, his amendment assumes that the war against the Boers will be “carried to a 
successful issue”—hardly a surprising sentiment given the ardent jingoism that polluted the 
politics of the age.  As such, Bernard Shaw’s motion is concerned chiefly with recommending to 
the British government things it should do after its victory.  
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Tellingly, neither the resolution nor the amendment was carried at the meeting.  Stymied 
but determined, the executive recognized the need to consult its membership to decide whether it 
should make “an official pronouncement…on Imperialism in relation to the War” to begin with.  
Thus, in February 1900 the society sent the “Referendum on the Transvaal War and its bearings 
upon the Socialist Movement” by postal ballot to its members and, to no one’s surprise, the 
caucus revealed a divided membership. 148  On the one hand, there were those who argued that 
“the Society should resist aggressive capitalism and militarism, thus putting itself into line with 
international socialism, and that expenditure on the war” would postpone social reform at home.  
On the other hand, there were those who “contended that the question was outside the province 
of the Society” and warned “that a resolution…might have a serious effect on the solidarity of 
the Society itself.”149  In both instances, the Fabians tacked closely to the insular, domestically-
focused agenda they had privileged since the society’s inception.  Yet, when the time came to 
vote, a majority of Fabians favored the government’s imperialist position in South Africa.150  The 
attrition that followed not only “sheared off [the Society’s] most politically aggressive spirits,” 
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including J. Ramsay MacDonald and J. A. Hobson, but “most of its union and Radical 
members,” as well.151 
The rump of the society that remained, which included Sidney and Beatrice Webb, 
Charles Charrington, and S. G. Hobson, was thus compelled to stake out the Fabian position vis-
à-vis empire by publishing Fabianism and the Empire:  A Manifesto of the Fabian Society.  
Written by Bernard Shaw, this provocative pamphlet represented the Fabians’ first published 
foray into the tempestuous waters of British imperial policy, which helps explain why more than 
half of its hundred pages were dedicated to domestic, rather than international, issues.  
Nevertheless, as Clarke observes, the “aim” of the manifesto was to “give imperialism a socialist 
rationale.”152 
 Fabianism and the Empire steered no middle ground.  Directed against both the laissez-
faire individualism of “unteachable Liberal[s]…bound by Cobdenite tradition”153—a swipe at 
free-trade “Little Englanders” like Sir William Harcourt and John Morley, who, according to The 
Fortnightly Review, “out-Cobdens Cobden”154—and those industrialists whose solution was to 
deal with foreign competition by imposing duties on imports155—a position favored by the 
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protectionist Joseph Chamberlain—the Fabians argued that Britain was at a crossroads, and the 
choice before it never more existential.  Would Britain be the “centre and nucleus” of a global 
empire in which inclusion was viewed as a modernizing “privilege?”156  In the end, could that 
very same empire also be an instrument for socialism?  Or would the empire, which appeared 
listless and weak, burdened by outdated institutions and caught between a Liberal Party that was 
in ruin and a Conservative Party empowered only in the absence of a viable alternative, lose its 
colonies and be reduced to a pair of isolated, insignificant islands in the North Sea?157   
For the Fabian theoreticians, the answer to saving the empire lay in attracting the “best 
elements from all political circles” (handily sidestepping the muddle-headed and incompetent 
Liberal and Conservative “old guard”) by combining a strong imperial policy with a “dynamic” 
but “nonrevolutionary” social reform program.158  Or, as the Fabians saw it, a variant of 
Bismarckian social-imperialism159 which framed an external solution (the empire) to an internal 
problem (improving the condition of the most depressed classes of the archipelago) with the 
ultimate goal of “influencing the future domestic program” of the government in power.160  
Doing so required subsuming the centrifugal forces—i.e. individual, parochial, and class-based 
barriers—which had dominated England’s nineteenth century political discourse within a 
unifying communal framework of both national and imperial interest.161  Crucial to achieving 
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this, as witnessed in Germany, was the adoption of a system of state socialism designed to 
convince Britain’s working-class that its interests were inseparable from those of the nation—
hence, the manifesto’s prescriptions, which reeked of Fabianism:  the taxation of “unearned 
income” (and the public provisions it would provide),162 further reform and subsequent 
democratization of the electorate (some 3.6 million adult males still awaited enfranchisement, to 
say nothing of 11 million women),163 and an array of moral and social reforms that targeted the 
working-class (including the end of both the sweating system and “starvation wages,” two of the 
more egregious offenses wrought by the capitalist system, and the adoption of national 
minimums in terms of wages, sanitation, and housing).164    
 Above all else, however, what the Manifesto emphasized was collectivism, a key 
principle of Fabianism since the society’s earliest days, and one particularly favored by the 
Webbs.  Collectivism, in the imperial context, called for the most efficient and least wasteful 
“means of advancing British interests” through the “intelligent direction of the imperial economy 
by experts”165—lest, as Bernard Shaw feared, “trade be exterminated” by competition from more 
efficient states.166  Such a dire prognosis meant the state had to do more than simply engage in 
social reform at home; it had also to assume regulatory control over factories and bring industry 
under “abler direction.”167  Doing so would not only put an end to the “parasitic industries” 
whose owners’ ruthless exploitation of labor had so destabilized the state, but make industry 
more effective and competitive.168  This obliged not only a significant capital investment on the 
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state’s part to “organize industry at home,”169 but also, in time, the establishment of an 
“industrial British fleet” to replace the “lines of commercial privateers” whose ships 
monopolized the transport of British manufactured goods abroad.170  It was, in other words, to be 
a comprehensive collectivization of industry managed by the government and its cadre of 
experts. 
The Fabians believed this model of social-imperialism, sustained by the ideology of 
“national efficiency,”171 which unified local, central, and imperial machinery into an “organically 
working whole,”172 would not only secure the empire—and, therefore, the long-sought social 
reforms—but also lay a foundation for “International Socialism.”173  This it would achieve by 
“making the British flag carry with it wherever it flies a factory code and a standard of life 
secured by a legal minimum wage….  It is not enough for trade to follow the flag when the flag 
has followed irresponsible explorers who purchase concessions from tribal chiefs who do not 
know what concessions mean:  civilization must follow the flag.  And it is becoming more and 
more our concern that no flag that does not carry a reasonable standard of life with it shall be the 
flag of a Great Power.”174 
Thus, taking in the broad view of the imperial landscape from Clifford’s Inn, the Fabians 
effectively doubled-down on empire—or at least a self-contained version of empire consonant 
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with Fabianism, which married social reform and efficiency at home to Britain’s imperial destiny 
abroad.175   
 
Conclusion 
As with the British Empire, the 1890s was a profoundly restive decade for the Fabians.  
The society had formed, broken apart, and re-formed alliances with the Liberal Party as and 
when the party’s own internal configuration seemed to favor the Fabian tactic of permeation.176  
But even when the relationship between these two groups seemed to have reached a nadir, the 
upper echelons of the society—the Webbs, Bernard Shaw, Pease, and Bland, for example—never 
fully broke with the Liberals, even in the face of A Plan of Campaign for Labor.  Perhaps 
ungenerously, then, we can read the society’s flirtation with the ILP as nothing more than the 
manifestation of anti-Liberal spitefulness.  The fact that the staunch core of the Fabian old guard 
made insouciant overtures to nascent labor that did little beyond antagonize it, from imposing 
unreasonable demands on its relationship with the TUC to hedging its bets in elections that also 
featured progressive or Liberal candidates, arguably testifies to this. 
After several tumultuous and humbling years initially spent oscillating between factions 
of the Liberal Party and then between the Liberals and labor and then back again, the Fabians 
understood that they were best served by adhering to an apolitical principle.  So it was that, in 
1896, the society published Fabian Electoral Tactics in which they did two things:  first, they 
declared that the society “does not seek direct political representation by putting forward Fabian 
candidates at elections;”177 and, second, they positioned themselves to advance the cause of 
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whichever candidate was most likely to further their social reform agenda—regardless of party 
affiliation.  At the level of principle, this remained the Fabian strategy for a decade; in practice, 
however, such a policy of benign disinterest proved—and would continue to prove—elusive and 
fractious, as the Fabian executive election of 1900 made apparent.178   
Nevertheless, the society had, by the end of the century, succeeded in articulating a core 
philosophy of Fabianism that would, over time, prove both malleable and resilient.  It is, in fact, 
this very same ideology—and the tortuous social, political, and economic paths wended by the 
Fabians to create it—which Bevir credits with being instrumental in the “transition from the 
radicalisms of the nineteenth century to the social democracy of the twentieth.”179  Indeed, 
Fabianism was an ideological bridge linking the two, bringing together Britain’s traditional 
democratic institutions with au courant progressivism through the subtle, non-revolutionary 
permeation of the political classes, from Westminster down to the local vestry.  The Fabians’ 
goal was, of course, reform—specifically of the conditions which had motivated the radicalisms 
in the first place—but it was also a great deal more than that:  for in achieving these reforms 
through “collective administration” and the “collectivist organization of society” prescribed by 
Fabianism,180 Britain would gradually arrive at socialism through the selfsame traditional 
democratic institutions—this, rather than the destruction of the state.  As we have seen, this 
design had taken on imperial as well as domestic dimensions, a development which would have 
significant future implications.   
In the meantime, however, the Fabians were drawn inexorably into the decade’s most 
pressing imperial problems as they themselves became casualties of the South African War.  
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Indeed, the decisions made by the Fabians earlier in the decade came back to haunt them rather 
spectacularly in 1899.  So much so that, in the end, the battlefields of Mafeking and Kimberley 
were strewn not only with the bodies of Afrikaner settlers and British soldiers—along with the 
ambitions of more than a few of the Cape’s more notorious political aspirants—but also 




CHAPTER 2:  1900-1939 
From “Benevolent Passivity” to Policy Architect:  The Ebb and Flow of Fabian Fortunes—
From the British Labor Party to the New Fabian Research Bureau   
 
Introduction 
Stung by the fractious political entanglements of the late-nineteenth century, particularly 
the debate surrounding the South African War, the Fabian Society sought to avoid political 
controversy that could threaten its recrudescent and clearly fragile unity.  As we shall see, when 
confronted by the arch-imperialist Joseph Chamberlain and his crusade for tariff reform, the 
society steered a largely rhetorical course, emphasizing vague “alternative policy”1 solutions that 
targeted the uninspiring middle ground between the antipodean poles of free trade and 
protectionism.  In the immediate term, then, Fabian policy initiatives tended toward the parochial 
while expressing little innovative spirit in the realm of imperial thought.   
In the meantime, the Fabians, along with the Independent Labor Party (ILP) and the 
Social Democratic Federation (SDF), were invited to help create a body to represent the interests 
of labor in parliament.  The Labor Representation Committee (LRC) which resulted became, in 
1906, the British Labor Party.  The Fabians showed little interest in the new entity beyond what 
Edward Pease described as “benevolent passivity.”2  Yet of all of Labor’s founding socialists, the 
Fabians alone supported the party’s pro-government position when the First World War broke 
out in 1914.  This proved decisive, for it brought the like-minded society into intimate and long-
standing collaboration with the party, a process which secured its position of influence over 
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Labor.  Indeed, as discussed in this chapter, the Fabians were enormously influential not only in 
the formulation of Labor’s new constitution of 1918 and its related policy documents, such as 
Labour and the New Social Order, but also in its annual party programs, including Labour and 
the Nation (1928) and, to a lesser extent, Labour’s Immediate Programme (1936).3    
Yet in the period following the First World War, Britain’s contemporary unemployment 
crisis, stoked as it was by disappointing industrial performance, exorbitant inflation, and a 
largely stagnant international context, created conditions that made many key elements of 
Fabianism unworkable—chiefly its favored “socialism by gradualness.”4  At the same time, the 
Fabians slowly descended into a period of intellectual “senility.”5  The stagnation of the twenties 
was carried over into the frustrating thirties, which witnessed the formation of the New Fabian 
Research Bureau (NFRB).  An independent body, the remit of the NFRB was devoid of the 
Fabian political and electoral activities and was intended solely to “follow the Fabian tradition of 
Socialist research,” an ambit that ranged from guaranteed wages to constitutional reform.6  Its 
subsequent output between 1932 and 1938 was comparable only to that of the pre-War Fabian 
Society, yet the Bureau’s apolitical stance did not outlast the temporal bookend of that six-year 
period, for in 1938 the NFRB and the Fabian Society were amalgamated, the event that 
revitalized the Fabian Society.  
This chapter examines the circumstances which brought together the Fabian Society and 
the Labor Party between 1899 and 1939.  It takes as its point of departure the South African War, 
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which catalyzed the Fabians’ early, pro-imperial perspectives on empire, signaling what would 
become a provocative trend for the society.  Indeed, the correspondence of the Fabian position 
with that of Whitehall in 1899/1900 mirrored that of the society when war broke out in Europe in 
1914.  As we shall see, this alignment of interests did much to shape the Fabian Society’s 
fortunes in the twentieth century.  For, on the one hand, it aligned the society with the pro-war 
Labor Party, while, on the other, it alienated the anti-war ILP, the body which had hitherto been 
the dominant ideological force in terms of party policy formulation.  These circumstances 
nurtured and encouraged an affinity between the Fabians and Labor which, after the Second 
World War and the electoral rise of Labor in 1945, proved pivotal in terms of the potential for 
realizing the Fabianization of the British Empire.  The nuance of these earlier developments is, 
therefore, essential to our understanding of later events.  Necessarily, this chapter explores some 
aspects of the evolution of Fabian thought in relation to the colonial empire, but its emphasis is 
on the degree of Fabian permeation on Labor ideology.   
 
The South African War and British Socialists:  The Fabians, the SDF, and the ILP7 
In the closing years of the nineteenth century, the issues that increasingly came to 
dominate British national politics were all connected with imperial expansion, particularly in 
Africa.  In 1895, for example, the collapse of the Jameson Raid in South Africa revealed not only 
the iniquity of the British South Africa Company (BSAC) and the magnate Cecil Rhodes, the 
raid’s “chief conspirator,” but also the depth of the cancerous malfeasance which characterized 
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Whitehall’s relationship with the British administration at Cape Colony.8  Indeed, Jameson’s 
“underbred business” in the Transvaal laid bare the complicity of such figures as Hercules 
Robinson, the British High Commissioner at Cape Town, as well as that of Joseph Chamberlain, 
the Liberal-Unionist Government’s newly-installed Colonial Secretary who, once assured of 
success by Robinson, agreed with the movement to secure British interests in the South African 
interior.9  These revelations created a public relations nightmare for the British government, 
which following the debacle stood exposed as bullying, bungling imperial provocateurs.  That 
the South African Committee of Enquiry investigating the BSAC’s folly was defanged while 
London “white washed” Cecil Rhodes, who at the time of the raid was also prime minister of 
Cape Colony,10 is testament to the political economy of the age.11 
Events, however, soon conspired to intensify British involvement in Africa.  For barely 
two months after the Jameson Raid, the BSAC was once again mired in conflict, this time in the 
form of the 1896 Matabele Uprising, a murderous tit-for-tat game in which white settlers were 
massacred by Ndebele soldiers and Ndebele soldiers were butchered by the heavily armed forces 
of the BSAC.  As the colony of Rhodesia got off to a bloody start, Chamberlain convened the 
1897 Colonial Conference in London, a vaguely arranged meeting designed to solicit feedback 
from the premiers of the self-governing colonies on various topics, including the potential for 
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federation and the colonial contribution to the British naval fund.12  Little more than a year later, 
in September 1898, General Sir H. H. Kitchener led the combined Anglo-Egyptian Army in a 
vengeful slaughter of thousands of Muslim Dervishes at the Battle of Omdurman in Sudan.  In 
the ghastly, industrial horror which followed “Shrapnel whistled and Maxims growled savagely.  
From all the line came perpetual fire, fire, fire, and shrieked forth in great gusts of destruction. 
…  The dervish army was killed out as hardly an army has been killed out in the history of 
war.”13  Omdurman, as had been hoped, was the ultra-violent means by which the British 
avenged General Charles Gordon who, along with the British forces under his command, was 
annihilated on virtually the same spot thirteen years earlier.  Days later, the dreadfully effective 
Kitchener was dispatched to Fashoda, where the crisis that marked the climax of Anglo-French 
imperial competition in Africa unfolded.   
This near-constant series of crises and conflicts culminated in the South African War of 
1899, a difficult, large-scale colonial war waged by a truculent nation in defiance of the world.  
The profundity of this dynamic was no more competently expressed than by Bernard Shaw, who 
captured perfectly the sense of unyielding British public sentiment for the war in a letter to 
George Samuel in December 1899:  “The Boer and the Britisher are both fighting animals. …  
Do you expect me solemnly to inform a listening nation that the solution of the South Africa 
problem is that the lion shall lie down with the highly-armed lamb in mutual raptures of 
quakerism, vegetarianism, and teetotalism? … Now—and here I am going to deliver a piece of 
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exquisitely English wisdom—either the Boers will lick the British in this campaign, or the 
British will lick the Boers.”14   
This is not to say that Bernard Shaw felt some especial affinity for the empire or, for that 
matter, its imperialists.  Rather, as he wrote to the playwright and fellow Fabian Edward Rose, 
empire “is the disease that kills civilization, and...as [William] Morris put it ‘no man is good 
enough to be another man’s master.’”15  Nevertheless, behind the cynicism of the paradigmatic 
piece of Shavian wit above lay the fast-flowing current of national sentiment, itself fueled ever 
more egregiously by copious amounts of incendiary propaganda meant to stoke the fires of great 
British race patriots and imperial zealots everywhere.  
At the nexus of this cause lay the hydra-like tendrils of jingoistic and aggrieved 
officialdom.  For privately, Chamberlain was determined to bring the Boers to heel following the 
Jameson Raid debacle—and in the high summer of 1899, he had in his grasp a nettle of 
provocation.  After enduring weeks of torturous negotiations surrounding the question of British 
immigrant (“Uitlander”) franchise in the Transvaal, during the course of which he was inundated 
with increasingly frantic reports from Cape Town,16 Chamberlain minuted the following:  “It is 
clear that we cannot go on negotiating for ever and we must bring matters to a head.  The next 
step in military preparations is so important and so costly that I hesitate to incur the expense…so 
long as there seems a fair chance of a satisfactory settlement.  But I dread above all the continued 
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whittling away of differences until we have no casus belli left, although the Boers may claim a 
partial diplomatic victory and be as disagreeable and intractable in the future as in the past.”17 
To effect the hoped-for punishment of the Boers, the Colonial Secretary had already 
installed at the Cape the necessary instrument:  Sir Alfred Milner, a cultural Darwinist described 
by Beatrice Webb as “intolerant,” “sore,” and “bitter.”18  Like Chamberlain, Milner was an arch-
imperialist who believed that the British race was the greatest of all governing races, a succinct 
characterization that hardly does Milner’s hidebound narrow-mindedness justice.  For in his own 
words, Milner was “a British (indeed primarily English) Nationalist.  If I am also an Imperialist, 
it is because the destiny of the English race, owing to its insular position and long supremacy at 
sea, has been to strike fresh roots in distant parts of the world.  My patriotism knows no 
geographical but only racial limits.  I am an Imperialist…because I am a British Race Patriot.”19   
The Prime Minister Lord Salisbury loathed Milner and “his jingo supporters,” whom 
Salisbury was rightly convinced would “force the Government to make a considerable military 
effort [in South Africa]—all for a people whom we despise, and for something which will bring 
no profit and no power to England.”20  No matter; for in the end, the provocative hawks and 
crowing jingoes, carried aloft on an upsurge of national sentiment stiffened into resolve by 
foreign expressions of sympathy for the Boers, particularly from Germany and Russia, got their 
war.   
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The South African War caused a remarkable realignment of friendships and hostilities 
among the British socialists.  We have seen of course how the war coupled with the Fabians’ 
neglect of foreign policy to open an ideological chasm within the society.  Months after the split 
and before Fabianism and the Empire was published, the Fabian executive sent a cyclostyled 
letter to its membership with what reads like a self-justifying assurance: “we steered the Society 
safely through a rapid in which it might have been wrecked by a party pronouncement on the 
war.”21  Numerically, perhaps, the assurance was correct; the society had not, after all, been 
“wrecked.”  Yet, the fact that the assurance appears in a paragraph above a reminder that the 
upcoming Fabian executive election featured candidates who opposed the imperialist pro-
government view belies any sense of equanimity within the society.  It seemed much remained at 
stake for the Fabians in a matter that would not be settled until the appearance of Bernard Shaw’s 
uncharacteristically tactful and delicately-balanced manifesto.   
For all this, the Fabians were not the only prominent British socialists22 to reckon with 
the South African War.  The fact that they were one of the few socialist groups to actively side 
with the government, however, bequeathed to the society a certain ignominy amongst its fierier 
socialist peers.  For its part, the SDF denounced imperial expansion because it smacked of 
capitalist iniquity, whatever its context.  For such leading figures of the SDF as H. M. Hyndman, 
who criticized the Fabians for their “championship of the capitalist gang and their agents” in 
South Africa,23 the war was an especially flagrant example of the sneer-inducing intimacies to 
which capitalism and imperialism were prone; for it was clear that the war’s catalyst was the 
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greed of the Randlords and the rapacity of the mining speculators who were desperate to lay their 
hands on part—any part—of the Witwatersrand windfall.  In fact, an article which appeared in its 
rabble-rousing journal Justice in December 1899 made clear the SDF position: “Those 
speculators of the City, helped by Chamberlain, have egged the Boers on to war, and they 
deserve the reprobation of the whole of humanity.”24  It would be an error, however, to infer 
from this anything like altruism on Hyndman’s part; for underlying such criticism and 
protestation was the decidedly less magnanimous reality of his pervasive bigotry.  Indeed, above 
all else Hyndman conceived British intentions in South Africa as “part of a great project for the 
constitution of an Anglo-Hebraic Empire in Africa,” chiefly because Rhodes’ company was 
financed by Jewish financial capital and his business partner was Jewish, the potential for which 
caused no small amount of handwringing amongst Hyndman and his cadre of anti-Semites.25  So 
motivated, the Marxian SDF remained committed anti-Imperialists—a stance it shared with J. 
Keir Hardie’s Independent Labor Party (ILP).   
As with the SDF, the ILP—which spent the latter part of the 1890s developing an attitude 
toward international matters largely derived from a synthesis of Marxist sources and left-wing 
“Little England” liberalism26—condemned as tyrannical Britain’s grasping imperial 
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Britain’s invasion of Egypt in 1882.  In describing the causes of the South African War, Hyndman wrote 
in Justice that “the Jew capitalists have been specially prominent in this nefarious business, and it is the 
Jew-owned yellow press which has been specially virulent in exciting the jingo mob here.”  See:  G. 
Claeys, Imperial Sceptics:  British Critics of Empire, 1850-1920 (Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 154.   
26 That is, a non-revolutionary centrist Marxist position which, in the vein of Hobson, repudiated 
financial imperialism while at the same time propounding English nationalistic sentiment.  Still, the ILP 
seems not to have adopted a “foreign policy” as such, preferring instead to accept a general attitude 
toward affairs international.  As explained in the ILP News (1897): “The ILP does not possess any set of 
opinions on foreign affairs that can be called a foreign policy, except in so far as it claims that the nature 
of democracy is such that if the power of the people were to become real, the unnatural monarch-made 
national barriers would break down without losing for us those special national characteristics that are 
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machinations in the South African interior.  Indeed, as early as July 1899 the National 
Administrative Council (NAC) of the ILP protested the manner in which the government was 
conducting negotiations with the Transvaal, which the council argued were designed to do little 
more than provoke war “in the interests of unscrupulous exploiters.”27  By January 1900, the 
jingoes got their way and Britain found itself once again enmeshed in a war, only this time 
amidst the vastness of the South African veldt.  J. Keir Hardie, now fully embarked on a pro-
Boer, anti-imperialist propaganda campaign, harshly rebuked the imperial government in his 
speeches and, in an article that ran in the January 6 edition of the Labour Leader, moved to 
position the ILP in opposition to the hawks in Whitehall and Cape Town, writing that “As 
Socialists, our sympathies are bound to be with the Boers.  Their Republican form of government 
bespeaks freedom, and is thus hateful to tyrants, whilst their methods of production for use are 
much nearer our ideal than any form of exploitation for profit.”28   
Some three months later, the NAC took its cue from Hardie and denounced the unsavory 
actions of “Big Englanders” like Chamberlain, Milner, and Salisbury.  Remit in hand, the council 
proposed the following resolution for the First Annual Conference of the Labor Representation 
Committee (LRC):  “This Congress, believing the harrowing war in South Africa to be mainly 
due to the corrupt agitation of the Transvaal mine-owners, having for its object the acquisition of 
monopolies and a cheap supply of coloured and European labour, protests against the destruction 
of the two Republics as being contrary to all our ideals of national political justice, and 
                                                          
valuable.”  See:  Claeys, Imperial Sceptics, 219-221; A. Morgan, J. Ramsay MacDonald (Manchester:  
Manchester University Press, 1987), 26; McBriar, Fabian Socialism and English Politics, 280-306; 
Pelling, Origins of the Labour Party, 145-168.   
27 Independent Labour Party, Report of the Ninth Annual Conference of the Independent Labour 
Party, April 8th and 9th 1901 (London:  Independent Labour Party, 1901), 4. 
28 Keir Hardie, “A Capitalist’s War,” Labour Leader, January 6, 1900.  As quoted in Preben 
Kaarsholm, “Pro-Boers,” in Patriotism:  The Making and Unmaking of British National Identity, Volume 
I:  History and Politics, ed. Raphael Samuel (Abindgdon:  Routledge, 1989), 110-126.   
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respectfully invites the Government to endeavor to terminate hostilities by offering to submit to 
arbitration….”29   
The ILP’s unabashed pro-Boer, anti-imperial sentiment (“We are…dead against any 
further extension of the British Empire” the ILP News trumpeted dogmatically30) stands in stark 
contrast to the posture of the foreign policy neophyte Fabians, who reconciled themselves with 
the government’s cause by framing the British Empire as the fulcrum of a social-imperial 
paradigm.  They were not, however, British socialism’s only martially-inspired apostates; for 
Robert Blatchford, the founder and editor of the exceptionally popular socialist publication 
Clarion, had likewise come to terms with the idea that the empire, gently massaged by the oiled 
and responsible hands of appropriately-designated ideologues, could be an entirely appropriate 
vehicle for the fulfilment of socialism’s aims.  To this end, in the weeks following the start of the 
South African War, Clarion unveiled a strategy that, with cloying voguishness, recalled the 
Fabians:  a marriage of socialism and imperialism.  The blissful outcome of this ideological 
coupling was pointedly expressed in an article that appeared in the November 11, 1899, issue of 
Clarion:  “The distinction between Socialist Imperialism and the other sort is that our aim is, not 
to filch from our neighbours, but to benefit them; not to increase international rancor by taking 
advantage of weaker States, but to promote the fraternisation of the peoples by extending to all 
the advantages we ourselves enjoy …  To develop the world’s blessings for the world’s benefit, 
to work unceasingly for the prosperity of the human race even more than for the glorification of 
our own nation—that is the Imperialism of Socialism.”31 
                                                          
29 Independent Labour Party, Report of the Ninth Annual Conference of the Independent Labour 
Party, April 8th and 9th 1901, 12.  The report of 1901 outlines numerous agenda items added by the ILP 
NAC in advance of the first LRC meeting.   
30 ILP News (March 1900): 3. 
31 Clarion, November 11, 1899.  As quoted in Claeys, Imperial Sceptics, 176.   
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As stimulating as such pronouncements of harmony undoubtedly were, at best they 
produced an ambivalent honeymoon—and at worst one that was thoroughly disappointing to the 
newlyweds.  For “Numquan,” the pseudonym under which Blatchford wrote for Clarion, did not 
necessarily approve of the empire; indeed, before 1898 he in fact seems to have been a keenly 
anti-imperialist Little Englander.32  What prompted Blatchford’s somewhat head-scratching 
volte-face was the outbreak of the South African War, which evidently provoked in him an 
acknowledgement of the reality of the British Empire: it was there, and regardless of anything 
else, whatever formless, unknown and unknowable ocean of chaos its seawalls were holding 
back, whatever inundation it kept at bay, was reason enough to justify not only its maintenance, 
but also its extension.  Thus, for Blatchford, this unquantifiable variable made the abrogation of 
the empire far too “dangerous.”33  Britain and the British were encumbered with Leviathan and 
the only rational choice was to perpetuate it; for in its absence, le deluge.   
 
The Fabians and Labor:  Beginnings and Distractions 
For all the vitriol and bitterness that stalked the debate surrounding the South African 
War like some loquacious predator alert to the faintest shift in allegiance, the war was 
nonetheless a boon to the British socialists, whose visibility in affairs international unexpectedly 
surged.  This was especially the case for the Fabians, whose “new birth pang with a foreign 
                                                          
32 Having culled an impressive array of quotes from pre-war Clarion articles that express 
Blatchford’s anti-imperialism, Claeys’ Imperial Sceptics provides an impressive contrarian’s perspective 
on Blatchford’s later imperialist fervor.  At that same time, it should be noted that Blatchford seems also 
to have recognized the validity of anti-war claims.  Indeed, as he wrote in the October 28, 1899 issue of 
Clarion: “Mr. Chamberlain’s conduct of the negotiations may be open to criticism, there has doubtless 
been some unholy financial intrigue on the Rand and many of the British ‘Jingo’ papers have uttered a 
good deal of pernicious folly but…the real cause of the present war is the ignorance and the 
bumptiousness of the Boers.”  See:  Claeys, Imperial Sceptics, 172-180; Clarion, October 28, 1899.   
33 Clarion, September 30, 1904.  As quoted in Claeys, Imperial Sceptics, 180.   
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policy” roused in the breasts of its membership an intense interest in foreign affairs hitherto 
largely absent.34  Soon, along with Fabianism, the Fabians brought this heightened awareness 
with them to London’s Memorial Hall where, in conjunction with the ILP and the SDF, and 
against the backdrop of a deepening sense of economic depression,35 they were invited to discuss 
the formation of a working-class political party alongside the TUC.36  Yet the Fabians’ card for 
this particular dance had been punched once before—when the ILP proposed electoral 
cooperation between themselves, the TUC, and the Fabians back in 1896—and it was a sloppy, 
acrimonious affair that ended with feet aching on both sides.37  Exigency, however, tends to alter 
circumstances, and for the majority of the trade union leaders, who to a man were Gladstonian 
Liberals (i.e. Little Englanders), the outbreak of the South African War did precisely that.  
Staggered by the sudden collapse of Liberal opposition to the war and the subsequent rise of the 
Liberal Imperialists in Parliament—with whom the trades unionists could not agree—the TUC 
unexpectedly found itself being drawn to the same conclusion as most of the socialists:  that the 
“war had been brought about by unscrupulous financial interests.”38   
Thus it was that on February 27, 1900, 129 delegates representing over half a million 
trade unionists along with a disparate assemblage of British socialists of varying shades of 
radicalism converged on Memorial Hall in Farringdon Street, “that cathedral of 
                                                          
34 Laurence, Bernard Shaw Collected Letters, 1898-1910, 119. 
35 Martin Hewitt, ed., The Victorian World (Abingdon:  Routledge, 2012), 35.   
36 The conference took place over the course of two days, starting February 27, 1900.   
37 In 1896, the potential for trades union-British Socialist electoral cooperation was thwarted by 
Fabian particularity.  As we have seen, when the ILP proposed electoral cooperation between themselves, 
the TUC, and the Fabians, the Fabian executive hedged against outright alliance by publishing A 
Campaign for Labor, a tract on electoral strategy that effectively alienated both independent labor and the 
trades unions.  That this did not put paid any further consideration of Fabian collaboration with the 
advocates of a working-class party testifies not only to the tolerance and common sense of the bulk of the 
Labor movement, but also the caustic domestic political reality inspired by the South African War.  See:  
Cole, The Story of Fabian Socialism, 89-94.   
38 Pelling, Origins of the Labour Party, 206-207; Adelman, The Rise of the Labour Party, 1880-
1945, 28-29.   
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Nonconformity.”39  There, in an atmosphere of “mutual reconciliation” and guided by an agreed-
upon schema40 for their deliberations, it was decided to form the Labor Representation 
Committee (LRC), the purpose of which was to establish, “a distinct Labour group in Parliament, 
who shall have their own whips, and agree upon their policy, which must embrace a readiness to 
cooperate with any party which for the time being may be engaged in promoting legislation in 
the direct interests of labour, and be equally ready to associate themselves with any party 
opposing measures having an opposite tendency.”41   
Pelling understandably considers this the most important resolution promulgated during 
the two-day conference.42  Yet for all its significance as a foundational tenet of the soon-to-be 
Labor Party, the statement was anything but new, particularly to the Fabians, who had proposed 
almost precisely the same programmatic collaborative design in A Plan of Campaign for Labor.  
Published in 1896, the Bernard Shaw-Webb-penned tract outlined an electoral strategy that 
called for the formation of an “independent Labor…party in Parliament,” a plan the Fabians 
framed in terms virtually identical to those proposed at the foundational meeting of the LRC.  
For example, it was argued in A Plan of Campaign for Labor that relations between labor, the 
“Social-Democratic party,” and the “Trade Unions need not be otherwise than entirely friendly, 
provided only all the political societies work loyally for increasing the representation of Labor in 
                                                          
39 Clarion, March 3, 1900.  As quoted in Martin Pugh, Speak for Britain!  A New History of the 
Labour Party (London:  Vintage Books, 2011), 1. 
40 The schematic was the product of an earlier meeting of a small group of representatives from 
the TUC, the SDF, the Fabians, and the ILP.  It embodied three essential points:  the absolute 
independence of working-class candidates in Parliament, absolute loyalty to the decisions of the 
conference, and financial autonomy.  See:  ILP News, February 1900.   
41 Report of the First Annual Conference of the Labour Representation Committee, February 1, 
1901, LSE FSA Labour Party Relations [henceforth L] 1/1.  Initially, the LRC had no policy, but rather a 
function:  organizing Labor candidatures.  This differed from the role of the earlier Labor Electoral 
Association and the Labor Representation League in that the candidates promoted by the LRC were 
somehow to be independent of the Liberal Party.  As discussed in McBriar, Fabian Socialism and English 
Politics, 307-345.   
42 Pelling, Origins of the Labour Party, 209.   
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Parliament.”  Furthermore, among the trio of resolutions that guided the conference’s 
deliberations was the guarantee of candidates’ “financial autonomy”—or, as the Fabians had 
proposed, “A thorough Labor candidature ought not to cost the candidate a single farthing.”43   
It could be argued, of course, that the cooperative nature of these resolutions is, in fact, 
commonsensical, especially in light of the hoped-for outcome of the London conference; so 
considered, any similarity between the LRC’s foundational tenets and the Fabians’ treatise is 
rendered a mere product of circumstance.  Such sentiment is, however, problematic; for it 
presupposes collaborative inevitability amongst and between these groups—particularly the trade 
unions and independent labor—in the face of a historical landscape littered with failed attempts 
at association.44  Moreover, it ignores collaboration between the former Fabian J. Ramsay 
MacDonald45—who, along with J. Keir Hardie, was responsible for devising the ILP’s 
contribution to the conference—and Pease, the secretary of the Fabian Society, in the months 
leading up to the conference.  In that correspondence, dating from November 1899, MacDonald 
outlined some of the principles the ILP proposed to advance at the London meeting and solicited 
Pease’s feedback.46  Thereafter, both men kept in constant contact regarding the committee’s 
work, with MacDonald, then Secretary of the LRC, occasionally consulting Pease on special 
                                                          
43 ILP News, February 1900, 6; A Campaign for Labor (London:  The Fabian Society, 1894), 23-
24 and 29.    
44 Indeed, not every trade union participated in the London Conference, for the conservative 
cotton and coal unions did not send delegates.  In the end, there was absolutely no certainty that in 1900 
the trade unions and independent labor—divided as they were between unionized and non-unionized, left- 
and right-wing—would eventually collaborate to the point of near-coalescence, particularly from the 
standpoint of their political agendas, which independent labor had long-hoped to dominate.  
45 MacDonald resigned in April 1899 because of the society’s referendum on the South African 
War. 
46 As proposed by MacDonald, the three points of the scheme were: “1.  That the candidates be 
run by Trade Union, Socialist and other labour bodies and have no connection with either Liberal or Tory 
parties.  2.  That each party run its own candidates and find its own money.  3.  That a joint committee of 
the organizations running candidates should be the political committee of the combined forces.”  
MacDonald to Pease, November 29, 1899.  As quoted in Pelling, Origins of the Labour Party, 207. 
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points, such as the creation of a Labor Members’ Maintenance Fund—a fund originally proposed 
in 1894 in the Fabian tract “To Your Tents, O Israel!,” itself the basis of A Plan of Campaign for 
Labor.47  Thus, of all the groups interested in electoral collaboration and the formation of a truly 
working-class political party who contributed to the foundation of the LRC, the significance of 
the Fabian role is irrefutable—albeit one which manifested itself in a characteristically rhetorical 
fashion.  
For all this, the Fabians, who as founding members of the LRC and, subsequently, the 
British Labor Party, enjoyed a seat on the Executive Committee48 (eventually Labor’s National 
Executive Committee, or NEC), were utterly non-nonplussed by these developments.  After all, 
as McBriar points out, four years had lapsed since the publication of A Plan of Campaign for 
Labor and, in the intervening period, the society’s executive had justifiably lost much of its 
enthusiasm for the endeavor.49  Pease himself, who for years served conscientiously—if 
unimaginatively—as the society’s member on the LRC executive as well as the Fabian delegate 
to the annual conference, characterized the Fabians’ attitude toward the new body as one of 
                                                          
47 Originally proposed in “To Your Tents, O Israel!” as “A subscription of a penny a week for a 
year from every member of a trade union in the country….”  On January 11, 1901, the Fabian executive 
minuted the following resolution to be proposed by S. G. Hobson at the LRC: “That this Conference 
expresses general approval of the scheme for a Labour Members’ Maintenance Guarantee Fund, as 
framed by the Fabian Society, and instructs the Executive Committee officially to assist in its formation 
by all suitable means.”  Ultimately, the Fabian proposal was modified to an annual subscription of a 
penny and finally passed at the 1903 Annual Meeting of the LRC. See:  A Plan of Campaign for Labour, 
21; Minutes, FS, November 17, 1899-June 26, 1903, January 11, 1901, LSE FSA C/8.   
48 An executive committee of twelve was formed, and it was decided that it should include one 
member elected by the Fabian Society.  Given their membership constituted the lion’s share of the LRC, 
the trades unions represented their majority stake on the executive with seven seats; followed by the ILP 
and the SDF with two seats apiece; and then the Fabians, with one.   
49 McBriar, Fabian Socialism and English Politics, 311.  It has been suggested by Norman 
MacKenzie that Fabian Tract 70, Report on Fabian Policy and Resolutions, which the society published 
in 1896, represents something of a rejection of the cooperative sensibility endorsed in A Plan of 
Campaign for Labor.  However, Part VI “Fabian Compromise” of Tract 70, which states that “The Fabian 
Society, having learnt from experience that Socialists cannot have their own way in everything any more 
than other people, recognizes that in a Democratic community compromise is a necessary condition of 
political progress,” seems to argue against MacKenzie.  See:  MacKenzie, The Fabians, 231-232.  
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“benevolent passivity.”50  Testifying to this general sense of indifference is the fact that the 
Fabians did not put forward any new resolutions until Labor’s Newport Conference—which was 
convened a full decade later, in 1910.51 
In the meantime, the Fabians’ chrysalis of ambivalence in relation to the nascent Labor 
movement, some of whose upstarts almost immediately turned colicky and recalcitrant,52 did 
nothing to insulate them from the political fortunes of the Liberal Party, which had been riven 
following the khaki election of 1900.  Defeated and shunted into opposition by the coalition of 
Lord Salisbury’s Conservatives and Chamberlain’s Liberal-Unionists, the now-fractured Liberal 
Party responded by swiftly cannibalizing itself.53  Mistaking this as the ideal opportunity to 
permeate the Liberal Party and thus massage the government’s domestic reform program, the 
Fabians tacked into the strong headwinds blowing from the direction of Westminster only to find 
themselves wrecked once again on the shoals of Lord Rosebery’s political indeterminacy.54  In 
                                                          
50 In his History of the Fabian Society (p. 82), Pease described his tenure on the LRC as a “little 
comedy.”  Others occasionally stood in for Pease, including Bernard Shaw and SG Hobson.  Minutes, FS, 
November 17, 1899-June 26, 1903, June 26, 1903, LSE FSA C/8. 
51 McBriar, Fabian Socialism and English Politics, 314. 
52 Little more than a month after the foundational LRC meeting on March 26, the NAC of the ILP 
was in the unenviable position of defending itself against accusations of “treachery” by the SDF, which 
soon abandoned the LRC.  Independent Labour Party, Report of the Eighth Annual Conference of the 
Independent Labour Party, April 16 and 17, 1900 (London:  ILP Office, 1900), 7. 
53 Following the election, the Liberal Party’s leadership fell to a pair of Gladstonian “Little 
Englanders,” Henry Campbell-Bannerman and David Lloyd George—much to the dismay of the Liberal-
Imperialist arm of the party.  
54 It is a testament to the fluidity of the Fabian political agenda and program of permeation that in 
a letter to Beatrice Webb, Bernard Shaw acknowledged Rosebery’s considerable flaws, going so far as to 
suggest the inevitable failure of a Rosebery government (“Rosberyites will be at one another’s throats on 
the first Stock Exchange, Trade Union or fiscal question that arises”), while at the same time convincing 
the Fabian “Old Gang” to launch an ill-timed foray into Liberal politics backing Rosebery.  Beatrice’s 
glee at the political intrigue surrounding efforts to resurrect Rosebery as a national leader 
notwithstanding, it was Bernard Shaw’s nagging insistence coupled with his flowery blandishments that 
resulted in “Lord Rosebery’s Escape from Houndsditch,” an article written by Sidney Webb that, in the 
name of Webb’s “national efficiency” pet project, lionized Rosebery and needlessly antagonized the only 
men in the Liberal Party with any prospect of leading a reformist government.  It was a colossal 
miscalculation.  See:  Laurence, Bernard Shaw Collected Letters, 1898-1910, 232-235. 
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March 1902, Beatrice Webb vented her spleen at Rosebery and his cliquish acolytes, in whom 
the Fabians had vested and lost so much of their political capital:  “Asquith is deplorably 
‘slack,’” she wrote, adding that “Grey is a mere dilettante, Haldane plays at political intrigue,” 
while the frustratingly evanescent Rosebery,55 who had “no care for or knowledge of economic 
and social evils, lives and moves…in the plutocratic atmosphere, shares to the full the fears and 
prejudices of his class.”  Irritated, she concluded somewhat redundantly that Rosebery was “a 
bad colleague.”56 
The political outlook did indeed look bleak for the Fabians, particularly considering two 
developments:  first, labor had run two successful candidatures in the 1900 election.57  This was 
                                                          
55 Herbert Henry (H. H.) Asquith, attorney, Liberal parliamentarian, imperialist, and long-time 
associate of the Webbs.  He served in the House of Commons until 1895, when the election brought to 
power the Conservative Party, then under Lord Salisbury.  Asquith was consigned to the “political 
wilderness” for the next decade—until, that is, the collapse of Arthur Balfour’s Conservative-led 
government in 1905/6 brought the Liberal Party once again to power.  Soon after his return, Asquith was 
named to the cabinet as Chancellor of the Exchequer and, in 1908, succeeded Henry Campbell-
Bannerman as the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, in which capacity he served until 1916.  See:  
H. C. G. Matthew, “Asquith, Herbert Henry, First Earl of Asquith and Oxford (1852-1928),” in Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2004),  
http://www.oxforddnb.com/index/30/101030483/ (accessed June 24, 2017).   
Edward Grey, like Asquith, was a Liberal politician who fell from power in the election of 1895.  
Following the upheaval of Balfour’s Conservative regime, Grey was named Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs.  He served under Asquith until 1916, when the Liberal ministry collapsed.  See:  Viscount Grey, 
Twenty-Five Years (New York:  Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1925), 1-21.  
Richard Haldane was a longtime ally of Asquith and Grey, and was likewise a Liberal 
parliamentarian and imperialist (i.e. “Limp”).  He served as Secretary of War in Asquith’s cabinet until 
1912, when he became Lord Chancellor, in which capacity he acted until his alleged German sympathies 
prompted his resignation in 1915.  See:  John Shepherd and Keith Laybourn, Britain’s First Labour 
Government (Basingstoke:  Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 41-67.   
Archibald Primrose, whose political oscillations were the source of so much Fabian grief.  The 
Lord Rosebery was a Liberal statesman who served as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1894 
to 1895.  From 1896, he served as the effective head of the Liberal Imperialist (“Limp”) faction of the 
Liberal Party, marshalling the talents of men like Asquith, Haldane, and Grey.  Unlike those figures, 
however, he did not enjoy a return to power in 1905/6.  In fact, he was a wholly negative critic of both the 
Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith regimes.   See:  Elie Halevy, Imperialism and the Rise of Labour, 
1895-1905 (New York:  Barnes & Noble Inc., 1961), 99-110; Robert Crewe Milnes, Rosebery, Volume II 
(London:  Harper & Brothers, 1931), 50-55.   
56 BWTD, January 2, 1901-February 10, 1911, March 19, 1902, LSE FSA PASS/1.   
57 Most notably including J. Keir Hardie.   
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a disquieting indicator, for labor—from whom the Fabians seemed to be abstaining—were 
gaining ground politically while at the same time the society’s favored Liberals were losing it.  
And while the passage of the Fabian-influenced Education Acts of 1902-3 marked a proper 
legislative boon for the society generally and Sidney Webb’s policy of permeation specifically,58 
it was soon overshadowed by Chamberlain, who resigned from the government in 1903 and 
launched his crusade for tariff reform with “savage persistence.” 59    
Chamberlain’s enormously popular campaign framed a worrisome discourse for the 
Fabians, as Sidney Webb recognized.  “The irruption of this new steamboat into political 
waters,” Webb noted, “will make a swell that is calculated to affect the smallest cockboat, and 
we must be careful.”60  Indeed, for the Fabian Society, the tariff reform movement dredged up all 
the old questions concerning their position relative to the antipodean poles of free trade and 
protectionism—and, by extension, the empire—recalling the circumstances that irrevocably split 
the society in 1900.  Having survived the ideological quagmire engendered by the South African 
War, Chamberlain’s tariff reform movement scraped open all the old wounds—and the society 
unhappily found itself in the same querulous position for the second time in its near-twenty-year 
history.   
                                                          
58 The personal and political intrigues that lay at the back of the Education Acts of 1902-3 were 
enormously complex, commingling a bitterly divided Liberal Party with a Fabian Society bereft of a 
common ground.  For Sidney Webb, at root the issue turned on his notion of “national efficiency”—that 
is, the most efficient means by which the betterment of society could be achieved through things like 
collectivism.  Applied to education, Webb argued that the efficiency of education could be maximized by 
eliminating school boards, with their cumbersome system of irregular elections, and placing elementary 
and secondary education in the hands of local and county municipal councils.  That education was largely 
the domain of religious institutions made the subject agonizingly thorny.  Detailed expositions of the 
Fabians’ contribution to the Education Acts can be found in MacKenzie, The Fabians; Michalos and Poff, 
Bernard Shaw and the Webbs; McBriar, Fabian Socialism and English Politics, among others.           
59 BWTD, January 2, 1901-February 10, 1911, June 17, 1904, LSE FSA PASS/1.     
60 MacKenzie, The Letters of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Volume II, 185. 
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As divided over free trade and protectionism as it had been over empire, the Fabians 
again responded ambiguously, this time fully cognizant of the potential for internal strife, with 
the Bernard Shaw-penned tract Fabianism and the Fiscal Question.  As with Fabianism and the 
Empire, Bernard Shaw invoked the vague notion of an “alternative policy”—a third way, which, 
in this case, was the centuries-old-but-still-controversial bounty system, “which does not raise 
prices, and might be used to hasten the development, within the Empire, of supplies of food and 
raw material to replace those which our present alien purveyors will soon want for their home 
market”—while harshly criticizing the “nincompoop” Chamberlainites and the “obstinate” free 
traders and—for good measure—upbraiding the working-class for “failing to strike out for 
itself.”61  In the end, Fabianism and the Fiscal Question represents a sort of negative ideological 
response to the controversy, heavily critiquing the positions of all the other parties involved in 
the tariff reform debate and hewing closely to the tenets of Fabianism—especially collectivism 
and state interference as a means of “subordinating” commercial enterprise to “national 
interests,” thus ensuring the “intelligent direction of the imperial economy”62—while not actually 
promulgating an official Fabian policy.  Perhaps this was the very point of Bernard Shaw’s 
rhetorical legerdemain, since it saved the society from cleaving itself in two for the second time 
in three years.   
                                                          
61 Bernard Shaw, Fabianism and the Fiscal Question, 35-38.  It is worth noting that Labor 
leaders—those of the ILP and those of the Labor Party—were firmly attached to the doctrines of free 
trade.  Their acknowledged affinity for Free Trade was mitigated in Shaw’s tract in two instances:  firstly, 
Labor’s belief that free trade was not, in itself, sufficient to ensure England’s prosperity suggested a 
relative openness to an “alternative policy,” a fact that softened the edges around the Shavian rhetoric.  
And, secondly, the Fabians themselves were hopelessly split over free trade and protectionism.  To come 
down too hard on either side risked a repeat of the cleavage occasioned by the South African War, the 
very thing the Fabian executive wished to avoid.   
62 Bernard Shaw, Fabianism and the Fiscal Question, 3. 
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Able to find and then navigate a middle ground between the internal contradictions 
provoked by a second, rather public and increasingly politicized debate surrounding the nature of 
the British Empire, the Fabian Society turned once more to what the executive considered their 
“proper business”:  domestic reform.63  Thus, until 1918, the Fabians were largely, although not 
exclusively, preoccupied with parochial affairs, working on the one hand to iron-out the 
practicalities of English Socialism while, on the other, working in partnership with the ILP to 
crystallize the ideological framework of the embryonic Labor Party (formerly the LRC).64   
 
The Fabians “On the Threshold” 
By the time the Labor Party published its new constitution and its accompanying 
manifesto, Labor and the New Social Order, in 1918, the Fabians had effectively displaced the 
ILP, the hitherto senior intellectual partner in the association, and cemented the society’s 
position as the Cronus of Labor ideology.65  The genesis of this conversion lay in events 
surrounding the First World War, which in 1914 not only opened a deep ideological chasm 
between independent labor and the Labor Party, but also fractured Labor’s erstwhile solidarity.  
Renowned for its pugnacious antiwar rhetoric, the ILP’s “extreme Pacifist Executive”66 
                                                          
63 Over the course of the ensuing decade, the society published work on everything from the ills 
of the sweating system (Home Work and Sweating:  Causes and Remedies), the fate of electoral reform 
(The Twentieth Century Reform Bill), and a biography of Robert Owen to the motives underlying the 
women’s movement (The Economic Foundations of the Women’s Movement) and the future of the arts 
under a socialist regime (Socialism and the Arts of Use).   
64 The two were not mutually exclusive.  Following the 1906 election, which witnessed the return 
of 29 Labor candidates, five of whom were Fabians, the society published Socialism and Labor Policy.  
In it, they schooled Labor on its policy priorities by contrasting the Socialist alternatives favored by the 
society—and the “average elector . . . who in the last resort must decide” the party’s future—with the 
policies of “historic and traditional Liberalism.”  It was a by-now familiar drumbeat of things like Poor 
Law Reform, the right to work, and taxation, that great anathema of Liberalism (for, as noted in Socialism 
and Labor Policy, “To the Socialist the best of governments is that which spends the most”). 
65 McBriar, Fabian Socialism and English Politics, 343-345.   
66 Michalos and Poff, Bernard Shaw and the Webbs, 150 
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denounced in no uncertain terms the Labor executive’s pro-war stance67—a disagreement shared 
by the party’s own pacifist wing, prompting the resignation of the likeminded Ramsay 
MacDonald, then secretary of Labor’s Parliamentary Labor Party (PLP).  Meanwhile, the 
majority of the Fabians68 sympathized with the party executive and thus assiduously supported 
its wartime efforts.69  Naturally, the Labor Party gravitated toward the similarly-disposed 
Fabians, who themselves had been orbiting Labor with increasing affinity since the election of 
1906, which returned five Labor candidates who were also members of the Fabian Society.  The 
outcome of the election marked the beginning of a years-long Fabian presence in Labor’s PLP.70 
The figure primarily responsible for the wartime alteration in Fabian fortunes was Arthur 
Henderson, who replaced Ramsay MacDonald as Secretary of the PLP.  A Fabian himself,71 
Henderson recognized Sidney Webb’s ability to formulate policy, draft reports, and to manage 
                                                          
67 J. Keir Hardie declared, “Militarism and all that pertains to it is inimical to the cause of 
progress.”  He added later that “We are prepared to cooperate with our German friends in thwarting the 
malignant designs of the small group of interested scaremongers….”  As quoted in Neil Hollander, 
Elusive Dove:  The Search for Peace During World War I (Jefferson:  McFarland Books, 2014), 74.   
68 A notable exception being Bernard Shaw who, in his correspondence to Beatrice Webb dated 
August 26, 1914, opposed war with Germany because Berlin was an effective counterbalance to the 
French.  Three months and 35,000 words later, Bernard Shaw’s “Common Sense about the War” 
appeared as a supplement in the Fabian-edited New Statesman defending his position.  To no one’s 
surprise, the press forthwith denounced Bernard Shaw as a traitor (to wit the ever-game Bernard Shaw 
wrote to the Austrian playwright Siegfried Trebitsch that “The story of my persecution is wildly wrong.  I 
never was so popular in my life.”).   See:  Michalos and Poff, Bernard Shaw and the Webbs, 143-147; 
Bernard Shaw to Trebitsch, June 9, 1915, Samuel A. Weiss, ed., Bernard Shaw’s Letters to Siegfried 
Trebitsch (Stanford:  Stanford University Press, 1986), 186. 
69 At first and in keeping with the “spirit” of the Stuttgart Congress of the Second International, 
Labor opposed intervention, a stance that changed following Germany’s invasion of Belgium on August 
4, 1914.   
70 As McBriar notes, the number fell to four in the election of January 1910, but increased to eight 
when elections were held in December of that same year.  In 1918, the number fell again; this time, to 
three.  Fabian members of the PLP between 1906 and 1918 were:  J. Keir Hardie, Philp Snowden, Will 
Crooks, Walter Hudson, and James O’Grady (1906); Hardie, Snowden, O’Grady, and Hudson (January 
1910); Hardie, Snowden, O’Grady, Hudson, Crooks, George Lansbury, FW Goldstone, and Joseph 
Pointer (December 1910); Crooks, Ben Tillett, William Graham (1918).  McBriar, Fabian Socialism and 
English Politics, fn. 314. 
71 Since 1912.  Cole, The Story of Fabian Socialism, 131 and 168 
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committees—all of which were on display during Webb’s tenure on the War Emergency 
Committee (WEC).72  The WEC was an umbrella organization that brought together the various 
arms of the Labor Movement.73  As a member of its executive, Webb was propelled into the very 
heart of the Labor Party’s wartime affairs.  Early on, he was encouraged by J. S. Middleton, 
secretary of the WEC and assistant secretary of the Labor Party, to “formulate policies first on 
the impact of the war on the workers and then later on post-war reconstruction.”74  This Sidney 
Webb did, and with electrifying effect became the chief architect behind the committee’s 
proposals.75  Indeed, within a week he had prepared The War and the Workers, a guidebook 
intended for use throughout the country by local organizations like trades councils, trade union 
branches, and branches of socialist societies and designed to prevent war-related dislocation and 
distress.76  Not coincidentally, the Fabian Society issued the pamphlet on behalf of the 
committee.  Soon, Webb was inspiring the committee to act as a labor movement pressure group 
on everything from food prices to old age pensions and the supply and cost of coal.77  As 
Beatrice Webb noted in a diary entry from September 1915, the work of the WEC “has laid 
down the policy for Labour and Socialist Movement during the war.  Sidney, representing the 
Fabian Society, has been able to make himself useful by drafting the resolutions, pamphlets and 
                                                          
72 Also known, rather clumsily, as the Wartime Workers’ Emergency Committee (WWEC).   
73 Including the TUC, the Labor Party, the General Federation of Trade Unions, the Cooperative 
Movement (including the Cooperative Union and the Cooperative Wholesale Society), the Socialist 
societies (the SDF and the Fabian Society, among others), the Women’s Labor League, the London 
Trades Council, and even the National Union of Teachers (NUT).  See:  Cole, The Story of Fabian 
Socialism, 162-163; Lisanne Radice, Beatrice and Sidney Webb, Fabian Socialists (New York:  St. 
Martin’s Press, 1984), 204-207.    
74 Radice, Beatrice and Sidney Webb, 204-205. 
75 Royden Harrison, “The War Emergency Workers’ National Committee, 1914-1920,” in Essays 
in Labour History 1886-1923, eds. Asa Briggs and John Saville (Hamden:  Archon Books, 1971), fn. 214.  
Harrison is quoting from J. S. Middleton’s essay “Webb and the Labour Party,” found in M. Cole, ed., 
The Webbs and Their Work (London:  Frederick Muller, 1949).   
76 Cole, The Story of Fabian Socialism, 168.  The tract in question is 176.   
77 Radice, Beatrice and Sidney Webb, 206. 
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leaflets that the Committee has issued.  …  One result of [the Committee’s] existence is that we 
personally have never been more intimate with all sections of the Labour Movement.  ...  It is 
interesting that in the new Labour and Socialist Yearbook, though Sidney has written more than 
anyone else, his name is nowhere mentioned.  …  We can still be useful as the ‘clerks’ of the 
Labour Movement if we are content to take a back seat.”78 
Sidney Webb had by this time taken the Fabian position on Labor’s NEC which, as 
Middleton later pointed out, was “a position of immense advantage to Webb.”79  Indeed, it 
brought him into contact with Henderson who, by 1916, was not only the secretary of the PLP, 
but also its chairman and a member of Lloyd George’s coalition wartime Cabinet.80  Henderson 
himself possessed some “sterling qualities,” Beatrice Webb noted.  But although he was “a 
veritable rock of bourgeois respectability and control,” she sneered that “he is personally most 
unattractive.  I have never known a man of undoubted power with so little personal charm or 
magnetism.”81  
Notwithstanding Beatrice Webb’s uncouth assessment, which seems not to have 
prevented her from inviting Henderson to dinner,82 it was under Henderson’s guidance that a 
new Joint Committee on Post-War Reconstruction headed by the NEC was formed.83  The WEC, 
                                                          
78 BWTD, March 6, 1911-December 8, 1916, September 9, 1915, LSE FSA PASS/1.  Margaret 
Cole discusses this passage in The History of Fabian Socialism (168f) and describes it as “cross,” 
suggesting Beatrice Webb was unhappy with the arrangement.  This is a curious reading, for the very 
same passage continues “If the young Intellectuals [referring here, at least in part, to the new generation 
of Fabians, including G. D. H. Cole, which was, at best, truculent toward the Fabian “Old Gang”] would 
serve as unpaid civil servants of the labour world and consent to remain unrecognized they could do very 
splendid work.  But young men with vigorous opinions and healthy ambitions very naturally want to hear 
their own voices and see their own names.”    
79 As quoted in Radice, Beatrice and Sidney Webb, 208. 
80 At the end of 1916, the Lloyd George coalition replaced that of H. H. Asquith, which was held 
responsible for wartime losses.   
81 BWTD, December 9, 1916-October 10, 1924, June 23, 1918, LSE FSA PASS/1. 
82 Ibid., September 9, 1915.   
83 Radice, Beatrice and Sidney Webb, 209.   
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with Sidney Webb as its representative, was a member of the committee, which soon established 
a number of dedicated sub-committees to deal with areas of special concern related to Britain’s 
post-war recovery, from unemployment and taxation to education, trades unions, and 
demobilization.  In a collaborative masterstroke, the Webbs “arranged to have the research for 
the sub-committees carried out by the Fabian Research Department,” which presaged a 
deepening ideological affinity between the Fabians and the Labor Party.84  This was confirmed 
when, on July 1, 1918, the Fabian Research Department (FRD) moved into Labor headquarters 
and converted into the Labor Research Department (LRD), there to provide research and 
information under the heads of trade unions, cooperatives, trades councils, and labor parties.85  
The fact that Fabians acted either in the capacity of chairmen or secretaries to almost all the 
party’s subsequently-created advisory committees further testifies to the breadth and depth of the 
Fabian-Labor entrenchment.86   
This chain of Fabian influence on the Labor Party culminated with the promulgation of 
Labor’s new constitution and the accompanying policy statement, Labour and the New Social 
Order, drafted by Sidney Webb.  Both documents bear the socialist commitment that was a 
hallmark of Webb’s research87 and, indeed, Fabianism, particularly as expressed in his 
                                                          
84 Ibid.  The Fabian Research Department was created by Beatrice Webb in 1913.   
85 Norman MacKenzie, ed., The Letters of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Volume III:  Pilgrimage, 
1912-1947, 103; Dean E. McHenry, The Labour Party in Transition, 1931-1938 (London:  G. Routledge 
and Sons Ltd., 1938), 79.  The process of “translating” the FRD into the LRD was largely the work of 
Beatrice Webb.  For the privilege, the Fabian Society paid £150/annum.   
86 For example, Sidney Webb served on Labor’s Advisory Committee for Education, G. D. H. 
Cole chaired the Advisory Committee on Trade Unionism, and Beatrice Webb served on the Committee 
for Health and Unemployment Insurance.  See:  J. M. Winter, Socialism and the Challenge of War:  Ideas 
and Politics in Britain 1912-18 (London:  Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), 232. 
87 Beatrice Webb was not optimistic about the outcome of this in April 1918, writing that “this 
new and, I fear, wholly undeserved reputation of the Labour Party is based on little more than [Sidney 
Webb’s Labour’s War Aims and Labour and the New Social Order].  He [Sidney] made the reputation of 
the Progressive Party of the LCC by his ideas and intellectual propaganda.  Is he going to do likewise for 
the Labour Party?  The analogy,” she concluded, “is not comforting.”  See:  MacKenzie, The Diary of 
Beatrice Webb, Volume Three, 305. 
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“Conscription of Wealth” campaign and “Labour After the War” program, and pledged Labor to 
the “universal” enforcement of a “national minimum,”88 secured through “full employment at 
decent wages;” the “democratic control of industry” and the immediate nationalization of such 
industries as railways, roads, electricity, and mines; taxation based on the ability to pay, plus a 
capital levy or wealth tax to pay off the huge national debt that had accumulated during the war. 
89  Revolutionary as it may appear, it is somewhat ironic that a program designed to preserve the 
wartime state and the increased prominence of working-class demands—by definition, 
conservative goals since it would maintain the wartime status quo—should signal the acme of 
Fabian influence on the development of Labor Party policy for the next thirty years.    
Yet, like the Labor Party itself, which following the war seemed poised to be considered 
a player in government for the first time, the Fabians too were tantalizingly close to the 
threshold.  While it is true that in the period of reconstruction immediately following the war the 
amalgamated Fabian and Labor research departments produced little of note, an exception being 
Leonard Woolf’s study of imperialism, Empire and Commerce in Africa (1919), politically the 
Fabians were buoyed by the sensational performance of Labor in the elections of 1922 and 1923.  
In 1922, Labor claimed slightly more than 29 per cent of the votes, an outcome which brought 10 
Fabian-affiliated Labor parliamentarians to Westminster.90  While a year later the confused 
                                                          
88 An essential component of Fabian collectivism, the “national minimum” was a slogan coined 
by the Webbs in Industrial Democracy (1896).  It represented a sort of umbrella term under which various 
Fabian-favored efficiency campaigns fell, including the extension of the factory acts, anti-sweating 
campaigns, demands for arbitration and an eight-hour working day, the extension of workers’ 
compensation, support for old age pensions, poor law reform, improved housing conditions, and the 
extension of educational facilities.  In adopting national minimums for these, the lot of the 
underprivileged would be accordingly improved, thereby making the state and its industry more efficient.  
As discussed in McBriar, Fabian Socialism and English Politics, 107-108.  
89 Winter, Socialism and the Challenge of War, 207-208; Thorpe, A History of the Labour Party, 
39-40.   
90 Cole, The Story of Fabian Socialism, 193; Thorpe, A History of the Labour Party, 47.   
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results of the election witnessed only a slight uptick in Labor representation,91 the number of 
Fabian-affiliated MPs—five of whom eventually became Cabinet members92—doubled.  Webb, 
who won a constituency seat (Seaham) for the first time, took “almost boyish pleasure in the 
adventure.”93  Of his experience on the PLP that year, Beatrice Webb observed, “And yet 
Sidney’s life in the Parliamentary Labour Party is full of interest.  The Parliamentary Labour 
Party is unlike either of the other political parties as I knew them through my brothers-in-law and 
friendly MPs.  It is a closely-knit organization with a vivid internal life of its own.  The leaders 
do not dominate, and in so far as they lead, they lead by perpetual consultation with the rank-
and-file members.”94   
The bloom was still on the rose when, in January 1924, Conservative efforts to forge a 
coalition government collapsed and Labor was invited to form its first minority government.95  
The sudden arrival of Labor made very urgent Sidney Webb’s remarks in The Labour Party on 
the Threshold, his chairman’s address at the party’s annual conference in 1923.  He stressed that 
Labor had to do more than convince the electorate that the Conservatives had failed to deal with 
major problems; instead, Labor had to prove that it could solve them by using the “principles that 
we preached.”96  Those principles comprised an alternative program, encouraged by the difficult-
to-quantify notion of “inevitable gradualness,” based fundamentally on the platform outlined in 
Labour and the New Social Order, Webb’s heavily-Fabianized 1918 policy document.97  But this 
                                                          
91 Thorpe, A History of the Labour Party, 49-50.   
92 Arthur Henderson, Sidney Webb, Sydney Olivier, Noel-Buxton, and C. B. Thomson.   
93 MacKenzie, The Diary of Beatrice Webb, 407. 
94 Ibid., 416. 
95 The Liberals, still very much a formidable force in British politics, made it abundantly clear 
that they would not support a Conservative regime.  They therefore threw their weight behind Labor.    
96 Sidney Webb, The Labour Party on the Threshold (London:  The Fabian Society, 1923), 4 and 
11-12.   
97 Sidney Webb, The Labour Party on the Threshold (London:  The Fabian Society, 1923), 4 and 
11-12.   
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first Labor government did not get far with its program, for the impressive rhetoric of Labour 
and the New Social Order proved woefully inadequate in the face of ongoing, postwar domestic 
problems—such as exorbitant inflation, high levels of unemployment,  and disappointing 
industrial performance—and a largely stagnant international context.98  Together, these 
conditions made even socialism by gradualness impossible.99  By the beginning of October 1924, 
it was clear that the government could not survive much longer:  a combination of internal 
stresses, incapacity, frustration of its policies, and the growing opposition of both Conservatives 
and Liberals brought it down in November.100   
Scholars note that at this point, or perhaps a little before, the Fabian Society entered a 
period of “inertia” and “lethargy.”101  While this assessment is somewhat overdrawn—for the 
frequency and breadth of the society’s lectures (a particularly memorable series was “Untrodden 
Paths in Politics”), the putting forward of possible Labor candidates to run in local elections, the 
work of the New Fabian Group, and the publishing of tracts and treatises (mostly revisions, but 
some were new) proceeded at a respectable pace—there is nevertheless profound evidence that 
an ideological malaise had in fact settled amongst the “old-guard” Fabians by the 1920s.  The 
most damning indication can be found in Labour and the Nation, the party’s new program, the 
drafting of which was “mainly” the work of the Fabian, R. H. Tawney.102  Put forward and 
agreed at the 1928 annual conference, the manifesto drew heavily on Webb’s Labour and the 
New Social Order.  But unlike that treatise, which had the benefit of framing a legislative 
                                                          
98 Thorpe, A History of the Labour Party, 57. 
99 Ibid., 51.   
100 MacKenzie, The Letters of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Volume III, 216.   
101 Cole, The Story of Fabian Socialism, 194; Pugh, Educate, Agitate, Organize, 142-143 and 
154-157. 
102 The outlining of the program was the work of Ramsay MacDonald, George Lansbury*, F. O. 
Roberts, T. C. Cramp*, Herbert Morrison*, Ellen Wilkinson*, Oswald Mosley*, C. Trevelyan, and 
Arthur Henderson*.  At least six of whom (marked with asterisks) were Fabians.   
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program, Labour and the Nation was little more than a set of principles wrapped in outdated 
socialist platitudes.103  It was, as Tawney later wrote, “a glittering forest of Christmas trees, with 
presents for everyone.”104  Indeed, having read confidential drafts in advance, Sidney Webb 
stressed to Beatrice Webb in a letter dated February 24, 1928 that “I don’t think it will be any 
improvement on Labour and the New Social Order!”105  Of course, he was right; and soon, the 
more radical elements to the party’s left attacked Labour and the Nation for its imprecision and 
lack of commitment.  Troublingly, it seemed that the Fabian Society was not only stuck, but had 
regressed; arguing for the same unworkable solutions in increasingly rhetorical terms.106  Very 
soon, much sooner than perhaps anyone could have imagined, the flaws of the Fabian design 
were realized, with disastrous consequences for the Labor Party.   
 
 
The New Fabian Research Bureau107 and the Next Generation of Fabians 
                                                          
103 For example, the Labor Party was “the political organ created to express the needs and voice 
the aspirations of all who share in the labour which is the lot of mankind…the force which sustains 
society is not passive property but creative effort…[and] the Labour Party since it holds that creed is a 
Socialist Party…[it aims] without violence…[by] scientific knowledge…[at the] deliberate 
establishment…of a social order…to secure…the largest possible measure of economic welfare and 
personal freedom.”  See:  The Labour Party, Labour and the Nation (London:  The Labour Party, 1927), 
5.   
104 R. H. Tawney, The Webbs in Perspective (London:  Athlone Press, 1953), 57. 
105 MacKenzie, The Letters of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Volume III, 296-297.   
106 As Foote has noted, what Labour and the Nation proposed was a “variety of palliatives,” from 
higher direct taxes (a familiar drumbeat if ever there was one) to enlarged powers for certain agencies, 
which were devoid of the political strategy necessary to make them even remotely realizable.  This sense 
of disconnect was made worse by the document’s jarringly discordant tone which, although uplifting, 
would have been better suited to a text on existentialism.  Foote, The Labour Party’s Political Thought, 
124.     
107 Elizabeth Durbin’s New Jerusalems:  The Labour Party and the Economics of Democratic 
Socialism (London:  Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985) constitutes the best, if somewhat muddled, “history” 
of the NFRB in the 1930s.   
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Labor had wed itself to Labour and the Nation by the time it unexpectedly lurched into 
government in 1929.  Given the rhetorical DNA of Labor’s plan, most of the cabinet were 
befittingly Fabians (or at the very least associates of Fabians), as were 21 out of the 54 members 
of the PLP.108  The density of Fabian permeation is further evidenced by the 1931 Labour 
Yearbook, which reveals Fabians in both upper groups of the party as well as serving in advisory 
capacities, including:  Basil Hall, Defense; A. E. Davies and J. M. Kenworthy, Finance; R. H. 
Tawney and Barbara Drake, Education; Barbara Ayrton Gould, Home; C. R. Buxton and 
Leonard Woolf, International; Josiah Wedgwood, Land; Arthur Henderson, Jr., Legal; Herbert 
Morrison, Local Government; Somerville Hastings and G. P. Blizard, Health; G. W. Thomson, 
Science; and C. T. Cramp, Transport.109   
Yet, the second Labor government could have been packed stem to stern with Fabians for 
all the difference it would have made, for the government was quickly overtaken by a worldwide 
economic crisis for which it was clearly unprepared.110  Indeed, the economic upheaval prompted 
by the Wall Street crash in October 1929 plunged Britain into a severe economic crisis.  Since at 
least 1928, British export orders had been falling, a trend accelerated by the problems which 
beset the US economy the following year.  The deterioration of the old staple industries111 
intensified, unemployment continued to rise, and the balance of trade worsened.  Across Britain, 
the number of registered unemployed workers rose from 1,534,000 in January 1930 to 2,783,000 
in July 1931.112  These troubling circumstances converged on the minority Labour government, 
                                                          
108 In total, 47 of the 99 Fabians who stood were elected.  Pugh, Educate, Agitate, Organize, 157. 
109 Labour Yearbook of 1931, 9.   
110 Even Beatrice Webb had her doubts early on.  Less than two months into Labor’s second 
tenure, she noted in her diary that she anticipated the “fall of the Labour Government some 18 months 
hence.”  BWTD, May 30, 1929-December 25, 1931, July 28, 1929, LSE FSA PASS/1.   
111 Especially mining, shipbuilding, and textiles.   
112 Ramsay MacDonald summed up the new and unprecedented nature of depression-era 
unemployment in Britain by posing this rhetorical question in his address to the 1930 party conference: 
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which during the 1929 election ran a campaign that concentrated heavily on the plight of the 
unemployed (one of the party’s more popular slogans was “The Works Are Closed!  But the 
Ballot Box Is Open!”), and stripped the government of its vague rhetorical veneer, laying bare 
the deep chasm between the party’s nationalistic grandiloquence (grounded as it was in “old 
guard” Fabianism) and the reality of Britain’s political and economic decay.113   
The nuance of the government’s spectacular collapse in 1931 has been debated copiously 
elsewhere and therefore need not detain us here.  Indeed, for our purposes the critical aspect of 
the government’s downfall is not to be found in the event itself, but rather in its aftermath, which 
witnessed Labor’s electoral decimation.114  The upshot of this defeat was a series of parallel, yet 
complementary, developments that turned out to be crucial to the future of the Labor Party.  
First, the party, which had been stunned by the “betrayal” of its prime minister, Ramsay 
                                                          
“Is there a man or a woman here who does not know that the unemployment which started last October 
and November is an unemployment of a totally different nature from that which we faced in the last 
general election….”  The Labour Party, Report of the Annual Conference of the Labour Party (London:  
The Labour Party, 1930), 180.  For the unemployment statistics rendered here, see: Ministry of Labour 
Gazette, December 1930 and 1931.   
113 David Howell, The Lost Left:  Three Studies in Socialism and Nationalism (Chicago:  
University of Chicago Press, 1986), 247. 




MacDonald,115 pivoted left to reinvent itself ideologically.116  As part of its rehabilitation, 
judicious watchwords and catchphrases like “socialism by gradualism,” which had populated the 
elaborate programs of the earlier Labor regimes, were jettisoned in favor of more concrete 
agenda.  Here, again, the Fabians played a decisive role.  For the NEC, under the guiding hand of 
George Lansbury, himself a Fabian, established an eight-man policy committee effectively 
dominated by the moderate, Cambridge-educated Fabian Hugh Dalton.117  Equipped with a remit 
to “put the flesh on the bones of the party’s future vision,” the policy committee created a quartet 
of subcommittees responsible for the development of Labor policy on everything from finance 
and trade (chaired by Dalton himself) to the reorganization of industry.  These groups included a 
mixture of trade unionists and various coopted experts and party intellectuals, such as the noted 
                                                          
115 MacDonald’s decision following Labor’s defeat in 1931 to leave the party and continue as 
Prime Minister of the National Government has become Labor Party folklore.  Depending on who you 
read, it is characterized either as “the greatest betrayal in the political history of this country” (Clement 
Attlee’s unforgiving assessment) or the appropriately realist response to the economic crisis (as Reginald 
Bassett and Matthew Worley would have it).  See:  Clement Attlee, As It Happened (London:  
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Parliamentary Labour Party. …  The relationship of the Government with the Parliamentary Party, which 
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attend the meetings of the Parliamentary Party’s consultative committee.”  McHenry, The Labour Party in 
Transition, 269-277.   
116 Paul Corthorn, In the Shadow of Dictators:  The British Left in the 1930s (London:  Tauris 
Academic Studies, 2006), 3; Jonathan Davis, “Labour’s Political Thought:  The Soviet Influence on the 
Interwar Years,” in British Labour Party and the Wider World:  Domestic Politics, Internationalism, and 
Foreign Policy, eds. Paul Corthorn and Jonathan Davis (London:  Tauris Academic Studies, 2012), 74. 
117 Matthew Worley, Labour Inside the Gate:  A History of the British Labour Party Between the 
Wars (London:  I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2005), 151; Ingrid Rima, Development of Economic Analysis 
(Oxon:  Routledge, 2009), 433.  The perpetually acerbic Beatrice Webb referred to Dalton as the “time-
serving manipulator of the National Executive of the Labour Party at Transport House.”  See:  BWTD, 
January 1, 1935-December 27, 1937, April 16, 1937, LSE FAS PASS/1. 
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Fabians Harold Laski and F. W. Pethick-Lawrence. 118  The subsequent investigations of the 
policy committee, its multifarious subcommittees, and even the PLP depended not only on the 
research and reports of Labor’s own research department, under the headship of the Fabian 
Arthur Greenwood at the time,119 but also on the work of an extra-parliamentary section, the 
New Fabian Research Bureau (NFRB), which was founded by G. D. H. Cole in 1931.120   
Created with the “enthusiastic endorsement”121 of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, the NFRB 
was the implicit acknowledgement of the ideological complacency into which the Fabian Society 
had sunk, resulting in such wordy and unworkable policies as those found in Labour and the 
Nation.122  The NFRB123 was the product of a new generation of intellectuals who not only 
eschewed the kind of direct political involvement to which the Fabian Society had become 
prone, but also considered the old Fabian Basis “obsolete” and “unintelligible.”124  Indeed, where 
                                                          
118 Worley, Labour Inside the Gate, 121-122. 
119 Ibid., 151. 
120 G. D. H. Cole, who eventually became the chairman of the Fabian Society when the NFRB 
amalgamated with it, served alongside R. H. Tawney on the party’s Economic Advisory Committee 
(EAC) from 1929.  See:  Pugh, Educate, Agitate, Organize, 158.   
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its predecessor had been disposed to increasingly nebulous policy formulations, the NFRB 
offered detailed policy blueprints and “ways forward” to Labor.  Tellingly, in the mere seven 
years of its existence, the Bureau managed to produce some 42 research pamphlets, seven books, 
and volumes of memoranda—an output that shamed the traditionalists of the Fabian Society.125  
In its Aims and Methods, the NFRB positioned itself thusly:  ”The Bureau does not promise 
immediate results.  It is setting out on a programme of research meant to be spread over a 
considerable period of time, and it is setting out to do its work patiently … conscious that what 
the Labour movement needs above all is the constant expansion and adaption of policy in the 
light of changing conditions, on a basis of accurate research and collection of available 
experience.”126 
Almost immediately after its founding, the Bureau became affiliated with the Labor 
Party—a process initiated in part by Arthur Henderson who, while still leader of the party in 
1931, wrote to Cole encouraging cooperation between the New Fabians and Labor.127  The 
election of Clement Attlee as the Bureau’s first chairman in June 1931 signaled the potential for 
a deepening of this affinity, for Attlee soon became the party’s deputy leader—a development 
                                                          
works for the extinction of private property in land, with equitable consideration of established 
expectations, and due provision for the tenure of the home and the homestead; for the transfer to the 
community, by constitutional methods, of all such industries as can be conducted socially; and for the 
establishment, as the governing consideration in the regulation of production, distribution and service, of 
the common good instead of private profit.”  Just how this was to be accomplished precisely was 
anyone’s guess—hence the New Fabians’ criticism.   
125 Ben Pimlott, Labour and the Left (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1977), 36-37.  In 
contrast, the Fabian Society proper produced only three tracts, all in 1938.   
126 As quoted in Cole, The Story of Fabian Socialism, 226. 
127 While acting as president and chair of the World Disarmament Conference at Geneva in 1932, 
Henderson (who had initially been invited to the conference in his capacity as Foreign Secretary of the 
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I think we cannot do too much constructive thinking on those lines, and the more that you and your group 
can get done in that direction, the better for the Party.”   
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which effectively guaranteed the NFRB considerable publicity within the PLP.128  Furthering this 
process of entrenchment was Cole himself, who, along with other like-minded literati, formed 
the House of Commons Group, which acted as a sort of connective tissue between the NFRB, 
parliamentary leaders, and individual members of Labor’s National Executive.129   
Thus, when the NFRB sent a delegation to study socialism in Russia in 1932, the 
machinery of a reinvigorated Fabianism was well-positioned to influence anew the Labor 
Party.130  Before long the relationship bore fruit, for among the membership of the Bureau’s 
mission was Hugh Dalton, arguably the dominant figure on the party’s policy committee.  As 
part of the wider delegation, the trip provided Dalton with the opportunity to gather information 
on the nature of “planning” in the Soviet Union which, unlike Britain, had escaped the ravages of 
depression-era unemployment.131  Upon his return from Russia, Dalton immediately began using 
the lessons he learned to influence Labor’s thought on economic policy.  In point of fact, it is 
from this point forward that the word “planning” took a central place in Dalton’s vocabulary—as 
indeed it did in the Fabian lexicon.132  Indeed, so convinced had he become as to the efficacy of 
“the principle of economic planning along socialist lines” that when Dalton drafted For 
Socialism and Peace,133 the program adopted by the party at its annual conference in 1934, it 
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However, it was by no means certain that Dalton’s NFRB-informed For Socialism and Peace would 
119 
 
emphasized the creation of a planned national economy as a necessary precursor in the move 
away from capitalist enterprise, called for policies of social provision (in education, health, and 
housing, among others), and the use of surpluses created by “social effort…for the good of 
all”—the very same basic framework which lay at the heart of Fabianism.134  This triumph of 
Dalton’s vision of technocratic socialism was fueled by the NEC, which earlier took the decisive 
step of inviting the New Fabians into direct cooperation with its Policy Committee.135   
So it was that from 1934 onwards, notions of economic planning and assertive references 
to socialism began more readily to characterize party—and Fabian—policy; the vagaries which 
had been symptomatic of MacDonaldism were replaced by the “practical socialism” of a new 
generation of Fabians—men like Dalton, Herbert Morrison (whom Beatrice Webb glowingly 
referred to as “a Fabian of Fabians—a direct disciple of Sidney Webb’s”136), and Clement Attlee 
(whose election as leader of the PLP in 1935 prompted Beatrice Webb to unflatteringly describe 
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as a “somewhat diminutive and meaningless figure to represent the British Labor Movement in 
the House of Commons!”137).  Yet the small PLP—which had been catastrophically reduced 
following the election of 1931—was largely ineffective until 1935, when the outcome of the 
general election brought about a moderate recovery by Labor.138  Indeed, the return of “known” 
Labor politicians139 as well as many experienced PLP and NEC members brought much-needed 
stability and competence to the parliamentary party, with New Fabians being well-represented in 
both.  The PLP, for example, now counted among its ranks Dalton, Morrison, Pethick-Lawrence, 
and Attlee, who replaced Lansbury as the leader of the parliamentary party.  Meanwhile, Dalton 
and Morrison were elected to the party’s executive.140     
As this cadre of like-minded New Fabian intellectuals gradually penetrated the upper 
echelons of Labor, Dalton published in 1935 Practical Socialism for Britain.  Although not an 
official party program, Practical Socialism brought together the work Labor and the New 
Fabians had been engaged in since 1932 and pointed the way forward by providing Labor with 
the soon-to-be-realized long-term framework of its social reform agenda, the ideological basis of 
which was undeniably New Fabian.141  Yet, with its defiant “pragmatism,” Practical Socialism 
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also managed to accomplish something else, as Pimlott has observed; for it “revived” “nuts-and-
bolts Fabianism” by divesting it of the sentimental rhetoric to which it had been inclined since 
the 1920s and, through ideas such as national planning, restored to it a broad-based appeal in an 
age of hardship.142  Meanwhile, changes were afoot within the NFRB itself.  Originally 
dominated by G. D. H. Cole, its provocative founder, initiative within the Bureau soon passed to 
the less-controversial intellectual triumvirate of Hugh Gaitskell, Evan Durbin, and Douglas 
Jay.143  In 1936, this younger generation of New Fabians was coopted by Dalton to serve on the 
NEC’s Finance and Trade Policy Subcommittee and create a “center-left version of technocratic 
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socialism which regarded public ownership and planning as essential preconditions for social 
reform.”144   
Hence, by the time Dalton assumed the chairmanship of the party’s annual conference in 
October 1936, the struts and armatures necessary to support Labor’s ideological evolution were 
in place and the machinery to launch it well and truly primed.  Effectively unencumbered, Dalton 
presided over the formulation and preparation of Labor’s new policy statement, which it 
promulgated in Labour’s Immediate Programme (alt. Labor’s Short Programme).145  Rooted 
firmly in the social reform agenda developed by Dalton in Practical Socialism and, by extension, 
the work of the New Fabians, Labor’s new manifesto committed the party to a program of 
“measures of Socialism and Social Amelioration,” a rubric which rolled up under its expansive 
umbrella a quartet of measures aimed at reconstruction, including finance, land, transport, and 
energy; and a corresponding set of “great benefits,” including “abundant food, good wages, 
leisure, and security.”146  For all this, however, it was a remarkably moderate manifesto, a quality 
which clearly reflects Dalton’s judiciousness.  Indeed, while Labour’s Immediate Programme 
presented the party’s “plans to bring real prosperity and peace to all,” it stopped far short of 
articulating anything like a too-radical agenda.  For example, the earlier rhetoric surrounding 
nationalization which virtually suffused For Socialism and Peace was softened in favor of a 
vague policy designed to direct the “commanding heights” of the economy.147  Moreover, very 
little was said about constitutional reform, deficit financing (Keynesianism remained a 
contentious issue within the party), or even planning.  Nevertheless, the specificity and 
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practicality of Labour’s Immediate Programme constituted a major advance for Labor as a party 
of reform and would, in time, form the “bedrock” of the work of Attlee’s postwar Labor 
regime.148   
 
“A Marriage Arranged”:  Amalgamation and the Revival of the Fabian Society 
The following resolution was agreed at an extraordinary meeting of the Fabian Society 
executive on June 18, 1934:  “The Fabian Society does not undertake the publication of 
pamphlets upon specific issues of policy, since this function is already performed in the research 
stage by the New Fabian Research Bureau and in the definitive stage by the Labour Party.”149 
With one sentence, the society effectively gutted itself, resigning into the hands of the 
NFRB the prestigious, clout-generating function which had propelled the Fabians into the inner 
circles of Britain’s political elite.  Now “elderly” and “comatose,”150 the Fabian Society was 
content to act as little more than a purveyor of “socialist books and pamphlets” and an arranger 
of lecture series and summer schools designed to “re-state…the fundamental principles” upon 
which the “British Socialist Commonwealth” must be built.  It was noted, however, that should a 
“specifically Fabian approach to particular problems emerge” in the course of said restatement, 
“it may be advisable to consider its development and arrange for subsequent publication.”151  
Thus, the society’s new raison d’etre, as approved by the executive, confirmed its own 
intellectual feebleness. 
Yet beneath the banality of the society’s subsequent proceedings and the perfunctory 
revision of tracts and pamphlets increasingly at risk of becoming outdated, there stirred a 
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movement to stave off this officially-sanctioned decline into obsolescence.  Indeed, barely seven 
months after the extraordinary meeting, the journalist, Fabian, and New Fabian Ivor Thomas152 
motioned that the society’s executive appoint a small subcommittee to “consider relations 
between the Society and the New Fabian Research Bureau and to make recommendations for 
closer working arrangements.”153  Later that same year, G. D. H. Cole was invited to speak on 
“What socialist planning means” at the Fabian-sponsored autumn lectures, New Fabians were 
appointed to society subcommittees (Barbara Drake and Harold Laski, for example, sat on the 
Publications Subcommittee), and the society and the NFRB published tracts jointly (for example, 
Colin Clarke’s A Socialist Budget).154  Yet when amalgamation was initially broached by the 
society in 1935, the Bureau declined; for at the time it was trying to organize an investigation of 
Nazi Germany similar to that which had produced Twelve Studies in Socialist Russia (a project 
that included a parallel volume of essays)155 and merger would have complicated the scheme.156  
A year later, the Webbs’ exploration of union was rebuffed by the society’s long-serving general 
secretary, F. W. Galton, who objected for fear of losing his job.157   
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The way was finally cleared of encumbrances in 1938 when, on January 10, the officers 
of the NFRB “plumped” for amalgamation.158  Indeed, contending that union brought with it not 
only greater prestige but also more income, even Cole reasoned in favor of a merger.  But as 
founder of the extra-parliamentary organ which had assumed the Fabian Society’s high-profile 
research mantle, Cole had to be persuaded that the new body should assume the Fabian name.  
After all, would not such a move give the impression that the Bureau had been taken over by the 
society?159  In the end, two conditions convinced Cole that adopting the “Fabian Society” was 
indeed the best way forward:  firstly, name recognition.  Seedy and aged though it may have 
become, it was undeniable that the Fabian Society’s reputation brought with it a certain cachet 
which the NFRB totally lacked.  Secondly, and rather more pragmatically, Cole was aware that 
there were large and non-transferable legacies tied to the Fabian Society.  Changing the name of 
the society meant sacrificing future solvency, a decision no one was willing to make.   
When the merger was finally approved—having been agreed by a vote of 78 to 0 (with 
four abstentions) by the Fabian Society in December of 1938—the revitalized society not only 
retained its name, but its long-standing and highly-fruitful affiliation with the Labor Party.160  
Yet to accomplish all this, significant concessions had to be made to Cole and the NFRB, 
including the laying out and adoption of a new set of rules that jettisoned the old Fabian Basis161 
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and contained, controversially, a “Self-Denying Ordinance” or “Rule 3.”162  The ordinance read 
as follows:  “No resolution of a political character expressing an opinion or calling for action, 
other than in relation to the running of the Society itself, shall be put forward in the name of the 
Society.  Delegates to conferences of the Labour Party, or any other conference, shall be 
appointed by the Executive Committee without any mandatory instructions.”163   
In effect, Cole and the NFRB made amalgamation contingent upon reasserting the 
primacy of the Fabian Society’s research function.  Given her history as the founder of the 
Fabian Research Department (FRD) and her own fraught relationship with Labor politics as 
ciphered through Sidney, Beatrice Webb understandably defended the New Fabians’ position, 
even going so far as to argue in her welcoming message, which appeared in the February 1939 
issue of Fabian News, that “The plain truth is that research and active propaganda of immediate 
proposals are uncongenial companions: the one insists on an open mind, the other prefers a 
closed one.  If Fabians want to influence the immediate policy of the Parliamentary Labour 
Party, they can fall back on their local Labour Party or their trade union.”164 
With that, the “contract of marriage” between the Fabians and the Bureau was sealed.  
The immediate outcome of this conjugation was a revitalized and progressive Fabian Society 
chaired by Cole and presided over by Beatrice Webb in the newly-created post of honorary 
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president.165  By then entering her eighty-second year, Webb held the position just long enough 
to safeguard the continuation of the Fabian Society in its reconstituted form and then, in June 
1941, withdrew.  Thus, one era ended and another began. 
 
Conclusion 
When the constitution of the revitalized Fabian Society was approved in June 1939, 
nearly four decades had passed since the meeting of the LRC at Memorial Hall in London.  Since 
that time, the fortunes of the Fabian Society had oscillated in accordance with the vagaries of the 
Labor Party and the vertiginous character of contemporary British politics.  That the society 
managed not only to survive these tumultuous circumstances, but also to outlive so many 
members of its Victorian cohort is testament to its ability to stay relevant—sometimes at great 
cost to itself.   
For all this, however, the Fabian Society was not permitted to wallow overlong in 
connubial bliss.  Indeed, the honeymoon did not outlast the summer of 1939; for on September 4, 
1939, less than four months after the promulgation of the society’s new constitution and a day 
after Britain declared war on Germany, the Fabian Finance and General Purposes Committee 
convened an emergency meeting.166  At the meeting, it was agreed that, with the onset of the 
Second World War, “the Society should draw up a new programme beginning with work on war 
aims etc, watching and criticising war legislation, orders in council, etc.  It was recommended 
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that the Executive Committee should suspend all committees and sections and should delegate 
powers of action between meetings to the officers, who should organize research and other 
activities. …  It was recommended that cooperation on suitable work take place with the Labour 
Party, the Haldane Society, PEP, UDC, and LRD.  It was decided to offer the Society’s services 
to the Labour Party for research work during the war.”167   
In truth, the onset of war was a boon to the Fabian Society for, as we have seen, the 
society always functioned best when it had a clear purpose.  Absent an overarching context 
heavily informed by some sort of exigency—be it the South African War or the First World 
War—precision of purpose proved to be frustratingly elusive, circumstances which, in retrospect, 
activated the Fabians’ less successful rhetorical proclivities.  Thus, as it had in 1923/4, the 
Fabian Society found itself on a threshold—poised somewhere between realizing fully its 
potential or fading into obscurity.  But unlike the last time, when the Fabians slipped from the 
precipice and descended into a period of “seedy” indolence, 1939 was different.  This time, the 
Fabian Society crossed the threshold and did so with remarkable effect. 
                                                          
167 Minutes, FS, January 16, 1939-June 29, 1946, September 4, 1939, LSE FSA C/20.   
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CHAPTER 3:  1929-1944 
From Imperial Trusteeship to Mass Education in African Society:  A Study of Fabian 
Perspectives and Influence on Colonial Development Policy through the  
Second World War 
 
This country is under a Conservative Government, pledged up to the hilt to the 
defence of capitalist interests.  …  While men’s minds are keyed up by suspense, 
the chance is ours to organize and redirect the democratic forces.1 
 
– G. D. H. Cole 
 
Introduction 
In putting its research functions at the disposal of the Labor Party during the Second 
World War, the reconstituted Fabian Society skirted the jagged edge of its self-denying 
ordinance.  A threshold mandated as part of G. D. H. Cole’s amalgamation concessions, it is hard 
to imagine an arrangement less propitious to ensuring Fabian neutrality.  While it is certainly true 
that in principle the society remained impartial, refraining from making policy proposals or 
pronouncements in the name of the society itself, in practice certain of its bureau effectively 
ignored the ordinance.  This was especially true of the Fabian Colonial Bureau (FCB), which 
was established in late-1940 and chaired by the Fabian and Labor MP Arthur Creech Jones.  The 
ostensible remit of the FCB was to act as an objective research clearinghouse for colonial 
information and research, a framework which necessarily obliged the creation of a network that 
connected the Bureau both to governmental and non-governmental bodies.  Over time, the 
processes inherent in collecting, analyzing, and sharing information managed to deepen the 
                                                          
1 G. D. H. Cole, The War on the Home Front (London:  The Fabian Society, 1939), 8 and 16.   
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nascent Bureau’s relationship with Labor, an almost organic development naturally encouraged 
by the Fabian Society’s long-standing relationship with the party.     
Having been dazed by the one-two punch of the collapse of its second ministry and 
subsequent defection of Prime Minister J. Ramsay MacDonald, the Labor Party was sent reeling 
to the ropes of government as His Majesty’s Opposition in 1931.  There, mired in the economic 
crises stimulated by the Great Depression and buffeted by the concomitant economic blowback 
suffered by its working-class constituency, the party licked its wounds, choosing to focus on its 
favored domestic-policy agenda while adopting a default, paternalistic approach toward the 
colonial empire.  This largely benign position prevented Labor from developing anything like a 
long-term imperial vision.  Yet, this is not to say that the party was explicitly neglectful, at least 
at the level of policy formulation; indeed, rather the opposite is true, for the Advisory Committee 
on Imperial Questions (ACIQ) produced two notable treatises on the subject, one in 1933 (The 
Colonial Empire2) and another in 1936 (The Demand for Colonial Equality of Economic 
Opportunity3).  That these were largely ignored by the annual party conferences, however, has 
led some scholars, including Barbara Bush and Stephen Howe,4 to bemoan the party’s thorough, 
near decade-long muteness on matters imperial.   
This torpor was interrupted with the establishment of the FCB, which remained wedded 
to the society’s self-denying ordinance only until Labor issued The Old World and the New 
Society:  An Interim Report of the National Executive of the British Labour Party on the 
                                                          
2 The Colonial Empire (London:  The Labour Party, 1933), Labour Party Archive, Labour History 
Archive and Study Centre [henceforth, LPA LHASC]. 
3 The Demand for Colonial Equality of Economic Opportunity (London:  The Labour Party 
Publications Department, 1936).    
4 Barbara Bush, Imperialism, Race and Resistance:  Britain and Africa, 1919-1945 (New York:  
Routledge, 2002), 250; Stephen Howe, Anticolonialism in British Politics:  The Left and the End of 
Empire, 1918-1964 (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1993), 52. 
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Problems of Reconstruction in 1941.5  Meant to guide deliberations at the party’s 1942 annual 
conference, The Old World and the New Society included eight sections detailing everything 
from the party’s position on appeasement to its policies on social security.  Of special interest to 
the Bureau was the section on “Imperial Questions,” the basis of which was the work of the 
Fabian Leonard Woolf, who had spent the previous two years devising and adapting policies as a 
member of the ACIQ.  But by the time The Old World and the New Society was published, 
“Imperial Questions” had been defanged by the Labor Party executive.  Gone now were the 
Fabians’ more ardent initiatives and pointedly anti-white settler language, prompting the FCB to 
issue a long and painstaking rebuke to the National Executive Committee (NEC).  This 
admonishment, Patricia Pugh concludes justifiably, signaled the Bureau’s abrogation of the 
society’s self-denying ordinance in regard to party policy statements.6  Henceforth, the FCB was 
an active and unambiguous partner in Labor’s colonial policy formulations.7   
                                                          
5 The Old World and the New Society:  An Interim Report of the National Executive of the British 
Labour Party on the Problems of Reconstruction, LPA LHASC, J. S. Middleton Papers [henceforth JSM], 
G-L.   
6 Pugh, Educate, Agitate, Organize, 192. 
7 In practical terms, the FCB’s work was “rather different” from that of the society proper.  
According to Margaret Cole, a long-serving member of the society and the FCB, as well as the wife of G. 
D. H. Cole, the Bureau was “more self-contained” than any of the parent society’s other bureaus.  
Broadly-speaking, this meant that while the FCB perpetuated certain functions of the parent society, such 
as bringing together “Socialists of experience and knowledge in discussion and conference, by setting up 
committees of inquiry…and by publishing books and pamphlets,” and it was funded, in part, by a small 
grant from the parent body, the Bureau’s specialization in colonial affairs, its separate membership 
subscription base (from which the majority of its operating funds derived), and subsequent direct grants 
from the Trade Union Council and the Labor Party acted to partially sequester the FCB from the society.  
The impact of this sequestration was to a degree mitigated by two things:  first, several members of the 
Bureau’s executive served simultaneously on the same administrative organ of the parent society.  For 
example, between 1944 and 1945, the following members of the FCB sat on the Fabian Society 
executive:  Creech Jones, Margaret Cole, Lord Faringdon, Susan Lawrence, and Woolf.  Doing so 
doubtless helped ensure the Bureau’s work remained consistent with the society’s overarching premise 
and intent.  Second, membership in the society necessarily and justifiably presupposes a degree of 
ideological congruence amongst and between those who belong, notwithstanding individual proclivity, 
peccadillo, and interest.  See:  Cole, The Story of Fabian Socialism, 282; Pugh, Educate, Agitate, 
Organize, 222; Fabian Society 61st Annual Report (Draft), March 1944, LPA LHASC, JSM, International 
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Yet, throughout the early twentieth century, the Fabians were no less subject to the 
vicissitudes of Britain’s colonial enterprise than the Labor Party—or, indeed, Whitehall—was 
itself.  From the debate surrounding imperial trusteeship and paternalism to the practical 
translation of the empire’s fraught colonial development regime, the society strove to reconcile 
the reality of colonialism with indigenous interests, in the end formulating a positivist vision of 
colonial policy that framed trusteeship as the vehicle for the political, economic, and social 
progress of colonial peoples.  As we shall see, along the way, the Fabians worked in tandem 
with, and independently of, colonial officials to forge certain policy initiatives, notably Mass 
Education in African Society (1944) and the Model Cooperative Societies Ordinance (1946).  
Encumbered with such ideas as the gradual extension of democracy and the improvement of the 
machinery of democratic government through such elements as education, as well as the 
expansion of government powers in a way that yielded “positive government action” as a means 
of promoting social and economic equality8 through the establishment and regulation of local 
cooperatives, both initiatives harkened back to Fabianism’s vision of development-based 
progress.  In the final analysis, the success of these initiatives reflects not only the ability of the 
Fabians to extend their influence beyond the confines of the Labor Party, but also hints at the 
complex of idealism and pragmatism which underlay the society’s evolving socialist ethos.     
This chapter examines the evolution of Fabian thought regarding colonial development 
policy in the period between the onset of the Great Depression and the end of the Second World 
War.  During this time, the Fabians jettisoned Chamberlainite trusteeship as a cog in their 
ideological wheelhouse in favor of an alternative vision of trusteeship primed by Sydney Olivier.  
                                                          
Subcommittee Minutes & Documents, 1942-1949; Fabian Society 62nd Annual Report (Draft), March 
1945, LPA LHASC, JSM, International Subcommittee Minutes & Documents, 1942-1949.    
8 McBriar, Fabian Socialism and English Politics, 25.  
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With its emphasis on indigenous African interests, Olivier’s work framed key discursive 
elements of subsequent Fabian colonial development theory for the next 25 years.  This 
evolution of Fabian thought coincided with a revolution in official development policy, for 1929 
marks the passage of Britain’s Colonial Development Act (CDA).  Although economic exigency 
prompted a retrofit of the CDA, ultimately bending the machinery of colonial development 
toward the fulfillment of metropolitan needs, it nonetheless signaled an important change in the 
“official mind” at Westminster.  Indeed, a precedent had been set, and it was the CDA’s 
legislative successor, the Colonial Development and Welfare Act (CDWA), which, a decade 
later, provided vital political impetus for Fabian colonial development designs.  As such, 
included herein is an examination of the degree to which Fabian thought manifested official 
policy under the Conservative-dominated wartime Coalition Government.  This chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the sterling crisis of 1947 and its impact on the postwar colonial 
development drive.  Necessarily, this chapter introduces and explores the work of the FCB, the 
organ of the Fabian Society which, under the chairmanship of Creech Jones, was responsible for 
researching, devising, and pursuing departures in official colonial development policy.   
 
The Fabians and “Trusteeship”:  Evolving Perspectives on Empire 
At the turn of the twentieth century, the cardinal principle of the British Empire’s 
colonial development regime was “trusteeship,”9 the developmental parameters of which were 
                                                          
9 The eventual framework of “development-through-trusteeship” was derived in part from the 
work of late-eighteenth/early-nineteenth-century French social theorist and “founding socialist” Claude-
Henri de Saint-Simon.  Informed by the destabilizing effects of the Industrial Revolution, Saint-Simonian 
development philosophy argued for development as the means by which stability could be achieved 
amidst the destructive effects of “progress.”  As the Saint-Simonians saw it, the necessary vehicle for this 
restoration of order was “an organization of material work”—that is, “trusteeship,” whereby those 
individuals with the capacity to utilize land, labor, and capital in the interests of society were “entrusted” 
with the responsibility to do so.  As imagined by the Saint-Simonians, the system worked something like 
134 
 
sketched by Chamberlain during his time as the Secretary of State for the Colonies.10  An “ardent 
imperial spokesman,” Chamberlain saw the “colonies as being in the condition of 
underdeveloped estates, and estates which never [could] be developed without imperial 
assistance.”11  For Chamberlain, Britain was not some absentee landlord neglectful of the 
maintenance and improvement of his manor.  Rather, Britain was an imperial trustee, an active 
partner possessed of a sacred duty to develop the massive agricultural estate which had been 
“entrusted” to it.  Thus, if the endgame of colonial development was to make the colonies more 
productive and self-sufficient in order to promote the economic well-being of the metropole, as 
Chamberlain’s vision of social-imperial trusteeship held,12 they could no longer be subject to the 
                                                          
this:  banks (and their bankers) were to be “fitted for trusteeship through the creation of a ‘general system 
of banks’ headed by a central government bank.”  These banks, according to Iggers, would act as the 
“depository of all the riches, of all the total fund of production, and all the instruments of work.” The 
destructive effects of progress would in turn, be “tamed through reform of the banking system and the 
personal morality of the banker.”  This idea formed the basis of the Saint-Simonian “social scheme,” 
which offered an anti-laissez-faire vision of the future in which industry and capitalism worked toward 
the constructive, stability-inducing betterment of mankind.  See:  Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton, 
“The Invention of Development,” in Power of Development, ed. Jonathan Crush (London:  Routledge, 
1995), 32-33; Peter W. Preston, Development Theory:  An Introduction (Oxford:  Blackwell Publishers 
Ltd., 1997), 40; G. Iggers, The Doctrine of Saint-Simon:  An Exposition, First Year 1828-1829 (New 
York:  Schocken Books, 1972), 103-110 as quoted in Cowen and Shenton, The Invention of Development.    
10 Stephen Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 1914-1940 
(London:  Frank Cass and Company Ltd., 1984), 11.     
11 Joseph Hodge, Triumph of the Expert:  Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of 
British Colonialism (Athens:  Ohio University Press, 2007), 22; Constantine, The Making of British 
Colonial Development Policy, 11.  Bernard Porter has observed in his book The Lion’s Share:  A History 
of British Imperialism, 1850-2011 (New York:  Pearson Education Limited, 1975) that the management 
of the imperial “estate” was a favorite analogy of Chamberlain’s.   
12 In theory, the social-imperial paradigm—be it Chamberlain’s, the Fabians’, the Roseberyites’, 
or even the Conservatives’—formed a sort of trade-based continuum that improved the living standards 
and conditions of the British working class.  In practice, Chamberlain’s conception worked something 
like this:  London needed to import a staple product—wheat, for example.  The City, at the center of a 
global network of exchange, was not lacking for options, including Argentine wheat and wheat from the 
American Midwest.  The choice, however, was far from simple, for investing in the American or 
Argentine wheat industries could in no way be construed as an investment in the empire—rather the 
opposite was true.  Fortunately, there was an ideal solution for the empire’s wheat-quandary, and it came 
in the form of an Imperial Dominion:  Canada.  By the system of “imperial preference” consummated as 
part of Chamberlain’s imperial estates doctrine, London could guarantee favorable terms of trade with 
Canada that ensured, and possibly even boosted, imperial production of wheat.  In return, Canada bought 
its earthenware, china, glassware, cutlery, or other finished products from the metropole’s manufacturing 
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laissez-faire vagaries of nineteenth-century imperialism.13  Rather, dependencies like Africa and 
the West Indies required a more “constructive imperialism,” obliging a minimum of state-
directed improvements in things like infrastructure, agriculture, veterinary services, and 
education to “unlock” their untapped wealth and resources.14  To this end, the CO retrofitted the 
struts and armatures of Britain’s colonial development regime to support Chamberlain’s new 
“imperial estates doctrine” and its associated scheme of “imperial preference.” 
For a time, at least, the Fabian Society shared this view; in fact, in Fabianism and the 
Empire, the society had expressed views that were “practically identical to that upheld by Mr. 
Chamberlain.”15  This position remained static even in the years immediately following the 
debate over free trade and protectionism, which briefly imperiled the society’s fragile postwar 
recrudescence.  Yet cosseted as they were in a swathe of post-tariff reform insularity, one thing 
about Chamberlain’s system was impossible for the Fabians to ignore: the operation of 
trusteeship within the rubric of the imperial estates doctrine rendered the interests of the 
indigenous peoples of the colonies “wholly subservient” to those of British capitalism.16  One 
need look no further than Kenya, where the impoverishment of Africans at the hands of 
speculative European landlords and the large numbers of “native” producers forced into wage 
                                                          
centers.  Thus, a self-perpetuating system was formed, one that kept the prices of foreign goods 
artificially elevated through the regulatory mechanism of a tariff (hence, Chamberlain’s Tariff Reform 
“crusade”) while at the same time sustaining higher levels of employment within the empire’s industrial 
and agricultural sectors.   
For fuller discussions on social-imperialism and its variants, see:  Peter J. Cain and Anthony G. 
Hopkins, British Imperialism:  Innovation and Expansion 1688-1914 (New York: Longman Group, 
1993), 204-213; Semmel, Imperialism and Social Reform, 1-17 and 89-118.   
13 Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 23.    
14 Joseph M. Hodge and Gerald Hodl, “Introduction,” in Developing Africa:  Concepts and 
Practices in Twentieth Century Colonialism, eds. Joseph M. Hodge, Gerald Hodl, and Martina Kopf 
(Manchester:  Manchester University Press, 2014), 6.   
15 Sydney Olivier, “Liberalism and the Fabians,” The Daily News, December 17, 1901, 4.  As 
quoted in Francis Lee, Fabianism and Colonialism:  The Life and Political Thought of Lord Sydney 
Olivier (London:  Defiant Books, 1988), 105. 
16 Cowen and Shenton, “Origin,” 152 and 156.     
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labor to achieve minimal subsistence attested to the corrosive advance of capitalism, to witness 
how colonial policy had “diseased and disordered” African communities.17  Indeed, soon after 
Chamberlain left office, Lord Elgin, the Liberal Secretary of State, found himself in the position 
of trying to constrain “the evils of unrestricted speculation in land” in Kenya, with decidedly 
mixed results.18   
Indeed, by the 1920s, this system of exploitative paternalism had become entrenched, 
frustrating even the efforts of the CO to assert the “unassailable” paramountcy of African 
interests as part of the principle of trusteeship.19  So it was that, throughout the decade, the 
fortunes of trusteeship waxed and waned according to the caprice of the administration.  In 1923, 
for example, the Devonshire Declaration not only upheld the paramount importance of African 
interests in the face of immigrant settlement, but also rejected outright “the grant of responsible 
self-government” to Britain’s African dependencies.20  Some four years later, however, the white 
paper on “Future policy in regard to Eastern Africa,” written by then Colonial Secretary L. S. 
Amery, argued in favor of extending the responsibility for native trusteeship to immigrant 
settlers, a step expressly forbidden by Devonshire,21 while at the same time suggesting the 
                                                          
17 Cowen and Shenton, “Origin,” 152 and 156.     
18 In office from 1905-1908, Elgin’s seems an unhappy tenure in the post-Chamberlain CO, 
having to impose a regime of professionalism over a cabinet department whose rank-and-file showed a 
thoroughly impertinent attitude toward Crown representatives.  Described as arrogant and contentious, the 
Chamberlain ministry seems to have garnered much ill-will at Westminster and Whitehall, more so as 
Elgin found himself called to deal with indigenous land tenure problems in Kenya, a matter which, 
through 1908, consumed a disproportionate amount of Elgin’s attention.  Ultimately, Elgin “rejected” the 
application European land tenure forms in Africa.  See:  Cowen and Shenton, Doctrines of Development, 
292; Ronald Hyam, Elgin and Churchill at the Colonial Office, 1905-1908:  The Watershed of the 
Empire-Commonwealth (New York:  St. Martin’s Press, 1968), 486 and 420.  
19  As articulated in Indians in Kenya, Cmnd. 1922 (July 1923).  Alternatively, the “Devonshire 
Declaration” or the “Kenya White Paper.”   
20 “Future Policy in Regard to Eastern Africa,” UK National Archives, Kew, Cabinet Papers 
[henceforth NA CAB] 24/187/41, 3. 
21 The white paper argued that the immigrant settlers’ “claim to share progressively in the 
responsibilities of government … cannot be limited to the representation of their own community 
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possibility of a “Closer Union”22 of Britain’s East African colonies and the creation of what 
Priscilla Shilaro describes as a “grand Dominion of East Africa, comprising Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanganyika, and possibly Rhodesia and Nyasaland.”23  These suppositions, reflective of Amery’s 
belief that European migration and settlement in the colonies was the motive-force for colonial 
development and, thus, a precondition for indigenous advance,24 framed the remit of the Hilton 
Young Commission, which was launched in 1927 to investigate and make recommendations on 
associating immigrant communities “more closely in the responsibilities and trusteeship of 
Government” so that they might help determine how the development of “native” communities 
could “best be progressively applied in the political as well as the economic sphere.”25  In 1929, 
the commission’s findings were published in its Report on Closer Union of the Dependencies in 
British East and Central Africa, which essentially rejected Amery’s proposals by reverting 
colonial policy back to the declaration of 1923.26 
As the CO struggled to arrive at a consistent development policy, the Fabians’ own 
paradigm of trusteeship underwent an overhaul.  The change was largely the result of the 
influence of leading Fabian Sydney Olivier, who, during his tenure as a colonial official in 
                                                          
interests.”  As such, their “share in the trusteeship for the progress and welfare of the natives must be 
developed.”  “Future Policy in Regard to Eastern Africa,” NA CAB 24/187/41, 3-5. 
22 N. J. Westcott, “Closer Union and the Future of East Africa, 1939-1948:  A Case Study in the 
‘Official Mind of Imperialism’,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 10, no. 1 (October 
1981): 67.   
23 “Future Policy in Regard to Eastern Africa,” NA CAB 24/187/41, 3; John Barnes and David 
Nicholson, eds., The Leo Amery Diaries, Volume I:  1896-1929 (London:  Hutchinson, 1980), 510; 
Priscilla M. Shilaro, “A Failed Eldorado:  British Trusteeship, Luyia Land Rights and the Kakamega Gold 
Rush, 1930-52” (PhD diss., West Virginia University, 2000), 40. 
24 Hodge, Triumph of the Expert, 126.   
25 “Future Policy in Regard to Eastern Africa,” NA CAB 24/187/41, 4-5. 
26 As quoted from the Report, the Commission held the view that, “the paramountcy of native 
interests is to be interpreted in the sense that the creation and preservation of a field for the full 
development of native life is a first charge on any territory, and that the Government, having created this 
field, has the duty to devote all available resources to assisting natives to develop within.”  “The Hilton-
Young and Wilson Reports on East Africa,” Bulletin of International News 6, no. 10 (Nov. 21, 1929): 
270.   
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Jamaica between 1900 and 1913, set the tone for a particular “Fabian conception” of 
colonialism.27  A long-time student of Comtean social theory,28 Olivier saw in Auguste Comte’s 
                                                          
27 Olivier served as a colonial official in Jamaica between 1901 and 1913, including governor 
from 1907-1913.  During his tenure, Olivier worked to “extend peasant proprietorship” by “de-
nationalising Crown land” for alienation to small-holders—a peasantization scheme whose spirit lay in 
the Fabian tract Capital and Land, which Olivier penned in 1888.  As Cowen and Shenton have observed, 
a “favourite theme of Olivier’s and, not coincidentally of the emerging Fabian critique of British colonial 
rule in Africa, was to contrast the beneficent colonialism of the West Indies and West Africa with the 
maleficent implantation of settler and large-scale production in Kenya and Southern Africa.”  Later, 
Olivier became Lord Olivier and Secretary of State for India.  Cowen and Shenton, “Origin,” 153. 
28 As a theory of human development, “positivism” originated with the work of Auguste Comte 
(1798-1857), Henri-Claude de Saint Simon’s secretary and principal ideological successor.  Comte argued 
that the Saint-Simonian paradigm of development (the model which eventually lay at the back of 
Chamberlainite trusteeship) had, in fact, failed to reconcile progress with order; for progress remained 
imperfect—relentless, inconstant, and chaotic and had not, therefore, brought about the “constructive 
order” promised by the Saint-Simonian model.  Thus, development-based “improvement” had reached an 
impasse.  The solution, Comte believed, was philosophical; hence, positivism, the character of which is 
generally defined as being altruistic, or the putting of “the social above the personal.” 
As outlined in Comte’s “Law of Three Stages,” positivism was the third and final stage of human 
development.  Briefly, Comte reasoned that human society developed through a trio of “mentally 
conceived” stages, each of which was defined by the means and methods humans used to understand and 
rationalize the world around them:  the Theological Stage, the Metaphysical Stage, and the Positive Stage.  
In the Theological Stage, human development is subject to and entirely dependent upon the caprice of 
personified deities—as expressed, for instance, in animistic, polytheistic, and monotheistic belief systems.  
The Metaphysical Stage is a sort of “abstractified” extension of this first stage.  Lastly, the Positive Stage 
(alt. the Scientific Stage), in which human development is understood/explained by way of observation, 
experiment, and comparison.  Unlike the earlier, supernatural stages, the Positive Stage relies on the 
scientific method and objective thought to explain the natural world and correct for its imperfections.   
Considered within the context of development, it is in the Positive Stage that humanity acquires 
the intellectual capacity necessary to “tame progress” through order so that it might achieve the kind of 
altruistic, mature, morality-based “progressive development” required for “improvement.”  In the end, 
what this Comtean model of development effectively did was bring together the Saint-Simonian banker-
trustees with Comte’s “high priests of positivism”—scientists and sociologists—as the new agents of 
“collective development.”   
The Comtean model of social theory was pivotal in the formation of the Fabians’ own vision of 
social trusteeship.  However, the Fabians’ version differed from that of Comte in that it “rejected the role 
of the banker as a social trustee.”  Indeed, in keeping with their own theory of rent, the Fabians saw 
bankers as just another active and “knowingly self-interested” (rather than altruistic) party that received 
“rents”—in the form of things like interest—in much the same way landlords received rents from land.  
Inasmuch as landlords could “not be depended upon to fulfill their social obligation to make land 
productive and at the same time keep labor employed without destitution,” bankers could likewise not be 
trusted to act impartially.  The Fabians therefore fell back upon state officials who did have the “potential 
to be positively enlightened” or “permeated” by Fabian thought.  Thus, in the Fabian vision of social 
trusteeship, bankers were replaced state officials as the new priests of positivism imagined by Comte.   
For the best source on Comtean Positivism, see:  A Comte (trans.), A General View of Positivism 
(Aberdeen:  A. King & Co, 1865).  For notable—if esoteric—renderings on the connections between 
Saint-Simonian trusteeship and Comtean Positivism and British and Fabian colonial development 
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doctrine of positivism the means by which development could not only correct the depredations 
of Chamberlainite trusteeship—which critics held promoted capitalist interests as the “chief 
function of the State”29—but also lead to social, political, and economic improvement in the 
colonies.  This positivist assessment of development’s potential formed the basis of “Fabian 
Trusteeship,” which in effect redefined Bernard Shaw’s “privilege” of inclusion in the empire by 
converting social obligation—such as the protection of colonial subjects from the ravages of the 
market—into a regime of progressive development arranged and ordered by altruistic state 
officials (or “trustees”).30  Thus, for Olivier, and a growing body of Fabians, including Leonard 
Woolf, Graham Wallas, and, eventually, Sidney Webb, the question confronting imperial Britain 
was no longer if it would remain the “centre and nucleus” of a global empire characterized by 
“Responsible Government,” as Bernard Shaw had postulated in Fabianism and the Empire, but 
whether or not the “State can be changed from an instrument of economic exploitation into an 
instrument of good government and progress.”31   
Leonard Woolf—publisher and close friend of Olivier and, arguably, the Fabian nearest 
to him ideologically32—developed this theme in Empire and Commerce in Africa.  Published by 
the Labor Research Department in 1919, which had recently been amalgamated with the research 
arm of the Fabian Society, Woolf argued that Britain’s position in Africa was “merely that of 
trustee for the native population and that its only duty was to promote the interests…of the 
Africans.”33  This benign sense of trusteeship was to be guided by a bundle of principles that 
                                                          
policies, see Cowen and Shenton, “The Invention of Development” in Power of Development, 27-43; 
Cowen and Shenton, Doctrines of Development. 
29  Leonard Woolf, Empire and Commerce in Africa:  A Study in Economic Imperialism (London:  
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1920), 9 and 352-353.   
30 Cowen and Shenton, “Origin,” 156-157.  
31 Woolf, Empire and Commerce in Africa, 358.   
32 This ideological affinity is explored in Lee’s Fabianism and Colonialism, 170-197.   
33 Woolf, Empire and Commerce in Africa, 362.   
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included the protection of native land rights and the use of revenue derived from the land to 
support native development, measures that constituted an early roadmap toward eventual self-
government.  Later, Woolf extended versions of these principles to Labor’s colonial policy 
formulations when, as secretary of the Imperial Affairs Sub-Committee34 (later renamed the 
Advisory Committee on Imperial Questions), he drafted, along with its chairman, the Fabian C. 
R. Buxton, The Empire in Africa:  Labour’s Policy (1926), the party’s first comprehensive 
colonial policy statement.35   
 As Labor’s policy crystallized around a nucleus of Fabian-approved doctrine, Sydney 
(now Lord) Olivier launched a broadside against Amery’s White Paper in the House of Lords.  
The principle of trusteeship as expressed in the Devonshire Declaration, he observed, represented 
a “distinct and acceptable departure” from the earlier Chamberlainite policy which regarded 
“Imperial Dominions as undeveloped estates of the sovereign nation.”36  Amery’s white paper, 
with its controversial reliance and the “fallacy”37 of benevolent immigrant trusteeship vis-à-vis 
native affairs, threatened to wreck this and, in the process, destroy “the confidence of African 
                                                          
34 Mary Davis, “Labour, Race and Empire:  The Trades Union Congress and Colonial Policy, 
1945-51,” in The British Labour Movement and Imperialism, eds. Billy Frank, Craig Horner, and David 
Stewart (Newcastle-upon-Tyne:  Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010), 91. 
35 Helen Carr, “Virginia Woolf:  Empire and Race,” in The Cambridge Companion to Virginia 
Woolf, ed. Susan Sellers (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2010), 200.   
Labor had earlier toyed with colonial issues.  For example, in its 1922 election manifesto, 
Labour’s Call to the People, the party included a section entitled “Freedom in the Empire” which 
recommended independence for Egypt and home rule for India and Ireland.  However, Empire in Africa 
represents the party’s first wide-ranging effort at addressing colonialism in the African context, a novelty 
touted by the document (“Labour,” it announced, “has hitherto naturally given little detailed attention to 
the Empire”).  See:  Robert G. Gregory, Sidney Webb and East Africa:  Labor’s Experiment with the 
Doctrine of Native Paramountcy (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1962), 83; Goldsworthy, 
Colonial Issues in British Politics, 113. 
36 Sydney Olivier, White Capital and Coloured Labour (London:  Hogarth Press, 1929), 358.   
37 Lord Olivier, Speech to the House of Lords, March 13, 1929, Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 
5th ser., vol. 73, col. 481.   
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natives in the British government.”38  When in early 1929 the Hilton Young Commission 
delivered to Parliament its findings affirming39 but vaguely the imperial government’s principles 
of trusteeship as outlined in 1923, its imprecision only fueled Olivier’s frustration, who 
complained that it was “not enough” to simply adopt the principles of trusteeship and to reiterate 
their adoption in white papers. 40  
For Olivier, this war of words over trusteeship climaxed in the tract Imperial Trusteeship, 
which the Fabian Society published in 1929.  Hewing closely to Labor’s colonial policy as 
formulated in Woolf and Buxton’s Empire in Africa and partially informed by the Hilton Young 
Commission’s report, the Olivier-penned treatise proposed a framework of state-run social 
trusteeship that scuttled Chamberlainite policy.  Based on Devonshire’s ostensible “dictum that 
native interests are to be paramount,”41 Olivier’s model delinked European landlordism and its 
                                                          
38 Lord Olivier, Speech to the House of Lords, December 7, 1927, Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 
5th ser., vol. 69, cols. 551-600. 
39 Great Britain, Report on Closer Union of the Dependencies in British East and Central Africa, 
Cmnd. 3234 (1929).  The report assigned the following meaning to the “Paramountcy of native interests”: 
“first, to define what are the essential native interests; secondly, to settle what are the conditions which 
must be created and preserved in order to give those interests a fair field in which to start and an adequate 
measure of protection and assistance for their development, and, thirdly, to allow nothing to interfere with 
these conditions.  Subject to these requirements, the Government must do all in its power to help the 
immigrant communities.” Report, 41.   
40 Lord Olivier, Speech to the House of Lords, March 13, 1929, Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 
5th ser., vol. 73, col. 480-481. 
41 Despite Olivier’s grandiloquence, the declaration’s doctrine of “native” paramountcy was 
hardly the manifestation of humanitarian magnanimity his rhetoric implied.  Indeed, at the time the 
Devonshire Declaration was promulgated, African paramountcy was little more than a political expedient, 
the means by which the simmering tensions which had characterized relations between the Indian 
immigrant population in Kenya and the colony’s white settler population since 1919 could be defused.   
Kenya’s “Indian question” had, since the First World War, pivoted on four issues:  Indians 
demanded 1) the right to obtain land in the European “white highlands;” 2) the “same political rights as 
those granted to the settlers after the war;” 3) an end to both commercial and residential segregation in the 
colony’s urban areas; and 4) the right of Indians to “immigrate freely” to Kenya.  After three years of 
haggling, the India Office and the CO put forward in 1922 the Wood-Winterton plan (so named after the 
plan’s leading architects, Stuart Edward Wood, under-secretary of state at the CO, and his opposite at the 
India Office, Lord Winterton), which sought to strike a balance between the two parties.  On one hand, 
the Wood-Winterton formula rejected the notion of Indian immigrants obtaining land in the highlands, a 
preclusion which effectively left the area exclusively in the hands of white settlers; on the other hand, it 
adopted Indian demands for an “end to urban residential and commercial segregation.”  In the immediate 
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concomitant scourges from the health and longevity of the empire by ensuring adherence to the 
“just and equal principles of British Imperial rule which prior to the Imperial development period 
were assumed [to be] axiomatic.”42  In effect, Olivier—and, by extension, the Fabian Society 
itself—argued that a return to the humanitarian precepts of “justice, liberty and equality of civic 
privilege”43 that characterized Britain’s “Old Empire”44 was the necessary bridge between the 
contemporary rhetoric of trusteeship and its reality.   
                                                          
term, however, such ameliorative efforts amounted to naught, for changing political fortunes in London 
coupled with European intransigence in Kenya to forestall resolution.  Until, that is, early the following 
year, when considerations over African rights interposed and presented officials with “a clever and 
convenient way out of a serious imperial problem.”   
On the surface, at least, the two sets of issues seem poles apart—and yet, a swathe of fiscal 
common ground existed between them.  For the very same year that the Wood-Winterton plan was being 
formulated, it dawned on the CO that the economic policy of Governor Sir Edward Northey (in office, 
1919-1922), based entirely on European production for export, posed two very real dangers:  first, the 
bankruptcy of the colony; second, rising levels of African dissent.  The ramifications of these 
developments were all-too-vividly realized in the form of intensifying African nationalism and its 
concomitant scourge, rebelliousness, as embodied by the work of Harry Thuku and the East African 
Association; “by the complaints of British capitalists;” and by the protestations of British humanitarians.  
Pressurized seemingly from every angle, the CO did the only realistic thing it could to help ventilate these 
frustrations:  in 1922, it committed itself to measures “for encouraging native agriculture and industry.” 
The decision to do so had a ripple effect on the controversy surrounding the Indian question.  For 
the revivification of African production for export required not only greater assistance to African 
agriculture and increased provision of services to the reserves (thereby defusing an increasingly volatile 
political situation between the colony and its African subjects), but also the presence of Indian traders 
who would “provide the means for getting African product to the world market.”  Hence, there could be, 
as Maxon observes, “no question of a complete stoppage of Indian immigration, nor could there be a 
complete denial of Indian claims for equal rights.”  As a result, driven by economic necessity, the 
Devonshire Declaration included language that guaranteed the paramountcy of African interests.  Despite 
this, however, the officials at Whitehall went to some lengths to assure the white settler population that 
African production for export was meant to complement, not supplant, European production.  Framed 
accordingly, Olivier’s allusion back to Devonshire’s dictum is, at best, the sincerest form of rhetorical 
flummery.  See:  Robert M. Maxon, “The Devonshire Declaration:  The Myth of Missionary 
Intervention,” History of Africa 18 (1991), 259-270.   
42 Sydney Olivier, Imperial Trusteeship (London:  The Fabian Society, 1929), 4-5 and 13.   
43 Ibid., 4.   
44 Cowen and Shenton, “Origin,” 156.  As explained by the authors, Olivier contrasted Britain’s 
“third Empire,” which was created by the partition and subsequent colonization of Africa, with the “Old 
Empires” of white settlement, such as North America.  Olivier argued that there had been two motives 
behind the creation of this third Empire: first, “to secure minerals and materials which might have fallen 
into the hands of foreign powers” and, second, “to protect Africans from the ‘destruction and 
exploitation’ which they would have received at the hands of others.”  Olivier saw these motives as being 
consistent with the principles and practices of the evolving old empires, which had incorporated 
humanitarian precepts into the imperial transition from mercantilism to self-government.  But the 
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By this time, the Fabians had never been closer to realizing their vision of social 
trusteeship.  For in the summer of 1929, the newly-installed Labor government, equipped with 
Empire in Africa, initiated a series of policy changes seemingly calculated to consummate the 
Fabian design:  first, the founder Fabian Sidney Webb, who chaired Labor’s Imperial Affairs 
Sub-Committee from 1918-1921,45 was elevated to a peerage (the Lord Passfield), an 
appointment accompanied by his installation as Secretary of State for the Colonies;46 a month 
later, Parliament passed the long-gestating CDA, which set aside funds for “aiding and 
developing agriculture and industry” in the colonies.47  Taken together, this cascade of good 
fortune suggested that the stars in the constellation of Fabian Trusteeship had well and truly—if 
unexpectedly—aligned.  “Fabians to the Rescue!” The Clarion boldly proclaimed.48 
Events, however, soon conspired to disillusion the Fabians—and the first sign of 
difficulty came from an unexpected source:  Sidney Webb himself.  In June 1930,49 Webb issued 
his Memorandum on Native Policy in East Africa which, although it upheld the paramountcy of 
                                                          
practices of the “third Empire” had departed from the precepts “under the pressure of intensified capitalist 
competition,” with the result being the exploitation of Africans.   
45 Gregory, Sidney Webb and East Africa, 81-83.   
46 Given his ideological proclivities, Webb was an understandably reluctant lord.  He accepted the 
seals of the CO only because the Prime Minister J. Ramsay MacDonald was himself mired in a 
constitutional quandary.  In a rush to fill the cabinet, MacDonald failed to comply with the constitutional 
requirement that the government have at least two Secretaries of State in the Lords.  While he hoped to 
appoint his favorite, J. H. Thomas, to the post of Secretary of State for the Colonies—which Thomas had 
held in 1924—this was not to be, for Thomas had a rather large family; with the king reluctant to increase 
the number of hereditary peers in the Lords (which, of course, Thomas’ offspring certainly risked), 
MacDonald was forced to seek out an alternative, hence the childless Sidney Webb, who reluctantly gave 
up his plans for retirement to accommodate the prime minister.  See: Gregory, Sidney Webb and East 
Africa, 77.   
47 Colonial Development Act of 1929, 20 Geo. 5, c. 5.  
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo5/20-21/5/enacted.  Accessed on September 10, 2016.  
48 The Clarion 11 (November 1930), 311.   
49 Webb’s Memorandum was completed in November 1929.  It was not published until the 
following June because the Cabinet was divided over certain demands of the European settlers, which 
Webb wanted to concede as part of a package deal.  An excellent discussion of the nuance of Webb’s 
position can be found in Partha Sarathi Gupta, Imperialism and the British Labour Movement, 1914-1964 
(New York:  Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1975), 174. 
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native interests as embedded in the Devonshire Declaration,50 in abeyance since 1924,51 also 
sought to reconcile native paramountcy with Amery’s proposal to extend trusteeship to 
immigrant settlers by promoting the “fiction” that being mindful of settler interests was “in no 
way inconsistent” with the ideal—a notion which was conceptually anathema to the bulk of the 
Fabians.52  Insult was added to injury when, in April 1931, Webb, literally cornered53 by the anti-
colonialists Woolf and Buxton who pressed him to implement the policies as outlined in Empire 
in Africa, balked after more than an hour of inflamed argument.54  Decades later, Woolf 
characterized Webb’s behavior at the meeting as the “pig-headed”55 conduct of “a common or 
garden imperialist Conservative”56 and admitted that at the time he feared—rather 
outlandishly—that Webb had succumbed to the blandishments and prevarications of Sir Edward 
                                                          
50 Labor had earlier been forced by members of its radical wing, including Buxton and Josiah 
Wedgewood, to reaffirm the party position in a debate before the House of Commons, during which a 
resolution was moved that: 
The Native population of our dependencies should not be exploited as a source of low-grade 
labour; no governmental pressure should be used to provide wage-labour for employers; due care 
should be taken of Native social well-being; the Native demand for land should be adequately and 
satisfactorily met and their rights therein properly safeguarded; where the Native population is 
not yet fitted for self-Government direct imperial control of Native policy should be fully 
maintained; Native self-governing should be fostered; and franchise and legal rights should be 
based upon the principle of equality for all without regard to race or colour.  (James Marley, 
Speech to the House of Commons, December 11, 1929, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th 
ser., vol. 233, cols. 581-582.)  
51  Shilaro, “A Failed Eldorado:  British Trusteeship, Luyia Land Rights and the Kakamega Gold 
Rush, 1930-52,” 40. 
52 Ronald Hyam, “Bureaucracy and ‘Trusteeship’ in Colonial Empire” in The Oxford History of 
the British Empire:  The Twentieth Century, eds. Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 2001), 269.  The so-called “Dual Policy” which, as outlined in Amery’s white 
paper, called for the “complementary development of non-native and native production” and its 
progressive application in both the political and economic spheres.   
53 Unable to secure a committee room at Westminster, Webb, Buxton, and Woolf were forced to 
sit in the vacant House of Lords.  Once there, Woolf and Buxton spent the better part of an hour berating 
Webb to get him to budge.  Leonard Woolf, personal interview, June 14, 1954, London.  As quoted in 
Gregory, Sidney Webb and East Africa, 92; Leonard Woolf, Downhill all the Way:  An Autobiography of 
the Years 1919 to 1939 (San Diego:  Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1967), 236-238.    
54 Woolf, Personal Interview, June 14, 1954, London.  As quoted in Gregory, Sidney Webb, 92. 
55 Ibid., 88. 
56 Woolf, Downhill all the Way, 236-237. 
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Grigg, the pro-settler governor of Kenya.  Woolf’s harsh critique seems to have failed to take 
into consideration two things:  first, Webb was no Grigg acolyte.  In fact, Webb was eager and 
committed to ensuring the security of African land rights in Kenya.  Indeed, as Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, Webb made revisions to the draft bill of the long-gestating Native Lands Trust 
Ordinance that were designed not only to fairly compensate Africans whose land was alienated, 
but, in the event of alienation for public purposes, to ensure that suitable contiguous land be 
appended to the reserves from whence the land came.  Second, unlike his predecessor at 
Whitehall, Webb was fully prepared to bypass the legislative morass fostered by Nairobi’s 
intransigent administration and the settler-dominated LegCo by issuing an Order in Council, 
which would legislate in accordance with the Secretary of State’s revisions and, in bearing the 
weight of the King of England, suffer none of the vicissitudes of colonial obduracy.57  Doubtless, 
the basis of Woolf’s critique lay in fundamental differences at the back of the two men’s 
ideological predispositions:  whereas Woolf’s Fabianism was of the militant variety—a 
temperament he shared with the likes of Buxton and, to some extent, Olivier—Webb’s was and 
always had been of the gradualist bent, one which made him loath to pursue anything like an 
immediate (what Webb saw as “radical”) departure in colonial policy such as that being 
suggested by Woolf and Buxton.58   
                                                          
57 The best and, to my knowledge, only examination of the conflict between Webb and Grigg 
over the Native Lands Trust Ordinance is Priscilla M. Shilaro, A Failed Eldorado:  Colonial Capitalism, 
Rural Industrialization, African Land Rights in Kenya, and the Kakamega Gold Rush, 1930-1952 
(Lanham:  University Press of America, 2008).  My exposition here is derived from pp. 13-58.   
58 Gregory, Sidney Webb and East Africa, 86.  According to Gregory, Webb had by this time 
become convinced that the party’s Advisory Committee on Imperial Questions (ACIQ), which had 
produced the research on The Empire in Africa, had fallen into the hands of militant radicals, such as 
Woolf, Buxton, Norman Leys, and Josiah Wedgewood.  
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Yet, even had Webb been receptive to Woolf’s and Buxton’s appeals, the economic 
slump that gripped Britain in the wake of the First World War59 all but ensured that government 
efforts to develop the colonies along the lines favored by the society’s more radical elements 
would be shaped by depression and spiraling unemployment at home, rather than concern over 
the inequalities of capitalism abroad.60  Thus, when it was passed in 1929 amid growing anxiety 
about the upcoming election becoming a referendum on the government’s handling of the 
economy, the CDA targeted the improvement of colonial agriculture and industry to promote 
“commerce with or industry in the United Kingdom” as part of a “scheme to solve our own 
unemployment problem.”61  In the end, the reality of contemporary global financial trends 
                                                          
59 World War I eroded the economic stability of Great Britain’s economy.  While it is true that the 
country had financed its war effort largely through foreign asset sales, Britain nevertheless realized a “net 
loss of £300 million of foreign investments and, together with the loss of material assets through enemy 
action, such divestiture reduced British investment abroad by approximately 20 percent.”  The consequent 
loss of foreign earnings “left the country much more dependent upon exports and therefore vulnerable to 
any sudden economic downturn in world markets.”  Moreover, World War I “permanently” eroded 
Britain’s international trading position because of major disruptions in trade routes and losses in shipping.  
As Matthijs observes, it was not until 1934 that “Britain again reached the level of national output that 
was attained in 1918.”  Indeed, while average GDP growth over the period 1919-1933 was -.03 percent, 
unemployment remained at “historically high levels” until 1939, averaging just over 10 percent.  See:  
Matthias Matthijs, Ideas and Economic Crises in Britain from Attlee to Blair (1945-2005) (London:  
Routledge, 2011), 44-45.  
60 Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 171.  Some idea as to the 
scope of the problem can be gleaned from a statement made by Lord Arnold, the Paymaster-General, who 
reported on the fiscal parameters of the unemployment crisis to the Lords on July 22, 1929: “As your 
Lordships are aware the Unemployment Insurance Fund has accumulated a large deficit in recent years.  
The deficiency now amounts to about £36,500,000, whereas the legal limit of borrowing for the Fund is 
only £40,000,000.  It is therefore clear that there is not much margin still remaining…. …  At the present 
time, unhappily, the number of unemployed is nearly 1,150,000.”  Lord Arnold, Speech to the House of 
Lords, July 22, 1929, Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 75, cols. 155-157.  
61 Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 187; Malcolm MacDonald, 
Speech to the House of Commons, May 21, 1940, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 361, 
col. 45.   
Even had circumstances been ideal in 1929/30, the CDA was anything but a silver bullet for the 
empire’s mounting colonial development concerns.  First, the act was chronically underfunded; there was 
comparatively little money available from outside sources for colonial development apart from the £1 
million annually from the Colonial Development Fund (CDF) which was established in 1929.  Second, it 
was burdened with what can only be described as Sisyphean logistical complexities; the CO and the 
colonial governments had to coordinate development plans based on the trade situations in each of the 
colonies.  In the end, the CDA’s importance lies not so much in terms of projects it directly funded, but 
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intersected with the symbiosis of the colonial-metropolitan economy not only to doom Labor’s 
second minority government, but to trump the idyll of Fabian Trusteeship.  The Fabians would 
have to wait some 15 years to once again be so positioned.   
 
The Colonial Development Crucible:  The Crisis of the West Indies, Hailey’s African 
Survey, and the CDWA, 1934-1941 
In the decade before Parliament marked the passage the CDWA of 1940, the operation of 
Britain’s colonial development machinery was increasingly subject to Parliamentary and extra-
Parliamentary criticism—a trend that prompted Sir Edward Grigg to complain in the Commons, 
“The attack on our position in Africa is not, in my opinion, coming from Africans or from 
anybody outside ourselves.  It is coming from within our own ranks. …  If that kind of 
propaganda goes on it will undermine the peace of the Colonial Empire, not because of its effects 
on Africa, but because of its great effect upon ourselves.”62 
Indeed, as R. D. Pearce has observed, parliamentary debates at the end of the 1930s 
reveal not only an atmosphere of widespread discontent with the colonial policy status quo, but 
also a readiness to “censure past mistakes in moral terms.” 63  Figures such as the Fabian PJ 
Noel-Baker, Sir Richard Acland, and Captain Peter MacDonald argued, respectively, for a 
reorganization of colonial policy, called for “violent” changes in policy, and expressed confusion 
over the CO’s long-term policy.  
                                                          
rather insofar as it marked the beginnings of Britain’s system of planned development.  Sir William 
McLean, Review of Development, 1930-1950, nd, BLUO, Mss. Brit. Emp. s. 332, Papers of Arthur 
Creech Jones [henceforth ACJ] 48/1. 
62 Edward Grigg, Speech to the House of Commons, July 25, 1935, Parliamentary Debates, 
Commons, 5th ser., vol. 304, col. 2069.   
63 R. D. Pearce, The Turning Point in Africa:  British Colonial Policy, 1938-1948 (London:  
Frank Cass, 1982), 18. 
148 
 
Dissatisfaction manifested itself much more ominously beyond the British archipelago, 
however, as events in the West Indies proved.  When the Great Depression spread across the 
empire in the 1930s, economic suffering in the Caribbean sugar island chain was amongst the 
most severe.  Indeed, following the effective collapse of the global sugar market, conditions were 
so abysmal that Jamaica, St. Kitts, St. Vincent, British Guiana, and Trinidad and Tobago were 
the scene of a series of violent disturbances and labor riots,64 events which scandalized those in 
Britain who took an interest in colonial affairs.  As the Times reported, “Recent events in the 
West Indies have shaken the complacency with which most people in this country have been 
accustomed to regard the Colonial Empire…they have created an uneasy suspicion that 
economic and social improvements may be just as badly needed in other parts as well.”65  
Amidst reports of growing casualties in Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, where 
policemen were being burned to death by rioters,66 the CO dispatched the Moyne Commission67 
to investigate the social and economic conditions of the island chain and make recommendations.  
Meanwhile, in the Commons, parliamentarians heaped scorn on Britain’s “deplorable”68 record 
in the West Indies:  David Lloyd George was “perfectly appalled at the conditions” and felt 
ashamed that this “slummy empire” had been so long tolerated; Creech Jones argued that the 
riots had “rudely shocked our own complacency in Colonial administration;” and Aneurin Bevan 
                                                          
64 Other flashpoints included:  a strike in the Northern Rhodesian copper mines (1935), 
disturbances on sugar estates in Mauritius (1937), and a cocoa delay in the Gold Coast and Nigeria by 
peasant farmers protesting low prices (1937).   
65 Times, June 11, 1938.   
66 O. Nigel Bolland, On the March:  Labour Rebellions in the British Caribbean, 1934-1939 
(Kingston:  Ian Randle, 1995), 150; S. Basdeo, Labour Organisation and Labour Reform in Trinidad 
1919-1939 (St. Augustine:  University of the West Indies, n. d.), 111-113.     
67 The West India Royal Commission under the chairmanship of Walter Guinness, 1st Baron 
Moyne.   
68 Lord Olivier, Speech to the House of Lords, February 23, 1938, Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 
5th ser., vol. 107. Cols. 830-831.     
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asserted that the boast about Britain being a good colonizer was baseless: “We are obviously 
incompetent,” he remarked.  “This House of Commons…is entirely not to be trusted with the 
stewardship of these areas.”69   
When the findings of the Moyne Commission were delivered in December 1939, a dire 
inventory that revealed disease, malnutrition, and illegitimacy on an unprecedented scale, they 
confirmed Bevan in his stark assessment.70  In fact, so horrendous were the commission’s 
conclusions that it was agreed not to release them for public consumption for fear that they 
would be used by Joseph Goebbels and his cadre of Nazi propagandists to undermine Britain’s 
position in the colonies during the Second World War.71  And yet in terms of colonial 
development policy, the events in the West Indies were, as Parker has observed, a “watershed,” a 
veritable “canary in the imperial coal mine” that triggered colonial reforms financed by the 
metropole on a scale that dwarfed the 1929 CDA.72  As Lord Moyne confirmed in a speech 
broadcast from London and received in Jamaica on February 20, 1940:  “To-day there have been 
two events of far-reaching importance not only to the West Indies but to the Colonial Empire as 
a whole.  One is the publication of the recommendations of the West India Royal 
Commission…and the other is the announcement by the Government of a new development 
                                                          
69 As quoted in Pearce, The Turning Point in Africa, 17-18. 
70 Typhoid, yaws, and tropical diseases were rampant; in one Jamaican parish, for example, 74 
percent of the tested population was found to be infected with hookworm.  The rate of infant mortality in 
some islands neared 300 per 1,000 live births.  Literacy, while higher than in much of the empire, barely 
exceeded 50 percent, and it was estimated that a third of the population had never seen the inside of a 
school.  See:  Jason C. Parker, Brother’s Keeper:  The United States, Race, and Empire in the British 
Caribbean, 1937-1962 (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2008), 23.   
71 Viscount Bledisloe, Speech to the House of Lords, March 20, 1940, Parliamentary Debates, 
Lords, 5th ser., vol. 115, cols. 988-989.   
72 Parker, Brother’s Keeper, 23.   
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policy for the Colonies...That policy is based on the same principles which led the West India 
Royal Commission quite independently to their most important recommendations.”73 
As Moyne delivered his address, the findings of Lord Hailey’s African Survey (1938) 
were being digested at Whitehall.74  A monumental research project running to some eighteen-
hundred pages in length, the Survey provided a compendium of British knowledge about the 
entire continent of Africa, with emphasis on agricultural, environmental, and social issues.  The 
Survey’s findings, which gave officials an “expert’s view” of local conditions, were dismal and 
doubtless uncomfortably familiar in the wake of the Moyne Commission’s revelations.75  Yet, it 
was more than a canvass of the bleak contemporary context in Britain’s African colonies; rather, 
Hailey’s study was a progressive treatise that offered a framework for an improved colonial 
future—one that called for a Colonial Research Fund (CRF) to support development schemes.76  
                                                          
73 “Lord Moyne Tells of Findings of Royal Commission,” The Daily Gleaner, February 21, 1940.   
74 There is some debate surrounding the impetus which underlay Hailey’s Survey.  Some scholars, 
such as Pearce, take Lord Lothian at his word when he wrote in the Survey’s Foreword that the project 
had been inspired “directly” by General Jan Smuts’ Rhodes’ Memorial Lecture, which the South African 
general delivered at Oxford in 1929.  Pearce’s assessment is broadly shared by Helen Tilley, who writes 
that the “conception” of the Survey “emerged from a series of lectures held at Oxford University in the 
autumn of 1929” to coincide with Smuts’ lecture.  Others, like John W. Cell, have adopted a contrarian’s 
view and argue that the genesis of the Survey lay not at all with Smuts’ address but rather was the product 
of a long “germination” process.  This process reflected currents of colonial development philosophy that 
had been circulating since the early interwar years.  To a point, Cell is undoubtedly correct, since 
nothing—including development philosophy—is born in a vacuum.  Yet, the fact remains that Hailey did 
not take issue with Lothian’s assessment of the origin of the Survey.  While it may not have been its basis, 
clearly the director of the survey saw the Smuts lecture as a catalyst—a perspective Cell does not seem to 
consider.  See:  Pearce, The Turning Point in Africa, 42-69; Helen Tilley, Africa as a Living Laboratory 
(Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 2011), 69-114; John Cell, “Lord Hailey and the Making of the 
African Survey,” in African Affairs, vol. 88, no. 353 (October 1989): 481-505.  
75 Joanna Lewis, Empire State-Building:  War & Welfare in Kenya 1925-52 (Oxford:  James 
Currey, 2000), 43. 
76 Lord Hailey, An African Survey (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1938), 1629.  The Survey 
suggested, and the CO agreed, that research funding should be set at £500,000 per annum.  Clarke 
observes that the CRF was the product of both long-standing interest at the CO in the creation of research 
institutes “across the Colonial Empire”—a trend discernible in the CO’s increasing willingness to consult 
specialists and experts in everything from colonial agriculture and health to welfare and education—and 
“an attempt to initiate a vigorous and constructive programme of change for the colonies” at the 
beginning of World War II.  Ultimately, the inclusion of a “substantial research fund for African 
development” in the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 seems to have originated with a 
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Coupled with the overt fear in the metropole that if left unaltered conditions in Africa would 
prompt violence to match or even exceed that witnessed in the West Indies, the way ahead at the 
CO was now clear; it therefore put in the hands of Secretary of State Malcolm MacDonald a 
memorandum to take to the cabinet.   
Presented to the cabinet by MacDonald, the memorandum put forward three reasons why 
a more progressive colonial policy was essential: 
1. A series of strikes and disturbances in the West Indies, Mauritius and elsewhere had 
brought home to people that all was not well in the economic or social field of these 
Colonies.  This impression was confirmed by such reports as Major Orde Browne, my 
Labour Adviser, on his visit to the West Indies.  Also, the Report of the Committee on 
Nutrition in the Colonial Empire brought home to people how low is the standard of 
living in almost every part of the Colonial Empire and how great the volume of 
preventable ill health and inefficiency. 
 
2. Lord Hailey in his great ‘Survey of Africa’ published at the beginning of this year 
emphasized that ‘the present is possibly the most formative and therefore the most critical 
period of African history’.  He brought home to the public the fact that the lines our 
policy took now might mold the future of the whole continent. 
 
3. The ‘Colonial question’ as an international problem focused attention on Colonial 
matters.  Foreign Governments have been quick to take note of talk about our ‘slum 
Empire’.  They have alleged that we are neglecting our vast possessions, that they impose 
a strain on our resources that we are unable to stand and that there should be some 
redistribution of Colonial territories.  These arguments, it may be noted, are not confined 
to our present enemy but were heard from Italy and from Poland.  In the face of the 
evidence which I have mentioned above, public opinion here and in the world generally, 
particularly perhaps America, has felt that there was at least some justification for these 
suggestions.77   
 
Eight months later, on May 21, 1940, Parliament marked the passage of the CDWA, 
which not only included Hailey’s CRF, to be administered by a Colonial Research Advisory 
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Committee (CRAC),78 itself an adjunct to the CO, but legislated social welfare and economic 
development as essential tenets of British trusteeship—a wide-ranging framework that 
compassed everything from agriculture and housing to health and education.  In the Commons 
that day, Creech Jones, no doubt alive to the parallels it shared with the Fabian vision of social 
trusteeship, noted with satisfaction that the philosophy which motivated the CDWA departed 
significantly from that which underlay the 1929 CDA, which was “more concerned with finding 
employment in this country than with Colonial development and the well-being of the Colonial 
peoples….”79   
In the immediate term, however, the CDWA amounted to little more than ink on paper.  
Shepherded through Parliament under Neville Chamberlain’s National Government in the 
months before his ministry collapsed and in the wake of the outbreak of the Second World War, 
it fell to Winston Churchill’s Conservative-dominated Coalition Government to instigate the 
CDWA.  The war, however, suppressed all but the most urgent of colonial development needs, 
as the Fabian and Labor MP R. W. Sorensen discovered when he inquired if the CO would 
consider expanding existing development plans to include a ten-year program of social, political, 
and economic development.  In his response, George Hall, the Colonial Under-Secretary of 
State, demurred; explaining that “wartime conditions” made it infeasible to embark on many of 
the types of development which the CDWA was designed to promote.  Although Hall blunted 
this assessment by adding that the CO would in time coordinate the formulation of a 
comprehensive development program with the colonial governments as soon as it was 
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“practicable” to do so,80 his remarks were consistent with restrictions emplaced in September 
1940, when the colonial governments were told that Britain “could not afford development 
schemes which did not bear a direct relation to the war effort unless ‘the scheme was of such 
urgency and importance as to justify the expenditure…in present circumstances’.”81  While a 
number of development projects were authorized in the period between 1940 and 1943, the 
expenditure, which amounted to £3.6 million, was a fraction of the total amount authorized for 
the period (£13,750,000).82  This, however, was the extent to which the CO was willing to 
commit itself in the period immediately following the passage of the CDWA and in some ways it 
reflected a more generalized sense of ambiguity which emanated both from Westminster and 
Whitehall during the early war years. 
Indeed, despite its wartime rhetoric of unity—which included the suspension of “normal 
politics,” such as elections, for the duration of the war—the Coalition government was, in fact, 
riven along ideological fault lines.  The breach was evident as early as 1941-42, when debate 
erupted over the Beveridge Report.83  While Labor came out quickly in favor of the report’s 
recommendations, even pressing for its implementation, the plan provoked considerable 
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resistance from Conservatives both in and out of government.  Endorsement soon turned into a 
highly partisan issue, with Conservatives seemingly unwilling to embrace the report while Labor 
was perceived as being strongly in support of it.  The rift that opened between them became a 
breeding ground for partisan restiveness, as Conservative backbenchers resentful of Labor’s 
influence in the Coalition denounced everything from coal rationing to perceived left-wing 
efforts at perpetuating “unnecessary official control” over things like trade and industry, 
employment, and even the private lives of Britons after the war.84  This steady erosion of 
political comity was not limited to the Conservatives; indeed, at Labor’s annual conference of 
1942, the ever-controversial Aneurin Bevan tabled a resolution to terminate the truce with the 
Conservatives altogether.  It was only narrowly defeated.85  This growing tendency toward inter-
party dissonance was intensified by a profound change in the military fortunes of the Allies.  For 
the same year that Bevan introduced his motion, advance of German forces was checked in both 
Stalingrad and North Africa, a turning of the tide on the battlefield that fundamentally altered the 
working relationship of the Coalition partners at Westminster, and not for the better.  No longer 
hamstrung by an intense fear that disagreement would unsettle the Coalition and, by extension, 
dampen the war effort, the parties were unshackled from their restraints, prompting the 
introduction of a tranche of controversial resolutions that, unsurprisingly, nurtured the growing 
sense of political alienation.86   
To be sure, these were worrisome fissures, but they remained bridgeable—at least until 
the Conservatives realized that they, as the majority stakeholders in the coalition, would be 
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identified with its policies, including those of the left-wing “progressives” and postwar 
“planners.”  In circumstances where over-identification with such antithetical policies as family 
allowances and universal health risked alienating its base, an estrangement that effectively 
torched Conservative hopes of governing postwar Britain, the political calculus presented a stark 
solution, one made all the bleaker as the war dragged on and the Coalition partners gradually 
salted the swathe of common ground that lay between them.87  Left only with those subjects on 
which they disagreed, Churchill was prompted to “Warn Against Premature Pledges” in a BBC 
broadcast on March 21, 1943.  “First of all,” the prime minister began, “we must beware of 
attempts to over-persuade or even coerce His Majesty’s Government to bind themselves or their 
unknown successors in conditions which no one can foresee and which may be years ahead, to 
impose great new expenditures on the State without any relation to the circumstances which 
might prevail at that time to make them pledge themselves to particular schemes without relation 
to other extremely important aspects of our post-war needs.”88   
  It was, in short, a caustic and uncertain time and it was debatable that efforts to reform 
the colonies as articulated in the CDWA would in fact be fulfilled—precisely the outcome the 
Fabians were keen to safeguard.  Thus, considering the “virtual suspension” of the CDWA, the 
society undertook to exert pressure on Whitehall to ensure its operation.89  The instrument for 
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doing so was the FCB, the founding chairman of which was the Labor MP and future Secretary 
of State for the Colonies, Arthur Creech Jones.   
 
The Fabian Colonial Bureau under Arthur Creech Jones:  Labor’s Nestor in a Wartime 
Coalition Government 
In February of 1939, the Fabian Norman Leys was busy beavering away on a revision of 
Labor’s colonial policy.  As he sifted through the juggernaut of Britain’s eclectic schematic of 
colonial governance, a thought occurred to him, prompting a note to Leonard Woolf.  “The 
problem,” Leys wrote, “is how to ensure that these…steps will in fact be taken within a month of 
the next L[abour] G[overnment]’s taking office.”  A champion grudge-holder, Woolf responded 
that getting the “Labour Government when it is sitting there in power to implement its promises” 
was the “real difficulty, as we found, with Passfield.”90  Four months later, Leys rendered a 
politely damning verdict: “The Labour Government of 1929-31,” he declared, “left scarcely a 
mark on Africa.”91  Ironically, this very evanescence birthed an enduring corollary, for following 
the demise of the government in 1931, Labor’s leadership, subject to suspicion and resentment in 
the wake of Ramsay MacDonald’s defection and subsequent expulsion,92 lapsed into near total 
“silence” on colonial reform.”93  Indeed, while it is true that the ACIQ produced a number of 
reports, most notably its policy statements of 1933 (The Colonial Empire) and 1936 (The 
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Demand for Colonial Equality of Economic Opportunity), these were largely ignored by the 
party.94  In the absence of any clear sense of direction in matters colonial, Labor defaulted to a 
position of paternalistic trusteeship towards Africa that was designed, on the one hand, to prevent 
capitalism from exploiting vulnerable people while, on the other, ensuring that Britain acted as a 
guardian of native rights.95  This policy had the effect of ossifying, rather than advancing, native 
interests, a state of affairs which persisted until the establishment in 1940 of the FCB, which 
soon was positioned to carry forward its CDWA campaign within a framework of Fabian-
favored social trusteeship.   
At its inaugural meeting on October 26, 1940, chaired by Creech Jones, the Bureau 
enumerated a scope of work that positioned it as a “clearinghouse for colonial information and 
research.”96  To build the necessary consultative network, the FCB drew on the well-established 
Fabian tactic of permeation by launching an aggressive campaign designed to connect its nascent 
investigative machinery not only to the CO,97 but to the Labor Party and to a consortium of non-
governmental agencies as well.  In its early stages, this aggregation of private institutions 
included the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, the Institute of Education’s Colonial 
Department Library at the University of London, the West Indies Parliamentary Committee,98 the 
think-tank Political and Economic Planning (PEP), and the League for Coloured Peoples—all of 
whom shared a broad swathe of ideological territory with the FCB.99  This, of course, raised the 
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specter of overlap, and its concomitant Moloch, inefficiency; it was therefore agreed that a 
member from each group should sit on the Bureau’s Advisory Committee.100   
Once the committee was established, and its constituent elements coopted, it remained to 
elaborate the apparatus of outreach, beginning with what the committee identified as one of the 
Bureau’s “most important lines of work.”  That is, the raising of questions on colonial affairs 
before the House.  It was to this end that Creech Jones vigorously applied himself, meeting with 
and enlisting a panel of like-minded MPs to ask questions in Parliament relating to colonial 
affairs.101  Having ensured that matters of interest to the Bureau remained part of the legislative 
ferment by feeding questions to friendly parliamentarians, it was decided to augment the 
Bureau’s efforts by having members of the advisory committee, including the Labor MP John 
Parker, Frank Horrabin, Dr. Rita Hinden, Leonard Woolf, Wilfred Benson, W. Arthur Lewis, 
Prof. W. M. MacMillan, and Dr. Julian Huxley, exercise their personal influence with the press 
by giving interviews and contributing articles relating to colonial affairs.102  In so doing, the 
Bureau secured an important means of “publicity for its work.”103  To this end, Horrabin’s leftist-
socialist journal Empire,104 which he offered to the FCB in early 1941,105 proved especially 
effective.  
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And yet it would be some time before the Bureau promulgated its position in relation to 
the colonial empire.  Indeed, it was not until its weekend conference on The Colonies, the War 
and the Future, which the Fabians convened at St. Peter’s Hall, Oxford, in July 1941, that the 
Bureau openly defined its attitude.  During the conference, speeches were presented on a variety 
of topics, including the obstacles of establishing a sound colonial economy against the backdrop 
of war and colonial-level intransigence, as well as on the benefits of educating colonial peoples.  
Appropriately enough, however, it fell to Creech Jones to make the declaration of policy in his 
chairman’s address.  In an interesting twist on the Chamberlainite metaphor, Creech Jones 
described the colonies as Britain’s “neglected estates” and evoked the essence of Fabian social 
trusteeship when he spoke of the “government’s and the public’s responsibility to ensure that in 
future (the colonies) were justly treated,” and argued that it was “incumbent upon Fabians 
interested in colonial affairs to insist on (the CDWA’s) good intentions being fulfilled and that 
money voted in Parliament be spent for the benefit of the colonial peoples, not for that of white 
entrepreneurs.”106  
In the meantime, the process of connecting the Bureau’s web-like research network to the 
Labor Party’s policy-making machinery proceeded apace.  For by 1941, Labor was already in the 
habit of consulting the Fabian Society as it formulated its initiatives, even going so far as to 
coopt certain members of the FCB, including Sorensen, Wilfred Benson, Woolf, and Leys, to 
draft and revise the party’s policy proposals—a process which all but abrogated the newly-
reconstituted society’s self-denying ordinance.  This was an especially fruitful enterprise in the 
early 1940s, for it was primarily Woolf, Leys, and Benson who worked alongside their fellow 
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Fabians Sir John Maynard107 and Creech Jones on the ACIQ to thrash out Labor’s embryonic 
colonial policy.108   
To get some sense of the emerging dynamic between the party and the FCB, we need 
look no further than the “Imperial Questions” section of Labor’s The Old World and the New 
Society:  An Interim Report of the National Executive of the British Labour Party on the 
Problems of Reconstruction.  Published in advance of the annual party conference of 1942, the 
intent of the report was to establish a baseline for Labor’s postwar reconstruction regime, 
prefiguring in many ways the later domestic implications of the “Beveridge boom.”109  As the 
following excerpts demonstrate, the “Imperial Questions” section of the The Old World and the 
New Society was a near word-for-word reproduction of Woolf’s commentary on the color bar, 
which he developed at some length for the ACIQ in 1941. 
Woolf:  The colour bar policy is a negation of the idea of colonial administration as a 
trust in the interest of native inhabitants. …  The Labour Party is absolutely opposed to 
the colour bar in every shape and form.  Wherever it exists in territories for which 
Parliament is responsible the laws and administrative practices upon which it rests must 
be immediately abolished, and Governors of colonial territories should be instructed to 
see that every kind of legal or administrative discrimination (whether by disabilities or 
privileges) on the ground of race, colour, or religion must cease.  Furthermore, 
Parliament should refuse to resign its responsibility for and control over any territory in 
Africa unless it is assured that the colour bar will not be introduced there in any form. ...  
The colour bar system is, however, so insidious and can take so many forms that a 
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general renunciation of it by governments Is not enough, and specific instructions on 
specific measures to be taken against it should be given to all colonial governments.110   
 
Labour’s Interim Report:  The Labour Party is absolutely opposed to the colour bar in 
every shape or form. …  In other words, the interests of those (native) inhabitants are and 
must remain paramount, and to those interests Parliament is the trustee. …  The negation 
of this policy for which the Party stands is the policy of the colour bar, the object and 
effect of which are to ensure, by law, administration and every other available means that 
the native inhabitant is given a different and subordinate status, civil and social, from that 
of the European.  It is in Africa that the colour bar as a ‘native policy’ can be seen in its 
most undisguised form, but it does, less evilly but more insidiously, affect British 
colonial policy in other continents.  The Labour Party is absolutely opposed to the colour 
bar in every shape and form.  It maintains therefore that in territories which Parliament is 
responsible the laws and administrative practices upon which the colour bar resets should 
be abolished and colonial crimination (whether by disabilities or privileges), on the 
grounds of race, colour, or religion, should cease. …  It follows that in all colonial 
territories in which white settlers are in a minority, Parliament must remain trustee of the 
native interests, and the Labour Party cannot therefore agree to any conferment of 
responsible government upon any territory or union of territories which would involve 
delegation of its duties to a legislative body in which native races were in a minority.111   
 
The fact that the section on “Imperial Questions” comprises little more than one full page 
in the 32-page report exposes two things about the Labor Party of the early 1940s: first, it is clear 
that Labor remained more confident in its ability to formulate initiatives concerning the party’s 
long-privileged realm of domestic policy-making; and, second, borrowing so heavily from the 
Fabians in proportion to its declaration vis-à-vis matters imperial indicates the depth of the 
party’s growing dependency on the FCB’s research operation.  This is not to say, however, that 
the Fabians themselves were entirely satisfied with the final iteration of Labor’s postwar policy 
statement in 1942.  Indeed, at a meeting of the society’s International Bureau some four months 
after it was promulgated at the party’s annual conference, Woolf criticized The Old World and 
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the New Society for being long on resolution, but short on content.112  Moreover, such was the 
general sense of disappointment amongst the Fabians that the FCB felt compelled to issue a 
rejoinder, which it sent to the NEC under the heading “Note to the Labour Party Executive on the 
Imperial Section of the Party’s Interim Report.”113  Although the Bureau acknowledged that the 
report could not be amended ex post facto, it nevertheless went to some length making 
significant revisions to the whole of the “Imperial Section,” including pointed references to the 
preservation of native paramountcy in relation to the predatory interests of white settlers.   
Notwithstanding the Bureau’s frustration over the final form of The Old World and the 
New Society, Fabian permeation continued to deepen the society’s philosophical presence in 
Labor’s colonial policy.  At the annual conference of 1943, for example, Labor’s executive 
secured the party’s endorsement of the tract The Colonies: The Labour Party’s Post-War Policy 
for the African and Pacific Colonies.114  Originally drafted by Woolf in 1941, the pamphlet was 
prepared for publication in March 1943 by the party’s postwar Reconstruction Committee, then 
under the “guiding hand” of its leading member, Creech Jones.115  In many ways, The Colonies 
signifies a watershed moment in the advance of Fabian influence on Labour’s colonial policy; for 
as Goldsworthy explains, it represented the “first detailed policy statement—by any party” to 
take full account of the “new concepts of dynamic development and metropolitan financial 
responsibility” as embodied in the CDWA.  Not only were there “specific proposals for long-
                                                          
112 “Labour’s International Reconstruction Policy:  Politics Inseparable from Economics,” a 
speech by Leonard Woolf at a meeting of the Fabian International Bureau, in The New Dawn, September 
12, 1942, LPA LHASC, JSM, G-L.   
113 “Note to the Labour Party Executive on the Imperial Section of the Party’s Interim Report,” 
BLUO, MSS. Brit. Emp. s. 365, FCB 46/1. 
114  The Colonies:  The Labour Party’s Post-War Policy for the African and Pacific Colonies 
(London:  The Labour Party, 1943).    
115 J. M. Lee and M. Petter, The Colonial Office, War and Development Policy:  Organisation 
and the Planning of a Metropolitan Initiative, 1939-1945 (London:  Maurice Temple Smith Ltd., 1982), 
159.   
163 
 
term economic plans; for agriculture, mining, transport, controlled industrial growth, 
cooperation, and trade unionism; for an equitable redistribution of colonial wealth; for health and 
education services and the elimination of social and economic colour bars;” but there were also 
“specific proposals about ways and means, about the administration of development and the 
sources of finances.”116  That Woolf’s treatise on the International Post-War Settlement117 was 
approved by an overwhelming majority at the party’s annual conference the following year 
demonstrably confirms this tendency toward Fabian entrenchment.118   
Given this, it is little wonder that by the time Creech Jones assumed the chairmanship of 
the ACIQ in 1944, the FCB had become, unofficially, the research organization responsible for 
the creation of Labor’s colonial policy.119  That the party’s advisory committee included a 
sizable contingent of Fabians—a survey of the minutes between 1941 and 1944 reveals no fewer 
than 11 members of the FCB sat on the ACIQ at any given time—helps, in part, to explain 
this.120  Despite this, however, no amount of policy-making on the part of the Fabians could help 
the society overcome one glaring problem:  Labor was not in power.  Indeed, it was but the 
minority partner in the wartime Coalition Government dominated by the Conservatives, 
circumstances no amount of rhetoric could tangibly alter.  This, of course, raises an obvious 
question:  Were the Fabians able to influence the Coalition Government’s colonial development 
policy on a substantive level during the war?  If so, how and in what ways?   
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What follows, then, are two case studies designed to assess Fabian influence on Britain’s 
wartime colonial development policy.  As discussed above, wartime conditions made it unlikely 
that the Coalition Government under Churchill would go too far in its embracement of colonial 
development, particularly as conceived within the costly rubric of the 1940 CDWA.  When it 
became increasingly apparent that the Allies would win the war, political considerations over the 
shape of Britain’s postwar administration assumed an urgency that prompted a swift 
recalculation of the cost-benefits equation which had hitherto stimulated the tenuous equanimity 
of the Coalition Government.  The result, as we have seen, was an increasing sense of friction.  
Within such a context, there was no single path open for the Fabians to realize their aims vis-à-
vis social trusteeship and colonial development.  Indeed, having so recently amalgamated with 
the NFRB (1939), the society—let alone its philosophy—was itself very much in a state of flux.  
Nevertheless, in both of the following instances, the Fabians overcame these and various other 
obstacles to successfully give form to colonial thought.   
 
From Mass Education in African Society to the Model Cooperative Societies Ordinance: Case 
Studies in Fabian Influence on Colonial Policy During the Second World War  
The first case study examines the development of adult and mass education policy in 
Africa between 1925 and 1944, when the CO Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies 
(ACEC) published its report on Mass Education in African Society.  The study takes as its point 
of departure the work of Arthur Creech Jones, member of the ACEC, chairman of the FCB, and 
future Secretary of State for the Colonies.  The case study is important because it represents a 
particular and unique instance of Fabian influence during the war.  It marks the influence 
exercised by a prominent Fabian who was already part of the authorized apparatus meant to 
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advise the CO on related matters.  Moreover, the process reveals a central theme of Creech 
Jones’ development ethos, which he carried forward as Secretary of State for the Colonies:  mass 
education.  The case study is, therefore, experientially distinct and should not be taken as 
necessarily representative of the oftentimes torturous path of Fabian influence on colonial policy 
during the war.   
 
Adult and Mass Education Policy 
One of only a handful of Fabian-affiliated Labor MPs elected to the House of Commons 
in 1935,121 Creech Jones immediately set about carving a niche for himself in Parliament, where 
early on his special interest in colonial education led to his cooption by the CO’s Advisory 
Committee on Education in the Colonies (ACEC).122  The ACEC, which functioned until 1961, 
was only the most recent bureaucratic think-tank launched to assess education policy in the 
colonies.  For following the publication in 1922 of the Phelps-Stokes Commission123 report 
Education in Africa, the CO launched the Advisory Committee on Native Education in Tropical 
Africa (ACNETA) with a remit to establish the basis of educational policy in Britain’s African 
dependencies.124  Toward that end, the ACNETA issued the white paper Education Policy in 
                                                          
121 A group which included John Parker, the general secretary of the Fabian Society.    
122 The Nuffield Office and the Colonial Office, African Education:  A Study of Educational 
Policy and Practice in British Tropical Africa (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1953), 1. 
123 A body of American education experts who travelled all over Africa between 1920 and 1924, 
the remit of the Phelps-Stokes Commission was to conduct a review of education in all the African 
dependencies and write proposals for its adaptation to meet the needs of rural communities.  One of the 
more significant of these “adaptations” was the translation of the American Jeanes Training Schools to 
East Africa.  Having originated in the southern United States, a region which lacked a widespread, 
organized mass education movement, the Jeanes’ emphasis on local-level, community-based education 
made it “more relevant” in the context of Britain’s African dependencies than the mass education and 
adult literacy experiences of China, Turkey, or Russia.  As discussed in: “Section C—Lessons from 
Experience,” CO Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies, Mass Education in African Society, 
Colonial No. 186 (London:  HMSO, 1943), 51-57.   
124 L. P. Mair, Welfare in the British Colonies (London: The Royal Institute of Royal Affairs, 
1944), 26.  The activities of ANETA/ACEC as well as the reports and memoranda they produced have 
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British Tropical Africa in March 1925 which, as Hodge notes, put forward several “broad 
principles” as the basis of a “sound educational policy.”  The “central tenet” of the new policy, 
largely the work of the humanitarian lobbyist and missionary J. H. Oldham, was the “adaptation” 
and development of education “along native lines.”125  In theory, this meant that: 
Education should be adapted to the mentality, aptitudes, occupations and traditions of the 
various people, conserving as far as possible all sound and healthy elements in the fabric 
of their social life; adapting them where necessary to changed circumstances and 
progressive ideas, as an agent of natural growth and evolution.  Its aim should be to 
render the individual more efficient in his or her condition of life, whatever it may be, 
and to promote the advancement of the community as a whole through the improvement 
of agriculture, the development of native industries, the improvement of health, the 
training of the people in the management of their own affairs, and the inculcation of true 
ideals of citizenship in service.  It must include the raising up of capable, trustworthy, 
public-spirited leaders of the people, belonging to their own race.   
 
To realize this, the white paper suggested the training up of native teachers and the 
establishment of a system of visiting instructors as a “means of improving village schools.”  It 
advocated the use of vernacular languages and the preparation of vernacular textbooks.  It also 
proposed the education of women and girls in hygiene, child welfare, domestic economy, and 
care of the home, since these were considered key to the improvement of public health.  
Furthermore, it laid stress on the importance of “discipline of work” and the development of 
habits of industry as part of the “foundation of character.”  Lastly, the white paper acknowledged 
the need to train those required to fill administrative posts, to which end “higher education…in 
Africa must be increasingly opened for those who by character, ability and temperament show 
themselves fitted….”126   
                                                          
been considered in U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, The Formulation of British 
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125 Hodge, Triumph of the Expert, 127 and 131. 
126 Ibid., 132.   
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At the same time, however, the white paper put forward recommendations that were 
paternalistic and increasingly outmoded, including the endorsement of religious teaching to build 
“character” and official recognition of the place of Christian missions as “partners” in the 
provision of schooling in Africa.127  Some four years later, the prominence of these Victorian 
archaisms, doubtless reflecting Oldham’s influence, was diminished by the CO when it 
reconstituted the ACNETA as the ACEC,128 the functions of which not only expanded to serve 
all of Britain’s colonies, but also weakened missionary influence on the formulation of colonial 
education policy by instead coopting a raft of prominent British academics and experts.129   
When the ACEC’s Memorandum on the Education of African Communities was 
published in 1935, it represented both the outcome of ten years’ study and experiment in the 
application of the principles which had earlier been outlined as well as developments in the 
attitude toward education in Britain itself.  It therefore stressed that school-based education in 
rural communities was most profitable when it not only targeted the young, but was incorporated 
into an overarching program designed to improve the “living forces of the society which the 
school is meant to serve.”130  As Oldham remarked, “The main purpose…was to emphasize the 
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128 This is not to say that everyone at the CO was entirely convinced of the necessity—not to say 
the usefulness—of an educational advisory committee.  According to William Ormsby-Gore, the chair of 
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idea that, if the object of education in Africa was to advance backward communities, the best 
results would not be obtained if only the education of the young was considered; the community 
must be envisaged as a whole.”131  This holistic approach endorsed by Oldham, once again a 
leading architect of the policy, insisted on an interrelation between education and local 
environment, arguing that schools should act as progressive forces in terms of spreading new 
knowledge and skills while, at the same time, incentivizing interest in environmental 
improvement.  Furthermore, it emphasized the importance of adult education—which was 
broached but inchoate in the 1925 memorandum132—and recommended “the appointment of 
agents, European and African, who are specially trained to develop this type of education.”133   
Cumulatively, the work of the ACNETA and the ACEC in formulating colonial 
education policy constitutes something like a program of educative social betterment and 
embodies what has described as the “pre-history” of Britain’s postwar community development 
regime.134  Despite this, however, colonial education policy during the interwar period was 
fraught with much confusion of purpose and lack of resources135 which, at the level of colonial 
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‘Community Development’ in Africa Between the Wars” (paper, Canadian Association of African 
Studies, Annual Conference, Bishop’s University, Sherbrooke, Quebec, June 1999), 11-12.   
132 While Education Policy in British Tropical Africa suggested the enlargement of educational 
opportunities for adults as a means of avoiding “as far as possible, a breach in good tribal traditions by 
interesting the older people in the education of their children for the welfare of the community,” it also 
stressed the experimental nature of such an endeavor.      
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administration, manifested educational practice characterized by “improvisation, vacillation, and 
sheer expediency.”136   
It is against this backdrop that Creech Jones joined the ACEC.  A fervent supporter of the 
cause of adult education, he had already spent the better part of a decade serving as vice-
chairman of the British Institute of Adult Education, a noteworthy tenure characterized by an 
emphasis on adult education as a “vital factor” in responsible democratic government.137  He 
brought this sensibility with him to the ACEC, where he proved instrumental in promoting both 
adult and mass education as a means of encouraging equality in developing countries.  For it was 
in these countries that the problem of education was especially acute:  across the whole of British 
colonial Africa, for example, it was estimated in 1939 that only 12 per cent of school-age 
children received any sort of education.  “It was because I appreciated all this,” Creech Jones 
later recalled, “that before the war when I was a member of the Colonial Secretary’s Education 
Advisory Committee I emphasized the importance of the subject until Sir Fred Clarke and Dr. 
Margaret Read produced their excellent memoranda on its place in Colonial development.”138  
The memorandum in question was Mass Education in African Society (1944).   
It was in May 1940, some six months before chairing the inaugural meeting of the FCB, 
that Creech Jones first raised the subject of adult education at a gathering of the ACEC.  During 
the meeting, he made it clear that the expansion of adult education was imperative since it 
provided indigenous people with the means to help them cope with rapid socioeconomic 
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change.139  He stressed, however, that adult education was not to be “confused with 
‘fundamental’ education or attacks on illiteracy or with technical or trade instruction;” rather, it 
was intended to “raise the standards of a community and pave the way for interest and 
responsibility in the practice of local and national government” while encouraging “political 
democracy and voluntary movements,” from cooperatives to trade unions.140   
Creech Jones’ line of reasoning proved persuasive, for in 1941 the ACEC launched the 
Adult and Mass Education Subcommittee to survey education in the African colonies.  The 
subcommittee, which counted among its membership the Fabians Margery Perham, Dr. Huxley, 
Margaret Wrong, and Prof. MacMillan,141 took two years to “consider the best approach to the 
problem of mass literacy and adult education…in the more backward dependencies, taking into 
account the emphasis which the Advisory Committee has laid…upon community education.”142  
The result of the subcommittee’s investigation was Mass Education in African Society,143 which 
advanced the idea that mass education could overcome “a narrow sectionalism, operating behind 
barriers which divide people from their fellows.”  As Barbara Ingham and Paul Mosley have 
observed, this perspective embedded within the blueprint of the colonial education project the 
notion that it could help “build stronger and more accountable states that were less vulnerable to 
fragmentation and internecine conflict.”144  
When coupled with its successor, Education for Citizenship in Africa (1948), the two 
reports made education a key component of Britain’s progressive colonial development 
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regime.145  Indeed, recalling sentiments expressed by Lord Hailey at a 1939 meeting of the 
ACEC that mass education was to be a “popular type” of education “suitable” to the 
“community-oriented” conditions in Africa,146 the initiative made a “direct appeal to the great 
majority of adults and adolescents in the community, so that they and their families will really 
benefit from it.”  The essential focus was “upon the whole community as a unit to be educated” 
so that “people everywhere” might “be aware of, to understand and take part in, and ultimately to 
control the social and economic changes which are taking place among them, and which are 
being advocated for their welfare….”147  And in a nod to the ACEC’s Memorandum on the 
Education of African Communities of 1935, the prime agent of education was identified as “mass 
education officers,” experts who, through the coordination of on-the-ground campaigns, would 
link local-level community projects with the wider plans of the colony.148  Local need would, 
moreover, be assessed through surveys; contact would be made with “likely elements in the 
community who would support the campaign” (e.g. 4-H clubs and teachers’ associations); and a 
“curriculum” planned in relation to the main obstacles to progress in the area.  If the figures 
responsible for mass education were its officers, their work, it was suggested, could be 
coordinated through a framework of like-minded Fabian-favored social trustees, such as trade 
unions and cooperatives.  “We have only to look at the last hundred years of English history,” 
the Sub-committee for Adult and Mass Education observed, “to see how powerful an incentive to 
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mass education both cooperatives and the trade unions have turned out to be.  English experience 
shows too how wide a view [cooperatives and trade unions] took of education, regarding it not 
only as literacy and improved technical skill but as involving a new outlook in both local and 
central government on citizenship.”149 
As the subcommittee worked to draft its memoranda, Creech Jones played a vital role not 
only in the formulation and shaping of community-level mass education policy, but also in its 
practice.  In point of fact, he regularly corresponded with minor and major mass educators as 
well as administrators throughout the colonies. 
For example, in late-summer 1942, C. A. Grossmith, the secretary of the Adult and Mass 
Education Subcommittee, wrote to Creech Jones inviting his feedback on the draft memorandum 
of Mass Education in African Society submitted by fellow-committeeman, Sir Fred Clarke.  In 
his response, Creech Jones commended Clarke for having crafted “an excellent piece of work” 
that “was meaty…and covered the ground splendidly.”  But in Creech Jones’ eyes, Clarke’s draft 
was flawed; it lacked inspiration and was too cerebral. “While my head had been satisfied,” he 
noted to Clarke, “I remained little moved.  I wanted the argument to glow, to convince, to stir to 
action, to stimulate the imagination.”  Although Creech Jones was evidently looking for 
something more visceral, he was nonetheless generous with substantive suggestions for 
improving the final draft of the memorandum.  “You have made clear,” he began, “the 
relationship of adult education with other aspects of education, but I felt it was desirable to make 
clearer that education was a process which shoul[d] extend through life, that adult work was as 
necessary as other work – in some respects more so. …  You bring out the importance of 
community education, of the relation of adult education with the primary school and adolescents. 
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…  But I felt that these connections, and the whole-ness of the problem called for a little more 
emphasis.”150     
While Creech Jones’ critique prompted polite acknowledgment from Clarke, who was 
“grateful” for his colleague’s candor, such banal acceptance proved a sharp contrast to the 
incendiary, carpet-biting harshness such policies were exposed to when they found their way into 
the hands of colonial officials in Africa.151  For instance, Zanzibar’s director of education 
condemned as “unrealistic” the plan outlined in Mass Education in African Society,152 while Sir 
Philip Mitchell, the governor of Kenya, launched into a pages-long diatribe against Education for 
Citizenship in Africa.  The scheme, he argued with barely a modicum of professional restraint, 
was shrouded in “a mist of unreality,” aspiring to a citizenry and a “polity the pattern of which 
may be laid up in heaven but is hardly yet to be seen on earth.  Colonial Governments,” Mitchell 
concluded, “beset by many and pressing real problems, must be excused if they decline to direct 
their energies to the preparation of their subjects for a state of society which never has existed on 
this earth, which there is certainly no prospect of establishing anywhere in Africa….”153 
While Mitchell’s sentiments echoed typical concerns over the nebulousness of Fabian-
influenced policy initiatives, as we have seen, voices of dissent were not the only ones in the 
chorus of colonial officialdom.  Others, such as Tom Askwith, Kenya’s future commissioner for 
social welfare, praised mass and adult education, arguing that it constituted an essential adjunct 
to Britain’s development regime, even crediting it with creating the “climate of understanding 
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necessary to win the cooperation of the people.”154  Moreover, Secretary of State for the 
Colonies Oliver Stanley confirmed the CO in its belief as to the efficacy of the project when he 
noted in the House of Commons that “a very successful campaign in mass education on lines 
similar to those suggested in (Mass Education in African Society) has been carried out in part of 
the Sierra Leone protectorate and that a grant made under the C.D.&W. Act is being made for its 
extension to a wider area.”155  As we shall see, in time, that “wider area” became British Africa.   
~~~ 
The second and final case study is meant to contrast with the first and takes as its point of 
departure the work of the FCB’s Committee for the Study of Cooperation in the Colonies, which 
was formed in 1942.  Unlike Creech Jones’ curriculum vitae, the Fabians who sat on this 
committee, while prominent, were not standing members of a similarly-tasked body housed 
within the CO.  Rather, through research and agitation, the committee’s work came to the 
attention of the CO, which eventually invited it to help craft an ordinance governing cooperatives 
in the colonies—that is, the Model Cooperative Societies Ordinance of 1946, at the back of 
which lay the initial report of the Fabian Committee for the Study of Cooperation in the 
Colonies, which it produced in 1944.  
 
The Model Cooperative Societies Ordinance 
The idea that cooperation could enhance imperial development gained traction early, 
particularly in India, where recurrent famines and rural poverty combined with peasant 
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indebtedness (itself the result of these conditions) to threaten the colony’s putative stability,156 
hence the Cooperative Credit Societies Act of India (1904), Britain’s first colonial cooperative 
measure.  As formalized by that legislation, the colonial cooperative movement’s marriage of 
low-cost development and self-sufficiency was arguably the quintessential Chamberlainite 
development scheme:  the cooperatives funded themselves, increased production and 
profitability themselves, and, by virtue of the indigenous sociocultural framework that dictated 
interpersonal relationships among members and helped prevent indebtedness, were largely self-
regulating.157  Success in India brought with it similar and still-more-sweeping legislation in 
places like Ceylon (1911), Mauritius (1913), and Cyprus (1914).158   
Relatively cheap with limited administrative oversight and with the potential for a decent 
return on imperial investment, a full-fledged program of colonial cooperation was a politically 
attractive way to ensure the operation of the CDWA during the Second World War—and, in 
many respects, the thin end of the developmental wedge.  The Fabians recognized this early on 
and, as part of their campaign to ensure the operation of the CDWA even in wartime,159 the FCB 
formed its Committee for the Study of Cooperation in the Colonies in 1942.160  Chaired by Lord 
Winster, the committee set to work with many prominent colonial cooperators, such as C. F. 
Strickland,161 author of Cooperation for Africa and an important contributor to the CO’s 1930 
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Conference on Cooperation in the Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories; H. Calvert, 
former registrar of cooperative societies in the Punjab; and A. Cavendish, former director of 
cooperation in Malaya, to develop a picture of the colonial cooperative enterprise.162  The 
committee’s report, published in 1944, “roundly criticized”163 past colonial cooperative policy 
and blamed the “failure to effect any adequate improvement” on the “laisser-faire [sic] attitude 
of British governments.  Colonial policy,” the report continued, “was less directed to promotion 
of colonial welfare and prosperity than to the maintenance of law and order so that trading 
companies might pursue . . . their business of securing a steady flow of raw materials to the 
wealthier industrial countries.”164  This state of affairs, coupled with the “lack of skilled 
direction,” had the effect of perpetuating a system of “degrading colonial poverty.”165  The 
corrective here was development, as prescribed by the CDWA and as achieved through 
mechanisms of Fabian social trusteeship like cooperatives, an ideological and practical marriage 
Winster emphasized in a speech before the House of Lords in August, 1944.  Winster noted that, 
“The Colonial Development Act, 1940, recognizes that the Colonies cannot build up reasonable 
standards of living while relying on their own resources. It recognizes that while they must be 
helped, the Colonies must also be encouraged to tackle these problems in their own way. To my 
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mind cooperation is one [of the] most hopeful way[s] in which those problems can be 
tackled.”166  
That the “Colonial Secretary himself…stressed the importance of cooperatives”167 
encouraged the Bureau which instigated a campaign to persuade the CO to adopt a new 
“enlightened” cooperative approach.168  Accordingly, the Committee presented its final report to 
Secretary of State Oliver Stanley by April 1944.169  Although the report covered familiar 
cooperative territory, such as the need for the “appointment of specially trained staff,” its 
recommendations for the establishment of “separate Cooperative Departments inside the 
Colonial Office” and “in the separate colonies” and, most importantly, the “revision of Colonial 
Cooperative laws” represented a “pioneer piece of work on the scope and function of the 
Cooperative Movement in the Colonies.”170  As it considered the Bureau’s findings, the CO, 
responding to a request from the government of Kenya,171 dispatched noted cooperative expert 
W. K. H. Campbell to explore the possibilities of developing the cooperative movement among 
Africans in East Africa.172   
In the meantime, the Fabians ratcheted up the pressure on the CO by peppering the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies with questions in the House of Commons.  In June, the Fabian 
and Labor MP John Dugdale inquired “what action has been taken within the Colonial Empire to 
carry out the recommendations of the [UN] Hot Springs Conference” on Food and 
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Agriculture,173 which emphasized “the important role which cooperative movements can and 
should play in post-war reconstruction.”174  Stanley responded cautiously that the CO had 
commended the resolutions of the conference to the territories, hedging that the “general sense of 
the replies is that the Governments accept the broad aim of the resolutions and to give effect to 
them in so far as they are applicable in local conditions.”175  When Creech Jones asked less than 
a month later, “what general policy is being followed to extend cooperation among producers 
and consumers throughout the Colonial Empire,”176 Stanley provided a brief update on existing 
cooperative legislation, but added that, “measures to stimulate the growth of cooperation in the 
Colonies are in the first place a matter for the Governments concerned and it will be appreciated 
that local circumstances and conditions vary considerably.  I am, however, giving consideration 
at the present time to the sending out of some general advice on the subject.”177 
If the government was still on the fence regarding cooperative policy when Winster made 
his remarks on the floor of the House of Lords in August, it came off the fence by November, 
when “a deputation from the Bureau was received by an inter-departmental committee of the 
Colonial Office to discuss the recommendations for the encouragement of the Colonial 
cooperative movement which had been put to the Colonial Office by the Bureau earlier this 
year.”178  The deputation was led by Lord Winster and included Creech Jones, Sir Malcolm 
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Darling, and Dr. Hinden, secretary of the FCB.  Following the discussion, “the Colonial Office 
agreed that the time had come to revise the laws on Cooperation in the different colonies, and 
also to prepare plans for the training of personnel to man cooperative departments.  The Bureau 
was asked to help in both these tasks.”179 
With the CO on board, the Fabians set about work on two of the report’s more important 
suggestions: the formation of a Cooperative Advisory Committee, renamed the Advisory 
Committee on Cooperation in the Colonies and charged with determining “how the colonies 
should be advised on cooperation, and what changes in organization within the Colonial Office 
should be made to enable the subject to be dealt with adequately,”180 and the formulation of a 
Model Cooperative Societies Ordinance to be “drafted on sufficiently elastic lines to cover the 
diverse conditions of the various Colonies, to be made effective in territories where cooperative 
legislation is at present inadequate.”181  Designed by former cooperative registrars E. H. Lucette 
and B. J. Surridge and augmented by Campbell’s Memorandum on Cooperation in the Colonies 
(1944), which outlined the principles of cooperation, the Model Ordinance was meant to serve as 
an “archetype,” a blueprint to “prevent the restriction of Cooperation to one form, and would 
preclude such freak legislation as the requirement of a minimum of fifty members in certain 
Pacific Islands.”182  The resulting template was chiefly defined by its flexibility, one that was 
general enough not to “cramp development,” but nevertheless outlined the objects a cooperative 
society could legitimately pursue—and the consequences should it not.183   
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In concert with the overtures made by the CO and certainly reflective of the new 
emphasis placed on colonial cooperation, the governor of Kenya introduced A Bill Relating to 
the Constitution and Regulation of Cooperative Societies to the Legislative Council in Nairobi.  
Informed by Campbell’s investigations earlier in the year, in which he noted that the 
“pessimists” must disabuse themselves of “visualizing a complex organ like the ‘English 
Cooperative Wholesale’” working at the incipient level in Africa,184 and his subsequent 
testimony before the select committee,185 the bill repealed the 1932 legislation that withheld the 
resources necessary for the support and organization of African cooperative societies.  It also 
suggested the creation of a registrar and the provision of a staff to educate, train, and oversee an 
indigenous cooperative movement—the first of its kind in Kenya.186  Recognizing this decisive 
change in policy, the Attorney General Stafford Sutton-Foster remarked that “it is in a sense 
breaking new ground” in that “we are making a departure from normal practice and we are doing 
it because conditions in this Colony justify” it.187  The bill was debated by the LegCo in July 
1945, during which several modifications were made that increased the ordinance’s flexibility 
and augmented the powers of the registrar, such as those surrounding the rights and duties of 
cooperative societies to appeal decisions.188  In doing so, the council brought the new ordinance 
in line with the Bureau’s recommendations to the CO, which were published earlier that year in 
                                                          
184 W. K. H. Campbell, Report on an Investigation of Cooperative Possibilities in Kenya 
(Nairobi:  Government Printer, 1945), 1.   
185 Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Legislative Council Debates (LegCo Deb.), XXII (July 26, 
1945):  233-234. 
186 Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Official Gazette, XXXXVII (November 14, 1944), 413-
423.   
187 Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Legislative Council Debates (LegCo Deb.), XXII (July 26, 
1945):  238.   
188 Ibid., 232-234.  Both the liquidation of member assets and subsequent valuation were also 




Cooperation in the Colonies:  A Report from a Special Committee to the Fabian Colonial 
Bureau.189   
~~~ 
In the final analysis, Mass Education in African Society and the Model Cooperative 
Societies Ordinance can be seen as bellwethers of later Fabian influence.  Indeed, as John D. 
Hargreaves has observed, the fact that both innovations received vital impetus from the 
Conservative-dominated Coalition Government during politically and economically uncertain 
times indicates the Fabians’ reforming conscience had made considerable ideological inroads, 
laying the groundwork for a burgeoning colonial consensus that was enormously suggestive of 
postwar developments.190  However minor, a precedent of Fabian influence had been set.   
 
Colonial Development Interrupted:  The Sterling Crisis of 1947 
Incipient and quietly effective “Fabianization” of colonial development policy between 
1939 and 1945 exposes the Janus-faced nature of Britain’s colonial development regime.  On the 
one hand, Britain’s wheelhouse of development programs included an array of modest, 
inexpensive schemes concerned to nurture indigenous progress at its most basic level—that is, 
the African community—by way of projects meant to encourage local-level betterment in terms 
of health, education, welfare, and economic equality.  On the other hand, there is the postwar 
“colonial development offensive,” to borrow Cowen and Shenton’s militant-sounding 
phraseology, which is renowned for its large-scale and costly mechanized development projects.  
Inspired in part by Fabian ideas about the state as an agent of progress, designed by experts, 
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implemented by bureaucratic “planners,” and coordinated through such bodies as the CO, the 
various colonial governments, and the newly-created Overseas Food Corporation (OFC) and 
Colonial Development Corporation (CDC), this singular aspect of colonial development 
dominates the historiography—and it is heavily criticized for its phenomenally expensive 
failures.191  Perhaps the most potent examples of this scholarly penchant involve the OFC’s East 
African Groundnuts Scheme (1947)192 and the CDC’s Gambia Egg Scheme (1948),193 the abject 
failures of which historians routinely haul out, dust off, and then promptly use as a stick with 
which to thrash the postwar planners who stand accused of “maladministration” and “waste.”194  
These projects have been copiously examined elsewhere and, suffice it to say, scholars agree that 
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the schemes were neither planned nor managed particularly well.195  The question therefore 
becomes why?  How do we explain these failures?  The answer lies in the postwar sterling crisis 
of 1947.     
The Second World War devastated Britain’s economy.  In the period between 1938 and 
1945, for instance, Britain’s external debt skyrocketed from £500 million to £3.355 billion while, 
during the same period, the value of its reserves of gold and dollars was nearly halved, falling 
from £864 million in 1938 to about £453 million by October 1945.196  Nearly bankrupt and left 
with no other alternative following the end of the American Lend-Lease program,197 Britain 
turned to the United States for a $5 billion loan.198  But policy-makers in Washington, who 
believed the best way to achieve global trade was through the elimination of trade barriers, 
viewed the sterling area—which, during the war, was the site of hard currency rationing “through 
the operation of the gold and dollar pool”—as a “discriminatory economic bloc” and, therefore, a 
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massive obstacle to trade—precisely what the Americans proposed to dismantle.199  Thus, the 
United States was unwilling to provide more than $3.5 billion in credit to Britain—and, at that, 
only on condition that the UK government “made sterling convertible for current transactions 
into any other currency.”200  As this allowed “private citizens and companies to purchase US 
exports with dollars passing through Britain,” the immediate result was a “frantic run on the 
Bank of England’s reserves and the rapid depreciation of the pound against the dollar.”201  As the 
value of the pound plummeted—and, with it, the basis of exchange in the sterling area—the 
empire-wide dollar deficit, accumulated through the importation of goods produced in the dollar 
area, soared.  Indeed, to get some sense of the scope of the problem, we need look no further 
than the West Indies, where the Bahamas, which in 1948 had a total population of 85,000, 
incurred a net-dollar import deficit of $6,495,000.202  Such were Britain’s postwar economic 
woes and they fashioned a bleak prognosis for the empire:  officials projected a “cumulative 
balance of payments deficit” of £1.25 billion between 1945 and 1950.203   
This crisis framed Britain’s novel postwar status as the “world’s leading debtor 
country”204 and it did much to undermine Creech Jones’ “welfarist agenda.”205  In fact, from 
1946/7, British policy-makers sought not only to “restrain” imports from the dollar area,206 but 
also to bend colonial development initiatives toward the production of dollar-earning and dollar-
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saving commodities otherwise imported from outside the sterling area.207  As Sir Stafford Cripps, 
Minister for Economic Affairs, observed in a speech to the African Governors’ Conference in 
November 1947, “What I think is most important is that we should get right ahead with as many 
large scale experimental schemes as possible.”208  It was not long before Sir Stafford’s sentiment 
was given an institutional basis.  For in February 1948, Parliament legislated the Overseas 
Resources Development Act and established the CDC and the OFC, bodies which, in tandem 
with the CO and the Treasury, were charged with the coordination of Britain’s postwar colonial 
development regime.   
It was to be a fraught working relationship.209  Indeed, while the OFC and the CDC were 
tasked with “securing the investigation, formulation and carrying out of projects for production 
or processing in places outside the United Kingdom of foodstuffs or agricultural products other 
than foodstuffs, and the marketing thereof,” and “securing the investigation, formulation and 
carrying out of projects for developing resources of colonial territories with a view to the 
expansion of production therein of foodstuffs and raw materials, or for other agricultural, 
industrial or trade development therein,”210 respectively, and could, therefore, initiate 
development schemes, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who had “overriding 
responsibility for the political and economic well-being of the Colonies,” had no such 
authority.211  Moreover, the CO was granted only minimal oversight of corporation-approved 
schemes, as Section 1 of the Overseas Resources Development Act made plain:  “The 
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Corporation can therefore undertake a wide range of projects by widely differing methods, and 
neither the commercial soundness of a project nor the methods by which it is to be carried out, 
can be questioned by the Secretary of State [for the Colonies] unless the project, or the methods 
of its operation, conflicted with public policy.”212 
These limits, which prompted a lengthy rebuke from Creech Jones, effectively restricted 
CO influence to brokering, along with the Treasury, “policy and allocation clearances” for 
projects already approved by the new corporations.213  Yet, even this constraint had its limits, for 
both the OFC and the CDC could embark on schemes “of a preliminary or urgent character” 
even in advance of sanction from either the CO or the Treasury.214  The board of the CDC 
justified this latitude in its first annual report:  “the board have sometimes felt, during the course 
of this first year, that if they are required to move always and only on the rails of exact planning, 
obtaining the full concurrence of various Government Departments and outside interests which 
may have views to assert, it may be difficult to move at all; and they have therefore welcomed 
every measure of freedom and independent initiative, within the general requirements of 
economic policy, which the Secretary of State [for the Colonies] and the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer have felt able, in their interpretation of the terms of the Act, to concede.”215 
Rationalized within the context of the sterling crisis and the urgent, postwar call for 
“resource mobilization” throughout the empire, these circumstances combined to elevate large-
scale colonial development schemes to a position of importance several magnitude above 
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projects concerned chiefly with indigenous social betterment.216  Little wonder, then, that, as 
Riley observes, there emerged within the Attlee government a polarity of development 
philosophies:  on the one hand, figures such as John Strachey, the Minister of Food charged with 
overseeing the OFC and, consequently, the East African Groundnuts Scheme, and Lord 
Trefgarne who, as chairman of the board of the CDC, was ultimately responsible for oversight of 
The Gambia Egg Scheme, were adherents to this new fiscally-driven ethos, one motivated by the 
idea that development should aid in the postwar reconstruction of Britain.   
Of course, given the scope of the crisis confronting the empire, and the purported 
outcome of the development schemes it compelled—it was estimated, for example, that the East 
Africa Groundnut Scheme alone would produce £10 million per annum in dollar-savings, while 
it was reckoned that egg production in The Gambia would produce something on the order of 20 
million eggs per annum following a relatively minor capital outlay on the part of the UK 
government of £500,000—this ethos, while not justifiable, is certainly explicable.217  
Nevertheless, the change in development philosophy embodied by the work of these agencies has 
prompted certain scholars, such as Kelemen and Fieldhouse, to frame the resultant “colonial 
development offensive” in the bleakest of terms, characterizing them as exploitative of Africans 
in the vein of Chamberlain’s imperial estates doctrine—precisely the circumstance the Fabians 
set out to correct in 1929.218   
Indeed, it is the positivist vision derived from Sydney Olivier’s Imperial Trusteeship, 
published in 1929, with its prescriptive moral responsibility, its humanitarian precepts of civil, 
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economic, and social equality, and a belief in the fundamental benevolence of state-sponsored 
development-based progress favored by Creech Jones, the FCB, and many within the CO, that 
stood in such stark contrast to the new development philosophy and the monstrous 
manifestations of midcentury modernity it obliged.  This dichotomy not only prompted an 
institutional tension between the CO and the OFC and the CDC, but led, pace Heinlein and 
Riley, to resistance on the part of CO officials “on moral grounds” to development plans that 
“might engender exploitation, or even the perception of exploitation, of colonial populations for 
British financial gain.”219   
 
Conclusion 
Britain’s postwar development strategy was about more than writing progress across the 
landscape of Africa in the mechanized language of industrialization—a fact that is clouded by 
the very historiography that scholars such as Kelemen and Fieldhouse perpetuate.  Indeed, 
obscured by this tendency is an equally significant strand of development:  modest, inexpensive 
schemes concerned to nurture indigenous progress at its most basic level—that is, the African 
community.  Eclipsed by the ambitious and flashy plans of revolutionary large-scale 
mechanization and agricultural production, local-level initiatives were nonetheless critical to the 
development of Britain’s African territories.  That such schemes go unnoticed or are treated as 
asides in the historiography fosters not only a grim assessment of postwar colonial development 
and the Fabianism which often lay at the heart of its ideals, but also one that is woefully 
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incomplete, particularly in light of the primacy Creech Jones assigned to one such colonial 
development stratagem:  mass education.     
Indeed, Creech Jones felt very strongly that the successful marriage of progress and 
development in Britain’s African territories hinged on this particular community-level initiative.  
The byzantine path wended by Creech Jones and the Adult and Mass Education Subcommittee 
that led to the unspectacular promulgation of Mass Education in African Society in 1944 testifies 
to this.  But the success of colonial development projects, Fabian-influenced or otherwise, lies 
ultimately not in an effective policy formulation, but whether or not—and if indeed, how—that 
proposal manifested itself tangibly on the ground in African communities.  This, of course, is the 
problematic at the very center of the question of postwar Fabian influence on the British Empire.  
In the end, when the Tribune announced that the “Fabianising” of the empire had begun in 1947, 
was this meant to herald something more than the rhetorical comeuppance of a society whose 
members had spent years permeating the upper echelons of government—or was it simply the 
gleeful announcement of a long-awaited—and ultimately hollow—succession?   
To answer this question, we must turn to the vehicle arguably best situated to Fabianize 
the British Empire following the Second World War:  the Cambridge Summer Conference of 




CHAPTER 4:  1948-1956 
On Colonial Summer Schools and Community Development in Kenya and Uganda:  Case 
Studies in the Fabianization of the British Empire 
 
Through Mr. Creech Jones and Mr. Jim Griffiths our programme was largely put 
into effect by the Labour Government.1  
 
–Dr. Rita Hinden, Secretary of the 
Fabian Colonial Bureau, to the 




By the time the CO Summer Conference on African Administration convened in August 
1948, the schematic of Fabian social trusteeship had crystallized into a positivist marriage of 
progress and development, a conjugation of Fabianism and Sydney Olivier’s imperial trusteeship 
designed to bring about the betterment of colonial peoples through a regime of state-interference 
under the guiding agency of state trustees.  Although the Great Depression’s impact on Britain’s 
political and economic circumstances had a cumulative suppressive effect on advancing these 
ideals in the realm of colonial development policy during the 1930s, the Fabians remained 
faithful to the basic principles of Olivier’s design.  Yet the formula of Fabian social trusteeship 
was not immutable; by the 1940s, circumstances prompted revision, particularly in light of the 
move toward colonial self-government.  As the FCB observed: “In the move forward of colonial 
territories…it is of great importance that a modern system of government should be laid.”2   
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As we have seen, for the Fabians, the foundation of this modern system of government 
had a basis in the experiences of Britain’s nineteenth-century working-classes, which had been 
excluded from “the exercise of full political rights.”3  As they gained and exercised these rights, 
the working-classes derived strength from what the Fabians saw as a host of "principal sources," 
notably trade unions, cooperatives, and local government.  These institutions, long-cherished by 
the Fabians as both generators of a sense of community4 and incubators of democracy,5 provided 
not only a blueprint for eventual self-government, but also its requisite social trustees, the state-
supported bodies best positioned to train Africans in the administrative skills needed to 
(eventually) take over from the imperial state.6  As important “staging posts” along the road to 
eventual self-government, the Fabians saw these institutions as logical counterparts to trusteeship 
in an age when Lord Lugard’s indirect rule, the preferred method of governance in Britain’s 
African colonies, had become increasingly outmoded, especially as educated Africans came to 
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see it as a barrier to progress.  Coupled with mass education, the institution particularly favored 
by Arthur Creech Jones and the subject of this chapter, local government, trade unions, and 
cooperatives comprised what the Bureau referred to as “The Social Foundation” of trusteeship.7   
While the ideological bricks of this foundation were being laid, the Labor Party gradually 
devolved its colonial policy formulation machinery into the hands of the increasingly better-
positioned Fabians.  We get some sense of this movement as early as 1933, when something very 
much like the FCB’s Social Foundation made a tentative appearance in The Colonial Empire, 
one of Labor’s largely-disregarded Depression-era treatises on colonial policy.  Promulgated 
following the party’s electoral implosion, retreat into opposition, and subsequent lunge to the 
left, The Colonial Empire outlined a plan of “socialisation and self-government” in the colonies 
that depended partly upon a framework of local government, the organization of cooperatives 
and native trade unions, and an educational curriculum that included mass education.8  The 
obvious parallel with the Social Foundation is rather more than historical happenstance; for at the 
time, the party relied on the ostensibly apolitical NFRB, a Fabian-led research department (the 
LRD), and an executive whose policy committee was dominated by Fabians to formulate its 
colonial initiatives.9  As suggestive as this is, however, the ultimate significance of The Colonial 
Empire lay not in its affirmation of Fabian permeation, but rather in its status as an exemplar of 
Labor’s prewar tendency to draw upon what became the nuts-and-bolts of Fabian social 
trusteeship.  As Kelemen has observed, with the passage of time these rudiments became a 
“long-standing” and distinctly Fabian contribution to Labor’s postwar colonial policy 
                                                          
7 “The Social Foundation of Trusteeship,” Venture:  Journal of the Fabian Colonial Bureau, 2, 
no. 8 (September 1950): 8, BLUO, MSS. Brit. Emp. s. 332, ACJ 16/3. 
8 The Colonial Empire, 4, 11, 12, and 14. 
9 See Chapter 2 for a fuller discussion.    
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formulations.10  Indeed, it is the climax of this trend which prompted Morgan to describe the 
postwar CO as “the Fabian Colonial Bureau writ large.”11 
By the 1940s, a dense ideological network stretched between and connected Labor and 
the Fabians, both in terms of domestic and foreign policy.  Little wonder, then, that the party’s 
1945 election manifesto, Let Us Face the Future, should itself have been written by the Fabian 
Michael Young.12  Yet, in many ways, it is no less emblematic for having been so; for as 
Callaghan has noted, in terms of sheer political clout—that is, the proportion of members in the 
governing body as an expression of influence—1945 represents something of an apex for the 
Fabians.13  In point of fact, the election that year, which brought to power Labor’s Third 
Ministry, a landmark occasioned by Labor’s historic landslide victory, and coincided with the 
promulgation of an amended CDWA, manifested an astronomical change in the political fortunes 
of the society:  of the 394 Labor MPs elected, 229 were Fabians;14 ten cabinet ministers, 
including the premier, Clement Attlee; 35 undersecretaries of state and 11 parliamentary private 
secretaries were also Fabians.15  So transformative was the election of 1945 in terms of Fabian 
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representation that the wife of John Parker, the MP and general secretary of the Fabian Society, 
remarked on being introduced to the new PLP:  “Why, it looks just like an enormous Fabian 
School!”16  Though we should not confuse numerical preponderance with anything like a 
mandate for the Fabian agenda, Mrs. Parker’s effervescence was not too far wide of the mark; for 
the fact remains that for the first time since 1929, a type of political context existed that was 
theoretically favorable to the “Fabianization of the British Empire.”  “At last,” Dr. Hinden wrote 
of the elation felt among certain members of the FCB, “the policies which had been pondered 
over and pressed during the preceding years of hard work would be carried into effect, and 
enthusiasm ran high.”17   
Of all the advisory mechanisms at the disposal of the Colonial Office to commence with 
this “Fabianizing,”18 to borrow from the Tribune, none was better situated than the CO Summer 
School19 on African Administration, which met for the first time in 1947 under the tutelage of 
the Fabian and newly-minted Colonial Secretary, Arthur Creech Jones.  Convened annually over 
a two-week period in August and September between 1947 and 1949 and again from 1951, the 
conferences were designed to bring the experience of “serving officers,”20 who were given leave 
to attend, to bear on the problems confronting postwar-Britain in the administration of its 
dependent territories.  In their turn, the conferences that met while Creech Jones was Secretary of 
State considered the subjects of African Local Government (1947), The Encouragement of 
Initiative in African Society (1948), and Agricultural Development in Africa (1949).  Officially, 
these conferences were consultative in nature; they were not substitutes for the “ordinary 
                                                          
16 As quoted in Cole, The Story of Fabian Socialism, 301.   
17 Rita Hinden, Socialists and the Empire (London:  Fabian Publications, 1946), 22. 
18 Tribune, July 4, 1947.   As quoted in Cowen and Shenton, “Origin,” 143.   
19 The meeting held in 1947 was referred to as a “school.”  Subsequent meetings were referred to 
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20 Cohen to Hinden, May 5, 1947, BLUO, MSS. Brit. Emp. s. 365, FCB 25/2. 
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machinery” of policy-making in the African territories or in London.  Rather, they were intended 
to pool experience and to produce practical suggestions for consideration by everyone concerned 
with African development.  Unofficially, however, the position of the conferences vis-à-vis the 
official policy-making functions of the CO was less straightforward, as attested by Creech Jones' 
assurance in 1948 that the conference was not meant “to put something across to the officers 
from Africa.”21 
There was no more appropriate setting for Creech Jones’ caveat.  For the centerpiece of 
the 1948 summer conference was mass education, a project in which the Secretary of State’s 
faith was so deep and abiding he had garnered a reputation among certain colonial officials as its 
“apostle.”22  For Creech Jones, mass education was the “essence” responsible for stimulating the 
most elusive of all the alchemical quanta of colonial development:  African initiative, which, in 
the eyes of many colonial officials, had been hitherto circumscribed by the commingling of 
hidebound “(native) lethargy and ignorance” and the more advanced Africans’ generalized 
“distrust” of British intentions.23  Yet, like all crusading apostles, Creech Jones’ message was 
only as effective as the proselytizing missionary network on which it depended:  in this case, the 
British Colonial Service.  But the Secretary of State for the Colonies could not govern by fiat; 
instead, constitutional convention obliged him to work through colonial governors who, like 
himself, drew authority from the royal prerogative, and whose decisions he had, by and large, to 
                                                          
21 Colonial Office Summer Conference on African Administration, Second Session, August 19-
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support.24  Within such a framework, the cooperation of the Colonial Service could only be 
solicited, not compelled—an administrative impediment complicated by the fact that, as 
Goldsworthy has pointed out, “many people had a stake in resisting (Creech Jones’) policies.”25   
Almost as a matter of routine, then, the task of winning over colonial officials was 
nothing short of Sisyphean:  requiring navigation of the convoluted structure of an ossified, still-
conservative colonial regime studded barbwire-like with what Creech Jones referred to as 
“unimaginative reactionaries,”26 hostile toward “planning,” who saw CO Fabians as idealistic 
and their policies unrealistic.  To say nothing of indigenous, nationalist resistance to colonial rule 
itself.27  Thus, in many ways, Creech Jones’ best hope to further his progressive agenda lay in a 
well-executed summer conference populated by sympathetic colonial officials and partisans.28   
This chapter explores both the policy implications and practical ramifications of the 
“Fabianization of the British Empire.”  It takes as its point of departure the CO Summer 
Conference of 1948.  Convened under the sponsorship of Arthur Creech Jones in his capacity as 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, the conference met and deliberated on a topic in which the 
minister and the FCB were both keenly interested:  mass education.  This chapter shows that, as 
implemented within the framework laid out in Mass Education in African Society, the CO policy 
promulgated in 1944 and guided to a considerable extent by Creech Jones in his capacity as a 
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member of the ACEC, mass education policy had been revealed to be an ill-defined and 
unwieldy concept.  In the colonies, the resultant muddle manifested a variegated efflorescence of 
mass education regimes which were noteworthy, above all, for their lack of consistency.  As a 
result, the 1948 summer conference set out to reimagine mass education policy and bring to it 
some much-needed clarity.  The conference accomplished this by framing what was essentially 
the same policy but within the rubric of “community development.”  To get some sense of the 
efficacy of these formulations, and thus some idea of the nature of a “Fabianized” British 
Empire, this chapter pivots to an examination of community development in situ—that is, in 
Africa.  As such, we conclude here with a pair of case studies on the evolution and practical 
effects of community development as realized in Kenya and Uganda.   
 
The Fabianization of the British Empire:  Fabians and the 1948 CO Summer Conference 
on African Administration 
In his opening address to the 1948 Cambridge Summer Conference on African 
Administration, the Secretary of State for the Colonies Arthur Creech Jones laid out his vision 
for the future of development in Africa to a roomful of colonial officials.  The nub of his speech, 
which faulted past development efforts for emphasizing the “substance” of development 
programs over the encouragement of indigenous “motive power,” was that the political and 
economic development of colonial societies depended ultimately upon their own peoples.29  
“Looked at by any real standard of values,” Creech Jones reasoned, “it is less important that a 
particular African territory should have a progressive constitution with full African participation 
                                                          
29  Colonial Office Summer Conference on African Administration, Second Session, August 19-
September 2, 1948, King’s College, Cambridge:  The Encouragement of Initiative in African Society, 10, 
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than that there should exist in the territory a considerable group of people capable of effective 
political capacity, by which is meant…the capacity to take part effectively in public life and to 
shape political development themselves.  At the other end of the scale it is less important that 
there should be a village school than that the people should have the initiative, not only to want a 
school and ask for a school, but actually to build and run it by their own efforts.”30  
For all its ostensible altruism, this high-minded rhetoric is jarring to modern ears, 
reminding us that the Secretary of State was no less subject to the “genie of colonial 
paternalism”31 than any other colonial administrator.  Indeed, it was more a matter of degree than 
of completeness, since Creech Jones clearly believed Africans were capable of achieving 
progress, they lacked only the initiative to realize it.  Little wonder, then, that Creech Jones 
concluded in his speech that the “primary task” of Britain’s colonial development regime in 
Africa was the stimulation of “initiative…to encourage people to want change” and “to equip 
them with the power themselves to create change.”32  In other words, the tangible ends of a 
planned development scheme—be it dams and irrigation canals, groundnut schemes or egg 
production, or schools and community buildings—were not, in fact, the point of development at 
all.  Rather, it was the means by which development was accepted, understood, and achieved by 
the indigenous peoples—that is, the fostering of enterprise in African society itself as a sort of 
bastardized version of “development from below”33 that depended, paradoxically, on 
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paternalistic European encouragement—which would far outlast any metropolitan-imposed 
framework34 and ultimately “allow Africans to take over from the imperial state.”35   
If, as Creech Jones held, African progress was a dynamic fueled by initiative, what 
remained was its arousal and sustainment; the means by which the bulk of the population who 
lacked the requisite “motive power” was to be induced to “become the pioneers in building the 
institutions and works most suitable to their needs.”36  For Creech Jones, the necessary 
provocateurs in this scheme were the colonial state and, in time, the Fabian-favored institutions 
of social trusteeship—i.e. local government, trade unions, and cooperatives—whose job it was to 
supply “the spark to kindle the flame” of collective initiative.  As opposed to market incentives, 
the chief mechanism for igniting this spark was mass education,37 itself, as we shall see, the 
imprecise conceptual tinder which underpinned the philosophical basis of the 1948 Cambridge 
summer conference.   
The 1948 summer conference stood astride the nexus of an extensive, years-long, and 
somewhat ad hoc information collation project, which gathered together technique analyses as 
well as experiential and experimental data with a view toward assessing the “whole problem” of 
colonial mass education and determining, in Creech Jones’ words, “what can be done to get the 
Colonies directed [to] carry this thing [mass education] further.”38  Organized and spearheaded 
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by a group of Fabians and a clique of like-minded CO administrators, parliamentarians, and 
colonial and international officials who saw communal activity and training in administrative 
skills as the necessary precursors to self-government,39 the conference was the second in a series 
of annual summer conferences on African Administration that were the brainchild of Andrew B. 
Cohen,40 the Fabianized head of the African Division of the CO.41 
When it met in Cambridge, the 1948 summer conference was packed virtually stem to 
stern with Fabian partisans, comprising a veritable “who’s who” of colonial development 
specialists and planners that included:  Cohen, chairman of the conference; G. B. Cartland, 
general secretary of the conference and contributor to the FCB’s report on Local Government 
and the Colonies;42 Leonard Barnes, Fabian and co-chair of the panel tasked with examining the 
“Incentives to Progress in African Society;” the Fabian Dr. Margery Perham who, along with 
Prof. C. H. Philips, himself a Fabian collaborator, spoke on nationalism as a motive force in 
African societies; Dr. Huxley, a long-serving Fabian, former member of the ACEC, and director 
general of UNESCO who spoke of the inspiration his agency had drawn from the CO’s mass 
education policy; the Fabian Prof. Arthur Lewis, who spoke on the “indirect approach” of 
encouraging African initiative in “betterment schemes;” W. E. F. Ward, Deputy Colonial 
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Education Adviser, chairman of the panel charged with elaborating “The Content of Mass 
Education,” and contributor to the New Fabian Colonial Essays;43 as well as Colonial Education 
Adviser Sir Christopher Cox, who served as deputy chair of the conference, and Dr. Margaret 
Read, who spoke on the necessity of encouraging “key individuals” to promote progress—both 
of whom were long-time Fabian collaborators and contributors who worked alongside Creech 
Jones in the formulation of Mass Education in African Society.   
Planned, prepared, and delivered by this group of Fabians and their collaborators and 
correspondents, the conference was pumped and primed to diffuse a Fabianized vision of 
colonial mass education policy throughout the empire.44  Appropriately, it took as its point of 
departure the CO’s report on Mass Education in African Society, the “prime begetter” of which 
was Creech Jones.45  Published in 1944, the report did much to encourage an empire-wide 
dialogue about mass education, while rendering it increasingly amorphous, a duality 
acknowledged by Creech Jones in his opening remarks at the Conference:  “There has been a 
great deal of talk over the past three or four years about mass education,” Creech Jones noted, 
“and many people have failed to understand what it means.”46   
By 1948, this lingering sense of nebulousness was felt most acutely in the colonies.  
Between 1944 and 1946, the “dilemma” of mass education came up in a variety of colonial 
contexts.  For example, the educationalist V. L. Griffiths, the principal of Bakht-er-Ruda College 
in Sudan, argued that mass education, even assuming it was properly understood and 
implemented, was but a constituent part of the solution to a much larger problem facing Britain’s 
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postwar colonial empire.  “If we really mean to develop the Colonies until they are capable of 
governing themselves within measurable time,” he wrote Cox in 1944, “I suggest that the civic 
training of the educated and the gaining of their cooperation is as important a subject as Mass 
Education.”  Griffiths punctuated his appraisal with a warning that “without some such 
complement to Mass Education, the latter is likely to go sour on us through the interference and 
rivalry of flamboyant and bitter nationalists.  This has happened in India….”47  Griffiths’ 
paternalistic concerns that African initiative without proper “supervision” could be dangerous—
and, hence, the need for vesting trusteeship in the hands of “experts”—were echoed by Uganda’s 
social welfare adviser, who reflected in 1946 that: “My experience here in Uganda has utterly 
convinced me…that the CO Report on Mass Education would remain only paper until such time 
as Africans were called up for training in citizenship….”48  This “training in citizenship” 
encompassed a wide range of vague-sounding initiatives framed by the notion that “good 
citizenship” was a “way of living,” rather than a “body of knowledge.”  As such, it included both 
a direct classroom approach and an indirect classroom approach, from fostering “elementary 
social habits”—learned through the constant contact of pupils with teachers and staff—
reinforced by cleanliness and self-control; “character training,” where Africans learned how to 
be what Europeans considered “good citizens” by observing and following the examples of good 
behavior set by their teachers while simultaneously maintaining “good relationships” with those 
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around them; to field trips where classes visited government offices (post offices, police stations, 
railways stations, etc.) to attain an understanding and even appreciation of the work officials do; 
and classroom-based studies in such subjects as politics, where more advanced students could 
learn about the “machinery and spirit of Government:  in the native authority and the Crown 
colony system, in Dominion status, in the working of the parliamentary and Cabinet system, and 
the functions of the Crown.”49  It was, in other words, meant to be a regime of inculcation in a 
specifically British (and generally Eurocentric) vision of citizenship.   
When, in the summer of 1947, an investigation was launched under the auspices of the 
CO “to advise on problems of mass education and literacy” in East Africa with a remit to discuss 
related plans of campaign in Kenya, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, and Uganda, the survey confirmed 
that progress regarding mass education had been irregular.  Carried out by Prof. Philips of the 
School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London, the survey recognized that while the 
“underlying conception” of mass education in colonial society had “long been part of British 
rule,” the term “mass education” was itself “much misunderstood” in the colonies.  In Kenya, for 
example, the survey found a robust infrastructure existed to help facilitate mass education 
projects, but that administrative overlap between the Departments of Education, Training, and 
Social Welfare had coupled with resource limitations to create an incoherent and inefficient 
policy.50  Meantime, in Uganda, where it fell under the purview of the Department of Public 
Relations and Social Welfare, mass education consisted, in part, of traveling demonstration 
teams exhibiting everything from latrine maintenance to the proper planting of banana trees and 
posters exhorting the moral virtues of hard work.  While favorably impressed by the teams’ “fine 
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method of mass teaching,” Prof. Philips cautioned that the lack of coordination and delay in 
follow-up could derail their efforts.51     
In his final report, Prof. Philips assessed candidly the state of mass education in East 
Africa.  “To some [mass education] means simply literacy for all within a couple of years and 
properly is dismissed as impracticable;” by others it was “taken to mean nothing more than 
universal schooling for children, which, in any event, is unlikely to be achieved…in under a 
generation;” while “for most it carries the connotation of formal education within the walls of a 
classroom.”52  By any of these measures, Prof. Philips concluded, mass education was not 
happening in certain of Britain’s East African colonies, most notably Tanganyika, the soon-to-be 
site of the East African Groundnuts Scheme.53   
Given this, and despite Cox’s own remark to Creech Jones in 1945 that “action” on mass 
education was “overdue,”54 it is evident that little progress had been made in capturing and 
caging the ponderous mass education phenomenon before 1948.  Yet, an almost inexorable 
centripetal momentum had been triggered with the promulgation of Mass Education in African 
Society, which first broached the idea of coupling mass education with native initiative, albeit 
inchoately.  Centered on the CO, what at first was an epiphenomenal byproduct of a policy 
pronouncement had, by 1947, become a deliberate campaign under Creech Jones to canvass the 
empire’s mass education regime, drawing in data from across Britain’s African colonies and, 
gradually, building up a framework for the conference—a blueprint which included everything 
from the controversy surrounding the meaning and intent of mass education, to its configuration, 
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utility, and, ultimately, its practice.  These components converged at King’s College, Cambridge, 
where, over the course of a fortnight’s deliberation between August 19 and September 2, 1948, 
the future of colonial mass education policy and its place in Britain’s development arsenal was 
decided.   
As had been the case with its predecessor, the summer conference of 1948 was carefully 
orchestrated by its chairman, Cohen, who “sat in the Chair from the first lecture to the last every 
day.”55  The officers at King’s were divided into six groups, each of which attempted to elaborate 
certain aspects of colonial mass education policy and its role in stimulating African initiative.  
The groups were concerned with the technique and content of mass education, the question of 
incentivizing progress in African society, exploring the connections between citizenship and 
education, and the role of women in the colonial mass education project.  For all this, the most 
important discussion was that of Group VI.  Chaired by P. E. W. Williams, Commissioner of 
Social Welfare in Kenya and himself a former critic of Mass Education in African Society, the 
group’s chief concern was the organization of mass education.    
Conscious of the vexatious confusion which surrounded the term “mass education,” 
practically the first thing the group did was to adopt “community development” as a suitable 
complementary alternative.56  This rationalization not only clarified the modus operandi of mass 
education—the encouragement of a “popular self-help movement,” of which Creech Jones was a 
principal fosterer in Africa,57 designed to motivate “better living”—but also bequeathed to it a 
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multi-tiered organizational framework designed to ensure its perpetuation.58  Eager to assuage 
concerns that such an alteration obliged a costly, and therefore prohibitive, restructuring of 
colonial administration, it was stressed that mass education was not, in fact, a new field of 
activities, but rather constituted the application of new techniques within the extant framework—
albeit one adapted to the purpose.  Indeed, while the framework could be retained, it had to be 
“flexible” enough to accommodate Creech Jones’ prescription that community initiative ought to 
be stimulated from below as well as from above.59  With this caveat in mind, the group defined, 
and the conference accepted, mass education as follows:   
We understand the term “mass education” to mean a movement designed to promote 
better living for the whole community, with the active participation and, if possible, on 
the initiative of the community; but if this initiative is not forthcoming spontaneously, it 
should be aroused and stimulated by special techniques designed to secure the active and 
enthusiastic response of the community.  Mass education embraces all forms of 
betterment.  It includes the whole range of community development activities in the 
districts, whether these are undertaken by Government or unofficial bodies; in the field of 
agriculture by securing the adoption of better methods of soil conservation, better 
methods of farming and care of livestock, in the field of health by promoting better 
sanitation and water supplies, proper measures of hygiene and infant and maternity 
welfare; and in the field of education by spreading literacy and adult education as well as 
by the extension and improvement of schools for children.  Mass education must make 
use of the cooperative movement and must be put into effect in the closest association 
with local government bodies.60   
 
Bristling with voguish catchwords and key concepts that were the hallmarks of postwar 
development theory, the basis of which was later roundly encapsulated in Rostow’s 
modernization theory of development, this definition suggested a system that not only 
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encouraged in Africans a deep desire for their own progress and betterment, but one that 
sustained it.61  This required a complex ideological calculus, one that married popular inspiration 
with civic awareness, an “education for citizenship” designed to complement colonial mass 
education policy.  For, as the CO’s report on Education for Citizenship in Africa, published 
ahead of the summer conference and the basis of its deliberations on the same topic, cautioned 
officials, “political machinery or economic devices will not ensure true democracy.  Democracy 
requires a temper of the general mind which will only spring from a temper of mind found in the 
individual citizen.  Unless the true democratic temper is present, the most beautifully devised 
political or economic machinery will result in nothing but slavery….  If this temper is present, 
details of the machinery matter little.”62  
In practice, such considerations situated the village unit, possessed of a collective 
knowledge of its own economy, infrastructure, and society63 and, therefore, “the starting point 
from which the original ideas…must emanate,”64 at the very heart of the mass education project.  
It therefore constituted the organizational basis of the colonial Mass Education Movement and, 
as such, the locus of Creech Jones’ crucial initiative-building regime.  Centered around a “hard 
core”65 of villagers (a preferably “large and fluid body” to include ex-army servicemen, 
“Africans that have put in useful work in the African Civil Service and Local Government 
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Service,” and their wives66) and specialist staff consisting of local-level field officers and 
“Provincial Community Development (or Mass Education) Officers” charged with “stimulating 
local enthusiasm” within the widest possible rubric, this regime manifested a circuitous system 
of “community mobilisation”67 designed to canalize African motive power by inspiring it 
through emphasis on a complex of mutually-reinforcing local-level interests, hobbies, and 
occupations.68  The soundness of this approach was later explicated by Jackson, who, in 
language which suggests a belief that African society was somehow frozen in time, notes in his 
study on community development in eastern Nigeria that “village communities form the obvious 
area for community development work” for they were “still by far the strongest 
community…bound by a common history and the beliefs in a common ancestor, by the common 
ownership of land and the ties of intermarriage, by a common social life and a common 
custom.”69   
If the village unit and its assorted communal activities stood at the heart of the 
motivational enterprise that undergirded mass education, it was cooperatives, trade unions, and 
local government—the institutional essence of the social foundation of Fabian trusteeship—that 
were its civic lifeblood, the means by which the critical village-level initiative could be mustered 
and translated meaningfully into nascent self-governance along the lines of the “democratic 
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British model.”70  For Kelemen, the reciprocal initiative-encouraging schematic that 
characterized mass education policy constituted something like a “new system of governance,” 
the principles of which were laid down at the summer conference as a guide for wider 
application across Britain’s colonial territories.71  As the new Fabian-influenced paradigm, 
Creech Jones made it the crux of his opening address at the African Governors Conference,72 
which convened nearly a month later on September 29, 1948.  “The dynamic of progress must be 
created by the people themselves,” he surmised, adding that: 
The devolution of responsibility, the transfer of executive power, is no simple problem, 
but little progress can be made unless the people cooperate in the work of government, 
assume some direct responsibility in their own affairs, develop a sense of public service, 
and do not wait on government but initiate and attack their social and economic problems 
themselves.  It is for this reason that in recent colonial policy we have sought so 
strenuously to promote voluntary service and mutual aid, we have talked much about 
breaking through ignorance by community education, about extending mass education 
and literacy, and encouraging individual and community initiative. …  As we emphasised 
many years ago in our Report on Mass Education, we must secure the interest and 
cooperation of the local people in their advance so that they themselves become pioneers 
in building the institutions and works most suitable to their needs.73   
 
Before the year was out, mass education (alt. community development) was adopted as 
one of the central features of Britain’s African policy.74  Corona, the journal of the British 
Colonial Service, heralded the event as pioneering; it was “practical” and “constructive,” noted 
the editor, distinctions which suggest its predecessors, Mass Education in African Society and 
Education for Citizenship in Africa, were not.75  At the same time, however, Corona sounded a 
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note of caution, admonishing colonial officials then-engaged in mass education not to take for 
granted the cooperation of local peoples.  “Everybody will not be interested in the same thing,”76 
the journal explained, a fact which complicated the already-formidable work of community 
development (mass education) officers in “getting to know as much as possible about the people; 
their way of life, language, customs; their natural leaders; wants, hopes, and aspirations.”77  
Couched as an oblique indictment against indirect rule, the intent was to might stimulate and 
arouse native initiative, the vital element identified by Creech Jones as the essence of mass 
education and, by extension, Britain’s postwar colonial development enterprise.  Thus, Corona’s 
warning that “no scheme will be successful” if initiative was not aroused had serious 
implications for Britain’s imperial future.78   
For all this, however, as an expression of Fabian influence on colonial development, the 
work of the 1948 summer conference gets us closer to understanding the phenomenon of 
“Fabianization” only at the level of policy formulation.  Absent any sense of how Fabian 
influence revealed itself in practice, our evidence lacks the kind of granularity necessary for a 
reasonably comprehensive understanding of the process implied by the “Fabianization of the 
British Empire.”  As this suggests, the vital corollary is an examination of mass education in 
context; that is, a study of Fabianized colonial development policy in situ, at the level of the 
colonies.  This, however, is a deceptively straightforward proposition. For, in the end, how do we 
choose which of Britain’s colonial territories to examine?   
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The answer to this question can be found at the juncture of the central conceit of this 
study—that is, Fabian influence as realized in both the theory and practice of Britain’s colonial 
mass education policy—and the nature of the summer conference itself.  Logic dictates that the 
officials who attended the conference from the colonies were those best positioned to determine, 
or at least exercise, related initiatives in their respective territories.  Given postwar retrenchment 
and the concomitant imperial belt-tightening it engendered, suggesting otherwise is dubious.79  
Thus, in the search for exemplary colonial candidates who manifested Fabianization, the summer 
conference is an ideally-suited starting point.  Moreover, there is no prerequisite built into this 
study that argues candidates from the conference must also be members of the Fabian Society.  
Indeed, as with the historic operation of Fabian “permeation,” affiliation is neither obliged nor 
expected; rather, as agents of Fabian-favored policies, officials need only to endorse said 
initiatives, a sanctioning surmised either through outright approval (as, for example, quantified in 
correspondences) or, more tangibly, through implementation (be it partial or, more hopefully, 
complete).   
Subjected to these considerations, and excluding CO staff from London who had no hand 
in administering the conference, speakers and participants not affiliated with either the CO or 
any other official organ of state, attendees from territories not under the purview of the CO (e.g. 
Sudan), clerical workers (e.g. stenographers) and students, and the number of potential 
candidates drops from 160-plus to below 70.  Of these, two figures stand out both for their role in 
guiding the deliberations of the conference and in the formulation and ultimate implementation 
of the policies as enunciated at Cambridge in 1948.  They are Williams, Kenya’s Commissioner 
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of Social Welfare, the chairman of the conference group responsible for defining mass education, 
and future principal of the Local Government and Community Development Training Center at 
Entebbe, Uganda; and Cohen, the Fabianized conference chairman and future governor of 
Uganda.  Thus, in the search for tangible manifestations of Fabianization in the colonies, the 
field is considerably narrowed to these two East African territories.    
What follows is a pair of case studies designed to plot the trajectory of colonial mass 
education policy against the backdrop of the evolving political and social landscape of postwar 
Kenya and Uganda.  In the end, the findings reveal not only the breadth and scope of postwar 
Fabianization, but also underscore the fact that nowhere did (or, for that matter, could) 
development policy (Fabianized or otherwise) persist unadulterated following promulgation; 
indeed, policy formulations rested on a design that was intentionally negotiable80 so that it might 
be rendered legible within the framework of a particular colonial context.81  For the “British 
Empire” was hardly the monolithic, homogeneous entity the name suggests; rather, it was an 
aggregation of territories and cultures, an umbrella under which a vast array of peoples with wide 
differences were collected and administered in vaguely similar ways—inherent and unavoidable 
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circumstantial particularity that played an important part in the shape of mass education in both 
Kenya and Uganda.    
 
Mass Education in Context:  Case Studies of Postwar Social Welfare and Community 




I have got so far, far enough to see that community development is on the edge of 
the map.82 
 
-P. E. W. Williams, November 16, 1949  
 
Some fourteen months after the 1948 Summer Conference on African Administration, 
Williams wrote to Cox lamenting the future of community development in Kenya.  Williams’ 
five-year community development plan (Mass Education or Rural Community Development, 
Kenya Colony), placed before the executive council in 1948 and accepted “in principle” (an 
invariably ominous turn of phrase), had suffered a series of ghastly and humiliating setbacks at 
the hands of Nairobi’s bureaucrats, including the deletion of the mass education budget, funds 
for Williams’ assistant, and the money for the development of rural industries.83  So catastrophic 
was this turn of events, nearly unimaginable just eleven months before, that Williams not only 
declared his community development plan “dead,” but also resigned as Commissioner for Social 
Welfare.84  Fabianization, it seemed, was stillborn in Kenya.  Or was it? 
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The story of mass education in Kenya is one of oscillation and contradiction, starting 
with Williams himself.  After graduating from Cambridge with an MA in Modern Languages, he 
joined the British Colonial Service as an Education Officer in Tanganyika Territory in 1926.  At 
the outbreak of the Second World War, he enlisted with the King’s African Rifles (KAR) in East 
Africa where, as Staff Officer until 1943, he was tasked with forming and directing the East 
African Army Education Corps (EAAEC).  The origins of the EAAEC, which was formally 
inaugurated in 1942 and headquartered at the Center “C” Jeanes School (Kabete) on the outskirts 
of Nairobi, lay in the expulsion of the Italians from East Africa in 1942.  As Parsons explains, 
following the defeat of the Italians in the Ethiopian campaign, senior colonial officials began to 
worry about the African soldiery’s declining morale.  These concerns were exacerbated when, in 
February 1942, the KAR 25th Brigade in Eritrea, believing the expulsion of the Italians from East 
Africa signaled the end of the war, refused to board ships bound for Southeast Asia.  General 
William Platt, the officer in charge of the East Africa Command (EAC), concluded that a basic 
education program was needed to explain Allied war aims to the African soldiery.85  Once built, 
such a program could be bent to complementary purposes.  For example, colonial military 
authorities believed that bored askaris (African soldiers) were more likely to drink and seek the 
company of prostitutes than those engaged in things like course work.  Properly conceived, 
military education could not only elucidate Allied war aims, but also serve to improve health and 
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morale by providing a more “wholesome” and “productive” use of soldiers’ spare time.86  
Moreover, it provided askari with the opportunity to learn useful technical skills that, once they 
returned to civilian life, could help them secure well-paid jobs.  For their part, East African civil 
officials welcomed formal army education as a tool to blunt CO criticism that they had 
unnecessarily cut back on African education during the war.   
Over time, the AEC had a profound impact on rural populations throughout East and 
Central Africa.  Indeed, as Holford has observed, the AEC formed a touring army unit “not as a 
recruiting organization, but to inform millions of villagers in East and Central Africa about what 
their young men were doing in the forces.”87  These units, Mason notes, were composed of 
“hand-picked young Africans from various branches of the army…using ingenious techniques of 
demonstration, play-acting, and showmanship.”88  One such “show,” which anticipated greatly 
the later work of mass education demonstration teams in Uganda and Togoland, toured the 
United Kingdom in 1945 and so impressed Cox that he sought out its creator.  “Who had the 
lion’s share,” he wrote in May 1945 to Creech Jones, at the time Under-Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, “in bringing into being the remarkable Army Education business of the Jeanes School, 
Kabete, in the last three or four years and is now on show here in UK[?]”89   
Having so recently published Mass Education in African Society which, as we have seen, 
was subject to no small amount of criticism—even Williams described it as “insufficiently 
realistic” in the context of Britain’s poverty-stricken African colonies90—Cox was eager to see if 
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Williams’ wartime work on education in Kenya could somehow be translated to the civilian 
sphere.  After meeting with Creech Jones and Read, Cox hastily sent an air mail to Williams.  “I 
feel that you’ll understand that people here,” he scrawled, “particularly those who had anything 
to do with the Mass Education Report, who’ve seen or heard anything of the work of the AEC in 
East Africa & your Jeanes show in particular, are extremely keen that its distinctive features & 
assets & spirit should somehow have a chance of being carried over into the civil set up.  It’s a 
great piece of work…if anything can be done, you’re the person to see how.”91   
Possibly one of the most astute judges of the vital correlation between mass education, 
native interests, and native capabilities in all of British Africa, Williams welcomed Cox’s 
invitation to contribute to the postwar mass education discourse—an inducement reified by 
subsequent (and multiple) visits to Kenya from the likes of Creech Jones, Cohen, Elspeth 
Huxley, and indeed Cox himself.92  All were enthusiastic about Williams’ “effective and 
impressive” education centers at Kabete, particularly the innovative Jeanes School.93  Host to a 
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noteworthy curriculum of experimental and progressive coursework, such as homecrafts for the 
wives of ex-servicemen and even training courses for their children, Williams hoped the school 
would be the future home of mass education in Kenya.94   
In the meantime, as he worked with Cox on how best to position the Jeanes School as the 
colony’s mass education training center,95 Williams shared what he believed ought to be the 
basis of mass education with the newly-reconstituted Mass Education Subcommittee in 
London.96  “It seems to me,” he wrote, “that what all our…work should be based on [is] a group 
of men of sound character living in a village.  If we could only get groups of such men—some 
perhaps working as craftsmen, one or two as petty traders, and an agricultural instructor, a 
teacher and a health worker or two—and work outwardly from this group, getting them to run 
boy scouts, farmers clubs, welfare clubs etc., I feel we should very gradually build up a better 
spirit.”97 
Williams’ invocation of “a better spirit” derived from activities centered on a village unit 
anticipates, at least in part, the focus of Creech Jones’ community-based initiative-building 
regime, the struts and armatures of which were emplaced the following year at the 1948 summer 
conference.  Although absent the vital bridge connecting this collective “spirit” or motivation 
with self-government, and thus devoid the civic dimension of the Fabians’ social foundation of 
trusteeship, Williams clearly envisioned a mass education regime that in some measure 
accounted for progressive development from below.  Such an expression (albeit incomplete) by 
an official with twenty years’ experience educating Africans, increasingly au courant with 
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Creech Jones’ own thinking, could but have endeared Williams to the Secretary of State.  It is 
perhaps little wonder, then, that Williams should have played an important part in that 
conference’s deliberations.  Indeed, when the time came to organize the 1948 conference, he was 
asked to chair Group VI, which, as we have seen, originated the definition of mass education (alt. 
community development) ultimately accepted by the conference. 
The crystallization of policy achieved at Cambridge had an almost immediate effect on 
mass education in Kenya; for it effectively saved the Jeanes School from being decommissioned.  
Opened in 1925 to provide special training for rural village teachers as instructors, the school 
was closed down at the start of the Second World War and commandeered as a training center 
(Center “C”) for the EAC.98  Following the end of the war, the center was repurposed as a civil 
re-absorption organization at which ex-servicemen were given training to equip them for their 
return to civilian life—a program which had decidedly mixed results.99  Indeed, as Williams 
wrote to Heely Jowitt, his opposite in Bechuanaland, the efforts of the civil re-absorption officers 
to concentrate on village welfare had revealed a subversive and disheartening duality at the back 
of British development efforts in postwar Kenya:  on the one hand, educated Kenyans often had 
“absolutely no desire to assist their less educated brethren;”  on the other hand, African literacy 
training was an at-best fraught endeavor given the abundance of subversive anti-government, 
anti-settler, and anti-white literature which virtually saturated the colony.  As he surveyed this 
increasingly vehement vanguard of anti-colonial sentiment, punctuated by a massive strike at 
Mombasa in January 1947 that was itself the culmination of years of unaddressed or partially-
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addressed African grievances vis-à-vis labor conditions,100 Williams jadedly concluded that 
“Kenya is a very unhappy place at the moment and generally speaking the African population are 
getting completely out of hand. …  I suppose these are all growing pains, but it does rather shake 
one’s belief and tempers one’s enthusiasm.”101   
And yet, insofar as native education and training was concerned, the challenges posed by 
these “growing pains” were hardly mitigated by the fact that the civil re-absorption program was 
set to expire in 1949 and, with it, the postwar rationale which underlay the continued operation 
of the Jeanes School.102  The future looked undeniably bleak for the center at Kabete—until, that 
is, the summer conference of 1948, the advent of which brought with it a new raison d’être for 
the school:  “community development” (this was the term Williams preferred to “Mass 
Education,” although they meant the same thing).103  Accordingly, as the re-absorption scheme 
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gradually wound down, the Jeanes School underwent an overhaul, becoming not only the “main 
adult education centre” for the colony, the principal activities of which included enlightening 
leaders about the “working of government and local government” to “open the eyes” of the 
people as to the requirements of the “modern state,”104 but also the “nucleus” of Kenya’s nascent 
community development regime.105  At the heart of this regime lay a series of recommendations 
derived entirely from the conference, massaged to fit Kenya’s prevailing colonial context, and 
detailed by Williams in the memorandum Mass Education or Rural Community Development, 
Kenya Colony.   
Williams’ five-year plan took as its point of departure mass education as defined and 
accepted at Cambridge.106  The decision to do so was not inconsequential; for in recognizing the 
conference’s definition as the key principle of Kenya’s new community development plan, 
Williams implicitly accepted the framework for mass education it obliged, beginning with the 
“setting up of an organization whereby the African people of the Colony can be led to appreciate 
the part they must play in…district, provincial and departmental development plans of the 
Colony.  The organization must be designed to win their interest and cooperation by instruction, 
discussion and adult teaching techniques generally and thus arouse their initiative and 
enthusiasm.”107  Aware, however, that recommendations for new capital expenditures on social 
welfare and mass education were the economic equivalent of a blind date with a cold sore—
indeed, a full report on “Social Welfare, Information and Mass Education” had been submitted to 
the council in January 1946 where, nearly three years later, it remained, writhing in fiscal 
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purgatory—Williams stressed that community development was not a new field of activities.108  
Rather, as accepted at Cambridge and confirmed by Williams, it constituted the application of 
new techniques within the colony’s extant mass education framework adapted to the purpose of 
“arousing initiative.”  In the end, then, Williams drew up a plan that grafted community 
development onto Kenya’s existing social welfare superstructure and assumed the ongoing 
cooperation and financial assistance of Local Native Councils.109  In doing so, his plan steered 
clear of any major reversals of existing policy; instead, it consisted chiefly of the expansion of 
then-current work, accelerating the features that appeared to be “worthwhile,” and jettisoning 
those which did not.  In other words, it hewed closely to the summer conference’s 
recommendations.   
Ultimately, the form to be given expression by Williams’ proposed community 
development plan consisted of three essential parts:  first, it required a sound training 
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organization, beginning with an effort to inculcate an awareness in government staff that they 
were all, in fact, “Mass Education Officers” and that, as such, they were to regard themselves as 
teachers as well as “exponents of government and British colonial policy.”  Second, a field 
service was needed, working at the village as well as the district level “distributing information, 
stimulating initiative, arousing interest and generally preaching the gospel of responsibility and 
self-help within the community.”  Here, Williams’ intent was to instill a sense of “realism” 
among those in the field responsible for implementing development plans by giving them a voice 
in their preparation.  Finally, there was to be “no rigid control from above” concerning the 
disposition of central funds after they had been allocated for community development work.  
Instead, once estimates were planned on the village unit, district, and provincial bases, and 
monies accordingly disbursed, the local village committee was to have “greater latitude” as to 
their use with an absolute minimum of oversight.  This devolution of responsibility, with its 
attendant local government implications, Williams pointed out, was a necessary component of 
the whole “enthusiasm” building scheme.110 
To achieve all this while simultaneously keeping overhead down, it was necessary for 
Williams to splice community development with Kenya’s Social Welfare Department, the 
infrastructure of which was arguably best-positioned to facilitate the necessary work.  Staffed by 
European district welfare officers and African welfare workers and equipped with numerous 
social welfare halls throughout the colony, the reach of the department was considerable—as 
indeed was its curriculum and workload, which included demonstrations illustrating better 
farming methods and improved hygiene and sanitation, adult literacy and English programs, field 
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trips, spinning, weaving, and sewing classes, and handicrafts.111  At the center of all this stood, 
hub-like, the re-purposed Jeanes School, with its newfound emphasis on “Social Education,” 
offering citizenship courses in local government, marketing and trade, and the function of 
cooperative societies; lectures on agricultural, medical, and veterinary matters of interest; and 
rural development coursework on the social impact of education, marriage customs and dowry, 
and the inheritance of land and its consequent fragmentation.112  Thus, even while endeavoring to 
depress costs, the assumption of more work by an organization so encumbered unavoidably 
entailed further expenditures.  Indeed, Williams’ plan called for additions in both personnel (six 
more European district welfare officers, four in the newly-devised post of African assistant 
district welfare workers, as well as an increase in the number of African welfare workers from 41 
to 50 so that each location had one, and a rural industries officer) and infrastructure (both new 
constructions as well as renovations to standing structures and the implementation of temporary 
“Welfare Rooms”).113   
In accordance with the Secretary of State’s Despatch No. 86 (dated November 10, 1948) 
requesting “immediate action” on community development, Williams submitted this plan to the 
Executive Council in Nairobi.114  From the outset, the response from Government House was 
patently hostile.  Indeed, after he “glanced” through Creech Jones’ initial despatch, Kenya’s 
Governor Sir Philip Mitchell dismissed the idea of financial devolution envisioned by the 
conference and carried forward in Williams’ proposal.  The Legislative and Executive Councils, 
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Mitchell is reported to have said, “always expected to have estimates very cut and dried and were 
always desirous of seeing that expenditures followed very closely to that shown in the detailed 
estimates.”115  Making matters worse was Mitchell himself who, at the time, was preoccupied 
with trying to push his legacy project—the Nairobi Cultural Center—through the LegCo before 
the end of his term in office.116  The governor’s penchant for tangentially referring to this 
complication during meetings concerned with community development made it quite clear that 
he was unwilling to sacrifice his posterity at the altar of some newfangled CO novelty.  
The strong headwinds blowing from Government House were exceeded by those 
emanating from the white settler-dominated LegCo, which was “greatly perturbed at the 
proportion of money being spent in Kenya on Social Services as opposed to what they call 
productive services.”117  While the legislators grudgingly accepted the role of education, medical 
care, community development, and welfare in native progress, they resented the government’s 
emphasis on such programs, preferring instead that the funds be invested in transport 
infrastructure, soil and water conservation, and stock improvement.  After attending a council 
session at which the colony’s social welfare budget was heatedly debated and the Jeanes School 
nearly deleted altogether,118 Williams reported to Cox:  “I cannot over emphasize [sic] the 
strength of this opinion supported on the Government side….  I listened to some of the debates 
and it seemed to me that the C[hief] N[ative] C[ommissoner]’s voice was crying alone and 
almost unsupported.”119  Beyond the confines of the LegCo, European popular sentiment was no 
less discouraging.  For there was throughout the colony a sort of generalized sense that the 
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money spent in the past on schooling Africans had produced very little.  Williams, alive to this 
reality, conceded as much.  In his acknowledgement, we find warnings of a deep social malaise, 
the ramifications of which would be realized in 1952:  “Never before has the African shown such 
disturbing traits in his character; a complete dislike for work, lack of application even in office 
work and no understanding of honesty not only in dealings with other races but among members 
of his own race.”120  
It had been less than two months since Williams optimistically put forward his plan to the 
Executive Council and in that span of time he had gone from being an upbeat and energetic 
purveyor of the benefits and possibilities of community development in Kenya, to being a 
demoralized, borderline misanthrope mired in seemingly hopeless disillusionment.  Little 
wonder, then, that his cohort of supporters had grown cynical.  As he confessed to Cox in 
January 1949:  “Even those who have expressed agreement with the plea of the Cambridge paper 
that the African should be encouraged to think for himself given the opportunity to take part in 
planning right down to the village level and then authority to put accepted plans into operation, 
do so rather in the spirit of ‘It’s worth while [sic] trying but I doubt if it will work.’  It is the sort 
of last despairing hope.”121   
None of this boded especially well for the success of a mass education-based 
development plan that hinged critically on the building up of native initiative and enthusiasm.  
Indeed, despite a meeting of provincial commissioners in February during which it was agreed 
that the Cambridge recommendations, including greater financial devolution, should be put into 
action, and majority support for Williams’ five-year plan by such groups as the African Affairs 
Sub-Committee of the Electors’ Union, resistance was strong.  So strong, in fact, the year 
                                                          




following the 1948 summer conference witnessed an almost comprehensive breakdown over the 
future of community development in the colony,122 events which culminated in Williams’ 
bittersweet resignation.  “I feel at the moment that I am stale,” he wrote to Cox in November 
1949.  “I certainly have no right to feel this, but yet for the last 9 months this has certainly been 
so.”  Given what we know about the struggle over his community development plan, one could 
hardly blame him.  And yet there was an encouraging upshot.  For in standing aside, Williams 
opened the necessary (and, most crucially, budgeted) slot for his replacement as Commissioner 
for Social Welfare:  “a person…who is 100% enthusiastic, having behind him that little 
necessary personal push because it does make a difference.”123  That person was Tom Askwith, 
to whom responsibility for the realization of Williams’ community development plan passed.   
Formerly Municipal African Affairs Officer, Nairobi, Askwith was hand-picked by 
Williams to be his successor not only because of his “wide interests, a real love of matters 
African and an understanding of the African mind to an extent that is rarely found,” but also 
because of his proven ability “for getting initiative among the African population.”124  Described 
by Joanna Lewis as a curious blend of paternalism, progressivism, and inclusiveness, Askwith 
was “instrumental” in promoting a concept of community development “based on the devolution 
of resources to Africans.”125  At root, he believed that if Africans generated their own local-level, 
small-scale initiatives after technical officers (such as agricultural, veterinary, and medical 
specialists) ran campaigns of awareness-raising (from demonstration teams showing how to 
build latrines and cowsheds to the use of hand-puppets in curriculum focused on child-rearing), 
then the big administrative challenges of the day—be it soil erosion, disease, or even transport 
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constraints—would gradually be solved.  In working to accomplish community development, 
which required acting as a corporate body to collectively determine what resources to use and 
what projects to prioritize, villagers gained direct, hands-on experience in the democratic 
process.  Such elemental aspects of self-government and citizenship would, Askwith believed, 
remedy the perceived lack of native experience in British-style local government.126  For all this, 
however, no community development plan, be it Williams’, Askwith’s, or Creech Jones’, could 
possibly have accounted for Mau Mau, which “blew apart” the “edifice of colonial rule” in 
Kenya in 1952.127 
Mau Mau violently stripped the veneer from the colonial façade in Kenya, exposing the 
bricks and mortar of manipulation and repression which constituted the foundation of imperial 
rule in the colony.  Fueled by years of compounding (and largely unaddressed) grievances over 
the progressive circumscription and abolition of native land rights, inequitable labor practices, 
and discriminatory agricultural policies—factors which converged to effectively normalize 
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African poverty—Kenya erupted in 1952 into a “dirty war”128 between the empire and a 
nationalist insurrectionist movement (“Mau Mau”), resulting in the deaths of nearly 15,000 
people.129  Throughout the conflict, a key component in the government’s strategy to gain and 
maintain control over the colony was its “rehabilitation program,” a polite euphemism for the 
imprisonment of hundreds of thousands of Africans in detention camps and enclosed villages.130  
Viewed through the lens of these fraught circumstances, it is rather difficult to imagine a state of 
affairs less conducive to fostering the kind of initiative-building mass education campaigns and 
progressive self-government that constituted the means and ends of Fabian-favored community 
development.  And yet, unquestionably, community development was an important fixture in 
Britain’s Emergency-era program of pacification and rehabilitation in Kenya.  Indeed, as Lewis 
has noted, it was the seemingly irrevocable, inertia-like “slide” toward Mau Mau that first 
prompted the CO to press Nairobi into restoring the deleted line items from Williams’ five-year 
community development budget.131    
To get some sense of the degree to which Kenya’s Emergency-era community 
development regime was “Fabianized,” we need look no further than the work of the colony’s 
Department of Community Development and Rehabilitation under Askwith.132  It is worth 
noting, however, that while the remit of the department not only accounted for community 
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development, but also the “re-education and re-settlement or re-employment”133 (i.e. 
“rehabilitation”) of tens of thousands of Mau Mau detainees and convicts, we are concerned here 
only with projects whose lineage has a basis in the work promulgated at the 1948 summer 
conference.  Since the accepted definition of mass education or community development that 
emerged from that meeting did not reckon with prisoners or convicts or the exigencies of war, 
“rehabilitation projects” designed to “repatriate” Mau Mau are necessarily excluded from 
consideration.   
Of the remaining projects,134 one in particular stands out for its near-universal application 
of community development as defined at the conference:  the Machakos Betterment Scheme, a 
wide-ranging community development project which brought together schemes on soil erosion, 
water conservation, and animal husbandry; communal homestead improvement projects; an adult 
literacy program; and even nascent elements of self-government and citizenship along the lines 
of the democratic British model of local government—all of which was undergirded by a regime 
of initiative-building.135  The scheme was so effective that, by 1958, it was being described by 
the Commissioner of Social Welfare as a “model” development project.136 
 
The Machakos Betterment Scheme 
Machakos District had been the site of welfare schemes since 1948/9, when an expatriate 
social welfare officer engaged in a campaign to get Kamba communities interested in adult 
literacy programs, the building of meeting halls, the formation of women’s clubs (focusing on 
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things like domestic management and homecrafts), and improved farming management and 
related techniques.137  For assorted reasons, these efforts were met with frustration.  For example, 
not only was the labor required to engage in soil conservation arduous, but the measures 
proposed entailed the reduction of livestock, which possessed an almost religious significance 
for the district’s inhabitants.  When the campaign prompted a protest march on Government 
House in Nairobi, and the district’s residents rebuffed a subsequent proposal to introduce 
machinery to help with the project, the government found itself at an impasse.  For the next 
several years, the land continued to deteriorate, poverty increased as a result and, with it, 
unrest.138   
Social welfare development languished in the district until 1953, when Askwith 
introduced a betterment scheme based on a community development approach.  The first step in 
the process was a propaganda campaign meant to build awareness among the Kamba population 
and “convince” residents not only of the necessity of soil conservation, but also to accept the use 
of machinery to undertake it.  Led by John Malinda, a local man appointed African 
Administrative Officer, the inhabitants were gradually persuaded to accept Nairobi’s offer of 
assistance.  But Government House, no less cognizant of the ramifications of expensive large-
scale operations on native self-reliance, considered it essential that a self-help campaign along 
the lines articulated at Cambridge in 1948 be introduced in tandem with its soil conservation 
project.139   
So it was that a “homestead improvement campaign” was born.  Rooted in earlier work 
carried out in Central and North Nyanza Districts, the campaign drew together the training 
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efforts of the Jeanes School at Kabete, which in this instance focused its energies on developing 
a plan based on modern agricultural methods and the promotion of farm consolidation, with the 
technical field staff from Machakos District.140  The objective of the campaign was to connect 
community development with popular support by way of a single, initiative-generating 
homestead improvement project.  The first step in doing so was the identification of a 
demonstration homestead in the district to serve as the project centerpiece.  When that was 
accomplished, what remained was to persuade the neighbors of the homestead to assemble on a 
given day and, under the guiding hand of the community development technical staff, tackle the 
jobs which the householder wanted carried out, but was unable to do unaided.  Acting together, 
the group would set about improving the homestead by re-plastering and repairing the house, 
building a shed for cattle, paddocking and cultivating a vegetable garden, building a lavatory, 
and cleaning up the compound.141  The field staff believed that, in seeing the fruits of their 
labors, achieved quickly and through group effort, the project would serve as the mass education 
spark that would kindle the flame of collective initiative in Machakos. 
Of course, all this was easier said than done, since the Kamba homesteaders had first to 
be convinced of the merits of investing valuable time and industry in the repair and upkeep of 
their neighbors’ compounds.  To this end, the heads of the different homesteads were invited to 
the Jeanes School where the plan, along with its attendant logic, was discussed.142  While the 
reasons for the various improvements were explained and it was emphasized that they could only 
be carried out quickly and effectively by a group of people working together, the community 
development staff made absolutely no mention of the problems of soil conservation or of 
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reducing stock, since both issues were still, in Askwith’s words, “explosive.”143  Moreover, the 
European team stressed that the project was not compulsory; rather, the leaders were asked to 
return home and to discuss the campaign with the villagers who, if the project appealed to them, 
were to let Malinda, the district’s African Administrative Officer, know and to fix a day for the 
project.144   
This democratic consensus-building campaign reaped almost immediate rewards; for 
days later, the “Betterment Team”145—as the multifaceted staffs responsible for community 
development came to be called—was in full swing at the demonstration homestead.  By day’s 
end, it was the site of a veritable “transformation”:  the house had a new thatch, with “new large 
windows and smooth walls;” there was a cow shed, fences, and a vegetable garden.146  
Encouraged by their achievement, the Kamba agreed not only to continue the scheme, but to 
extend it.147  Extension, however, brought with it difficulties, since resources—from manpower 
to the availability of the necessary tools—were finite.  Prioritization was therefore essential.  
Thus, the population formed a sort of corporate system, working communally under locally-
elected village committees to determine which homesteads were repaired and in what order, 
going so far as to develop their own methods to ensure compliance—this, rather than relying on 
the chief’s sanctions.148  The result, over the course of the project, was a unique marriage of a 
genuine (if embryonic) institution of self-government with a variant of the traditional mwethya 
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ethic,149 the nucleus of which was clan-based “voluntary and traditional self-help groups.”150  As 
Creech Jones had argued was essential, the necessary stimulus for the homesteading project was 
multi-directional; that is, it came “from below as well as from above.”151 
As a “considerable measure of popular support”152 was harnessed and channeled in 
precisely the “community betterment” terms outlined by the 1948 summer conference153—
which, as noted earlier, also called for the canalization of self-help—homestead after homestead 
was refurbished.  Alongside these efforts, a terracing project was launched to augment soil 
conservation work.  Over the course of about two years, these efforts at preventing erosion 
resulted in the furrowing of hundreds of miles of ridges, which trapped water underground and 
produced higher crop yields in subsequent years.154  At the same time, groups made boundaries 
for newly-demarcated land, constructed dams, and built roads.155  According to Askwith, these 
infrastructural improvements spread to villages throughout Machakos and the attitude of the 
Kamba toward conservation and surplus stock began to change.156  The district also became the 
site of Kenya’s “first adult literacy scheme.”157  Administered by the recently-established District 
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Council from 1954, the pilot scheme was so successful that a year later it inspired a companion 
scheme in South Nyanza.158  But while comparatively-speaking the adult literacy program 
flourished in Machakos, the “response was poor” in South Nyanza, prompting the scheme’s 
closure and the withdrawal of its organizing officer.159   
And yet there were also significant problems with the Machakos Betterment Scheme 
itself.  To begin with, one man’s “motivation” is another man’s “compulsion;” indeed, a study 
conducted by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development160 soon after Kenya’s 
independence found that some of the villagers in Machakos District felt “considerable pressure 
to participate” in the betterment scheme, prompting a “reaction against all communal effort” in 
the early 1960s.  This retrogression was linked also to the diminution of government staff in the 
district after 1959.  At the same time, the project lays bare a deep contradiction of Britain’s late-
colonial enterprise; for despite the impressive modernizing efforts of a betterment scheme fueled 
by propaganda, supported with progressive training methodologies and industrial machinery, and 
backed by an army of technical “experts” in agricultural, medical, and veterinary practice, the 
colonial state found it necessary to revive and exploit mwethya, a traditional system of mutual 
assistance, to achieve its ends.  It was this very negotiation between modernity and “the energy-
producing molecules” orbiting a time-honored indigenous convention which Askwith himself 
credited with the success of community development in Kenya.161 
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Even so, the policy lineage which constituted the basis of the Machakos Betterment 
Scheme belies the notion, broached at the beginning of this case study, that the Fabianization of 
Britain’s colonial development policy in Kenya was stillborn with the advent of Williams’ 
resignation in 1949.  Indeed, even allowing for the unavoidable impingement of context-specific 
vicissitudes, as indicated by the exploitation of mwethya, it is quite clear that Askwith effectively 
carried forward his predecessor’s community development plan, which, as we have already seen, 
was rooted in the work of the heavily-Fabianized 1948 summer conference at Cambridge.  
Moreover, such rural development schemes based, at least in part, on the democratic 
organization of the people gave, as Askwith himself observed, a “reality and foundation” to the 
“more sophisticated organs of local government” then emerging.162  Given this, Machakos stands 
as an exemplar, an exceptional interface that allows us to witness the form and efficacy of 
Fabian-influenced colonial development policy at a granular, village level typically obscured by 





I believe profoundly myself that the rapid building up of local government 
through the process of devolution…is the most important of all methods by which 
we must seek to foster political evolution in Africa, in the hope of securing, when 
self-government eventually comes, a stable political system really representative 
of the whole body of the people rather than an oligarchy based on a 
comparatively limited intelligentsia or professional class.163  
 
– Andrew B. Cohen, October 29, 1947 
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Mass education (community development)…must be put into effect in the closest 
association with local government bodies.164  
 
– 1948 Summer Conference on African 
Administration 
 
These schemes are unspectacular; but, as one who has travelled widely in every 
part of the country, I can assure Honourable Members of their very great 
value.165 
 
– Sir Andrew B. Cohen, Speech to the Uganda 
Legislative Council, December 18, 1956 
 
The Fabian Andrew B. Cohen, unlike his conservative predecessor at Entebbe, Governor 
Sir John Hathorn Hall, was a bullish force for modernization in Uganda Protectorate.166  Having 
served as head of the African Division of the CO under fellow Fabian Arthur Creech Jones, in 
which capacity he presided over the Cambridge summer conferences on Local Government 
(1947), The Encouragement of African Initiative (1948), and Agricultural Development in Africa 
(1949), few colonial officials at the metropole were as deeply involved with, or indeed intimately 
aware of, the progressive direction of Britain’s postwar colonial development regime.  It is little 
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wonder, then, that when viewed through the lens of his own liberalism, Cohen saw Britain’s 
postwar colonial crisis—characterized by labor strikes and disturbances in Tanganyika, Kenya, 
and Uganda and insurgencies in Gold Coast and Kenya—in terms of a reckoning; a settling of 
accounts that had been forged, grievance by grievance, over years of conservative and “ill-
informed” colonial policies.167  Acutely aware of the capacity of these grievances to fuel the fire 
of African nationalist sentiment,168 Cohen believed that the necessary corrective was devolution; 
a movement, as Apter explains, toward “African freedom and African responsibility.”169  It was 
this reality that indicated to Cohen the “great value” of community development, alluded to 
above, which both he and Creech Jones held possessed an almost organic capacity to build local-
level initiative and, in so doing, foster self-government.170   
When he arrived at Entebbe to assume the governorship of Uganda in 1951, Cohen 
brought with him a near gospel-like faith in community development, a temperament which 
revealed itself soon after his inaugural tour of the colony.  For the findings of this extensive, 
district-by-district perambulation—during which the governor met not only with his district 
officers, but also with large numbers of Africans—laid bare the reality of postwar colonial rule in 
Uganda:  neither social welfare nor the devolution of responsibility had kept pace with economic 
development in the colony.  This disparity troubled the populist, reform-minded Cohen, as he 
wrote in a despatch to the CO dated July 22, 1952:  “From all that I have so far seen and heard in 
this country, I am convinced that a vigorous program of community development is 
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needed…urgently.”171  Cohen warned that the growing imbalance between economic and social 
development witnessed under the regime of Governor Hall threatened to blunt, if not retard, 
progress (and here he cited the protectorate’s recent industrial advances on the Owen Falls 
hydroelectric station and the Kilembe copper mine), an upshot which could easily dovetail into 
popular disaffection and, in the worst possible scenario, violence.172  The risk posed by the 
advent of a yawning and potentially unbridgeable chasm between these developmental priorities 
was therefore not insignificant, as testified by Uganda’s disturbances in 1945 and again in 1949, 
leading Cohen to reason that “economic projects…must be accompanied by solid and 
progressive advance in the Protectorate and local government services in the rural areas; it is 
here that the need for a vigorous program of community development is felt.”173   
The correspondence suggested by Cohen between local government and community 
development was not merely a marriage of ideological convenience.  It was altogether more 
significant, as he concluded in his despatch:  “an organized program of community development 
cannot succeed without an efficient system of local government.”174  Here we have a crucial 
caveat; for while it recalls the terms of community development as summarized and accepted at 
the summer conference of 1948, Cohen’s despatch presents an important emphatic difference 
between community development as envisioned by the conference and community development 
as realized in Uganda.  Whereas the conference recommended the “closest” possible 
“association” between community development and local government, Cohen invoked the 
relationship in terms that effectively framed their interdependence as vital:  you could not have 
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one without the other.175  But the nature of colonial governance in Uganda presented Cohen’s 
populist agenda with a near-insoluble problem, and it came in the form of the semi-autonomous 
Kingdom of Buganda and its ruler, the Kabaka. 
Prior to the arrival of the British, the Kabaka (king) of Buganda occupied an autocratic 
position and governed his kingdom through the agency of ministers and chiefs, all of whom were 
nominated by himself.  The Kabaka, his three chief ministers, and senior chiefs sat in the Great 
Lukiko (council) and the orders of the Kabaka were communicated from this body to the people 
through Enkiko (subordinate assemblies), local bodies devoid any legislative or executive 
functions, instead serving as channels of communication between Buganda government officials 
and the people.176  The polity, in other words, lacked any tradition of local-level (to say nothing 
of democratic) decision-making.  This pattern of governance persisted in Buganda long after the 
arrival of the British who, in 1900, concluded an agreement with the Kabaka that guaranteed a 
large measure of autonomy to the royal regime.177  Although by 1945, the colonial government 
could optimistically report that there had been a “considerable extension of popular 
representation on the Great Lukiko,” creating the means of channeling unofficial criticism and 
constructive thought to the royal government, the Enkiko remained “only advisory.”178  Cohen’s 
plans at devolution ran headlong into this political reality when he attempted to impose 
constitutional reforms and a framework that made Uganda a unitary state.  When weeks-long 
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negotiations to transform the autocratic Kabaka into a constitutional monarch broke down, 
Cohen responded by deporting the king, a step that galvanized the Buganda, who united in 
indignation against the colonial state.  Cohen broke the impasse which followed, which lasted 
two years, only by bringing the Kabaka back and by making major concessions to Buganda in 
the form of more autonomy, rather than less.179   
 
Introducing Community Development in Uganda 
It was not Cohen who introduced the rudiments of community development to Uganda; 
rather, it was Hall, who, following the promulgation of the CO’s report on Mass Education in 
African Society in 1944, set about welding together something like a basic framework for mass 
education in the colony.  This was, however, to be a rather fraught process; for at the time, the 
protectorate government was neither temperamentally nor institutionally disposed to realize mass 
education along lines favored by the report, which suggested the “effective co-ordination of 
welfare plans and mass education plans so that they form a comprehensive and balanced 
whole.”180  To begin with, the protectorate was the site of a series of massive and violent labor 
strikes and riots in January 1945.  Fundamentally a byproduct of postwar economic conditions in 
the colony (the by-now characteristic formula of low wages coupled with commodity shortages 
and a steep rise in the cost of living), the riots were initially centered on the quasi-autonomous 
Kingdom of Buganda.181  Over the course of about three weeks, however, the disturbances 
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spread, erupting in all the main towns of Uganda, including some just outside Kampala, the 
Bugandan capital city.182  In the shadow of this pandemonium, which was finally subdued only 
after reinforcements arrived from Kenya, Entebbe launched a full-scale inquiry into both the 
country’s economy as well as its developmental prospects.183   
The results, which indicated that “it was doubtful if a policy of progress would be 
possible by example and persuasion,” were discouraging.184  In the absence of inducement by 
encouragement, there was only compulsion which, as we have seen in the case of the Machakos 
Betterment Scheme in Kenya, risked hampering both current and future development.  
Moreover, the report cited several factors as being the principal impediments to progress in 
Uganda, including a lack of fundamental information about the country, an outmoded and 
wasteful agricultural system, use of the “most inefficient of fuels” for power (wood), and, 
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especially, “the low capacity of the African for physical and (less important for the time being) 
mental work, coupled with a lack of desire for economic or social advancement.”185  This 
patently racialized assessment, in light of the recent unrest, suggested to Government House that 
a series of indigenous and perhaps insurmountable brakes existed on the system that would make 
a development-based program of reform difficult, if not impossible, to attain.186   
Nevertheless, a program did eventually emerge—albeit one that was, to paraphrase Apter, 
unimaginative and fitfully executed.187  To a considerable degree, the dithering that characterized 
its early implementation was down to Hall himself, who confessed to being uncertain as to what 
social welfare was, let alone where and how mass education fit into it all.188  Indeed, it was only 
after several postponements and delays—a kaleidoscope of oscillation that elicited frustrated, if 
mostly sympathetic, murmurings from the CO—that the governor and his administration finally 
began “hastening slowly” to forge something like a combined mass education/social welfare 
scheme in the protectorate.  To this end, a preliminary outlay of £50,000 in development funds 
was made available for the construction of “permanent” and “lavishly equipped” district welfare 
centers throughout the colony.  Once completed, these constituted the infrastructural backbone of 
Uganda’s newly-amalgamated Department of Social Welfare and Public Relations, under whose 
purview mass education somewhat controversially fell.189   
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Over the course of the next several years, the sluggish pace of mass education in the 
colony—and social welfare development, generally190—was matched only by the lack of 
enthusiasm which emanated from Hall.  The governor was “pessimistic” about the potential of 
Ugandans to sustain development projects once the CDW funds allocated for them were 
exhausted.191  In point of fact, Hall’s racialized attitude encouraged in the governor not only an 
aversion to requesting any social welfare development funds whatsoever from Whitehall but, on 
one occasion, the reallocation of nearly £50,000 in social welfare-designated CDW monies to 
other projects in the protectorate.192  Moreover, when, in March 1949, he submitted to the CO a 
request for CDW funds in accord with the revised Uganda Development Plan of 1948, it 
included an annual fixed outlay of only £10,000 for public relations and social welfare 
schemes.193  Augmenting the governor’s apprehension was a dubiousness, stimulated to some 
extent by the disturbances and subsequent unrest witnessed in Uganda in 1945, that the formal 
education of Africans, particularly in a secondary school setting where politics featured as a part 
of the curriculum, would achieve little beyond increasing nationalist agitation among Ugandans.   
Yet, the governor did show a genuine interest in, and appreciation for, the merits of non-
formal (that is, non-academic) education for the illiterate and barely literate to learn proper 
agricultural techniques so that they might increase production—although he believed such ends 
could be achieved far more simply and cost-effectively through the combined propagandizing 
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techniques of mobile cinema units and demonstration teams.194  Indeed, so convinced was Hall 
of their educative value that, as of 1949, six amalgamated “propaganda teams,” consisting of 
between six and ten members and outfitted with a lorry, camp equipment, a portable stage, a 
mobile cinema van (occasionally), models, and posters constituted the “main Mass Education 
development in Uganda”—this, despite the creation of the Department of Social Welfare and 
Public Relations.195  Although Hall’s faith was not entirely displaced, for such teams had already 
shown a noteworthy facility for instruction in Uganda,196 this was hardly tantamount to the 
vision of mass education then being propagated by Creech Jones and, in turn, the CO.   
The upshot of Hall’s dull conservatism—which one scholar has referred to facetiously as 
“reform without politics” and precisely the opposite of what Creech Jones had intended—was a 
regime of community development that, by the end of the decade, had very little to show for 
itself.197  As the Fabian Colonial Bureau (FCB) pointed out in a series of correspondences 
addressed to Creech Jones at the CO on “Some Causes of Discontent in Uganda,” Entebbe had 
failed to create the kind of initiative-building framework anticipated by the Secretary of State at 
the 1948 summer conference; for Africans had neither become more meaningfully associated 
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with the decision-making apparatus of local self-government198 nor witnessed the kind of 
devolution of responsibility (fiscal or otherwise) Governor Hall had earlier promised.199  And 
since Government House had decided that “the field where the abilities of Africans will find the 
best scope is employment in the professional and technical departments of Government,” 
Africans seemed also to be excluded from opportunities in the civil administration.200  Thus, in 
spite of Creech Jones’ assurances to the contrary, the FCB could not but conclude that “no 
responsibility for any of the decisions is given to the people.  This is a serious gap which has 
alienated opinion in many Colonies.”201  When, in 1949, Uganda was once again the site of labor 
unrest and violent disturbances, the Fabians no doubt felt somewhat justified in their bleak 
assessment.   
Some two years later, the findings of the Wallis Inquiry on African Local Government in 
the Uganda Protectorate did much to confirm the Bureau’s appraisal.202  Commissioned by 
Cohen soon after his appointment in 1951 and conducted by the noted expert on British local 
government, C. A. G. Wallis, who had earlier collaborated with Dr. Hinden on the FCB’s report 
on Local Government in the Colonies (1950),203 the investigation found that, notwithstanding the 
“encouraging” and “admirable” talk which periodically bubbled up from Entebbe, local 
government had, in fact, languished under Hall.204  Indeed, contra Apter, even the formal 
                                                          
198 Hinden to Creech Jones, April 28, 1948, BLUO, MSS. Brit. Emp. s. 365, FCB 26/1. 
199 Education Policy, African Governors’ Conference draft minutes 29, November 1947, CO 
847/37/1 (21).  See:  Hyam, ed., The Labour Government and the End of Empire, 1945-1951:  Pt. 2:  
High Policy and Administration, 294.  An assessment confirmed by the Wallis Inquiry into African Local 
Government in the Uganda Protectorate, which was launched in 1952 (see below).   
200 Creech Jones to Hinden, June 19 and November 23, 1948, BLUO, MSS. Brit. Emp. s. 365, 
FCB 26/1. 
201 Hinden to Creech Jones, April 28, 1948, BLUO, MSS. Brit. Emp. s. 365, FCB 26/1. 
202 Uganda Protectorate, Annual Report of the Department of Community Development For the 
Year Ended December 31, 1952, 1-3, NA CO 822/656.   
203 Hinden to T. W. B. Mynors, October 22, 1947, BLUO, MSS. Brit. Emp. s. 365, FCB 40/2. 
204 Cohen to Hall, October 29, 1947, CO 847/37/7 (8).  See:  Hyam, ed., The Labour Government 
and the End of Empire, 1945-1951, 142. 
246 
 
establishment of district councils mandated by the 1949 African Local Government Ordinance 
had resulted in no meaningful devolution of authority in the protectorate.205  As Wallis 
concluded:  
African Local Governments as such have no functions or responsibilities other than those 
arising from the Native Administrations (Incorporation) Ordinance, 1938.  The councils 
equally have no responsibilities, for the bye-laws they make depend on the approval of 
the Provincial Commissioner or Governor and the budgets they pass are subject to the 
final instructions of the Protectorate Government. …  In practice a grave defect has been 
found to be the absence of any position function for the minor councils other than their 
triennial duty of electing members of the next higher grade of council. …  There is doubt 
even about the Government’s own intentions.206   
 
Wallis’ report revealed also that Hall’s obduracy had had a serious subsidiary effect on 
community development/mass education in the colony.207  For the absence of a responsible 
intermediary body (i.e. “local government”) to canalize African ingenuity from village units—as 
we have seen, the nucleus of Creech Jones’ all-important initiative-building regime—to district 
councils (hitherto the large and cumbersome “local authority,” some of which could meet only 
twice a year208), had effectively thwarted a vital stimulant of African “motive power.”209   
 
Cohen’s Joint Community Development and Local Government Regime  
These circumstances converged with Cohen’s conviction as to the collective and 
corresponding merits of devolution and community development to map a new way forward in 
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Uganda:  the institution of a comprehensive program that weaved together local government and 
community development under the auspices of a central authority fully invested in the “modern 
philosophy of colonial administration,” one which advocated the “democratic spirit” fostered by 
the marriage of economic development and social advance.210  Guiding the protectorate on this 
innovative and progressive trajectory was the newly-created Department of Community 
Development,211 the scope of which was extended to embrace training not only in the sphere of 
community development, but also in local government as well.212 
What followed was the prosecution of a protectorate-wide community development 
program, at the head of which was situated nearly a dozen district-level community development 
officers.  Charged with enlisting “the support and active participation of the people in the process 
of economic development and to prepare [them], especially by the training of their leaders, to 
adapt themselves to the social changes that…follow in the train of economic development,” the 
functions of these officials ran an exhaustive, and at times contradictory, gamut:  from 
community betterment and self-help schemes undertaken in rural areas, to adult education 
activities carried out in association with the protectorate’s Education Department, to social 
welfare programs meant to alleviate the “social ills” arising from the very changes the colonial 
administration was attempting to realize.213   
At first, the “fewness” of these officials “hampered” the department’s work, but in time 
each district came to have not only its own officer, but also teams with whom they worked in 
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conjunction with county councils (or ssazas, in the case of Buganda), who, in turn, helped 
facilitate their activities down to the village level.214  At the nexus of all this work, providing 
“maximum collaboration”215 between county councils and both the community development 
officers and the district officials, stood the newly-built Local Government and Community 
Development Training Center at Nsamizi.216  The principal and lead curriculum designer of this 
center was P. E. W. Williams, Kenya’s former Commissioner for Social Welfare, who arrived in 
Uganda alongside Cohen to help install and launch the protectorate’s community development 
program.  Under Williams, the scope and breadth of the training syllabus at Nsamizi mirrored 
that which he had developed at Kabete, including special courses for training officers of 
cooperative societies, adult education courses, courses on local government, chiefs’ leadership 
courses, child welfare, progressive farming techniques, literacy, and so on.217   
In a “Visitor’s Handout,” Williams explicated the objectives of the new center, which 
included:  giving “a fuller understanding of the duties of a good citizen” (covering an eclectic 
range of subjects, from water, food, and health, to transport, the postal service, freedom, and 
education); the training of “Chiefs and Local Government staffs in their duties while at the same 
time increasing their understanding of some of the problems facing us here in Uganda” (based on 
the coursework in good citizenship, but considerably enhanced to include “Protectorate and 
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Local Government organization, local government,” finance, judicial systems, industrialization, 
infrastructure, and cooperatives); training “Community Development Assistants in their duties, 
broadening their outlook and instructing them in the use of some of the techniques suitable for 
adult education work;”  instructing “Government staff, who have acquired their technical 
knowledge at their departmental training centres, in the art of how ‘to put over’ that knowledge 
to the general public;” training “the wives of some of the above in homecraft;”  and giving “a 
knowledge to Councillors and leading citizens of Local and Protectorate government 
organizations.”218 
It was an impressive program, all the more so because the curricular DNA that comprised 
the matrix of the center’s syllabus—with its emphasis on community and adult education, 
devolution of responsibility, public service, betterment and citizenship schemes—augmented the 
initiative-building of community development officers and their assistants to create a body of 
work that, at both the level of design and practice, represented a recognizable hereditary link 
back to Creech Jones and the work of the 1948 Summer Conference on African Administration.   
This program manifested itself rapidly across the protectorate.  Thousands of village self-
help schemes were launched, ranging from bridge and road repair to the construction of schools, 
swamp crossings, spring protection, fish ponds, and even clubs.219  In 1957 alone, hundreds of 
community development schemes were either underway or had already run their course, an array 
of projects that included everything from those aimed at small-scale adult literacy development 
(e.g. a £5 funding allocation for books to expand the holdings of Kisoko Men’s Club Library in 
Bukedi) to large-scale training facility construction and improvement (e.g. a thousand-pound 
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outlay each for workshops in Kyadondo and Buganganzsi), and everything in between (from pest 
control to latrine maintenance and sports ground repair to the construction of permanent show-
grounds).220  It was an awesome gamut, notable not only for its specificity, but also its 
comprehensiveness.   
Several comprehensive community development schemes were launched annually, a pair 
of significant ones in 1953.  In Buganda, a full campaign was opened in Butambala District in 
mid-August.  Organized by a committee of the county council with the help of the various 
departments concerned, including Community Development, Veterinary Services, the 
Department of Agriculture, and the Medical Services branch, and begun with a six-day course 
attended by some 200 local leaders, the program’s syllabus included demonstrations and lectures 
on disease vectors (e.g. dirt), the importance of housing upkeep and the maintenance of water 
supplies, child welfare and diet, plant diseases and increasing crop yields, and incorporated 
cinema shows on dysentery and cooperative coffee growing in “Chorgoria (sic)” and a play on 
“The Good Banana Garden.”  When the course ended, the demonstration team launched a 
months-long tour of the gombolola (parish) of Mumyuka through early October.  Spending five 
days in each gombolola parish, the team—consisting of between six and ten members and staff 
from the various invested departments—ran through a compressed version of the syllabus:  the 
first day was devoted to plays and demonstrations, followed by three days of practical work on 
latrines, soil conservation, and housing of stock.  On the final day, a course for village headmen 
was held covering methods and techniques of village and local governance.221   In its 1954 
summary of the campaign, the Community Development Department concluded that “real 
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progress resulted,” citing specifically the emergence of a number of small “better living 
societies” throughout the county, whose members engaged in self-help campaigns to improve 
each other’s homes.222  
Meanwhile, in Kaberamaido County, Teso District, Eastern Province, an ambitious, year-
long community development project unfolded.  Begun in February 1953 with a four-day course 
for 60 chiefs aimed at improving housing and animal husbandry in the county, what followed 
was a series of month-long demonstrations by teams in each of the county’s seven gombololas.  
The teams worked on some “thirty or more houses” which were improved, with the assistance of 
“volunteer labor,” to act as “examples for the rest of the area.”  The results, the Community 
Development Department reported, were promising; for by the end of the year, Kaberamaido had 
at least two hundred houses complete with “doors, windows and ventilation together with 
kitchens, bath places, chicken houses and hide and skin drying apparatus.”  Most encouraging of 
all, however, were indications that the team’s work had paid off in terms of initiative-building, a 
dividend realized with the continuation of housing improvements long after the team had left the 
county.  Indeed, so impressive were the results that not only did Cohen visit several of the 
improved homes, but film showing the work of the district team then-engaged in the campaign 
was shot.223   
A few years later, the governor delivered a speech in the LegCo in which he confidently 
noted that “these schemes are unspectacular; but, as one who has travelled widely in every part 
of the country, I can assure Honourable Members of their very great value.”224  As honest an 
assessment as this may have been, at least insofar as Cohen’s expectations were concerned and 
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bearing in mind that he was addressing the group of people who, by virtue of their 
constitutionally-obliged fiscal responsibility, effectively held the fate of the Department of 
Community Development in their hands, it is an inescapable fact that progress had been 
painstakingly slow.225   
Additionally, and despite Cohen’s optimistic reportage, evidence suggests that something 
was not quite right with community development in the protectorate between 1952 and 1956.  
We get a hint of this only as early as 1956, when the department noted, at the end of a lengthy 
passage in the “Campaigns” section of its annual report on the “considerable amount of 
progress” witnessed in Mengo District, Buganda, that villagers in the county of Buwekula were 
unenthusiastic about pursuing work related to community development.  “When the campaign 
ended in March,” it was noted, “most of the tasks had been completed but it was found that while 
the majority of the villagers understood and appreciated the measures recommended, very few 
were energetic enough to keep up the work unless pressed to do so.”226 
This could simply be an anomaly, of course, but for the fact that the same report signaled 
a potentially deeper problem.  For in the gombolola of Busoga Kapyanga, a rural betterment 
campaign was launched using a “new technique”:  “Instead of the campaign being initiated from 
the top through the various councils the initiative was taken by the people themselves in the 
villages.  Community development staff first toured the area speaking with the people and 
discovering their problems.  Then followed a course at the district training center for selected 
leaders.  When the leaders returned to their villages 54 different groups of people were formed 
each with its selected leader, to tackle the various problems….”227   
                                                          
225 Uganda Protectorate, Annual Report of the Department of Community Development, For the 
Year Ended 1956, 13, UCL IOE.   
226 Ibid.   
227 Ibid.   
253 
 
The trouble here is the indication that, through 1956, community development in Uganda 
had depended on a framework of paternalistic compulsion—this, rather than cultivating the kind 
of bottom-up, village-level initiative-building enterprise Creech Jones had anticipated.  Such an 
observation is more than simply a case of pedantism run amok; for it suggests that community 
development in the protectorate had failed in what Creech Jones viewed as the “primary task” of 
colonial development:  the stimulation of “initiative…to encourage people to want change” 228 so 
that they might “become the pioneers in building the institutions and works most suitable to their 
needs.”229  This failure was confirmed, at least in part, by Entebbe when it published its Review 
of Community Development Policy in 1957.  Launched in 1956 to “assess what has been 
achieved,” the review found not only that some project leaders placed too much emphasis on the 
“building up of many projects rather than encouraging the self-help and cooperation that should 
result” from them, but also that, in some cases, the community development leader was “far 
more enthusiastic for a project than the people it was intended to serve.”  The report went on to 
stress that community development should “stimulate [the people] to take an active part in 
schemes for their own betterment,” and concluded, in a statement rife with implication, that “the 
people themselves must play a greater part in initiating and carrying out local schemes.”230 
At the same time, the nature of British rule in the Uganda Protectorate acted as a brake on 
the community development/local government package in Buganda.  The threatened secession of 
Buganda from the protectorate in the face of Cohen’s reformist agenda was halted only with the 
recall of the Kabaka Mutesa II in 1955.  To quell the nationalist furor that had plagued Buganda 
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since the king’s deportation in 1953, the British had further to concede more autonomy to the 
Kingdom of Buganda under the reinstated Kabaka.  Rather the opposite of what Cohen had 
intended.  Buganda’s new political circumstances had the effect of suppressing the more ardent 
democratizing elements embedded within Uganda’s broader community development program.  
While community development schemes continued to move forward, the aspects designed to 
foster self-governance were modulated, if not jettisoned altogether.231   
Nevertheless, the fact remains that Uganda Protectorate possessed one of the most 
heavily Fabianized community development regimes in all East Africa.  Having proceeded under 
the sponsorship of Cohen, a leading Fabian figure who was not only deeply influenced by the 
work of ACreech Jones, but who also played a vital role in the process which defined community 
development at the 1948 summer conference; equipped with an educational system built literally 
from the ground up by Williams, a leading evangelist of Fabianized community development; 
and born aloft by the very organizational structure all three men helped forge, the protectorate 
presents, in theory at least, an ideal paradigm.  That Uganda was no less subject to the 
vicissitudes and vagaries of colonial rule than any of Britain’s other territories during the late-
colonial period makes the protectorate’s “solid” community development accomplishments all 
the more remarkable.232  Indeed, the very breadth and depth of Fabian penetration in the 
protectorate presents us with a singular context in which to witness the unfolding of Fabian 
influence against a rapidly evolving and enormously complex colonial backdrop.  By virtue of 
precisely these circumstances, community development in Uganda warrants a great deal of 
further study, particularly as it evolved in the final years of colonial rule.  
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The Inescapable Contradictions of Fabian Designs 
The efforts of the Fabians continue to be subject to criticism.  As we have seen, numerous 
scholars have scorned—to a point, justifiably—the failures of Fabian-influenced postwar 
development, both in terms of the sheer cost involved and because the associated projects are at 
times viewed as being exploitative, recalling the dreadfulness of Chamberlain’s imperial estates 
doctrine.  It is also evident that Britain’s efforts to develop her African territories, regardless of 
the magnanimous rhetoric which at times surrounded them, were framed in the overtly 
paternalistic language and ideology of empire-builders.  Indeed, it would seem the one thing 
postwar planners, developers, and imperialists could agree on was that Europeans knew what 
was best for Africans, be it government by white settler minorities and the degradation and 
suppression of the African population which resulted, or by the colonial state and its associated 
trustees in whom the responsibility of governance was to be vested until Africans could govern 
themselves.1  The principle, as we have seen, which underlay community development. 
In part, such considerations informed the Fabian perspective on the question of 
immediate colonial independence, a calculus that was not as straightforward as Riley has 
suggested.  For the Fabians, colonial self-government depended crucially on a series of gradual, 
incremental changes—this, rather than the sweeping grant of self-government many desired.   
Equally important to the Fabians was that self-government either within or without the 
Commonwealth was unthinkable if it meant rule by white European settlers.  As a result, the 
FCB routinely invoked the need for Labor to foster the conditions they believed would ultimately 
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lead to independence.  As Creech Jones himself opined in a letter to the editor of the Times 
following the election of 1951, “It is imperative that Labour should continue its work of 
debunking imperialism and assist in creating the conditions of viability and independence in the 
dependent territories in the Commonwealth.”2  As far as Creech jones was concerned, such 
conditions did not yet exist in all of Britain’s African territories.   
It is a testament to the Fabians’ thorny and paradoxical position as socialists rationalizing 
the empire that, on the one hand, they were criticized for opposing the independence of colonial 
territories while, on the other, they were excoriated for advocating colonial self-government.  As 
Dr. Hinden wrote in Socialists and the Empire, “There are some very vocal colonials who wish 
Britain to evacuate all the Colonies at once—nothing short of immediate and absolute 
independence will satisfy them.  The Bureau, on the other hand, while favouring the grant of 
independence in certain Colonies at once, has regarded others as being unfit for it immediately, 
and has considered the immediate task to be to prepare all Colonies for independence at the 
earliest possible moment.  The Bureau has therefore been very bitterly attacked by some of these 
people who have misrepresented its position, even to the extent of suggesting that it is against 
independence altogether.”3   
That Dr. Hinden could unselfconsciously argue against paternalism in the language of a 
paternalist is jarring, but symptomatic of the broader ideological contradictions which underscore 
the Fabian position.  For their part, the Bureau’s stance on any given colony’s independence 
seems to have hinged on what they perceived as the relative maturity of those institutions which 
fostered democracy—that is, trade unions, cooperatives, local government, and the like.  In 
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colonies where these were still-nascent, and thus the basis for democratization weak, the Fabians 
seem to have been cool to the notion of self-government.  Where they had become entrenched, 
the Fabians were more apt to support immediate independence, as had been the case with 
Ceylon.4   
Nevertheless, the subtle nuance of these distinctions was and is impossible to quantify, 
being invariably subject to the vicissitudes of circumstance.  As a result, the argument over the 
nature of Fabian colonial perspectives and intentions persists.  As a result, scholars often 
characterize Fabian intentions as being somehow nefarious; less trustworthy and altruistic than 
what the Fabian rhetoric would have us believe.  To paraphrase Dr. Hinden, it is the “stick” with 
which the Fabians can always be chastised.   
 
The “Partial” Fabianization of the British Empire?:  The Cold War and the Globalization 
of Community Development 
In “Reflections on Colonial Affairs,” a speech before the House of Commons on 
November 11, 1953, Dr. Hinden, the recently-retired secretary of the FCB, declared that the 
“work of the (Bureau) is responsible for a great deal that has been achieved…in the colonies.”  
Sometime later, Dr. Hinden reviewed the transcript of her speech and inserted the word “partly” 
into the sentence.  It now read: “The work of the (Bureau) is partly responsible for a great deal 
that has been achieved…in the colonies.”5  This otherwise innocuous adverbial interlineation by 
the figure positioned second only to Creech Jones in terms of formulating the Fabians’ colonial 
policy recommendations doubtless remains the best possible assessment of the complicated 
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legacy of Fabian influence on Britain’s colonial enterprise.  Indeed, despite unprecedented 
political conditions which witnessed, for the first time, a Labor-dominated Parliament whose 
majority membership identified as Fabian, the Fabianization of the British Empire could only 
ever be partial.  This sense of incompleteness is to a considerable extent the result of the 
dynamics that have been outlined in this dissertation.   
As we have seen, conditions aligned to forestall what Hodge has referred to as a hoped-
for postwar “imperial renaissance.”6  These conditions included intransigence at the level of 
colonial administration, which had the effect of blunting in many ways Creech Jones’ efforts at 
social betterment evangelization, as well as the sterling crisis, which, in the immediate term, 
acted to relegate colonial development that was not designed to achieve dollar-earnings or dollar-
savings to a semi-peripheral position in the development discourse.  Despite this postwar 
colonial development revision, however, Britain’s fiscal position remained parlous and resource 
mobilization by way of mechanized agricultural production, no matter how rapid, could not 
realistically be expected to offset the looming crisis, with all its attendant political and social 
implications both for Britain, specifically, and Europe, generally.7 
As a result, the United States, fearful that prevailing economic exigency would render its 
wartime European allies vulnerable to the siren-like call of Soviet Communism in the early Cold 
War years, launched the Marshall Plan.  More suggestion than a statement of policy when first 
articulated by the American Secretary of State George Marshall in 1947, the eponymous plan 
(formally, the European Recovery Program or ERP) dovetailed with the Truman Doctrine’s anti-
Soviet containment strategy and was intended to help rebuild the economies of those Western 
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European nations devastated by the war.8  Although some $98 million in ERP funds were 
eventually directed toward colonial development, mostly through the CDWA,9 it was earmarked 
for three purposes only:  “providing technical assistance, for the development of strategic 
materials, or for financing the dollar equipment required in Government projects of which the 
Americans approve.”10  The encumbered magnanimity of the ERP notwithstanding, considerable 
practical obstacles remained for British administrators in the colonies, not least of which had to 
do with the notion of “technical assistance.”  As Dr. Hinden wrote in an article for The New 
Statesman, “Each Colonial Office has to hunt for the experts it wants, and they are hard to find. 
…  The total number of American technicians who have actually gone to the British Colonies 
may be counted easily on less than ten fingers.”11  The Point Four Program, announced as part of 
Truman’s Inaugural Address in 1949,12 only compounded these concerns.  Meant to extend 
technical and economic support to developing countries as Marshall Plan aid tapered off, Point 
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Four replaced the agency of government institutions with that of “private American capitalist” 
firms whose investment and entrepreneurial spirit—lured to the world’s “undeveloped areas” by 
“guaranteed” profits underwritten by public funds—would facilitate the “long process of 
negotiating agreements, working out country-wide development plans, and setting up effective 
organizations and technical staffs for carrying them out.”13 It was these considerations which led 
Dr. Hinden to conclude gloomily that “American help, as at present envisaged, is doing 
nothing…to meet our real difficulties.”  Hers was not a singular perspective, particularly when 
framed by the United States’ blatant and well-known anti-colonialism, which was nowhere more 
succinctly (and in extraordinarily impolitic terms) expressed than by US Congressman 
Emmanuel Celler, who characterized the problems faced by postwar Britain as “too damned 
much Socialism at home and too damned much Imperialism abroad.”14 
Such sentiment, expressed by a pro-Zionist15 as Britain’s hold over its mandated territory 
in Palestine looked increasingly tenuous, reflected the broader US commitment to 
decolonization,16 a reality which made the Marshall Planners, “Fourth Pointers,” and Britain’s 
imperial policymakers unlikely—and, at times, uncomfortable—bedfellows.  As Riley notes, 
there was no “natural affinity” between these groups, a complicated reality made all the more so 
when seasoned with British distrust over US intentions vis-à-vis imperial sovereignty.  At 
Westminster, for example, there was palpable bipartisan anxiety surrounding the potential risks 
of American meddling in Britain’s postwar colonial affairs:  Conservative MPs like Beverley 
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Wilcox worried that the US would try to dictate terms of production to meet American needs, 
while, on the opposite bench, Labor parliamentarians such as Major Geoffrey Bing expressed 
concern that American aims, devoid of any moralizing element, would precipitate the 
exploitation of the colonies—a retrogression the Fabians were themselves keen to avoid.17  
Meanwhile, the corridors of Whitehall were positively alive with the sound of wringing hands as 
bureaucrats in the CO fretted that the Americans’ basic lack of knowledge in colonial matters 
would lead to an emphasis on what became known internally as the “major project approach,” 
which assessed colonial development chiefly from the perspective of “large-scale, expensive 
programs”18—a fear exacerbated by the idea that the Americans intended to create a kind of 
catalog of such schemes from which they could “pick and choose” a la carte-style where to 
intervene directly in the colonies.19  Worse still, should such a “horrifying” prospect become 
reality,20 it would mean an absolute sundering of the “unspectacular” social development 
projects that many in the CO considered vital to the long-term development of Britain’s 
colonies.21   
Although Colonial Office administrators such as A. H. Poynton, Deputy Undersecretary 
of State in charge of the Economic Division, and W. A. C. Mathieson, an Assistant Secretary of 
State, were deeply suspicions of US aims relative to the empire, and equally concerned over the 
prospect of US interference, American observers were nonetheless routinely present at the CO’s 
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summer conferences.  Given that attendance was by invitation only—and, at that, limited to 
“people with experience of Colonial administration or Colonial problems”22—the presence of 
American officials at the conferences is certainly suggestive.  On one hand, of course, it reflects 
the inescapable reality of the postwar world, one in which Whitehall had necessarily to reconcile 
itself with the hegemonic influence of US interests both at home and abroad.  Yet, on the other 
hand, American attendance presented the British with an educative opportunity, a chance to 
bridge the knowledge gap between themselves and US officials, who were, in the Fabian view, 
“completely uninformed as to the essence” of colonial policy and the “proper role” of colonial 
development.23 
How effective the conferences were in achieving this is open to debate, since edifying the 
half-dozen or so State Department officials who attended them between 1947 and 1949 on the 
nuance of colonial rule and development was hardly the remit.  What is certain, however, is that, 
at first, the Americans were “not favorably impressed” by what they saw and heard.  Initially, at 
least, the observers seem to have detected “defeatism” among the participants; a vague sense of 
resignation surrounding the question of British imperial longevity in the wake of the war.  This 
pessimism, it appears, made the British “overly sensitive” to international criticism, particularly 
when it was intimated that they were pushing local government reforms “too rapidly”—a 
development which had, in the view of the American observers, triggered in the colonies a “race 
for control of a self-governing state” between the “educated minority” and the “ignorant 
majority.”  It is possible, however, that the American impressions were themselves overdrawn, 
the result, perhaps, of entrenched anti-imperial sentiment; for the next year, US officials rendered 
                                                          
22 Cohen to Hinden, May 5, 1947, BLUO, MSS. Brit. Emp. s. 365, FCB 25/2.   
23 “Colonial Policy from the Public Relations Point of View,” BLUO, MSS. Brit. Emp. s. 365, 
FCB 48/1.   
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a decidedly more upbeat assessment of deliberations surrounding mass education and community 
development, characterizing them as constructive and enlightened.24   
While it seems clear that the observers neither made a substantive contribution to 
conference discussions nor tried to influence those of others, US policymakers soon coopted 
community development as a principle of their overseas development efforts.  For a year after 
the 1948 summer conference, which was attended by several bureaucrats from the US 
Department of State, President Truman enshrined community development in American foreign 
policy as part of his Point Four Program—and in terms Creech Jones, Cohen, Dr. Hinden, 
Askwith, and Williams would have found strikingly familiar:      
Community Development is a technique for stimulating organized self-help undertakings 
through the democratic process.  It aims to mobilize the principal resource of most 
underdeveloped areas—their manpower and their interest in improving their own lot—
once they have become aware that improvement is possible. 25 
 
Combined ostensibly with an emphasis on fostering political and economic stability 
through participation and inclusion, US policymakers adopted a model of community 
development that had much in common with that of the British.  Soon after, the notion that, pace 
Daniel Immerwahr, “villagers could shape their own destiny” through development built “from 
the bottom up” became, for a time, an important weapon in the US arsenal in the global fight 
against Communism.26  As Lane Holdcroft observes, it is this potent reality, encumbered with all 
the attendant complexities of the still-nascent East-West polarity, that more than any other 
                                                          
24 James P. Hubbard, The United States and the End of British Colonial Rule in Africa, 1941-1968 
(Jefferson:  McFarland & Company Inc., 2011), 91.   
25 Alyosha Goldstein, “The Attributes of Sovereignty:  The Cold War, Colonialism, and 
Community Education in Puerto Rico,” in Imagining Our Americas:  Toward a Transnational Frame, 
eds. S. Shukla and H. Tinsman (Durham:  Duke University Press, 2007), 315-317.   
26 Daniel Immerwahr, Thinking Small:  The United States and the Lure of Community 
Development (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 2015), 63.   
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informed the character and subsequent globalization of community development in the 1950s.27  
Considered within the context of the Cold War, the “political rationale” for community 
development was rendered clear:  “Essentially, community development was seen by its free 
world advocates as the democratic response to totalitarianism.  In the ‘Cold War’ era of the 
1950’s, American leadership believed that the developing nations in the free world were under a 
two pronged [sic] threat from international communism:  a) the potential for external military 
aggression and, b) the possibility of internal revolution growing out of subversion via communist 
agrarian movements.”28 
As such, American promotion of community development was reflective of a larger trend 
in the West inspired by the Cold War’s inherent dichotomy—one made manifest by the 
subsequent “wave” of related research and reports originating with the United States and the 
United Nations throughout the 1950s.29  Indeed, pace Holdcroft, this efflorescence in community 
development, laden with such virtuous and propaganda-friendly principles as political and 
material emancipation was, in reality, a façade masking social and political control—albeit one 
based, Olivier Charnoz explains, on “consent and self-involvement.”30     
The Cold War-inspired evolution of community development should not, however, 
detract from the social betterment rationale which was fundamental to the earlier, Fabianized 
version which took root in Kenya and Uganda.  Indeed, it is a testament to the resilience and 
appeal of this Fabian-favored paradigm that, despite British skepticism surrounding American 
                                                          
27 Lane Holdcroft, “The Rise and Fall of Community Development, 1950-1965,” (master’s thesis, 
Michigan State University, 1976), 3-9.   
28 Ibid., 12. 
29 Olivier Charnoz, “The Local Power Effects of Global Discourses:  A Methodological Enquiry 
into ‘Community Participation’,” in Local Politics, Global Impacts:  Steps to a Multi-Disciplinary 
Analysis of Scales, eds. Olivier Charnoz. Virginia Diaz Pedregal, and Alan L. Kolata (London:  
Routledge, 2015), 163-165.   
30 Ibid.   
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involvement in colonial affairs (understandably heightened by prevailing attitudes in US political 
circles vis-à-vis decolonization) and the fact that fiscal circumstances clearly favored largish 
dollar-generating development schemes (and, of course, efforts to make something of them did 
not go away), the “unspectacular” projects characteristic of the community development regimes 
found in Uganda and Kenya remained both popular and vital mechanisms of progress in the 
colonies—and, at that, not only to British colonial development policy, but to US foreign policy 
as well.  Framed and delivered in large part through the agency of the Fabians and their like-
minded sympathizers in and out of government following the Second World War, there is 
perhaps no more fitting postscript in terms of the Fabianization of the British Empire—partial or 
otherwise.   
 
Assessing the Impact of Partial Fabianization:  Study Findings and Outcomes 
Fabianized community development programs in Kenya and Uganda in the 1950s are an 
important link connecting the rhetoric of midcentury Fabianization with its practice, despite the 
kind of context-specific limitations that prompted Dr. Hinden’s circumspection.  Undertakings 
like the Machakos Betterment Scheme and the numerous community development projects in 
Uganda discussed above complicate a historiography that for decades has emphasized the high-
profile failures of Britain’s postwar colonial development regime to the detriment of smaller-
scale initiatives.  The case studies presented in this dissertation therefore suggest a need for 
scholarly revision.   
First, the findings of this study indicate that community development led to qualitative 
improvements in local level living conditions.  From the application of soil conservation 
strategies and the use of small-scale mechanization, to the introduction of health, education, and 
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welfare initiatives, the lives of many Africans were tangibly altered for the better.  Furthermore, 
where elements of devolution and responsibility for local governance were present, Fabianized 
community development fostered a democratic spirit among indigenous populations.  That this 
transpired against the backdrop of rapid political and social change suggests the designers of 
community development anticipated the inevitability of self-government.  
Second, the findings of this study indicate that at the village level, the processes inherent 
to development required negotiation between the community targeted for development and the 
agents of initiative-building on which the regime largely depended.  As much as anyone, the 
Fabians understood that the dynamic interaction of consultation with communities and 
cooperative decision-making were crucial to the success of development schemes.  Time and 
again, we witness this dynamic being employed to effect by the community development 
regimes in Kenya and Uganda, be it in the form of propaganda campaigns to encourage village 
buy-in of soil erosion prevention techniques and the necessity of farm consolidation, or the 
promotion of rural homestead improvement schemes through village-wide demonstrations.   
  Third, the findings also indicate that, despite the high-mindedness of its rhetoric and its 
designs, the “inspiration of motive power” on which the Fabian ideal of community development 
rested was difficult to achieve when it came cloaked in the mantle of European paternalism, no 
matter how well-intentioned.  That the FCB could not effectively fathom out how to 
comprehensively realize development solutions beyond this framework speaks to their inability 
to rationalize development independent of centuries-old European prejudice and signals the 
limits of their capacity.  Indeed, even Fabianized community development, at root a village-level 
enterprise designed to promote development from below, required top-down European 
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involvement.  It often took colonial officials years to recognize this paradox, as shown by the 
evidence from both Kenya and Uganda.   
Despite this, it can reasonably be argued that community development was relatively 
successful, at least in terms of its positive impact on the lives of many villagers in Britain’s 
African territories.  While this finding goes some way toward alleviating the obscurantist’s view 
of postwar colonial development, which is often rationalized within the unhelpful framework of 
the vaunted and controversial colonial development offensive, it comes encumbered with the 
caveat:  this conclusion hinges on evidence derived chiefly from British sources and, thus, reflect 
a primarily European perspective on community development in Uganda and Kenya.  Until the 
African voice can be isolated and included, which will undoubtedly complicate the narrative, the 
conclusion is necessarily tentative.  The future study of the Fabianization of the British Empire 













Nairobi University Library (NUL), Kenya 
Afr. J. 750.75.c.6w5  Mass Education or Rural Community Development, Kenya Colony 
 
UK 
The London School of Economics (LSE), London 
Passfield Papers 
Passfield/1   Diaries of Beatrice Webb.  Typescript. 
     
Fabian Society Archives 
Fabian Society/C/36  Minutes of the Fabian Society, 1883-1888.   
Fabian Society/C/37  Minutes of the Fabian Society, 1888-1891.   
Fabian Society/C/4  Minutes of the Fabian Society, 1891-1893.   
Fabian Society/C/5  Minutes of the Fabian Society, 1893-1895. 
Fabian Society/C/8  Minutes of the Fabian Society, 1899-1903.   
Fabian Society/C/18  Minutes of the Fabian Society, 1933-1937. 
Fabian Society/C/19  Minutes of the Fabian Society, 1938. 
Fabian Society/C/20  Minutes of the Fabian Society, 1939-1946.   
Fabian Society/C/26  Minutes of the Fabian Society, 1939-1948.   
Series L/1 Agenda and Reports of Annual Conferences   
 
Labour Party Archive, Labour History Archive and Study Centre (LP LHASC), Manchester 
J. S. Middleton Papers 
International   Box 6    




National Archives, Kew, London (NA) 
Series CAB 24/187/41 Future Policy in Regard to Eastern Africa 
Series CO 323/1102/3 Cooperation in the Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated 
Territories 
Series CO 417/265  Despatches, South African Republic 
Series CO 536/215  Uganda:  Original Correspondence 
Series CO 536/218 Uganda:  Original Correspondence 
Series CO 822/656  Reports of the Department of Community Development, Uganda 
Series CO 822/1142 Community Development in Uganda:  Establishment of Training 
Centre 
Series CO 847/38/7  African Conference, 1948 
Series CO 852/941/3 Despatch No. 86, Secretary of State to all the Colonies, November 
10, 1948 
Series CO 1071/403 Uganda:  Colonial Reports 
 
Bodleian Libraries, University of Oxford (BLUO) 
Mss. Afr. s. 1843  Papers of P. E. W. Williams  
Mss. Afr. s. 2166  Papers of T. G. Askwith 
Mss. Afr. s. 2234  Papers of T. G. Askwith 
Mss. Brit. Emp. s. 332 Papers of Arthur Creech Jones  
Mss. Brit. Emp. s. 365 Papers of the Fabian Colonial Bureau 
BLUO 600.17 r. 147  Colonial Office Summer School on African Administration, 1947 
BLUO 600.17 r. 147 (2) Colonial Office Summer Conference on African Administration, 
1948 
BLUO 600.17 r. 147 (4) Colonial Office Summer Conference on African Administration, 
1951 
 
University College London, Institute of Education (UCL IOE) 
Uganda Protectorate  Annual Report of the Department of Community Development for  
the Year Ended December 31, 1953. 
270 
 
Annual Report of the Department of Community Development for  
the Year Ended December 31, 1955. 
Annual Report of the Department of Community Development for  
the Year Ended December 31, 1956. 
 
US 
Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, Independence, Missouri (HSTLM) 
David D. Lloyd Files, 1951-1953    





Colonial Office, Colonial Reports and Memoranda 
African Education:  A Study of Educational Policy and Practice in British Tropical Africa.  
Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1953.   
Education for Citizenship in Africa.  Colonial No. 216.  London:  HMSO, 1948. 
Mass Education in African Society:  Report of the Adult and Mass Education Subcommittee of 
the ACEC. Colonial No. 186.  London:  H.M.S.O., 1943. 
Memorandum on the Education of African Communities.  Colonial No. 103.  London:  HMSO, 
1935. 
The Model Cooperative Societies Ordinance.  Colonial No. 199.  London:  HMSO, 1946.   
Proceedings of a Conference Between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Premiers of 
the Self-Governing Colonies.  London:  HMSO, 1897.   
Records of the Colonial Office, Dominions Office, Commonwealth Relations Office, and 
Commonwealth Office, Vol. I.  London:  HMSO, 1989.   
 
Sessional Papers 
Education Policy in British Tropical Africa:  Memorandum Submitted to the Secretary of the 
State for the Colonies by the Advisory Committee on Native Education in the British 
Tropical African Dependencies.  Cmnd. 2374.  London:  HMSO, 1925.   
271 
 
Further Correspondence Relating to Proposed Political Reforms in the South African Republic.  
Cmnd. 9518.  London:  HMSO, 1899.   
Indians in Kenya.  Cmnd. 1922.  July 1923. 
Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons and Command, Vol. 17.  Reports from Committees:  
Nine Volumes:  Volume 8.  February 11, 1890-August 18, 1890.  London:  HMSO, 1890.   
Report of the Commission on Closer Union of the Dependencies in British East and Central 
Africa.  Cmnd. 3234.  London:  HMSO, 1929.   
Report on the Gambia Egg Scheme.  Cmnd. 8560.  London:  HMSO, 1952.   
Second Report from the Select Committee on British South Africa; with the Proceedings of the 
Committee.  London:  HMSO, 1897.   
 
Parliamentary Debates 
Arnold, (Lord) Sydney.  Speech to the House of Lords, July 22, 1929.  Parliamentary Debates, 
Lords, 5th ser., vol. 115 (1909-), cols. 988-989.   
Bledisloe, Viscount.  Speech to the House of Lords, March 20, 1940.  Parliamentary Debates, 
Lords, 5th ser., vol. 107 (1909-), col. 830-831. 
Broadhurst, Henry.  Speech to the House of Commons, April 27, 1885.  Parliamentary Debates, 
Commons, 3rd ser., vol. 297, col. 820. 
Creech Jones, Arthur.  Speech to the House of Commons, November 13, 1940.  Parliamentary 
Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 361 (1909-1980), cols. 55.   
----.  Speech to the House of Commons, July 12, 1944.  Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th 
ser., vol. 401 (1909-1980), cols. 1744-1745.   
----.  Speech to the House of Commons, January 22, 1947.  Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 
5th ser., vol. 432 (1909-1980), col. 206.   
Dugdale, John.  Speech to the House of Commons, June 21, 1944.  Parliamentary Debates, 
Commons, 5th ser., vol. 401 (1909-1980), cols. 180-181. 
Grigg, Edward.  Speech to the House of Commons, July 25, 1935.  Parliamentary Debates, 
Commons, 5th ser., vol. 204, col. 2069.   
Hall, George.  Speech to the House of Commons, November 13, 1940.  Parliamentary Debates, 
Commons, 5th ser., vol. 365 (1909-1980), cols. 1709-1710.   
272 
 
Hurd, Anthony.  Speech to the House of Commons, March 13, 1951.  Parliamentary Debates, 
Commons, 5th ser., vol. 485 (1909-1980), cols. 1328-1329.   
Lennox-Boyd, Alan.  Speech to the House of Commons, March 13, 1951.  Parliamentary 
Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 405 (1909-1980), cols. 1318-1319.   
Marley, James.  Speech to the House of Commons, December 11, 1929.  Parliamentary Debates, 
Commons, 5th ser., vol. 233 (1909-1980), cols. 581-582.   
MacDonald, Malcolm.  Speech to the House of Commons, May 21, 1940.  Parliamentary 
Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 361 (1909-1980), col. 45.   
Olivier, (Lord) Sydney.  Speech to the House of Lords, December 7, 1927.  Parliamentary 
Debates, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 69 (1909-), cols. 551-600. 
----.  Speech to the House of Lords, March 13, 1929.  Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 
73 (1909-), col. 480-481. 
----.  Speech to the House of Lords, February 23, 1938.  Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 5th ser., 
vol. 107 (1909-), col. 830-831. 
Stanley, Oliver.  Speech to the House of Commons, June 21, 1944.  Parliamentary Debates, 
Commons, 5th ser., vol. 401 (1909-1980), col. 180-181.   
----.  Speech to the House of Commons, July 12, 1944.  Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th 
ser., vol. 401 (1909-1980), cols. 1744-1745.   
Winster, Lord.  Speech to the House of Lords, August 1, 1944.  Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 
5th ser., vol. 133 (1909-), col. 26-28. 
 
Colony and Protectorate of Kenya 
LegCo, Gazette 
Legislative Council Debates.  Third Session, vol. 22.   
Official Gazette of the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya 47 (14 November 1944). 
Report on an Investigation of Cooperative Possibilities in Kenya.  Nairobi:  Government Printer, 
1945.   







Cohen, (Sir) Andrew B.  Report on Uganda.  Speech by His Excellency the Governor to the 
Legislative Council, November 19, 1954.  Entebbe:  Government Printer, 1954.   
 
US Government 
Executive Department Reports 
U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.  The Formulation of British Colonial 
Education Policy, 1929-1961:  Final Report.  Washington, D.C.:  Bureau of Research, 




The British Labour Party 
The Colonial Empire.  London:  The Labour Party, 1933.   
For Socialism and Peace:  The Labour Party’s Programme of Action.  London:  The Labour 
Party, 1934.   
Labour and the Nation.  London:  The Labour Party, 1927.   
Labour’s Immediate Programme.  London:  Labour Publications Department, 1937.   
Report of the Annual Conference of the Labour Party.  London:  The Labour Party, 1930. 
 
The Fabian Society 
The Fabian Society:  What it has Done and How it has Done it.  London:  The Fabian Society, 
1892.   
A Plan of Campaign for Labour.  London:  The Fabian Society, 1894.   
Why Are the Many Poor?  London:  The Fabian Society, 1884.   
59th Annual Report for the year ending March 31, 1942 (Draft).  London:  The Fabian Society,  
1942. 
60th Annual Report for the year ending March 31, 1943 (Draft).  London:  The Fabian Society,  
1943. 





The Fabian Colonial Bureau  
Cooperation in the Colonies:  A Report from a Special Committee to the Fabian Colonial 
Bureau.  London:  George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1945.   
Hinden, Rita.  Socialists and the Empire.  London:  Fabian Publications Ltd., 1946.  
 
Independent Labour Party.   
Report of the Eighth Annual Conference of the Independent Labour Party.  London:  ILP Office, 
1900.   
Report of the Ninth Annual Conference of the Independent Labour Party.  London:  Independent 
Labour Party, 1901.   
 
Overseas Development Institute 
Tiffen, Mary, ed.  Environmental Change and Dryland Management in Machakos District, 
Kenya, 1930-90.  London:  Overseas Development Institute, 1992.   
 
Social Democratic Federation.   
Report of the Twentieth Annual Conference of the Social Democratic Federation.  London:  The 
Twentieth Century Press, n.d. 
 
Books 
Barnes, John and David Nicholson, eds.  The Leo Amery Diaries, Volume I:  1886-1929.  
London:  Hutchinson, 1980.   
Chamberlain, Joseph.  Foreign and Colonial Speeches.  London:  George Routledge & Sons 
Ltd., 1897.   
James, Robert Rhodes, ed.  Winston S. Churchill:  His Complete Speeches, 1897-1963:  Volume 
VII, 1943-1949.  New York:  Chelsea House Publishers, 1974.           
MacKenzie, Norman, ed.  The Letters of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Volume I:  Apprenticeships, 
1873-1892.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1978. 
----.  The Letters of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Volume II:  Partnership, 1892-1912.  Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1978. 
275 
 
----.  The Letters of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Volume III:  Pilgrimage, 1912-1947.  Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1978. 
MacKenzie, Norman and Jeanne, eds.  The Diary of Beatrice Webb, Volume Three:  1905-1924.  
Cambridge:  The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1984.     
Webb, Beatrice.  Our Partnership.  Edited by Barbara Drake and Margaret I. Cole.  London:  
Longmans, Green & Co., 1948 
Woolf, Leonard.  Downhill All the Way:  An Autobiography of the Years 1919 to 1939.  San 





Addison, Paul.  The Road to 1945:  British Politics in the Second World War.  London:  Pimlico, 
1994.   
Adelman, Paul.  The Rise of the Labour Party, 1880-1945.  New York:  Routledge, 2014.   
Alexander, Sally.  Women’s Fabian Tracts.  Abingdon:  Routledge, 1988. 
Apter, David E.  The Political Kingdom in Uganda:  A Study in Bureaucratic Nationalism.  
London:  Routledge, 1967.   
Anderson, David.  Histories of the Hanged:  A Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire.  New 
York: W. W. Norton & Co. Inc., 2005.   
Anschutz, R.  The Philosophy of J. S. Mill (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1953.   
Askwith, T.G.  Kenya’s Progress.  Nairobi:  The Eagle Press, on Behalf of the East African 
Literature Bureau, 1958. 
----.  From Mau Mau to Harambee:  Memoirs and Memoranda of Colonial Kenya.  Edited by 
Joanna Lewis.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1995.   
Attlee, Clement.  As It Happened.  London:  Heinemann, 1954.   
Adyanga, Omek C.  Modes of British Imperial Control of Africa:  A Case Study of Uganda, c. 
1890-1990.  Newcastle-upon-Tyne:  Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011.   
Baker, Bill.  The SDF and the Boer War.  London:  The Communist Party of Great Britain, 1975.   
Barker, Ernest.  Political Thought in England from Herbert Spencer to the Present Day.  
London:  Williams and Norgate, 1915.   
276 
 
Basdeo, S.  Labour Organisation and Labour Reform in Trinidad 1919-1939.  St. Augustine:  
University of the West Indies, n.d. 
Baylies, Carolyn.  History of the Yorkshire Miners, 1881-1918.  London:  Routledge, 1993.   
Bernard Shaw, George.  Fabianism and the Empire:  A Manifesto by the Fabian Society.  
London:  Grant Richards, 1900. 
----.  Fabianism and the Fiscal Question:  An Alternative Policy by the Fabian Society.  London:  
The Fabian Society, 1904.  
----.  The Fabian Society:  Its Early History.  London:  The Fabian Society, 1906.   
----.  A Manifesto.  London:  Geo. Standring & Co., 1884.   
----.  The True Radical Programme.  London:  The Fabian Society, 1887.   
----.  What Socialism Is.  London:  The Fabian Society, 1890.   
Bevir, Mark.  The Making of British Socialism.  Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 2011. 
Bolland, O. Nigel.  On the March:  Labour Rebellions in the British Caribbean, 1934-1939.  
Kingston:  Ian Randle, 1995.   
Bowie, Norman and Robert L. Simon, eds.  He Individual and the Political Order:  An 
Introduction to Social and Political Philosophy.  Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 
1998.   
Brady, R.  Crisis in Britain.  Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1950.   
Brailsford, H. N.  The Lifework of J. A. Hobson (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1948. 
Britain, Ian.  Fabianism and Culture:  A study in British Socialism and the Arts c. 1884-1918.  
Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2005.   
Bruno, John Favato.  Rosimini’s Contribution to Ethical Philosophy.  New York:  The Science 
Press, 1916.   
Bush, Barbara.  Imperialism, Race and Resistance:  Africa and Britain, 1919-1945.  New York:  
Routledge, 2002.   
Busky, Donald F.  Democratic Socialism:  A Global Survey.  Westport:  Praeger Publishers, 
2000. 
Butler, L. J.  Britain and Empire:  Adjusting to a Post-Imperial World.  London:  I. B. Tauris & 
Co. Ltd., 2002. 
----.  Industrialization and the British Colonial State:  West Africa, 1939-1951.  London:  
Routledge, 1997.   
277 
 
Cain, Peter J. and Anthony G. Hopkins, British Imperialism:  Innovation and Expansion 1688-
1914.  New York:  Longman Group, 1933.    
Callaghan, John.  The Labour Party and Foreign Policy:  A History.  Abingdon:  Routledge, 
2007. 
Carr, Wilfred.  Education and the Struggle for Democracy (Buckingham:  Open University 
Press, 2002. 
Carter, Matt.  T. H. Green and the Development of Ethical Socialism.  Exeter:  Imprint 
Academic, 2003.   
Chambers, Robert.  Settlement Schemes in Tropical Africa:  A Study of Organizations and 
Development.  London:  Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969.   
Champion, H. H.  The Great Dock Strike of August 1889.  London:  Swan Sonnenschein, 1890.   
Claeys, Gordon.  Imperial Sceptics:  British Critics of Empire, 1850-1920.  Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 2010.   
Clarke, Peter.  Liberal & Social Democrats (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1981. 
Clayton, Anthony and Donald C. Savage.  Government and Labour in Kenya, 1895-1963.  
Abingdon:  Frank Cass and Company Ltd., 1974.   
Clough, Marshall S.  Mau Mau Memoirs:  History, Memory, and Politics.  Boulder:  Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1998. 
Cohen, (Sir) Andrew B.  British Policy in Changing Africa.  Evanston:  Northwestern University, 
1959.   
Cole, Margaret.  The Story of Fabian Socialism.  Stanford:  Stanford University Press, 1961.   
----.  The Webbs and Their Work.  London:  Frederick Muller, 1949. 
Comte, A., trans.  A General View of Positivism.  Aberdeen:  A. King & Co., 1865.   
Constantine, Stephen.  The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 1914-1940.  
London:  Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1984. 
Cole, G. D. H.  The War on the Homefront.  London:  The Fabian Society, 1939. 
Cooper, Frederick.  Africa Since 1940:  The Past of the Present.  Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2002.  
----.  Decolonization and African Society:  The Labor Question in French and British Africa.  
Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
278 
 
Cooper, Frederick and Randall Packard, eds.  International Development and the Social 
Sciences:  Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge.  Berkeley:  University of 
California Press, 1997.   
Corthorn, Paul.  In the Shadow of Dictators:  The British Left in the 1930s.  London:  Tauris 
Academic Studies, 2006. 
Cowen, Michael and Robert Shenton.  Doctrines of Development.  London:  Routledge, 1996.   
Cox, Michael and R. A. Gilbert.  The Oxford Book of Victorian Ghost Stories.  Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 2003.   
Cronin, James E.  The Politics of State Expansion:  War, State, and Society in Twentieth Century 
Britain.  London:  Routledge, 1991.   
Davidson, J. Morrison.  The Annals of Toil:  Being Labour History—outlines, Roman and 
British.  London:  W. Reeves, 1899. 
De Haan, Arjan.  How the Aid Industry Works:  An Introduction to International Development.  
Sterling:  Kumarian Press, 2009.   
De Wilde, John C.  Experiences with Agricultural Development in Tropical Africa, Volume II:  
The Case Studies.  Baltimore:  The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967.   
Dilley, M. R.  British Policy in Kenya Colony.  London:  Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1937.   
Driver, Stephen.  Understanding British Party Politics.  Cambridge:  Polity Press, 2011. 
Du Maurier, Daphne.  Jamaica Inn.  Essex:  Pearson Education Ltd., 2008. 
Duignan, Peter and L. H. Gann.  The United States and Africa:  A History.  Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1987.   
Durbin, Elizabeth.  New Jerusalems:  The Labour Party and the Economics of Democratic 
Socialism.  London:  Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985.   
Engels, Friedrich.  The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844.  London:  Swan 
Sonnenschein & Co., 1892.   
Ensor, Robert.  England, 1870-1914.  Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1992.   
Foldy, Michael S.  The Trials of Oscar Wilde:  Deviance, Morality, and Late-Victorian Society.  
New Haven:  Yale University Press, 197.   
Foote, Gregory.  The Labour Party’s Political Thought:  A History.  Basingstoke:  MacMillan 
Press Ltd., 1997.   
279 
 
Freeden, Michael.  Ideologies and Political Theory:  A Conceptual Approach.  Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 1996.   
----.  The New Liberalism:  An Ideology of Social Reform.  Oxford:  The Clarendon Press, 2011.   
Friedmann, John.  Empowerment:  The Politics of Alternative Development.  Malden:  Blackwell 
Publishers, 1992.   
Gandhi, Leela.  Affective Communities:  Anticolonial Thought, Fin-de-Siècle Radicalism and the 
Politics of Friendship.  Durham:  Duke University Press, 2006.   
Gann, Lewis and Peter Duignan.  Burden of Empire:  An Appraisal of Western Colonialism in 
Africa South of the Sahara.  New York:  Frederick A. Praeger Inc., 1967. 
Goldman, Lawrence.  The Life of RH Tawney:  Socialism and History.  London:  Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2014.  
Goldsworthy, David.  Colonial Issues in British Politics, 1945-1961:  From “Colonial 
Development” to “Wind of Change.”  Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1971.   
Goodland, Graham.  British Foreign and Imperial Policy, 1865-1919.  London:  Routledge, 
2000. 
Greenlee, James G. and Charles M. Johnston.  Good Citizens:  British Missionaries and Imperial 
States, 1870-1918.  Montreal & Kingston:  McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999. 
Gregory, Robert G.  Sidney Webb and East Africa:  Labour’s Experiment with the Doctrine of 
Native Paramountcy.  Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1962. 
Grey, (Viscount) Edward.  Twenty-Five Years.  New York:  Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1925.   
Gupta, Partha Sarathi.  Imperialism and the British Labour Movement, 1914-1964.  New York:  
Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1975.   
Hailey Lord (Malcolm).  An African Survey.  Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1938.   
Halevy, Elie.  Imperialism and the Rise of Labour, 1895-1905.  New York:  Barnes & Noble 
Inc., 1961.  
Hamer, D. H.  Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone and Rosebery:  A Study in Leadership 
and Policy.  Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1972.   
Hargreaves, John D.  The End of Colonial Rule in West Africa:  Essays in Contemporary 
History.  London:  Palgrave MacMillan, 1979.   
Havinden, Michael and David Meredith.  Colonialism and Development:  Britain and its 
Tropical Colonies, 1850-1960.  London:  Routledge, 1993.   
280 
 
Haworth, Alan and Diane Hayter.  Men Who Made Labor.  New York:  Routledge, 2006.   
Hettne, Bjorn.  Development Theory and the Three Worlds.  Essex:  Longman House, 1990.  
----.  Thinking About Development:  Development Matters.  London:  Zed Books, 2009. 
Hewitt, Martin, ed.  The Victorian World.  Abingdon:  Routledge, 2012.   
Hicks, Ursula.  Development from Below:  Local Government and Finanace in Developing 
Countries of the Commonwealth.  Oxford:  The Clarendon Press, 1961.   
Hill, Martin J. D.  The Harambee Movement in Kenya:  Self-Help, Development and Education 
among the Kamba of Kitui District.  London:  Bloomsbury Academic, 1991. 
Hinden, Rita, ed.  Local Government and the Colonies:  A Report to the Fabian Colonial 
Bureau.  London:  George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1950.   
Hinds, Allistair.  Britain’s Sterling Colonial Policy and Decolonization, 1939-1958.  Westport:  
Greenwood Press, 2001.   
Hodge, Joseph M.  Triumph of the Expert:  Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies 
of British Colonialism.  Athens:  Ohio University Press, 2007.   
Hollander, Neil.  Elusive Dove:  The Search for Peace During World War I.  Jefferson:  
McFarland Books, 2014.   
Howe, Stephen.  Anticolonialism in British Politics:  The Left and the End of Empire, 1918-
1964.  Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1993. 
Howell, David.  The Lost Left:  Three Studies in Socialism and Nationalism.  Chicago:  
University of Chicago Press, 1986.   
Hubbard, James P.  The United States and the End of British Colonial Rule in Africa, 1941-1968.  
Jefferson:  McFarland & Company Inc., 2011. 
Hunt, Michael H.  Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy.  New Haven:  Yale University Press, 2009.   
Hyam, Ronald.  Elgin and Churchill at the Colonial Office, 1905-1908:  The Watershed of the 
Empire-Commonwealth.  New York:  St. Martin’s Press, 1968.   
----, ed.  The Labour Government and the End of Empire, 1945-1954:  Pt. I:  High Policy and 
Administration.  London:  HMSO, 1992.   
Immerwahr, Daniel.  Thinking Small:  The United States and the Lure of Community 
Development.  Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 2015.   
Jackson, IC.  Advance in Africa:  A Study in Community Development in Eastern Nigeria.  
London:  Oxford University Press, 1956.   
281 
 
Jackson, Patrick.  Harcourt & Sons:  A Political Biography of Sir William Harcourt, 1827-1904.  
Madison:  Farleigh-Dickinson University Press, 2010. 
James, Robert Rhodes.  Rosebery.  London:  Phoenix, 1963.   
Kinzer, Bruce L.  J. S. Mill Revisited:  Biographical and Political Explorations.  Basingstoke:  
Palgrave MacMillan, 2007.   
Knight, William Angus, ed.  Memorials of Thomas Davidson, the Wandering Scholar.  London:  
Ginn and Company Publishers, 1907.   
Laurence, Dan H., ed.  Bernard Shaw Collected Letters, 1898-1910.  New York:  Dodd, Mead & 
Company, 1972.   
Laybourn, Keith.  Fifty Key Figures in Twentieth Century British Politics.  London:  Routledge, 
2002. 
Lee, Francis.  Fabianism and Colonialism:  The Life and Political Thought of Lord Sydney 
Olivier.  London:  Defiant Books, 1988.   
Lee, J. M.  Colonial Development and Good Government:  A Study in the Ideas Expressed by the 
British Official Classes in Planning Decolonization 1939-1964.  Oxford:  Clarendon 
Press, 1967.   
Lee, J. M. and M. Petter.  The Colonial Office, War and Development Policy:  Organisation and 
the Planning of Metropolitan Initiative, 1939-1945.  London:  Maurice Temple Smith 
Ltd., 1982.   
Lewis, Joanna.  Empire State-Building:  War & Welfare in Kenya, 1925-1952.  Oxford:  James 
Currey, 2000. 
Lineham, Thomas.  Modernism and British Socialism.  Hampshire:  Palgrave MacMillan, 2012.   
Louis, William Roger.  The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951:  Arab Nationalism, 
The United States, and Postwar Imperialism.  Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1998. 
MacKenzie, Norman and Jeanne.  The Fabians:  The extraordinary story of that famous circle of 
enthusiasts, reformers, & brilliant eccentrics—Shaw, the Webbs, Wells—whose ideas and 
unconventional attitudes fashioned out modern world.  New York:  Simon and Schuster, 
1977. 
Mair, L. P.  Welfare in the British Colonies.  London:  The Royal Institute of Royal Affairs, 
1944.   
Mann, Thomas.  Tom Mann’s Memoirs.  London:  The Labour Publishing Company Ltd., 1932.   
282 
 
Matthijs, Matthias.  Ideas and Economic Crises in Britain from Attlee to Blair (1945-2005).  
London:  Routledge, 2011. 
Maxon, Robert.  Conflict and Accommodation in Western Kenya:  The Gusii and the British, 
1907-1963 (Teaneck:  Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1989.   
Mayhew, Arthur.  Education in the Colonial Empire.  London:  Longmans, Green and Co., 1938.   
McBriar, A. M.  Fabian Socialism and English Politics, 1884-1918.  Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1966. 
McCormick, Thomas J.  America’s Half-Century:  United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War 
and After.  Baltimore:  The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. 
McHenry, Dean M.  The Labour Party in Transition, 1931-1938.  London:  G. Routledge and 
Sons Ltd., 1938. 
McKinstry, Leo.  Rosebery:  Statesman in Turmoil.  London:  John Murray Publishers Ltd., 
2005.   
Meredith, Martin.  Diamonds, Gold, and War.  New York:  Public Affairs, 2008.   
Michalos, Alex C. and Deborah C. Poff, eds.  Bernard Shaw and the Webbs.  Toronto:  
University of Toronto Press, 2002.   
Mill, John Stuart.  Essays on Ethic, Religion, and Society.  Edited by J. M. Robson.  London:  
Kegan Paul, 1985.   
Milnes, Robert C.  Rosebery, Volume II.  London:  Harper & Brothers, 1931.   
Minkin, Lewis.  The Labour Party Conference:  A Study in the Politics of Intra-Party 
Democracy.  London:  Allen Lane, 1978.   
Moffett, John.  “Bridging the Gap.”  In Glimpses of Empire:  A Corona Anthology.  Edited by 
Anthony Kirk-Greene.  London:  I. B. Tauris, 2001.   
Morgan, A.  J. Ramsay MacDonald.  Manchester:  Manchester University Press, 1987. 
Morgan, K. O.  Labour in Power, 1945-1951.  Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1984.   
Mosley, Paul and Barbara Ingham.  Sir Arthur Lewis:  A Biography.  Basingstoke:  Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2013.   
Mukherjee, Ramkirshna.  Uganda:  An Historical Accident?  Class, Nation, State Formation.  
Trenton:  Africa World Press, 1985.   
Murphy, Philip.  Party Politics and Decolonization:  The Conservative Party and British 
Colonial Policy in Tropical Africa, 1951-1964.  Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1999. 
283 
 
Nettleship, R. L., ed.  The Works of Thomas Hill Green:  Philosophical Works.  London:  
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1888.   
Noble, Virginia A.  Inside the Welfare State:  Foundations of Policy and Practice in Post-War 
Britain.  Abingdon:  Routledge, 2009. 
Norgaard, Richard.  Development Betrayed:  The End of Progress and a Coevolutionary 
Revisioning of the Future.  New York:  Routledge, 1994.   
Nwauwa, Apollos.  Imperialism, Academe, and Nationalism:  Britain and University Education 
for Africans, 1860-1960.  London:  Frank Cass, 1997.   
O’Hara, Glenn.  Governing Post-War Britain:  The Paradoxes of Progress, 1951-1973.  London:  
Palgrave-MacMillan, 2012.   
Oldfield, Sybil, ed.  Afterwords:  Letters on the Death of Virginia Woolf.  New Brunswick:  
Rutgers University Press, 2005. 
Olivier, Sydney.  Imperial Trusteeship.  London:  The Fabian Society, 1929.   
----.  White Capital and Coloured Labour.  London:  Hogarth Press, 1929.   
Oppenheim, Janet.  The Other World:  Spiritualism and Psychical Research in England, 1850-
1914.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1985.   
Osborne, Myles.  Ethnicity and Empire in Kenya:  Loyalty and Martial Race Among the Kamba, 
c. 1800 to the Present.  New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2014. 
Owen, Robert.  The Book of the New Moral World, Explanatory of Elements of the Science of 
Society, or of the Social State of Man.  London:  J. Watson, 1842-44.   
Pakenham, Thomas.  The Boer War.  New York:  Random House, 1979.   
Parker, Jason C.  Brother’s Keeper:  The United States, Race, and Empire in the British 
Caribbean, 1937-1962.  Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2008. 
Parker, Robert J. and Eldon M. Alexander.  A History of Organized Labour in the English-
Speaking West Indies.  London:  Praeger, 2004.   
Pearce, R D.  The Turning Point in Africa:  British Colonial Policy 1938-1948.  London:  Frank 
Cass, 1982. 
Pearce, Robert D. and Roger Stearn.  Government and Reform:  Britain, 1815-1918.  London:  
Hodder & Staunton, 2000. 




Pelling, Henry.  The Origins of the British Labour Party, 1880-1900.  Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 1965.   
Pickering, Mary.  Auguste Comte:  An Intellectual Biography, Vol. I.  Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1993.   
Pierson, Stanley.  British Socialists:  The Journey from Fantasy to Politics.  Cambridge:  
Harvard University Press, 1979.   
----.  Hugh Dalton:  A Life.  London:  Jonathan Cape, 1985.   
----.  Labour and the Left.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1977.   
Porter, Bernard.  The Lion’s Share:  A History of British Imperialism, 1850-2011.  New York:  
Pearson Education Limited, 1975.   
Powell, Frederick W.  The Politics of Civil Society:  Neoliberalism or Social Left?  Bristol:  
Policy Press, 2007.   
Preston, Peter W.  Development Theory:  An Introduction.  Oxford:  Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 
1997. 
Pugh, Martin.  Speak for Britain!  A New History of the Labour Party.  London:  Vintage Books, 
2011.   
Pugh, Paula.  Educate, Agitate, Organize:  100 Years of Fabian Socialism.  London:  Methuen, 
1984.   
Qualter, Terence.  Graham Wallas and the Great Society.  London:  The MacMillan Press Ltd., 
1980.    
Radice, Lisanne.  Beatrice and Sidney Webb, Fabian Socialists.  New York:  St. Martin’s Press, 
1984.   
Rhodes, Rita.  Empire and Cooperation:  How the British Empire Used Cooperatives in its 
Development Strategies, 1900-1970.  Edinburgh:  John Donald, 2012.   
Riley, Charlotte Lydia.  “‘The Winds of Change are Blowing Economically’:  The Labour Party 
and British Overseas Development, 1940s-1960s.”  In Britain, France and the 
Decolonization of Africa:  Future Imperfect?  Edited by Andrew M. W. Smith and Chris 
Jeppesen.  London:  University College Press, 2017:  43-61.   
Ritschel, Daniel.  The Politics of Planning:  The Debate on Economic Planning in Britain in the 
1930s.  Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1997.   
Rima, Ingrid.  Development of Economic Analysis.  Oxon:  Routledge, 2009.   
285 
 
Rossinow, Doug.  Visions of Progress:  The Left-Liberal Tradition in America.  Philadelphia:  
The University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008. 
Rostow, W. W.  The Stages of Economic Growth:  A Non-Communist Manifesto.  Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1960.   
Rotberg, R. I.  Black Heart:  Gore-Browne and the Politics of Multi-Racial Zambia.  Berkeley:  
University of California Press, 1978.   
Sachs, Wolfgang.  The Development Dictionary:  A Guide to Knowledge and Power.  London:  
Zed Books, 1992. 
Scally, Robert J.  The Origins of the Lloyd George Coalition:  The Politics of Social-
Imperialism, 1900-1918.  Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1975. 
Scanlon, David G.  Education in Uganda.  Washington, D.C.:  Government Printing Office, 
1965.   
Schneer, Jonathan.  Ben Tillett:  Portrait of a Labour Leader.  Urbana:  University of Illinois 
Press, 1982.   
Schuknecht, Rohland.  British Colonial Development Policy after the Second World War.  New 
Brunswick:  Transaction Publishers, 2010.   
Schwarz, Bill.  The White Man’s World.  Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2011.   
Shaffer, Jack.  Historical Dictionary of the Cooperative Movement.  Lanham:  The Scarecrow 
Press Ltd., 1999. 
Shepherd, John and Keith Laybourn.  Britain’s First Labour Government.  Basingstoke:  
Palgrave MacMillan, 2006.   
Shilaro, Priscilla M.  A Failed Eldorado:  Colonial Capitalism, Rural Industrialization, African 
Land Rights in Kenya, and the Kakamega Gold Rush, 1930-1952.  Lanham:  University 
Press of America, 2008.   
Searle, G. R.  The Quest for National Efficiency:  A Study in British Politics and British Political 
Thought, 1899-1914.  Oxford:  Basil Blackwell, 1971.   
Semmel, Bernard.  Imperialism and Social Reform:  English Social-Imperial Thought, 1895-
1914.  Garden City:  Anchor Books Doubleday & Co. Inc., 1968.   
Smith, Iain R.  The Origins of the South African War 1899-1902.  London:  Longman Pearson, 
1996.   
286 
 
Spruyt, Hendrik.  Ending Empire:  Contested Sovereignty and Territorial Partition.  Ithaca:  
Cornell University Press, 2005.   
Ssekamwa, J. C.  History and Development of Education in Uganda.  Kampala:  Fountain 
Publishers, 1997.   
Steevens, G. W.  With Kitchener to Khartoum.  New York:  Dodd, Mead and Co., 1898. 
Sutton, Alex.  The Political Economy of Imperial Relations:  Britain, the Sterling Area, and 
Malaya, 1945-1960.  New York:  Palgrave MacMillan, 2015. 
Tawney, RH  The Webbs in Perspective.  London:  Athlone Press, 1953.   
Taylor, R.  Lord Salisbury.  London:  Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1975.  
Taylor, R. and T. Steele.  British Labour and Higher Education, 1945-2000:  Ideologies, 
Policies, and Practice.  London:  Bloomsbury Academic, 2011.   
Thompson, Noel.  Political Economy and the Labour Party:  The Economics of Democratic 
Socialism, 1884-2005.  London:  Routledge, 1996. 
Thorpe, Andrew.  A History of the Labour Party.  Houndmills:  Palgrave MacMillan, 1997.   
Tillett, Ben.  A Brief History of the Docker’s Union.  London:  n.d. 
Tilley, Helen.  Africa as a Living Laboratory:  Empire, Development, and the Problem of 
Scientific Knowledge.  Chicago:  Chicago University Press, 2011. 
Tsuzuki, Chushichi.  H. M. Hyndman and British Socialism.  London:  Lawrence and Wishart, 
1955.   
Tudor, Henry and J. M. Tudor.  Marxism and Social Democracy:  The Revisionist Debate, 1896-
1898.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1988.   
Tully, John.  Silvertown:  The Lost Story of a Strike that Shook London and Helped Launch the 
Modern Labor Movement.  New York:  Monthly Review Press, 2012.   
Van Beusekom, Monica M.  Negotiating Development:  African Farmers and Colonial Experts 
at the Office du Niger, 1920-1960.  Portsmouth:  Heinemann Publishing, 2001.   
Vickers, Rhiannon.  The Labour Party and the World, Volume I:  Evolution of Labour’s Foreign 
Policy, 1900-51.  Manchester:  Manchester University Press, 2003.    
Webb, Sidney.  Labour on the Threshold.  London:  The Fabian Society, 1923.   
----.  Towards Social Democracy?  A Study in Social Evolution During the Past Three-Quarters 
of a Century.  London:  The Fabian Society, 1916.   
287 
 
----.  Twentieth Century Politics:  A Policy of National Efficiency.  London:  The Fabian Society, 
1901. 
Webb, Sidney and Beatrice.  The History of Trade Unionism, 1666-1920.  London:  Printed by 
the Authors for the Trade Unionists of the United Kingdom, 1929.   
----.  Industrial Democracy.  London:  Longmans, Green & Co., 1902. 
Weiss, Samuel A., ed.  Bernard Shaw’s Letters to Siegfried Trebitsch.  Stanford:  Stanford 
University Press, 1986.   
Welsh, Frank.  South Africa:  A Narrative History.  New York:  Kodansha International, 1999. 
Whitehead, Clive.  Colonial Educators:  The British Indian and Colonial Education Service 
1858-1983.  London:  I. B. Tauris, 2003. 
Williamson, Philip.  National Crisis and National Government:  British Politics, the Economy, 
and Empire, 1926-1932.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1992.   
Winter, J. M.  Socialism and the Challenge of War:  Ideas and Politics in Britain, 1912-18.  
London:  Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974.   
Wolfe, Willard.  From Radicalism to Socialism:  Men and Ideas in the Formation of Fabian 
Socialist Doctrines, 1881-1889.  New Haven:  Yale University Press, 1975.  
Woolf, Leonard.  Economic Imperialism.  London:  The Swarthmore Press Ltd., 1920. 
----.  Empire and Commerce in Africa:  A Study in Economic Imperialism.  London:  George 
Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1920.   
Worley, Matthew.  Labour Inside the gate:  A History of the British Labour Party Between the 
Wars.  London:  I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2005. 
Yansane, Anguibou Yan.  Development Strategies in Africa:  Current Economic, Socio-political, 
and Institutional Trends and Issues.  Westport:  Greenwood Press, 1996.   
Young, Crawford, et al.  Cooperatives and Development:  Agricultural politics in Ghana and 
Uganda.  Madison:  University of Wisconsin Press, 1982.   
 
Articles and Book Chapters  
Atieno-Odhiambo, E. A.  “The Formative Years, 1945-55.”  In Decolonization and 
Independence in Kenya, 1940-93.  Edited by B. A. Ogot and W. R. Ochieng’.  London:  
James Currey Ltd., 1995.   
288 
 
Ball, Stephen.  “Imperialism, Social Control and the Colonial Curriculum.”  Journal of 
Curriculum Studies 15, no. 3 (1983):  237-263.   
Bevir, Mark.  “Fabianism, Permeation and Independent Labour.”  The Historical Journal 39, no. 
1 (March 1996):  179-196.   
----.  “Sidney Webb:  Utilitarianism, Positivism, and Social Democracy.”  The Journal of 
Modern History 74, no. 2 (June 2003):  214-252.   
Beech, Matt and Kevin Hickson.  “Evan Durbin.”  In Labour’s Thinkers:  The Intellectual Roots 
of Labour, from Tawney to Gordon Brown.  London:  Tauris Academic Studies, 2007:  
77-100. 
Biagini, Eugenio.  “Gladstone’s Legacy.”  In William Gladstone:  New Studies and Perspectives.  
Edited by R. Quinault, R. Swift, and R. C. Windscheffel, 293-313.  London:  Routledge, 
2016.   
Boyle, James.  “The New Socialism.”  The Forum 44, no. 6 (1910-12):  641-654.   
Britt Rasmussen, Kathleen.  “Great Britain and American Hegemony.”  In A Companion to 
Harry S. Truman.  Edited by David S. Margolies.  Oxford:  Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 
2012:  305-326. 
Callaghan, John.  “The Fabian Society since 1945.”  In Ideas and Think Tanks in Contemporary 
Britain, Volume 2.  Edited by M. David Kandiah and A. Seldon.  London:  Frank Cass & 
Co. Ltd., 1996.   
Carr, Helen.  “Virginia Woolf:  Empire and Race.”  In The Cambridge Companion to Virginia 
Woolf.  Edited by Susan Sellers.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2010:  197-
213.   
Cell, John.  “Lord Hailey and the Making of the African Survey.”  African Affairs 88, no. 353 
(October 1989):  481-505. 
Charnoz, Olivier.  “The Local Power Effects of Global Discourses:  A Methodological Enquiry 
into ‘Community Participation.”  In Local Politics, Global Impacts:  Steps to a Multi-
Disciplinary Analysis of Scales.  Edited by Olivier Charnoz, Virginia Diaz Pedregal, and 
Alan L. Kolata.  London:  Routledge, 2015:  157-184.   
Claeys, Gordon.  “Political Thought.”  In A Companion to Nineteenth-Century Britain.  Edited 
by C. Williams.  Oxford:  Blackwell Publishing, 2004:  189-202.   
289 
 
Clarke, Sabine.  “A Technocratic Imperial State?  The Colonial Office and Scientific Research, 
1940-1960.”  Twentieth Century British History 40, no. 4 (2007):  453-480.   
Courtney, W. L., ed.  “Mr. John Morley.”  The Fortnightly Review 70 (July-Dec. 1898):  249-
316. 
Cowen, M. P. and R. W. Shenton.  “Agrarian Doctrines of Development, Part II.”  The Journal 
of Peasant Studies 25, no. 3 (1998):  31-62.   
----.  “The Origin and Course of Fabian Colonialism in Africa.”  Journal of Historical Sociology 
4, no. 2 (June 1991):  143-174. 
Cowen, Michael and Robert Shenton.  “The Invention of Development.”  In Power of 
Development.  Edited by Jonathan Crush.  London:  Routledge, 1995:  27-43.    
Creech Jones, Arthur.  “Cooperation as a Factor in Colonial Progress.”  Review of International 
Cooperation:  The Official Organ of the International Cooperative Alliance 36, no. 7 
(July 1943):  97-98 
----.   “Labour’s Achievement in the Colonies.”  The Way Forward.  London:  The Fabian 
Society, 1950:  13-25.   
Davis, Jonathan.  “Labour’s Political Thought:  The Soviet Influence in the Interwar Years.”  In 
British Labour Party and the Wider World:  Domestic Politics, Internationalism, and 
Foreign Policy.  Edited by Paul Corthorn and Jonathan Davies.  London:  Tauris 
Academic Studies, 2012:  64-85.   
Davis, Mary.  “Labour, Race and Empire:  The Trades Union Congress and Colonial Policy, 
1945-51.”  In The British Labour Movement and Imperialism.  Edited by Billy Frank, 
Craig Horner, and David Stewart.  Newcastle-upon-Tyne:  Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, 2010:  89-106.   
Escobar, Arturo.  “Imagining a Post-Development Era?  Critical Thought, Development, and 
Social Movements.”  Social Text 31, no. 32 (1992):  20-56.   
----.  “Power and Visibility:  Development and the Invention and Management of the Third 
World.”  Cultural Anthropology 3, no. 4 (Nov. 1988):  428-443.   
Fieldhouse, D. K.  “The Labour Governments and the Empire Commonwealth, 1945-51.”  In The 
Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government.  Edited by R. Ovendale.  Leicester:  
Leicester University Press, 1984:  83-120.   
290 
 
Fox, Paul W. and H. Scott Gordon.  “The Early Fabian-Economists and Reformers.”  The 
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science/Revue Canadienne 17, no. 3 (Aug. 
1951):  307-319.   
Frank, Billy.  “Labour’s ‘New Imperialist Attitude’:  State-Sponsored Colonial Development in 
Africa, 1940-51.”  In The British Labour Movement and Imperialism.  Edited by Billy 
Frank, Craig Horner, and David Stewart.  Newcastle-upon-Tyne:  Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, 2010:  107-129. 
Fredericks, L. J.  “Free Enterprise and the Cooperative Movement in Malaysian Economic 
Development.”  The Developing Economies 12, no. 3 (1974):  229-244. 
Freeden, Michael.  “The Stranger at the Feast:  Ideology and Public Policy in Twentieth Century 
Britain.”  20th Century British History 1, no. 1 (1990):  9-34.   
Goldstein, Alyosha.  “The Attributes of Sovereignty:  The Cold War, Colonialism, and 
Community Education in Puerto Rico.”  In Imagining Our Americas:  Toward a 
Transnational Frame.  Edited by S. Shukla and H. Tinsman.  Durham:  Duke University 
Press, 2007:  313-337.  
 Harris, Jose.  “Labour’s Political and Social Thought.”  In Labour’s First Century.  Edited by 
Duncan Tanner, Pat Thane, and Nick Tiratsoo.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 
2000:  8-45.   
Harrison, Nick.  “Consensus Here, Consensus There…But Not Consensus Everywhere:  The 
Labour Party, Equality, and Social Policy in the 1950s.”  In The Myth of Consensus:  
New Views on British History, 1945-1964.  Edited by Harriet Jones and Michael Kandiah.  
London:  Palgrave, 1996:  17-39.   
Harrison, Royden.  “The War Emergency Workers’ National Committee, 1914-1920.” In Essays 
in Labour History 1886-1923.  Edited by Asa Briggs and John Saville.  Hamden:  Archon 
Books, 1971:  211-259.   
 “The Hilton-Young and Wilson Reports on East Africa.”  Bulletin of International News 6, no. 
10 (Nov. 21, 1929).   
Hinds, Alistair.  “Sterling and Decolonization in the British Empire, 1945-1958.”  Social and 
Economic Studies 48, no. 4 (December 1999):  97-116.   
291 
 
Hodge, Joseph M. and Gerald Hodl.  “Introduction.”  In Developing Africa:  Concepts and 
Practices in Twentieth-Century Colonialism.  Edited by Joseph M. Hodge, Gerald Hodl, 
and Martina Kopf.  Manchester:  Manchester University Press, 2014:  1-34.   
Holford, John.  “Mass Education and Community Development in the British Colonies, 1940-
1960:  A Study in the Politics of Community Education.”  International Journal of 
Lifelong Education 7, no. 3 (1988):  163-183.   
Hyam, Ronald.  “Bureaucracy and ‘Trusteeship’ in Colonial Empire.”  In The Oxford History of 
the British Empire:  The Twentieth Century.  Edited by Judith M. Brown and William 
Roger Louis.  Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2001:  255-279.   
Jackson, Ben.  “Socialism and the New Liberalism.”  In Liberalism as Ideology:  Essays in 
Honour of Michael Freeden.  Edited by B. Jackson and M. Stears.  Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 2012:  34-52.   
Jaures, Jean.  “Madness.”  Justice (December 2, 1899).   
Jensen, Jody and Ferenc Miszlivetz.  “Global Civil Society:  From Dissident Discourse to World 
Bank Parlance.”  In The Language of Civil Society.  Edited by Peter Wagner.  New York:  
Berghahn Books, 2006:  177-205.   
Jones, Aled.  “Workmen’s Advocates:  Ideology and Class in a Mid-Victorian Newspapers 
System.”  In The Victorian Periodical Press:  Soundings and Samplings.  Edited by J. 
Shattock and M. Wolff.  Leicester:  Leicester University Press, 1982.   
Kaarsholm, Preben.  “Pro-Boers.”  In Patriotism:  The Making and Unmaking of British National 
Identity, Volume I:  History and Politics.  Edited by Raphael Samuel.  Abingdon:  
Routledge, 1989:  110-126.   
Kelemen, Paul.  “‘Individualism is, Indeed, Running Riot’:  Components of the Social 
Democratic Model of Development.”  In Empire, Development & Colonialism:  The Past 
in the Present.  Edited by M. Duffield and V. Hewitt.  Suffolk:  James Currey, 2009:  
188-202.  
----.  “Planning for Africa:  The British Labour Party’s Colonial Development Policy, 1920-
1964.”  Journal of Agrarian Change 7, no. 1 (Jan. 2007):  76-98.   
Lawrence, Jon.  “Popular Radicalism and the Socialist Revival in Britain.”  Journal of British 
Studies 31, no. 2 (April 1992):  163-186.   
292 
 
Lonsdale, John.  “East Africa.”  In The Oxford History of the British Empire:  The Twentieth 
Century.  Edited by Judith M. Brown and William Roger Louis.  Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 1999:  530-544.  
----.  “Mau Maus of the Mind:  Making Mau Mau and Remaking Kenya.”  Journal of African 
History 31 (1990):  393-421 
“Lord Rosebery’s Leadership.”  The Spectator (March 1896):  8-9.   
Mahon, J. L.  “Trade Unionism.”  Murray’s Magazine:  A Home and Colonial Periodical for the 
General Reader, Volume VIII (July-December 1890):  116-119.   
Matthew, H. C. G.  “Disraeli, Gladstone, and the Politics of Mid-Victorian Budgets.”  Historical 
Journal 22, no. 3 (1979):  615-643.   
Maxon, Robert M.  “The Devonshire Declaration:  The Myth of Missionary Intervention.”  
History of Africa 18 (1991):  259-270.   
Morrell, Gordon W.  “The Big Three, the U.N. Trusteeship Council, and the Early Cold War.”  
In Imperialism on Trial:  Oversight and Colonial Rule in Historical Perspective.  Edited 
by R. M. Douglas, Michael D. Callahan, and Elizabeth Bishop.  Lanham:  Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2006.   
Muendo, Lydia Kanini.  “Challenges Facing Local Government in Development in Kenya:  The 
Case of Machakos District, 1950-1974.”  Historical Research Letter 33 (2016):  18-28.   
Newton, C. S. S.  “The Sterling Crisis of 1947 and the British Response to the Marshall Plan.”  
The Economic History Review (New Series) 37, no. 3 (August 1984):  391-408.   
Noakes, Richard.  “Spiritualism, Science and the Supernatural in Mid-Victorian Britain.”  In The 
Victorian Supernatural.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2004:  23-43.   
Okoth, P. G.  “The Creation of a Dependent Curriculum.”  In The Imperial Curriculum:  Racial 
Images and Education in the British Colonial Experience.  Edited by J. A. Mangan.  
London:  Routledge, 1993:  135-147.   
Olivier, Sydney.  “Liberalism and the Fabians.”  The Daily News.  December 17, 1901.   
Otte, T. G.  “Lord Salisbury.”  In British Conservative Leaders.  Edited by C. Clarke, T. James, 
T. Bale, and P. Diamond.  London:  Biteback Publishing, 2015.  Amazon Kindle Reader 
e-book.   
293 
 
Owen, Nicholas.  “Critics of Empire in Britain.”  In The Oxford History of the British Empire:  
The Twentieth Century.  Edited by Judith M. Brown and William Roger Louis.  Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 2001:  188-211.     
Parsons, Timothy.  “Dangerous Education?  The Army as School in Colonial East Africa.”  
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 28, no. 1 (January 2000):  112-134.   
Riddell, Neil.  “‘Age of Cole’?  G. D. H.  Cole and the British Labour Movement, 1929-1933.”  
The Historical Journal 38, no. 4 (December 1995):  937-954.   
Rosen, F.  “Jeremy Bentham’s Radicalism.”  In English Radicalism, 1550-1850:  Tradition or 
Fabrication?  Edited by G. Burgess and M. Festenstein.  Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2007:  217-240.   
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich and Ronan Van Rossem.  “The Verein fur Sozialpolitik and the Fabian 
Society:  A Study in the Sociology of Policy-Relevant Knowledge.”  In States, Social 
Knowledge, and the Origins of Modern Social Policies.  Edited by D. Rueschemeyer and 
T. Skocpol.  Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1996:  117-162.   
Sanders, Anne.  “Beveridge, Lord William Henry.”  In International Encyclopedia of Civil 
Society.  Edited by Helmut K. Anheier, Stefan Toepler, and Regina List.  New York:  
Springer Science and Business Media, 2010):  63. 
Simon, David.  “Development Reconsidered:  New Directions in Development Thinking.”  
Geografiska Annaler.  Series B, Huamn Geography, 79, no. 4 (1997):  183-201.   
Strickland, C. F.  “The Cooperative Movement in Africa.”  Journal of the Royal African Society 
34, no. 134 (January 1935):  738-753.   
----.  “The Cooperative Movement in the East.”  International Affairs (Royal Institute of 
International Affairs) 11, no. 6 (November 1932):  812-832.   
Sweezy, Paul M.  “Fabian Political Economy.”  Journal of Political Economy 57, no. 3 (June 
1949):  242-248.   
Thompson, Gardner.  “Colonialism in Crisis:  The Uganda Disturbances of 1945.”  African 
Affairs 91 (1992):  605-624.   
Twaddle, Michael.  “The Struggle for Political Sovereignty in Eastern Africa, 1945 to 
Independence.”  In General History of Africa VIII:  Africa since 1935.  Edited by Ali A. 
Mazrui.  Oxford:  James Currey, 1999:  221-248.   
294 
 
Van Beusekom, Monica M.  “Disjunctures in Theory and Practice:  Making Sense of Change in 
Agricultural Development at the Office du Niger, 1920-1960.”  The Journal of African 
History 41, no. 1 (2000):  79-99.   
Watts, Michael.  “‘A New Deal in Emotions’:  Theory and Practice and the Crisis of 
Development.”  In Power of Development.  Edited by Jonathan Crush.  London:  
Routledge, 1995:  44-62.   
Weiler, Peter.  “William Clarke:  The Making and Unmaking of a Fabian Socialist.”  Journal of 
British Studies 14, no. 1 (Nov. 1974):  77-108.   
Westcott, N. J.  “Closer Union and the Future of East Africa, 1939-1948:  A Case Study in the 
‘Official Mind of Imperialism.’”  Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 10, no. 
1 (October 1981):  67-88.   
Whitehead, Clive.  “The Historiography of British Imperial Education Policy, Part II:  Africa and 
the Rest of the World.”  History of Education 34, no. 4 (July 2005):  441-454.   
----.  “The Impact of the Second World War on Education in Britain’s Colonial Empire.”  In 
Education and the Second World War:  Studies in Schooling and Social Change.  Edited 
by Roy Lowe.  New York:  Routledge, 1992.   
Wilt, Judith.  “The Imperial Mouth:  Imperialism, the Gothic and Science Fiction.”  The Journal 
of Popular Culture 14, no. 4 (Spring 1981):  618-628.   
Wright, Thomas.  “The Press and the People.”  In Our New Masters (London, 1873):  311-358.   
Zeleza, Tiyambe.  “The Colonial Labour System in Kenya.”  In An Economic History of Kenya.  
Edited by W. R. Ochieng’ and Robert Maxon.  Nairobi:  East African Educational 
Publishers Ltd., 1992.   
 
Theses and Dissertations 
Holdcroft, Lane.  “The Rise and Fall of Community Development, 1950-1965.”  Master’s thesis, 
Michigan State University, 1976.   
McCarran, M. Margaret Patricia.  “Fabianism and the Political Life of Britain, 1919-1931.”  PhD 
diss., Catholic University of America, 1954.   
Riley, Charlotte Lydia.  “Monstrous Predatory Vampires and Beneficent Fairy-Godmothers:  
British Post-War Colonial Development in Africa.”  PhD diss., University College 
London, 2013.   
295 
 
Shilaro, Priscilla M.  “A Failed Eldorado:  British Trusteeship, Luyia Land Rights and the 
Kakamega Gold Rush, 1930-52.”  PhD diss., West Virginia University, 2000.   
Taylor, M.  “Radicalism and Patriotism, 1848-1859.”  PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1985.   
 
Conference Papers 
Hodge, Joseph M.  “Missionaries, Colonial ‘Experts’ and the Invention of ‘Community 
Development’ in Africa Between the Wars.”  Paper presented at the Canadian 
Association of African Studies, Annual Conference, Bishop’s University, Sherbrooke, 
Quebec, June 1999.   
Mason, H.  Some comments on the African contribution.  Paper presented at the South-East 
Treaty Organization (S.E.A.T.O.) Seminar on Community Development, Bangkok, 
Thailand, July 19-23, 1965.   
Rhodes, Rita.  “British Cooperative History.”  Paper presented at the Swedish Project, 
Stockholm, Sweden, November 30, 2009.    
 
 
